

U.S. POWER POLITICS AND THE UNITED NATIONS:
VOTE BUYING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

by

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This article examines the phenomenon of vote buying in the United Nations (UN) and its consequences for the international community. Expanding on the robust link the literature draws between UN Security Council (UNSC) membership and increased aid receipts, this case study of Yugoslavia's dissolution explores whether the United States engaged in vote buying to reach vote alignment in the UNSC. Although there is no evidence of vote buying using bilateral aid, some indicators point to the use of multilateral aid in this context. The results suggest that initially passive recipients transform themselves into active recipients to adjust to the power imbalance within the Council and the influence attempts of dominant states. Less powerful members extract bribes from the dominant states by keeping their voting intentions uncertain and exploiting the dominant states' concern with the topic under consideration. Thereby, this study reveals a so far unstudied mechanism that deserves further analysis.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EC	European Community
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organization
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
NAM	Non-Alignment Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
P5	Permanent Members of the UNSC
U.S.	United States
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII	World War II

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In December 2017, United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump publicly announced he was cutting foreign aid funding to those states that support the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, which rejects his recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Additionally, his officials threatened to cut U.S. contributions to the United Nations (UN). The international community reacted with a public outcry (Gaouette, 2017). Discussions focused on these happenings - specifically, on how they will affect the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as well as on the U.S. modus operandi to threat sovereign states with the cut of foreign aid that is ostensibly aimed at helping people in need. The UNGA resolution was passed with 128 votes in favor, despite the threats (Gaouette, 2017), and it was followed by a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution appealing to all states not to move their embassies to Jerusalem. However, a U.S. veto apparently blocked this resolution (UN Doc. S/PV.8139, 2017, pp. 2, 3).

Previous research has examined vote buying in international organizations (IOs) and aid payments as an instrument of influence. However, this case raised attention and established a new public dimension. Although the U.S.' threatening strategy was unsuccessful in this event, probably because it was too obvious, too polarizing, and too openly communicated, it is certainly possible that it prospers under different circumstances. The existing literature almost unanimously agrees that vote buying in IOs takes place on a frequent basis and in various forms. This finding is mainly based on quantitative analyses, while a limited number of qualitative studies exist. Studies that investigate the effects of vote buying are also rare. Increasing the number of qualitative studies will foster a practical understanding of vote buying and can help

prohibiting the practice or improving its outcomes for all actors. Furthermore, gaining insight into the scope of distortion that vote buying causes will improve subsequent research.

Utilizing the dissolution of Yugoslavia as the framework, the paper at hand evaluates whether the U.S. engaged in vote buying in the UNSC to reach its preferred outcome in the presented case. The analysis centers on bilateral aid as an instrument for aligning votes. Thereby, the implications of the findings for the involved countries, the international community, and the UN are examined. Unlike previous research, no clear evidence of vote buying using bilateral aid payments is found. However, some indicators point to vote buying using multilateral aid. Furthermore, thrilling insights about the power imbalance within the UNSC and its effects on the international community are revealed. Additionally, the process tracing approach addresses the prominent problem of missing causal evidence in the vote-buying literature and illustrates that seemingly obvious evidence of vote buying often has an alternative plausible explanation. The limits of the analysis stem from the topic itself and the scope of the paper. The detailed evaluation of the non-permanent members centers on the two most interesting ones while the other three are briefly analyzed. The rotating system of the UNSC excludes the remaining five as these only served one period of the two of interest.

The article proceeds by offering an overview of the theory and rationales behind vote buying. In the second part of Chapter 2, the existing literature dealing with vote buying through aid payments in the UN is reviewed to illustrate the scope of the project. Turning to the instrumental case study, Chapter 3 establishes the framework by explaining the situation that prevailed in Yugoslavia. Further, the U.S. interest in the case is discussed to determine whether it is plausible to argue that the U.S. has possibly engaged in vote buying. The remainder of the

chapter provides a detailed analysis of the non-permanent members' votes, their motivations behind the votes, and their aid accounts. Naturally, this is linked to the insights of the existing literature. Chapter 4 finalizes the analysis with a general conclusion and further research proposals.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 Theory, Rationales, and Legality

International vote buying is the exchange of a material benefit for a vote in an IO. Typically, a general precondition for such a trade is the existence of at least two states that are both in possession of something of interest to the other state. One of those must value a benefit more than its own vote, while the other must value this vote more than its own material possession (Dreher & Vreeland, 2011, p. 2). Both the promise of money as an inducement and the threat of cutting a monetary flow (“carrot and stick”) can be used to convince a country to vote in a certain way. Furthermore, countries can participate in logrolling, which means that they are exchanging votes for votes. This can take place within an IO or across IOs and is more likely among countries with a comparable level of power and influence (Eldar, 2008, pp. 5, 6). Consequently, there are different forms of vote buying in different IOs.

The UNSC is the most important and probably most powerful organ of any IO as it has the authority to approve the use of force and to issue resolutions that are legally binding for all UN members. Its organizational structure represents the political situation shortly after World War II (WWII). The victorious powers - China, France, Russia¹, the United Kingdom (UK), and the U.S. - are permanent members (P5) with veto power. The other ten members are elected by the UNGA, serve two-year terms and are not eligible for direct reelection. Voting in

¹ Following the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), its permanent seat in the UNSC was transferred to Russia in December 1991. In the remainder of the paper both terms “USSR” and “Russia” are used depending on whether an event took place before or after this date.

the UNSC takes place according to the “one country one vote” principle. However, for a resolution to be adopted a supermajority of nine affirmative votes, including the concurring votes of the P5, is necessary. Therefore, each of the P5 can potentially block a UNSC resolution by using its veto. The threshold for non-permanent members to block a resolution is higher and requires the concurring no-votes of at least six members. Accordingly, the non-permanent members, which are mostly smaller and weaker states than the P5, do not only suffer disadvantages due to their smaller economic and political power but also structural weaknesses imposed by the voting system (Thorhallsson, 2017, p. 35).

The P5’s interest in vote trading originates in the UN’s functions themselves. On the one hand, it fulfills an information transmission function. Therefore, powerful countries step back from their outside option and channel their policies through the UN when the expected benefits of doing so exceed the anticipated costs. Thereby, they send signals about their intentions and the consequences of the policies to foreign countries and their public. If a policy is approved by the UNSC, this will increase international support and reduce international costs. Nonetheless, it also results in disadvantages, such as constraints on actions, and costs related to possible delays, negotiations, and scrutiny (Thompson, 2006, pp. 9–11). On the other hand, the UN fulfills a legitimization function. The clear advantages of undertaking a multilateral action coordinated by the UN are the perceived legitimacy to act in accordance with the international community’s will, the support of other countries, and the signal to its domestic public about the necessity and importance of the action at stake. Disadvantages are again the evolving costs and the risk of not getting approval and, thus, having one’s position effectively labeled as illegitimate (Claude, 1966, pp. 372–374). For both functions to work properly, the highest possible support for a

resolution is desirable; for this purpose, unanimity is always the preferred outcome. Consequently, vote buying gains relevance as a tool to reach the desired vote alignment.

Although vote trading has a negative connotation which probably derives from the general knowledge that it is an illegal activity on the domestic level, it is legal and widely practiced on an international level. There is no mention of vote buying in the UN Charter or in the procedural rules. Moreover, the UN Declaration on Principles of International Law does not explicitly refer to vote trading; even if it did, it would not have a binding effect on the UN members (Lockwood, 2013, p. 111). The fact that the legal documents pertaining to international vote buying are rare implies that a general acceptance of the practice exists. However, some studies have discussed whether international vote buying should be prohibited. On the one hand, it has been argued that it constitutes a form of corruption that undermines the international democracy and therefore should be prohibited (Gillespie, 2004, as cited in Lockwood, 2013, p. 99). On the other hand, Eldar (2008) argued that countries' preferences are better represented through vote buying and, thus, the practice can be welfare increasing. Due to the possibility to buy votes when feeling strongly about the outcome, and, in turn, to sell the vote when one does not care about the topic under consideration, it is accounted for the voters' intensity of preferences which makes voting more efficient (pp. 7, 8, 20, 21). He concluded that banning vote buying would be unjustified (p. 4). Apart from the discussion about legality, vote buying can have detrimental effects on an IOs' credibility and effectiveness when it becomes a too obvious and rejected practice among its members. This is particularly the case in the context of the UNSC, whose ability to carry out its legitimization function builds on its members' voluntary participation and adherence to its decisions (Hurd, 2002, pp. 35, 38). Naturally, vote buying can

erode the UNSC members' trust in the organization and lead to reduced engagement and compliance. Thereby, it endangers the organization's legitimacy and significance. By contrast, the information transmission function is unlikely to suffer adverse effects from vote buying as it is explicitly accounted for in its theory; "side payments for votes" are an element of the "organization costs" a country incurs when seeking UNSC approval (Thompson, 2009, p. 31).

