

HOSTILITY TOWARDS IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE:  
EXAMINING THE ROLE OF MASS-ELITE RELATIONS AND THE CONTEXT OF  
PUBLIC SALIENCE

by

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Determinants of anti-immigration attitudes are traditionally ascribed to individual or group-level predispositions such as education, income or cultural threat. This paper contributes to this research by taking into account characteristics of the mass-elite relations, namely the impact of political trust, the presence of populist right-winged parties and the elite discourse on multiculturalism. Additionally, the analysis considers different levels of public salience of immigration. Using a hierarchical logistic model, the paper combines data from the Eurobarometer survey, ParlGov and the Comparative Manifesto Project from 2014 to 2017 to examine the impact of factors of mass-elite relations on anti-immigration attitudes and the context of salience. The analysis shows that political trust decreases and a positive elite discourse on multiculturalism increases hostility towards immigration. While neither public salience nor the presence of right-wing parties impact hostility towards immigration by themselves, the presence of right-wing parties conditioned on high public saliences increases hostility towards immigration.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	viii
LIST OF FIGURES .....	ix
LIST OF TABLES .....	x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .....	1
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .....	4
2.1 Economic self-interest: Labor market and fiscal competition .....	4
2.2 Sociotropic Concerns and Cultural Threat.....	6
2.3 Contextual factors: The Role of Salience .....	7
2.4 Contextual Factors: Characteristics of Mass-Elite Relationship .....	8
CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .....	10
3.1 Attitude formation .....	10
3.1.1 Attitude formation under constraints: The role of the information environment ..	11
3.2 Characteristics of Mass-Elite Relationship .....	13
3.2.1 Political Trust .....	13
3.2.2 Presence of Populist Right-wing Parties .....	15
3.2.3 Elite Discourse.....	16
3.3 Hypotheses.....	16
CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY .....	19
4.1 Data and Variables .....	19
4.1.1 Dependent Variable .....	20

4.1.2 Explanatory Variables .....	20
4.1.3 Control Variables .....	22
4.2 Model .....	23
4.3 Descriptive Statistics.....	26
CHAPTER 5 RESULTS .....	28
5.1 Robustness Checks .....	34
5.1.1 Varying the Dependent Variable .....	34
5.1.2 Using Newspaper Article Count as Measure of Salience.....	34
CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION .....	36
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION .....	41
APPENDIX A POPULIST/RIGHT-WING PARTIES .....	44
APPENDIX B OVERVIEW VARIABLES .....	45
APPENDIX C MARGINAL EFFECTS .....	46
APPENDIX D LOGIT COEFFICIENTS .....	48
APPENDIX E OVERVIEW LEXISNEXIS SEARCH TERMS.....	49
APPENDIX F ARTICLE COUNT AS SALIENCE MEASURE .....	50
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	51
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .....	59
CURRICULUM VITAE .....	

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland (German PRP)
CMP	Comparative Manifesto Project
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
ICC	Intra-class correlation coefficient
LN	Lega Nord
LsNS	Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko
NA	National Alliance for Fatherland and Freedom
PiS	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
PRP	Populist right-wing parties
SNS	Slovenská národná strana
SR	Sme Rodina
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees



## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1	Individual-Level Effects on Anti-Immigration Attitudes.....	23
Figure 2	Group Level Effects: Personal Predispositions.....	25
Figure 3	Political Trust in 8 EU Members between 2014 and 2017.....	26
Figure 4	Vote share of PRP in 4 EU members between 2014 and 2017.....	27
Figure 5	Average marginal effects of trust with 95% Cis.....	29
Figure 6	Average marginal effects of vote share PRP.....	31

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1	Individual-Level Effects on Anti-Immigration Attitudes.....	5
Table 2	Group-Level Effects: Personal Predispositions.....	6
Table 3	Characteristics Of Mass-Elite Relationships.....	8
Table 4	Summary Statistics.....	19
Table 5	Overview Expected Effects.....	23
Table 6	Intra-Class Correlation Coefficients.....	24
Table 7	Results of Baseline Models.....	30
Table A1	Populist Right-Wing Parties included in the Analysis.....	44
Table A2	Overview Variables.....	45
Table A3	Marginal Effects .....	46
Table A4	Logit Coefficients.....	48
Table A5	Overview LexisNexis Search Terms.....	49
Table A6	Article Count as Salience Measure.....	50

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

Immigration has been described as the “defining issue of this century” (Betts, 2015). Flight and asylum in particular are becoming increasingly important aspects of immigration with 2017 being the fifth year in a row in which forced displacement has increased (UNHCR, 2018). The significance of the topic unfolded especially during the “migration crisis” in 2015. Around a million refugees from war-torn countries were seeking refuge in countries of the European Union, while this escape itself developed into a humanitarian crisis. About 17,918 refugees died while trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea between 2014 and 2018 alone (Missing Migrants Project, 2019).