Vote buying is clearly not the only way a (powerful) country can influence the outcome of multilateral negotiations in IOs. Agenda setting, threats, and unofficial negotiations are further tools. However, agenda setting is less likely an issue in the context of the UNSC as all UN members and even non-UN members can bring in topics for discussion. Much more relevant are the unofficial negotiations. Typically, these take place prior to the official meetings and only include powerful countries that already decide on the further proceedings in an issue and the wordings of resolutions. Thereby, such meetings further increase the power imbalance within the UNSC (Hurd, 2002, pp. 39, 42, 43). In line with this, the possibility to use threats to influence other countries' decisions is not exclusively reserved to powerful countries but the credibility of such threats and thus their effectivity increases when articulated by a more powerful country. These tools are not subject to further analysis in the paper at hand.

2.2 Literature and Findings

Literature that addresses international vote buying in the UN has become more prominent. The analytic approaches range from mostly empirical analyses to a few game theoretical models, and finally, to some descriptive studies. However, most of those deal with vote buying in the UNGA and, to a lesser extent, analyze the case in the context of the UNSC. This is because of the limitation in UNSC data due to the rotating membership. Typically, voting

data for non-permanent members are only available when they are elected and even then, for only two consecutive years. Additionally, most UNSC resolutions are decided unanimously due to (double) hidden vetoes and “informal sessions”, which refer to consultations between the members before the actual vote takes place (Hurd, 2002, p. 43). Conversely, UNGA voting data are available and well documented for all 193 UN members on a broad variety of topics. Besides, for analyzing the U.S., complicated indicators to identify important resolutions are obsolete, as this is done by the U.S. State Department itself. According to U.S. law, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) must take the voting records on these important resolutions into account when deciding on the allocation of foreign aid (Carter & Stone, 2015, p. 1). Hence, vote buying can be portrayed as an official U.S. policy in the UNGA.

Kuziemko and Werker’s (2006) study, which examined the effect of UNSC membership on a country’s foreign aid receipt, is one of the most cited statistical analyses. Their findings demonstrated that U.S. foreign aid increases by about 59 percent on average, while the aid received from UN institutions increases by about 8 percent on average when a country is elected. These effects are particularly strong during “key diplomatic years” (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006, p. 907), which were defined as years in which more than 455 New York Times articles containing the words “United Nations” or “Security Council” were published. This proxy raises further questions, not only about the classification itself but also about the suitability of media as the sole indicator. Furthermore, Kuziemko and Werker’s (2006) results lack a causal explanation for the increase in foreign aid. The authors claimed that their findings can be traced back to vote buying and bribery (p. 907) but overlooked analyzing the essential data for this claim: i.e. the actual voting behavior of the non-permanent members. A more comprehensive analysis from

Vreeland and Dreher (2014) not only confirmed Kuziemko and Werker's (2006) findings but also showed that UNSC membership has a positive effect on bilateral aid from Japan and Germany. This is a remarkable finding, as Germany and Japan do not belong to the P5. In contrast, UNSC membership does not seem to influence the bilateral aid issued by two of the P5, France and the UK (p. 184).

Alexander and Rooney's (2018) study, mainly motivated by the two sources cited above, tackled the mentioned critique of missing causal evidence for the vote-buying claim in the existing literature. Their approach differed significantly from other studies in that they derived predictions of what optimal vote-buying behavior using aid payments would look like and compared these predictions to the U.S.' actual aid allocation. The authors found sufficient concordance to interpret their findings as causal support for the vote-buying hypothesis. Furthermore, they found that the U.S. is willing to use economic foreign aid but not military foreign aid to bribe UNSC members to reach unanimity when voting (pp. 1, 2, 19, 20).

Bashir and Lim (2013) took a different approach and evaluated the reasons behind the finding that non-permanent UNSC members perform worse in terms of economic and democratic indicators than comparable countries not serving on the UNSC (pp. 510, 511). This finding is a result of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's study and, as has been argued, it is caused by the increased aid payments the non-permanent members receive through vote buying (2010, as cited in Bashir & Lim, 2013, pp. 509, 510). Bashir and Lim (2013) expressed a lack of support for this claim and instead stated that the negative influence derives from the increase in state power due to the UNSC membership and the accompanying reduced fear of international sanctions when implementing detrimental policies. An alternative explanation is that the selection process to

become a non-permanent member is biased and thus causes the negative findings (pp. 519, 520). It is precisely this view that is reflected in various studies dealing with vote buying in the UNGA. For example, Eldar (2008) described two cases where the U.S. engaged in vote buying to prevent Sudan and Venezuela from becoming non-permanent UNSC members (pp. 23, 24). Furthermore, based on the evidence he presented, vote buying in the UN takes place in the context of the elections of judges to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (p. 24).

Due to its unique scope and availability, UNGA voting data are the preferred source to measure state preferences (Carter & Stone, 2015, p. 30). In this context, the findings related to vote buying are highly problematic, as estimates based on this data will most likely be biased. According to Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017), despite vote buying, UNGA data still contain valuable information about states' preferences. However, researchers must be careful when interpreting their results based on such measures because they do not refer to an assessment of "common interests" (pp. 448, 449).

Extending the literature in another direction, Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele (2008) found strong evidence that the effectiveness of vote buying depends on the type of aid offered. Untied aid, such as general budget support and grants, proves most effective in this regard (p. 157). In contrast, tied aid, such as U.S. food aid (OXFAM, 2009), is preferred when the donor's motivation behind the aid is commercial instead of political. Dreher et al. (2008) stated that the welfare effects of vote buying remain unclear and dependent on whether politically motivated aid serves as a substitute for humanistic motivated aid or is given as an addition (p. 157).

Moreover, Carter and Stone (2015) whose study involved a game theoretical analysis, discovered supportive evidence for the hypothesis that the U.S. preferably targets democracies

with its vote-buying strategy. According to the authors, this is the case as democracies are more vulnerable to vote buying and the U.S. strategy is more credible when directed towards these countries. Conversely, non-democracies are less frequently targeted as their stability often crucially depends on aid payments (Carter & Stone, 2015, pp. 3, 30). Therefore, cutting aid can result in the loss of a strategically important partner in a critical region (p. 3). This coincides with Alesina and Dollar's (2000) perspective that political motivations are a major factor in determining aid allocations and that more democratic countries earn increased aid payments (pp. 55, 56).

Additionally, numerous studies have examined whether multilateral aid is used in the vote buying context. Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland, for instance, found that UNSC membership leads to increased participation in International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and World Bank projects. Furthermore, UNSC members seem to be rewarded with comparably low conditionality attached to their IMF loans (2009a, 2009b, as cited in Vreeland & Dreher, 2014, pp. 184, 185).

Turning to the qualitative analyses the scope is much more limited. There are only two examples that are repeatedly analyzed. One is the deployment of military force in the First Gulf War. Arguably, the U.S. used bilateral as well as multilateral aid to bribe other UNSC members to obtain approval for the intervention in Iraq. Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ethiopia received increased aid payments (Eldar, 2008, p. 17), Zimbabwe received eased conditions regarding its IMF conditionality (Vreeland & Dreher, 2014, pp. 65, 66), and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) was compensated with military equipment and debt relief as a result of its refusal to conduct a UNSC emergency meeting addressing the events in Iraq (pp. 69, 70). Moreover, the U.S. did not only lift its trade sanctions on China but also supported its World

Bank loan inquiry (Eldar, 2008, p. 17). In terms of the second example, for the approval of the UNSC resolution mandating the 1994 ousting of the military regime in Haiti, the U.S. engaged in vote buying and logrolling. It promised Russia support for the UN peacekeeping mission in Georgia (von Einsiedel & Malone, 2004, pp. 467, 472, 473) and enabled the authorization of China's new World Bank loans by abstaining from the respective votes (Eldar, 2008, p. 18).

Altogether, the literature almost unanimously agrees that vote buying takes place in the UNGA as well as the UNSC. While the U.S. seems to be the main actor in this field, also other countries make use of vote buying using bilateral and/ or multilateral aid payments to reach their aims. The following case study contributes to the limited literature involving qualitative research on U.S. vote buying using bilateral aid in the UNSC, its implications for the UN's legitimization function, and the general consequences for the international community. Process tracing is employed to systematically analyze relevant evidence in the light of the research question and the hypotheses about the underlying events. Thereby, it tackles the common problem of missing causal evidence in the statistical vote-buying literature. This is done by firstly describing the situation and the potential phenomenon and secondly, evaluating the causal sequence (Collier, 2011, p. 823).

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY

3.1 Intention and Definition

The situation previous to and the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (following Yugoslavia) serves as the study's framework. The analysis focuses on UNSC resolutions that were important for the U.S. Thereby, "important" resolutions are those that aim at deploying forces; this means that if such a resolution is passed, the U.S. and other UN members will send their personnel to the region of conflict. This action results in a certain cost in the form of monetary expenditures and, naturally, puts people at risk.²

As explained in the theory section, unanimity is always the preferred outcome in UNSC voting. Regardless of whether the U.S. government wants to deploy personnel, the UN's information transmission and legitimization function play a role in the support it will earn and in the costs that will evolve. Given the framework, the U.S.' interference in an internal situation of a post-communist country shortly after the Cold War is likely to result in resistance from Russia. Therefore, channeling its policies through the UN sends strategic information and, thus, can reduce opposition. With an ongoing involvement in the First Gulf War, the U.S.' domestic public are potentially unsupportive of sending more personnel to critical regions. Hence, obtaining UN approval signals the necessity and importance of the actions at stake, and can secure support.

² To clarify, in the case of the initial resolution regarding a UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia, this entailed the deployment of almost 13,000 troops plus additional civilian personnel and police forces (Fetherston, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 1994, p. 182). In 1995, the same Force reached a strength of more than 38,000 personnel (UN DPI, 1996).

The following presentation of the case centers on the most important information necessary to understand the framework. The U.S. voted in favor of all resolutions issued about Yugoslavia. However, its preferences regarding the individual resolutions are not evaluated in detail, as this is not necessary to effectively discuss the research question. Rather, the emphasis is on determining whether vote alignment with the U.S. took place and, if so, whether it can be traced back to active vote buying.

In the following section, the framework of the case is established and its importance for the U.S. addressed. Thereafter, the most vulnerable members of the UNSC are determined and their voting decisions are thoroughly analyzed. The arguments are then summarized and their implications for the UN's functions and the general consequences for the international community are evaluated.

3.2 The Framework

3.2.1 Yugoslavia in Context: The Years 1991 and 1992, and What Happened Afterwards

Yugoslavia, a country that emerged from WWII, unified six republics and two autonomous regions with an ethnically diverse population consisting of Bosnians, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes. Its president, Josip Broz Tito, led the country under the slogan “brotherhood and unity” with a successful and revolutionist approach (Percy, 1995a). Despite having a communist regime, he broke with the Soviet Union (USSR) and opened Yugoslavia for international trade and economic liberalization. Thereby, it attracted attention from Western countries – notably, the U.S. During the Cold War, its geographical position and non-alignment with the power blocs constituted a buffer of deterrence between the USSR and the

West. The U.S. actively supported Yugoslavia's strategic position by providing military aid and easing economic assistance from the IMF and the World Bank (Woodward, 1995, pp. 1, 25). This balancing act between both blocs was a difficult encounter but was managed rather successfully, except for the accumulation of foreign debt (pp. 48, 49).

When Tito died in 1980, the country's leadership was restructured into a collective presidency where each president of the regions and territories became one seat and vote. The different parts of Yugoslavia all had their own constitution and government but were subordinated to the collective presidency (Weller, 1992, p. 569). With increasing foreign debt and new IMF loans that were tied to demands for economic restructuring, disagreement within the country surfaced regarding whether Yugoslavia should move politically further to the West or maintain its socialist course. Wealthier republics refused to share their resources with less wealthy ones, and the first ethnically motivated riots within and between regions broke out. In 1989, Slobodan Milošević, a politician of the Serbian Communist Party, organized a putsch and made himself the sole leader of Serbia (D'Souza, 1994, p. 3029). Under his leadership, a new and radical form of nationalism evolved that sought to establish a Serbian-ruled Yugoslavia. This nationalistic encounter was only supported by regions with a Serb majority, and was met with the resistance of other regions. Yet those regions' Serb minorities supported it (Percy, 1995a; 1995b). Milošević's willingness to use force to reach his ambitious aim became obvious for the first time in Kosovo in 1989, where he employed the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) to suppress the Albanian majority (Glaurdić, 2011, p. 1). Croatia and Slovenia were the first regions to announce their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, after holding free elections and a referendum on autonomy in 1990. Free elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia

brought non-communists to power; only in Serbia did Milošević and his communist party maintain domination. Serbia's response to the declaration of independence of Slovenia was an attack by the JNA (Meier, 1999, pp. xiii, xiv), justified by accusing Slovenia's leader of treason against Yugoslavia. The first wars broke out. Although Milošević reacted to international pressure by withdrawing the JNA, Serbian paramilitary groups and parts of the Serb population within the different regions continued fighting (Percy, 1995b). They could do so, inter alia, because the JNA left behind its weapons with the intention to bring the fights to an unofficial level (Fetherston, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 1994, p. 182). The war spread to Croatia and then to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it reached its zenith. The 1995 Srebrenica genocide is known as the gravest ethnic cleansing and mass murder in Europe after WWII; Bosnian Serbs killed more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslims within only five days and deported more than 23,000 women and children, many of whom were tortured and raped (Bookmiller, 2008, p. 81; Madi, 2016).

Until 2001, the conflicts in Yugoslavia continued and resulted in the split of the country into the autonomous states of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which was represented by Serbia and Montenegro. According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, about 140,000 people were killed and more than four million were displaced during the Yugoslavian wars (ICTJ, 2009). In 2006, Montenegro seceded peacefully from the FRY, and Kosovo announced its independence from Serbia in 2008 (U.S. Department of State, 2014).

Apparently, the tragedy in Yugoslavia was not only due to the economic downturn and Tito's death. Additional factors played, such as the cultural and religious

diversities, its history of animosities within the population, and the collapse of communism (U.S. Department of State, 2014).

3.2.2 Western Involvement and U.S. Interests

International involvement in the conflicts on Yugoslavian territory included Europe as well as the UN and later the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the U.S. was involved in the actions of all three actors. The European Community (EC) had already involved itself shortly after Slovenia and Croatia's declaration of independence and the first of the JNA attacks in July 1991. A mediation mission was sent to broker a political settlement. Soon afterwards, EC countries invoked the conflict-prevention mechanism of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)³. However, neither the EC nor the CSCE had the authority to establish binding decisions; they could only appeal to the parties to stop all hostilities (Weller, 1992, pp. 570, 571). Europe's interest was clearly based on maintaining peace, as conflicts could eventually spread to other European countries. Moreover, such conflicts would impede Europe's economic and political ties to Yugoslavia. Following the intensified fighting and repeated violation of negotiated ceasefires, European countries, namely France and Germany with the support of the UK and Belgium, sought help from the UN (Lucarelli, 2000, p. 21). Even Yugoslavia joined in the call for UN involvement. Thereafter, the UN became active and, among other steps, established a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (Weller, 1992, pp. 577, 585).

³ Now known as Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe. The CSCE is the meeting of the European countries, Canada, and the U.S, proposed by the USSR that established the Helsinki Accords to enhance security and cooperation. With the end of the Cold War, the organization got restructured and renamed (CSCE, 2016).

NATO's initial act in the conflict involved the launching of an air strike in reaction to an attack on UNPROFOR personnel in 1994. This action was requested by the UN and justified by the UNSC resolutions 836 and 844 (Gazzini, 2001, p. 400). In 1995, Operation Deliberate Force was established in response to the Srebrenica genocide, but Russia and China criticized its lack of explicit UNSC approval (pp. 403, 404). Its later actions were taken with reference to the support of the international community but in fact "[...] decided upon and executed by a limited group of states [...]", inter alia the U.S., and caused serious conflicts within the UNSC (Gazzini, 2001, p. 407).