This intensification of immigration mirrors the ambiguity of the topic of immigration for the European Union (EU). Migration lies at the heart of the European integration process with the Schengen agreement allowing for internal freedom of movement. Immigration from outside the EU, on the other hand, is heavily restricted and the member states still struggle to find a common approach towards external immigration. National particularities remain the main obstacle, which suggests immigration policy is still pre-dominated by national interests (Geddes and Scholten, 2016b, p. 166). The only supranational policy agreement, apart from basic provisions on immigrants legal and political rights, is the Dublin Convention, which collapsed under the pressure of the migration crisis in 2015 (Geddes and Scholten, 2016a, p. 17). The refugee crisis revealed a strong imbalance regarding the responsibility carried by some member states over others, drawing solidarity among European nations into question (Geddes and Scholten, 2016b, pp. 153–154).

From the angle of public opinion research the connection between policy makers, public opinion and uncontrollable factors that shape the policy area is of special interest. It demands policy makers to address the issue under continuously changing preconditions and exogenous factors, leading to varying levels of immigration. The uncertainty about the exogenous factor, however, is what makes the connection between political elites and general public particularly relevant. Characteristics of this relationship not only shape the individuals’ perception of how

immigration is politically addressed but also how the individual attitudes change if immigration becomes more important on the public agenda. The migration crisis happened at a time when the relationship between governing leaders and general public was already strained. The expansion of new and fast information media, lobbyism and corruption degraded the political elite's credibility in acting in the nations' best interest. Accordingly, both immigration and the weakened credibility of political elites challenge the cohesion of European societies with nationalist rhetoric and right-wing populism being expressions of this state of crisis. Hence, both factors are of particular relevance for the future of the European Union.

This paper examines characteristics of the relationship between political elites and the mass public as contextual determinants of anti-immigration attitudes. Moreover, it takes into account different levels of issue salience between European countries and over time. The following research questions are being addressed.

- In what way does political trust function as a moderator regarding hostility towards immigrants?
- When do populist-right wing parties successfully activate anti-immigration attitudes?
- How does the dominating elite discourse impact individuals' anti-immigration attitudes?
- To what extent does issue salience alter the relationships between trust, presence of right-wing parties, the elite discourse and anti-immigration attitudes?

This paper contributes to current research both methodologically and substantively. On the methodological level, it provides cross-country evidence from a hierarchical logit model that includes 27 European nations, based on survey data from the Eurobarometer waves during the peak of the migration crisis between fall 2014 and 2017. Content-wise, different characteristics of the public-elite relationship are examined and put into context of varying levels of issue salience. Even though the whole period is characterized by comparatively high ranking of immigration on the public agenda, there is a clear peak of salience in the second half of 2015. This makes the evaluation of the impact of extremely high levels of salience on immigration attitudes possible. Furthermore, European nations make a remarkable unit of analysis. The political alliance they formed challenges them to address immigration as an institutionalized

union, while the contextual factors and preconditions of interest to this paper differ significantly across these 27 nations.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The analysis is put into broader context in the literature review in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical foundations and hypotheses, explaining the role of contextual factors in the attitude formation process with an emphasis on the role of salience, political trust, right-wing parties and the elite discourse. Chapter 4 describes data and variables and explains the model used in the empirical analysis, before results are presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses the findings and puts them into broader perspective. Chapter 7 concludes.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The paper builds upon the vast amount of research on determinants of immigration attitudes on the individual and group level. Two distinctive research traditions have to be highlighted in this context, studies emphasizing economic self-interest as determinant for anti-immigration attitudes on the one hand and cultural threat on the other. Research on sociotropic concerns serves as a connective link between these other two areas. This research frames the broader context for the analysis of this paper. More closely related to this analysis are studies that emphasize country-level determinants and contextual factors, such as political-institutional factors as well as media and communication effects, which will be presented in sections 3 and 4.

#### **2.1 Economic self-interest: Labor market and fiscal competition**

The economic threat argument is twofold and addresses both labor market as well as fiscal competition as determinants of anti-immigration attitudes. First, regarding labor market competition, researchers emphasize individual characteristics that determine the individuals' labor market exposure and the probability of job loss in times of increasing immigration. The foundation for this argumentation is evidence that the individuals' education is uniformly connected to more positive attitudes towards immigrants (Burns and Gimpel, 2000, p. 220; Chandler and Tsai, 2001, p. 186; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007, p. 399; Mayda, 2006, p. 519; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001, p. 141). Scholars argue that people with a lower level of skills (Mayda, 2006, p. 510; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001, p. 133), or with a stronger focus on manual tasks (Ortega and Polavieja, 2012, p. 299) are more vulnerable to immigration and, thus, are more likely to be hostile towards immigration.