Despite public claims that Yugoslavia remained "a European problem" (Lucarelli, 2000, p. 19), the U.S. was already involved before the JNA attacked Slovenia. In 1990, U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann insinuated that the U.S. would not accept a Serbian attack on Croatia, which the JNA interpreted as the threat of intervention (Percy, 1995b). President Clinton himself later admitted in one of his books that the U.S. broke the arms embargo put in place by UNSC resolution 713, which the U.S. had initially supported. Additionally, the U.S. "[...] authorized a private company to use retired U.S. military personnel to improve and train the Croatian army" (Clinton, 2005, p. 265). It was also in 1990 that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that the "Yugoslav experiment has failed" and predicted that a civil war and ethnic violence would possibly erupt (Lucarelli, 2000, p. 16). Further, the CIA anticipated Yugoslavia's dissolution (U.S. Department of State, 2014). Besides, in response to Serbia's aggressive behavior, important Republican members of Congress called for a political change that involved being proactive about the conflict rather than watching it unfold. Among other demands, they requested a cut in foreign aid and discontinuation of support for IMF and World

Bank loans for Yugoslavia if human rights violations were observed. Subsequently, the Senate passed a resolution calling on Milošević to end repressive ethnic policies and JNA attacks. It also required the U.S. President to act (Glaurdić, 2011, pp. 156, 157). Even before the UN peacekeeping mission was launched in 1992, U.S. peacekeeping and monitoring forces were sent to the Serbian-Macedonian border “to monitor violence” (U.S. Department of State, 2014).

One essential precondition to test whether the U.S. engaged in vote buying in the presented case is that it had a sufficiently strong interest in a certain outcome of the votes. This is ensured by the U.S.’ longstanding engagement in Yugoslavia since its foundation. While the U.S. accomplished the break in the USSR-Yugoslav relations during the Cold War, it was unsuccessful in its intentions to transform Yugoslavia into a Western-oriented democracy (Melady, 2008). However, the onset of the conflicts within Yugoslavia and the democratic turns in all regions except Serbia finally made this aim tangible. With creating a democracy in and establishing political ties to Yugoslavia, this country would not only serve as a model for its immediate neighbor countries and foster the democratization in Eastern Europe, it would also improve the Euro-Atlantic relationship (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Croatia played a major role in the U.S.’ undertaking to extend its influence and leadership in Europe (Doder, 1993). On the one hand, this is due to Croatia’s strategically advantageous location at the coastal line of Europe. On the other hand, this is because the U.S. identified the Croatian-Serb relations as the “key issue in the Balkans”. The young and fragile democracy was seriously endangered by the threat Serbia’s communist encounter posed to Croatia (U.S. Embassy in Croatia, 1992). Consequently, an intervention aimed at securing Croatia’s survival and its democratic and market-oriented development was significant for the U.S. (U.S. Department of State, 2018). In

its self-perception, it was clear to the U.S. that it will “[...] inevitably play a leading role in the transformation of the republic.” This was supported by the Croatian population which preferred the U.S. rather than the EC to take over the leadership in the fight against Serbia and, thus, increased the U.S.’ influence in Croatia (U.S. Embassy in Croatia, 1992). The inseparable conflicts in the different regions of Yugoslavia made the actions of the U.S. necessary in the further pursuance of extending its influence in Europe. Regarding the U.S.’ involvement in the CSCE, Woodward (1995) noted that the U.S. always took a position when it had the impression that it was losing leadership in Europe (p. 396).

Furthermore, and irrespective of what the U.S. actions finally did to its reputation, Yugoslavia’s public outcry for help from the international community could have severely harmed the U.S.’ reputation if it had not acted. Especially when Croatia’s President Tudjman appealed to U.S. President Bush “[...] to use [...] [his] personal influence and [the U.S.’] international reputation [...] to activate the international community to undertake [...] measures [...] in order to bring to a permanent end the aggression and death of innocent people” (Tudjman, 1992), the U.S. was required to move. His letter was forwarded to the UN and consequently increased the international pressure on the U.S. Moreover, Madeleine Albright, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, stressed that doing nothing would “undermine U.S. credibility in the world” and proposed more aggressive military actions together with NATO and the UN (Lynch, 2015). In its statement regarding resolution 713, the first-ever issued UNSC resolution concerned with the situation in Yugoslavia, the U.S. described the happenings there as an “open warfare”, complained about the casualties, and identified Serbia as the key actor in the conflict. Moreover, it referred to Serbia’s intentions to create a “greater Serbia”, which would be based on

repression and the use of force. In regard to the humanitarian situation in Yugoslavia and the threat the conflict posed to Europe, the U.S. viewed Yugoslavia as the “prime concern” of the UNSC since the situation directly threatened “international peace and security” (UN Doc. S/PV.3009, 1991, pp. 58, 59). Altogether, this constitutes a stable base to justify that the U.S. interest was strong enough to possibly engage in vote buying.

3.3 Non-Permanent Members and their Votes

In the following section, the voting behavior of the non-permanent UNSC members and their U.S. foreign aid receipts is analyzed with respect to the research question. The analysis is restricted to the resolutions that were issued in 1991 and 1992. The beginning of the time frame constitutes the issuing of the first-ever UNSC resolution regarding the conflicts in Yugoslavia. The end is oriented toward the UNSC’s structure of rotating membership that is limited to two years per turn. This is because the analysis requires the evaluation of votes and aid payments of a consistent set of actors. Out of ten non-permanent members, five are left for analysis if only those who served both terms on the UNSC are considered. These are Austria, Belgium, Ecuador, India, and Zimbabwe. The focus is on those that were the most vulnerable to fluctuating aid payments and those most likely to oppose international involvement in Yugoslavia. According to their political relations, India and Zimbabwe had the closest ties to Yugoslavia and therefore are the most interesting for the analysis. Furthermore, Austria and Belgium already have been high-income countries and were thus less vulnerable to the influence of aid payments. Despite its status as a lower middle-income country (The World Bank, 1991, pp. 65, 66), Ecuador is not a good case to test vote buying because it was a regular recipient of highly volatile bilateral U.S. aid in the entire period of USAID data availability, even though it only served on the UNSC in

1950/51, 1960/61, and 1991/92. Thereby, these three periods are not standing out in the evaluation of the aid development over time and, hence, any potential change in aid inflows would not constitute a strong evidence (Vreeland & Dreher, 2014, p. 72; USAID, 2018a). The evaluation of the voting record of all resolutions regarding Yugoslavia in the time of interest (see Appendix) supports this, as only China, India, and Zimbabwe have a history of not always voting in line with the U.S. Accordingly, the analysis concentrates on India and Zimbabwe but also evaluates the motivations of Austria, Belgium, and Ecuador.

3.3.1 India

India, as co-founder of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) and a longstanding ally of Yugoslavia, should have every reason not to support the UN in interfering in Yugoslavia's internal activities. However, the UNSC voting record shows that India voted in favor of nine out of eleven important resolutions. At the same time, an increase in U.S. economic aid, and to a lesser extent, an increase in U.S. military aid, are observable (Figure 1, p. 23).

The resulting hypothesis H_0^I is that the U.S. bought India's vote in the UNSC with increased bilateral foreign aid payments. The alternative hypothesis H_1^I is that India voted in accordance with its own, true preferences without being bribed by the U.S.

The hypothesis H_0^I finds support in the superficial analysis of the historical relationship between India and Yugoslavia. Together with Egypt, they were founding members of the NAM in 1961. Created during the Cold War, the movement's objectives were characterized by the bipolar world order and emphasized the principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and self-determination (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012), which naturally oppose the interference of any actor in the internal conflicts of another country. As a result, and contrary to the voting

records, one would expect India to vote against all UNSC resolutions allowing such measures, or at least to demonstrate its disapproval by abstaining. This unexpected voting pattern could be an indicator of vote buying. Furthermore, the characteristic increase in U.S. economic as well as military aid during the years 1991 and 1992 as well as the years 1992 and 1993, respectively, strengthen the plausibility of the vote-buying claim - especially as both aid accounts drop after 1992 and 1993 (Figure 1). This brings to mind Kuziemko and Werker's (2006) finding of a positive relationship between UNSC service and aid receipts. Moreover, India's GDP development shows a stable upward trend with a reduced annual growth rate in 1991, where it reached 1.057 percent. However, the GDP grew by 5.482 percent and 4.751 percent in 1992 and 1993, respectively (USAID, 2018a; Figure 2; Figure 3, p. 25). On this basis, the increase in aid payments cannot easily be derived from India's economic situation.




Figure 1: Economic and Military Aid, India 1986–1997⁴

⁴ In the period displayed, India only served once on the UNSC: 1991-1992.

In contrast, analyzing NAM's political situation in detail provides evidence for the refusal of the hypothesis H_0^I . Until the early 1990s, NAM's self-conception was based on the "Ten Principles of Bandung". These principles reinforce the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the respect of fundamental human rights, the right of self-defense contingent on its conformity with the UN Charter, and equality among all races and nations (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012). Furthermore, NAM underwent a difficult time following the end of the Cold War, when the bipolar world order that served as its stability-providing framework and cohesion between its members collapsed. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was just one example of the difficulties the movement faced regarding its members. The warring clans within Somalia and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are others. However, the decay of the political relationship between Yugoslavia and NAM, and consequently its members, such as India, had already begun in 1989. During the 9th NAM Summit in Belgrade, Yugoslavia encountered resistance, when the other members did not share its views and only partly adopted its proposed changes to the movement (Syatauw, 1993, p. 130). Its situation in the movement rapidly worsened when the Muslim member countries rejected Yugoslavia because of its "aggressive and dehumanizing treatment of the ethnic minorities" within its borders (p. 135); even its expulsion from the conference was demanded. Despite receiving support from some African countries, NAM dissociated itself from Yugoslavia with the reasoning that all members should comply with the principles of the movement and resolve their conflicts peacefully; these norms should be imperative, especially for the movements' founding members. Yugoslavia was not excluded, but the movement emphasized that violence and ethnic cleansing are not acceptable within its ranks (Syatauw, 1993, pp. 136, 137).




Figure 2: GDP India, Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars




Figure 3: GDP Growth, India and Zimbabwe

Against this backdrop, the resolutions on which India voted in favor and those it abstained from must be analyzed in detail. Out of eleven resolutions identified as important for the U.S., India voted in favor of nine. Therefore, India agreed, *inter alia*, to the establishment of UNPROFOR and its deployment, as well as to a peacekeeping plan and enlargements of the mandate of UNPROFOR. The two resolutions from which India abstained, resolutions 770 and 776, were among other actions aimed at further enlarging UNPROFOR's mandate in reaction to the difficulties in providing humanitarian aid to the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Paragraph 2 of resolution 770, to which paragraph 2 of resolution 776 refers, called for all states and their regional organizations to take "[...] all measures necessary to facilitate [...] the delivery [...] of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (UN Doc. S/RES/770, 1992). Although recognizing Bosnia and Herzegovina as a legitimate member state of the UN and acknowledging its situation as devastating as it justifies the use of force to support the peacekeepers and humanitarian organizations in the field, India argued that the use of force can only be allowed when all actions taken are not only under UN command but also "[...] in strict conformity with the provisions of the [UN] Charter" (UN Doc. S/PV.3106, 1992, p. 12). The wording of the resolutions, however, would allow states and its regional organizations to act based on their own discretion and without accountability to the UN. According to India, this could endanger UNPROFOR personnel, which was why it decided not to support these resolutions (pp. 12, 13).

India voted in favor of all remaining 18 resolutions regarding Yugoslavia that are not categorized as important for the U.S., with one exception: resolution 777, which considered that "the state formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist"

and demanded that Serbia and Montenegro, the “new” FRY, should not be allowed to participate in UNGA meetings until it renews its status by newly applying to the UN (UN Doc. S/RES/777, 1992). India justified its abstention with the concern that recommending the exclusion of the FRY from the UN would have negative effects on its cooperation with UNPROFOR’s mission and thereby risk its success (UN Doc. S/PV.3116, 1992, pp. 6, 7). The assessment of the possible adverse consequences of resolution 777 was built on the fact that most UNPROFOR tasks were issued under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Voluntary cooperation between all parties is essential for such resolutions, as these only can call for support but cannot require compliance⁵ (UN DPI, 1996).

A closer analysis of the aid inflows yields that the largest part was issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture as “Public Law 480 Title II Grants” (USAID, 2018b). This kind of aid is issued in reaction to emergencies and provides food assistance or is part of a long-term plan aiming at securing food supply (Bacon, 2008). Although with lower amounts, this also constituted the largest inflow of aid in the years before and after 1991 and 1992 (USAID, 2018b). Such multi-year accounts imply that India was part of a non-emergency, development program and its increased aid can possibly be traced back to a change in the program, probably within the scope of the large-scale economic policy reform in 1991. The analysis of India’s GDP development does not show the effect the collapse of the USSR and the war in Iraq had on India’s already high current account and fiscal deficit. Shortened exports and spiking oil prices

⁵ Charter VI resolutions demand the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes“, while Charter VII resolutions allow military measures to maintain international peace and security (UN Charter, art. 33, 38, 42).

combined with inner administrative mismanagement caused a currency crisis in 1991 (Cerra & Saxena, 2002, pp. 397, 402, 403; Nayar, 1998, pp. 338, 340, 352).

On balance, India's voting behavior can straightforwardly be explained with the political developments in the years preceding the vote and the prevailing situation during the years 1991 and 1992. Yugoslavia's violation of NAM's principles of peaceful coexistence in its internal conflict, notably its resort to ethnic cleansing, distorted its relationship with NAM and, correspondingly, India. Consequently, India supported all UN decisions aimed at peacefully resolving the conflict within Yugoslavia. In its statement in the UNSC meeting 3106, India emphasized that it would support the use of force in implementing the UNSC resolutions "without any hesitation" if all actions taken were in accordance with the UN Charter (UN Doc. S/PV.3106, 1992, pp. 13–15). However, in India's opinion, this was not assured by the wording of resolutions 770 and 776. Its motivation to abstain from resolution 777 relates to the discussion of resolutions 770 and 776 – India supports the use of force but subordinated to UN control. The changes in the aid inflows can be seen in the context of its structural reform program following the currency crisis. Moreover, the loans received are categorized as tied aid (USAID, 2018b), which has proven to be less effective in buying votes (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2008, p. 157).

Considering all arguments, hypothesis H_1^I , i.e. that India voted according to its own, true preferences without being bribed by the U.S., finds more support than hypothesis H_0^I . The latter hypothesis, stating that India was bribed by the U.S., can be rejected due to multiple reasons. Thereby, NAM's break with Yugoslavia, India's reasoning behind its voting decisions, and the type of bilateral U.S. aid received are the most prevalent ones.

3.3.2 Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe, also a member of NAM as well as an ally of Yugoslavia and a socialist country, should be expected to dislike the UN's decisions to intervene in the conflict and, hence, vote against the resolutions or at least abstain. Nevertheless, and equal to the case of India, the UNSC voting record indicates that Zimbabwe voted in favor of nine out of eleven important resolutions, while it abstained from two. At the same time, U.S. foreign economic aid more than tripled between 1990 and 1992. Thereafter, it sharply declined. Regarding the U.S. military aid Zimbabwe received, a sharp increase is observed from 1990 to 1991; in 1992, military aid reduces by about half of its amount, only to increase in 1993 to almost its 1991 level again. Thereafter, the military aid amount abruptly decreased (Figure 4).




Figure 4: Economic and Military Aid, Zimbabwe 1986–1997

Consequently, hypothesis H_0^Z is as follows: The U.S. bought Zimbabwe's vote with increased bilateral aid payments. The alternative hypothesis H_1^Z is that Zimbabwe voted in accordance with its own, true preferences without being bribed.

Hypothesis H_0^Z finds support in the longstanding alliance of both countries; it was in 1980 when Zimbabwe's President R. G. Mugabe called Yugoslavia, China, and Romania its "truest friends" (Alao, 2012, p. 191). Zimbabwe's maintaining of these relations with members of the Eastern Bloc exemplifies its political orientation. Led by Mugabe, the country followed a strict Marxist-Leninist ideology. The characteristic increase in U.S. economic aid supports Kuziemko and Werker's (2006) argument that aid payments to non-permanent members increase during their service on the UNSC. Furthermore, Zimbabwe's 1991 abandonment of socialism, its subsequent turn to a market economy (Blair, 2002, p. 37), and the participation in World Bank and IMF loan programs with surprisingly low conditionality also seem to suggest vote buying (Vreeland & Dreher, 2014, pp. 64, 65).

By contrast, an analysis of Zimbabwe's economic performance in the respective years yields the finding that it suffered a severe drought that not only caused widespread malnutrition but also resulted in the shutdown of industries. Zimbabwe transitioned from an exporter of grain to an importer; cattle died or had to be slaughtered, as their maintenance was no longer affordable with imported stocks (Perlez, 1992). Consequently, Zimbabwe's GDP growth dropped from 5.532 percent in 1991 to - 9.016 percent in 1992 (Figure 3, p. 25; The World Bank, 2018b). Hence, its increased economic aid receipts are easily justifiable with the devastating situation the country suffered. In 1993, extraordinary yields in the harvests revived Zimbabwe's economy and led to a growth of agricultural production by almost 50 percent (IMF, 1996).

Thereby, Zimbabwe reached its pre-crisis GDP level which was followed by further growth. Accordingly, the observed decline in aid to pre-crisis levels, starting in 1993, fits the GDP development (Figure 3, p. 25; Figure 5). The argumentation that the increased aid receipts are not due to vote buying but caused by Zimbabwe’s economic situation finds support in the analysis of the aid account. In 1992, almost 60 percent of the received aid was issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in the form of tied aid, as direct emergency food assistance and enabling Zimbabwe to buy U.S. agricultural commodities and food at reduced prices (USAID, 2018b).




Figure 5: GDP Zimbabwe, Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars

Zimbabwe’s economic situation also explains the participation in the structural adjustment program of the IMF and the World Bank loans. Its abandonment of socialism, however, seems to be a means to an end to obtain international support instead of a true change

in ideology. This is because Western donors demanded political reforms as a precondition for new loans. Nevertheless, Mugabe himself stated that socialism would persist as Zimbabwe's "sworn ideology" (Meredith, 2002, p. 97). There is no obvious explanation for the pattern of military aid received. However, its increased inflow was issued by the Foreign Military Financing Program (USAID, 2018b), which enables countries to acquire military equipment and training from the U.S. Stated aims of the program are, *inter alia*, the improvement of the recipient's military relationship with the U.S. and improving its interoperability with international military forces (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). The U.S. most likely aimed at improving Zimbabwe's army's strength in the context of its involvement in the ongoing operations in Somalia, namely the UN Operation in Somalia I and II, and the U.S. led Unified Task Force (Baxter, 2013, p. 56; UN DPI, 1997). If this was not the reason, vote buying still seems implausible as the aid's characteristics disagree with the findings in the literature. The U.S. is unlikely to use military aid in the vote buying context, and tied aid proved to be less effective (Alexander & Rooney, 2018, p. 20; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2008, p. 157).

However, the above information does not explain the below-average conditionality attached to Zimbabwe's IMF loans, which was already associated with vote buying in an earlier analysis. Vreeland and Dreher (2014) linked it to the UNSC decisions regarding the First Gulf War and claimed that the U.S. used the IMF conditionality as leverage to gain Zimbabwe's support (p. 64). In addition to the doubts about the trustworthiness of the source (p. 66), there is evidence that Zimbabwe supported the UN's actions against Iraq which made vote buying in this context obsolete. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe's foreign minister, condemned the Iraqi actions in Kuwait and demanded an immediate withdrawal of troops at the very day of the

invasion. Zimbabwe's motivation behind the harsh refusal of the Iraqi actions was the adverse impact those actions had on the Arab efforts in easing the hardship in Palestine and, furthermore, Iraq's "[...] violation of the UN Charter, principles and objectives on non-alignment and all norms of international law" (Shamuyarira, 1990, as cited in Schwartz, 2001, p. 165). Zimbabwe was not only a supporter of strict actions against Iraq but also communicated this openly. For instance, Mugabe expressed his support for a possible military intervention during a public reception in Nigeria (p. 219) and Shamuyarira addressed the NAM, the Arab League, and other international forums with the demand to act in order to ensure "[...] that the situation doesn't deteriorate further" (Schwartz, 1997, pp. 218, 219). Possibly, economic reasons backed Zimbabwe's support for Kuwait since it supplied more than half of Zimbabwe's fuel needs at that time (Schwartz, 1997, p. 218). Consequently, Zimbabwe was willing to support the international community's actions. Therefore, it is not obvious why the below-average conditionality was applied to its loans. However, considering the contradictory statements Zimbabwe's officials made in the context of the Gulf War, such as criticizing the UN's plans as a violation of Iraq's sovereignty (Vreeland & Dreher, 2014, p. 64), it is likely that the below-average conditionality is a result of intended U.S. vote buying. Possibly, Zimbabwe took advantage of the importance of the votes for the U.S. to ease its own situation by keeping its voting intentions uncertain. In line with the finding that Zimbabwe's abandonment of socialism was also a means to extract benefits, this reveals a certain pattern of behavior.

Analyzing the UNSC voting record regarding Yugoslavia in detail shows that Zimbabwe abstained from the same two important resolutions as India: 770 and 776. Its reasoning was similar: While recognizing the prevailing conditions in Yugoslavia as enough to "warrant the

taking of all necessary measures”, it emphasized that any such action must be undertaken “[...] as a collective [...] [and] under the full control of and with full accountability to the United Nations [...]” (UN Doc. S/PV.3106, 1992, pp. 16, 17). Similar to India, Zimbabwe distrusted the powerful states in their possible actions and backed this fear with the argument that UNPROFOR personnel could be endangered. However, Zimbabwe went one step beyond and claimed that “all means necessary should be used” and that the respective security force should operate under the conditions it previously outlined while referring positively to the planning of the UN’s actions in Somalia (UN Doc. S/PV.3106, 1992, p. 18).

Regarding the resolutions not classified as important, Zimbabwe abstained from three out of 18; those were 757, 777, and 787. In its justification of its abstention from resolution 777, i.e. the question of UN membership of the FRY, Zimbabwe criticized the tendency in the UNSC to selectively apply or ignore the UN Charter and thus make small states more vulnerable to the power of the large states. Emphasizing that it also accepted Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as new members in the UN, Zimbabwe ostensibly had the impression that the FRY was deprived of its right to participate. Although an invitation for a new application was part of the resolution, Zimbabwe argued that the issuing countries of the resolution did not intend to admit this application on the same basis as they admitted Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (UN Doc. S/PV.3116, 1992, pp. 8–10). Concerning the sanctions the resolutions 757 and 787 imposed on Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe’s motivation behind its abstention was similar to China’s reasoning. Both argued that the sanctions would have a detrimental effect on the humanitarian situation within the region and would antagonize the parties to the UN actions and,

therefore, significantly inhibit the peace process (UN Doc. S/PV.3082, 1992, pp. 13, 14; UN Doc. S/PV.3137, 1992, p. 121).

On balance, there is no conclusive evidence for hypothesis H_0^Z that Zimbabwe was bribed with increased bilateral foreign aid payments. Its voting behavior in the UNSC fits its argumentation in the related UNSC meetings as well as in other forums and in the context of other conflicts. Furthermore, Zimbabwe's economic development can easily explain the increase and decrease in bilateral economic aid. However, some indicators point to vote buying using multilateral aid. Thereby, it is not clear whether this took place in the context of the UNSC decisions regarding Yugoslavia or the First Gulf War. However, this would fit the fact that a purely humanitarian reasoning for Zimbabwe's decisions, and thus motivation stemming from a moral surplus of reaching peace in Yugoslavia, is not authentic given the human rights violations that took place within Zimbabwe and during the ruling of Mugabe (Blair, 2002, pp. 31, 32).

3.3.3 Austria

In 1991, Yugoslavia and Austria shared both a border and a great part of their history. Experiencing the changes within Yugoslavia and the onset of the war, Austria was forced to rely on CSCE's emergency mechanism to intervene in the evolving crisis. An EC observer mission was established, and European economic aid to Yugoslavia was suspended. Austria's concern with the situation originated in its apprehension of a destabilization of the region and the extension of the conflict to other Eastern European states (Lucarelli, 2000, pp. 13, 19). Naturally, the flow of refugees and displaced persons who sought to escape from the war-torn areas first reached its direct neighbor countries, Austria, Hungary, and Italy (Barutciski, 1994, p. 32), which created an additional incentive to get involved and to push for a quick end of the conflict.

During its service on the UNSC, Austria officially addressed the demand for the establishment of UNPROFOR (Lucarelli, 2000, p. 23). Altogether, Austria seems to have unconditionally supported all UNSC resolutions regarding Yugoslavia; which is exactly what the voting record shows. Based on the meeting records, Austria pushed for the UN's increased engagement in Yugoslavia and called for the support of Bosnia and Herzegovina (UN Doc. S/PV.3106, 1992, pp. 22–24). Accordingly, it argued for a prompt exclusion of the FRY from the UN (UN Doc. S/PV.3116, 1992, p. 16). Furthermore, Austria emphasized its engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UN Doc. S/PV.3114, 1992, pp. 13, 14) and motivated further actions such as creating safe areas that were “[...] a decisive contribution to alleviating the problem of refugees and displaced persons [...]” (UN Doc. S/PV.3137, 1992, p. 124).

An analysis of the bilateral foreign aid payments Austria received during the period of interest yields some conspicuous observations. Between 1962 and 1991, Austria did not receive any U.S. economic aid, though this circumstance changed from 1991 to 1993 when it received, on average, an annual amount of 500,000 (constant 2016) U.S. dollars vaguely titled as “USAID Grants” (USAID, 2018b). Thereafter, and until 2008, it received no U.S. economic aid. In 2008, however, it received 6,969,590 (constant 2016) U.S. dollars, and the amount decreased to 3,267,812 (constant 2016) U.S. dollars in 2010. The aid then dropped abruptly (USAID, 2018a). Surprisingly, Austria's next term as a non-permanent UNSC member started in 2009. This could be a coincidence or a sign for vote buying; however, it is most likely related to the 2008 Fourth Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as the Department of Energy issued the economic aid payments for the purpose of “Defense and Nuclear Nonproliferation” (USAID, 2018b; IAEA, 2017). The payments in the years of interest seem suspicious but are rather

symbolic in their amount for both the U.S. and Austria. Additionally, following the argumentation above, Austria was fully supporting and even initiating the resolutions regarding Yugoslavia. Hence, there was no need for the U.S. to influence Austria's votes. Whether or not the 2008–2010 increased aid inflow was associated with vote buying remains subject to further analysis.

3.3.4 Belgium

Belgium's diplomatic relations to Serbia date back to 1886, though a break in the relations occurred from 1988 to 2002 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 2012b). The break in international relations is marked by the first signs of an evolving political crisis within Yugoslavia and the putsch that brought Milošević to power (Lucarelli, 2000, p. 15). As part of the EC involvement, Belgium was a member of the Troika that was sent to Yugoslavia to foster the involvement of the CSCE in the conflict (p. 19). Belgium also promoted the Franco-German proposal to directly involve the UN in conflict management (p. 21). Consequently, it had every incentive to support the UN's decisions and resolutions over the course of its engagement. Moreover, it co-sponsored, *inter alia*, resolution 770, which was one of the most debated important resolutions, as well as the resolutions 757 and 787 that were aimed at imposing sanctions. In its statements in various UNSC meetings, Belgium appreciated UNPROFOR's engagement but demanded further actions to end ethnic cleansing and to ease the situation for the people in Yugoslavia. In addition, it proposed the establishment of a "[...] ban [of] military flights over Bosnia territory [...]" (UN Doc. S/PV.3106, 1992, pp. 44–46; UN Doc. S/PV.3114, 1992, p. 19), which later became a binding resolution. Hence, Belgium was fully

supporting all UN actions so that there was no need for the U.S. to influence its voting behavior through payments.

As expected, the analysis of the bilateral foreign aid payments Belgium received during its term on the UNSC yields no indications of vote buying - at least not in the period of interest. The economic aid it received between 1992 and 1996 was relatively constant at a low level of around 500,000 (constant 2016) U.S. dollars on average per year. Thereafter, no economic aid was received until 1999; then, it significantly increased to 36,741,660 (constant 2016) U.S. dollars in 2007, which was – incidentally or not – when the next term of Belgium’s UNSC service started. Regarding the U.S. military aid, the picture is clearer as there is no aid disbursed to Belgium between 1967 and 2008 (USAID, 2018a). Hence, neither Belgium’s political position nor its aid inflows point to vote buying. However, what happened in 2007 deserves further analysis and could be an indicator of vote buying. At the very least, it brings to mind Kuziemko & Werker’s (2006) findings.

3.3.5 Ecuador

Even though Ecuador and Yugoslavia were both members of NAM and had some diplomatic and economic contacts dating back to 1956, a strong relationship never developed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 2012a). Consequently, and as expected, the UN documents show no conspicuous behavior, neither in the votes nor in the accompanying UNSC discussions. Notwithstanding, in the debate of the controversial resolution 770, Ecuador summarized the violations of human rights committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the UN’s efforts to bring those to a halt (UN Doc. S/PV.3106, 1992, pp. 7–10). José Ayala-Lasso, Ecuador’s representative, drew the link to the atrocities committed during WWII and called the

resolutions 770 and 771 the “[...] minimum response that the international community should make [...]” (UN Doc. S/PV.3106, 1992, p. 9). The country’s motivation that led it to vote in favor of all, important and not important, resolutions seems to be of humanistic nature.

An evaluation of the bilateral aid payments Ecuador received from the U.S. in the time it served on the UNSC yields no surprising findings. Its economic aid inflow decreased during 1986 and 1987; it then began to increase in 1988, with a slight peak in 1989. Thereafter, it followed a downward trend apart from a slight increase of about 5,000,000 (constant 2016) U.S. dollars in 1992. Its military aid increased during 1989 and 1990, decreased in 1991 and slightly increased in 1992 again (by approximately 6,000,000 constant 2016 U.S. dollars). Thereafter, it was rapidly falling until it steeply increased again to over 30,000,000 (constant 2016) U.S. dollars from 1996 to 2002, where it reached a local maximum (USAID, 2018a). However, this latter increase cannot be caused by vote buying in the context of the UNSC since Ecuador served its last period in 1992. Consequently, considering the increase in 1992 relative to the total amount of annual aid received and to the further changes, vote buying seems implausible. Furthermore, almost 80 percent of the increased aid payments were issued as tied aid (USAID, 2018a; USAID, 2018b).

3.4 Summary and Link to the Literature

Contrary to the clear predictions in the literature, there is no convincing evidence of U.S. vote buying using bilateral aid in the case of the 1991 and 1992 Yugoslavia resolutions in the UNSC. Although on the surface many indices point to vote buying, a detailed analysis reveals plausible explanations for most events that are not related to vote buying.

In the case of India, the increase in aid payments seems to be conspicuous, but its characteristics fit the circumstances. India was part of a development program and initiated a large-scale economic policy reform in 1991. Furthermore, using tied aid for vote-buying purposes disagrees with the predictions in the literature. Despite India's alliance with Yugoslavia, its public statements in the context of NAM's change toward its founding member Yugoslavia seem to follow an overall stringent guiding principle and explain India's votes. Its abstention from the resolution approving the use of force by UN members and their regional organizations, and its endorsement of the use of force under UN command are clear signs of protest and demonstrate its mistrust in the powerful members' potential actions. Additionally, it is an obvious sign of trust in the UN.

For Zimbabwe, the increased inflow of U.S. economic aid can directly be linked to the crisis in the respective year. This finds support in the type of aid received, as tied aid is less likely to buy votes. The increased multilateral payments that are not part of the deeper analysis can also easily be explained by Zimbabwe's economic situation. While these loans' below average conditionality has possibly been a result of vote buying, Zimbabwe's public demeanor and support for other UN missions involving NAM members imply that it acted to the best of its knowledge and without reacting to possible political interference. Consequently, it is likely that Zimbabwe took advantage of the understanding that the U.S. sought to attain a certain outcome in the votes to that extent that it was willing to incur costs to reach it. This gave Zimbabwe the opportunity to extract bribes from the U.S. by keeping its voting intentions uncertain while finally voting according to its own preferences. This suggests the transition from a passive recipient country to an active one. A learning effect takes place: Former vote-buying experience

and the knowledge about these practices endows countries with certain leverage. Hence, U.S. vote buying using multilateral aid probably took place but did not change Zimbabwe's vote. The development in U.S. military aid cannot be explained easily and remains unclear. However, previous studies have determined that military aid is less likely to be used for bribes. Like India but more explicitly articulated, Zimbabwe seems to mistrust the powerful countries' intentions and possible actions. It does not approve of the use of force as formulated in the resolution but demands the use of force subordinated to UN control. Moreover, it accuses powerful states of selectively interpreting the UN Charter, which makes the smaller states more vulnerable to their power. This critique targets the powerful countries - not the UN as an organization or its Security Council.

Austria, Belgium, and Ecuador clearly do not fit the vote-buying hypothesis. Neither these countries' aid accounts nor their behavior causes suspicions in the period of interest.

Following the analysis stated above, the probability that the U.S. engaged in vote buying using bilateral aid is low. However, some indicators point to the use of multilateral aid to influence Zimbabwe's votes. Fitting India's and Zimbabwe's critiques of the power imbalance within the UNSC, the U.S.' breach of the arms embargo and the initiation of air strikes without the full support of all UNSC members and, notably, the missing support of Russia and China exemplify the outside options to which powerful states can resort.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The broad literature about international vote buying almost unanimously agrees that vote buying is widely practiced. In some frameworks such as the UNGA, the U.S. pursues vote buying as an official policy. In others, such as the UNSC, it is secretly practiced. Therefore, qualitative analyses must resort to interpretations of government speeches and unofficial comments. Even after verifying the obtained information, valuable details could still be hidden in classified documents. The case study at hand shows how challenging such a qualitative analysis is and explains why literature is limited in this regard. Furthermore, it shows that seemingly obvious evidence for vote buying often has another, rational and plausible, explanation and thus, that hasty conclusions can be misleading.

There is no evidence of vote buying using bilateral aid in the case of Yugoslavia, which makes the analysis at hand standing out from the other two existing case studies about U.S. vote buying in the UNSC, and the general conclusion in the literature. Moreover, there are some indicators that point to the use of multilateral aid to influence the voting outcome, and the study offers important insights about the power imbalance within the UNSC. In general, the example demonstrates that less powerful countries can adjust to the circumstances characterized by the power gap and influence attempts of stronger states. They can transform themselves from passive to active recipients by extracting rents from dominant countries. Uncertainty about their voting behavior is their leverage. Furthermore, it clearly shows that powerful states can, but do not have to, resort to tools like vote buying to reach their aims. Attractive outside options are often available.

Negative effects of vote buying on the UN's information transmission function are ruled out by its very theory. However, and differently than expected, there are also no obvious detrimental effects on the UN's legitimization function. Dissatisfaction originates in the general inequality among its members and targets the stronger states instead of eroding the credibility and legitimacy of the UNSC. Nevertheless, and thereby, indirect negative effects could arise.

Future studies must consider the possible dynamic relationship between vote buying in the UNGA and the UNSC. If the election of UNSC members in the UNGA is not random, this will, in turn, affect the vote-buying behavior in the UNSC. Consequently, when utilizing UNSC data in research, it must be accounted for as a selection bias. Studies that assumed the UNSC membership as an exogenous variation in the data will most likely be distorted. The same holds for measuring state preferences with UNGA data; due to vote buying, these measures will be biased and will not represent the true preferences. Moreover, the election of judges to the ICJ based on vote buying instead of on their fair evaluation of competencies and suitability can have obvious detrimental effects on the international community.

Altogether, the remaining question is not whether vote buying in IOs takes place. Given the inequalities in the international system, vote buying will undoubtedly occur in some cases. The question is also not whether aid payments are used as an instrument of influence. If it is feasible and expedient, there is no reason why states would not resort to it. Instead, the questions in which situations states resort to vote buying is much more thrilling. A comparative approach, evaluating why the U.S. engaged in vote buying in the cases of the First Gulf War and Haiti in 1994 but not in Yugoslavia, can shed light on this question and provide further insights. Additionally, the effects vote buying has on the international community should be evaluated.

On the one hand, it is obvious that powerful states extend their leverage to customize the world according to their ideas. However, this would probably also happen without vote buying. On the other hand, states with less political influence can adapt to and exploit the framework to their own advantage. Yet, this possibility also has its clear limits. Therefore, the observed transition from a passive to an active recipient deserves further attention. It is to find out whether this also occurs in other situations and whether this phenomenon can be generalized. In this context, it is of particular interest to evaluate the less powerful countries' possibilities to optimize their standing in the world order given their economic and structural disadvantages, and to determine how they can optimally utilize their limited endowments to exploit the framework.

APPENDIX

Table 1: UNSC Resolutions, Yugoslavia 1991 – 1992

Date	Meeting Symbol	Resolution	Title	Decision	In Favor/ No / Abstention	Abstentions
25-Sep-91	S/PV.3009	713	“imposing a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
27-Nov-91	S/PV.3018	721	“on deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
15-Dec-91	S/PV.3023	724	“establishing a committee to monitor the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
08-Jan-92	S/PV.3028	727	“on the Implementing Accord signed at Sarajevo on the cease-fire agreed to on 23 Nov. 1991”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
07-Feb-92	S/PV.3049	740	“on the political settlement of the situation in Yugoslavia”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
21-Feb-92	S/PV.3055	743	“on establishment of the United Nations Protection Force”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
07-Apr-92	S/PV.3066	749	“on deployment of the UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
15-May-92	S/PV.3075	752	“on political conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
18-May-92	S/PV.3076	753	“on admission of Croatia to membership in the United Nations”	adopted	without a vote	-
18-May-92	S/PV.3077	754	“on admission of Slovenia to membership in the United Nations”	adopted	without a vote	-
20-May-92	S/PV.3079	755	“on admission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to membership in the United Nations”	adopted	without a vote	-
30-May-92	S/PV.3082	757	“on sanctions against Yugoslavia”	adopted	13 / 0 / 2	China, Zimbabwe

Date	Meeting Symbol	Resolution	Title	Decision	In Favor/ No / Abstention	Abstentions
08-Jun-92	S/PV.3083	758	“on enlargement of the mandate and the strength of the UN Protection Force and humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina”	adopted	without a vote	-
18-Jun-92	S/PV.3086	760	“on humanitarian assistance to the victims of conflict in Yugoslavia”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
29-Jun-92	S/PV.3087	761	“on deployment of additional elements of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
30-Jun-92	S/PV.3088	762	“on implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan in Yugoslavia”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
13-Jul-92	S/PV.3093	764	“on deployment of additional elements of the UN Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
07-Aug-92	S/PV.3104	769	“on enlargement of the mandate and strength of the UN Protection Force”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
13-Aug-92	S/PV.3106	770	“on humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina”	adopted	12 / 0 / 3	China, India, Zimbabwe
13-Aug-92	S/PV.3106	771	“on violations of humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
14-Sep-92	S/PV.3114	776	“on enlargement of the mandate of the UN Protection Force”	adopted	12 / 0 / 3	China, India, Zimbabwe
19-Sep-92	S/PV.3116	777	“on the question of membership of the Federal Republic of Y (Serbia and Montenegro) in the United Nations”	adopted	12 / 0 / 3	China, India, Zimbabwe

Date	Meeting Symbol	Resolution	Title	Decision	In Favor/ No / Abstention	Abstentions
06-Oct-92	S/PV.3118	779	“on implementation of the UN peace-keeping plan in Croatia”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
06-Oct-92	S/PV.3119	780	“on establishment of the Commission of Experts to Examine and Analyze the Information submitted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) on the situation in the former Yugoslavia”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
09-Oct-92	S/PV.3122	781	“on establishment of a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina except the flights of UN operations, including humanitarian assistance”	adopted	14 / 0 / 1	China
10-Nov-92	S/PV.3133	786	“on a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
16-Nov-92	S/PV.3137	787	“demanding that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina cease immediately”	adopted	13 / 0 / 2	China, Zimbabwe
11-Dec-92	S/PV.3147	795	“on establishment of a presence of the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-
18-Dec-92	S/PV.3150	798	“supporting initiative of the European Council to dispatch a fact-finding mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina”	adopted	15 / 0 / 0	-

Highlighted Cells = Important Resolutions (Aim at Deploying Forces).
Source: Own Representation based on UN (2018).

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Sandra Hartmann is one of the two first graduates of the new Dual Degree Master of Science program in International Political Economy of the University of Texas at Dallas, USA, and the Philipps University of Marburg, Germany. Following a Bachelor of Science in Economics and Business Administration with a focus on Economics, she decided to better adapt her studies to her private interests and to extend her knowledge with the respective graduate program.

CURRICULUM VITAE

EDUCATION

Philipps University of Marburg, Germany and University of Texas at Dallas, USA	10/2016 - 05/2018
M.Sc. International Political Economy, Dual Degree (PROMOS Scholar)	
University of Vaasa, Finland	08/2015 - 12/2015
Exchange semester (ERASMUS Scholar)	
Eberhard Karls University of Tuebingen, Germany	10/2012 - 01/2016
B. Sc. Economics and Business Administration, Specialization in Economics	

WORK EXPERIENCE

Daimler AG, Mercedes Benz Cars Procurement and Supplier Quality	01/2016 - 07/2016
Intern in the Model Series Management S-/E-/C-Class	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Administered and presented the record of timely critical parts on a weekly basis• Prepared cost and status reports for management	
Eberhard Karls University of Tuebingen	10/2014 - 02/2015
Academic tutor in "Finance and Investment"	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Prepared course material and presented problem set solutions for 50 students• Corrected the final exams	

VOLUNTEERING

Kulturzentrum franz.K e.V. Reutlingen	11/2012 - 01/2017
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Co-organized cultural events in a socio-cultural center which hosts more than 50.000 guests per year• Operated as security staff to ensure a smooth process of events and to provide a secure environment for guests	
Jugendhaus Epplhaus e.V. Tuebingen	01/2012 - 08/2015
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Organized talks, discussion rounds, and parties in a municipal youth center• Participated in fundraising to finance future events	

SKILLS

Key Qualifications	Mathematics for Microeconomists
Computing	MS PowerPoint, Word, Excel, Outlook ▪ advanced Stata ▪ basic skills
Languages	German ▪ native language English ▪ fluent ▪ Toefl iBT Score: 110