However, conceptual problems like omitted variable bias, the ambiguity of the skill measure (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007, p. 430), and evidence that individuals generally have stronger preferences for high skilled immigration independent from the individual skill level (Hainmueller, Hiscox and Margalit, 2015, p. 194), raise doubts over these findings. The opacity of the relationship is further highlighted by evidence suggesting that the degree of routine in the

individual's occupation affects anti-immigration attitudes, while the likelihood of offshoring does not show any effect (Im and Kaihovaara, 2018, p. 1). Additionally, the effect of labor market exposure on anti-immigration attitudes seems to be conditioned by the sector of employment. While the relationship was established for the US high-tech sector in the expected direction, it could not be replicated for other sectors in the US (Malhotra, Margalit and Mo, 2013, p. 407).

Table 1: Individual-Level Effects on Anti-Immigration Attitudes

<b>1) Labor Market Exposure</b>		
<b>Support</b>	<b>No Support</b>	<b>Mixed Effects</b>
Scheve & Slaughter (2001)	Hainmueller & Hiscox (2007)	Im & Kaihovaara (2018)
Mayda (2006)	Hainmueller, Hiscox, Margalit (2015)	Malhotra, Margalit and
Ortega & Polavieja (2012)	Nauman, Stoetzer, Pietrantuono (2018)	Mo (2013)
Timmer & Williamson (1998)		
O'Rourke & Sinnott (2006)		
<b>2) Fiscal Exposure</b>		
<b>Support</b>	<b>No Support</b>	<b>Mixed Effects</b>
Facchini & Mayda (2009)	Hainmueller & Hiscox (2010)	
Iturbe-Ormaetxe & Romero (2016)	Tingley (2013)	
Hanson, Scheve, & Slaughter (2007)	Burns & Gimpel (2000)	
Dustman & Preston (2007)	Chandler & Tsai (2001)	
Nauman, Stoetzer, & Pietrantuono (2018)		

The fiscal effects argument expects individuals to be more hostile towards low-skilled immigrants as they are more likely to rely on social transfers. Thus, increasing numbers of low-skilled immigrants imply either an adjustment on the side of the social benefits or on the side of the taxes, making both high and low income individuals more hostile towards low-skilled immigration (Facchini and Mayda, 2009, p. 295; Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter, 2007, pp. 6–7; Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Romero, 2016, p. 160). When explicitly controlling for attitudes towards high versus low-skilled immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010, p. 62) or increasing sample sizes (Tingley, 2013, pp. 18–19), evidence diminishes. Table 1 provides an overview of the findings in this research area.

Overall, evidence of past studies implies that individual-level effects based on economic self-interest remain ambiguous and seem dependent on different factors that researchers have not yet fully accounted for.

## 2.2 Sociotropic concerns and cultural threat

This strand of literature accounts for the fact that the individual’s attitude formation is embedded within the societal context, and refers to concepts of nativism, cultural superiority and racial stereotypes. Regarding sociotropic concerns, evidence is far more conclusive compared to both arguments above. Particularly, concerns about adverse impacts by immigration on the national economy as a whole exhibit strong explanatory power for anti-immigration attitudes (Citrin *et al.*, 1997, p. 876). Furthermore, evidence suggests sociotropic concerns outbalance aspects of economic self-interest within the European Union (Sides and Citrin, 2007, pp. 489–491).

Table 2: Group-Level Effects: Personal Predispositions

	<b>Support</b>	<b>No Support</b>
<b>Sociotropic concerns</b>	Citrin, Green, Muste et al. (1997) Burns & Gimpel (2000) Hainmueller & Hopkins (2015) Sides and Citrin (2007)	
<b>Perceived cultural threat</b>	Chandler & Tsai (2001) Sniderman & Hagendoorn (2004) Wright & Citrin (2010)	
<b>Racial / ethnic stereotypes</b>	Burns & Gimpel (2000) Dustman & Preston (2007) Ostfeld (2017)	Hainmueller & Hopkins (2015) Hopkins (2015)

Taking into account personal predispositions, research has turned from general attitudes towards immigration to the more specific question of whom to allow access to the country (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015, p. 546). Explanatory factors for anti-immigration attitudes in this context are the perceived threat to the English language (Chandler and Tsai, 2001, p. 186), perceived threat to the national identity in the United States (Wright and Citrin, 2010, p. 335) and domestic culture in the Netherlands (Sniderman, Prior and Hagendoorn, 2004, p. 47). Furthermore, possessing negative stereotypes about different races (Burns and Gimpel, 2000, pp. 218–219), as well as increasing differences in the outward appearance between natives and immigrants (Dustmann and Preston, 2007, p. 4; Ostfeld, 2017, p. 34) positively affect anti-immigration attitudes. However, when emphasizing information on immigrants’ education or language skills, the impact of personal predispositions and stereotypes diminishes (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015, p. 530).



### **2.3 Contextual factors: The role of salience**

This research tradition highlights the importance of contextual factors for the formation of immigration attitudes. With regard to this paper, the level of salience is of particular interest. Salience is conceptualized as issues that people are aware of and care about (Wlezien, 2017, p. 450). Prior studies have highlighted the importance of overall salience of immigration issues, either operationalized by net immigration, media coverage or the “most important problem” question in survey research. There is evidence for a positive association between the share of non-EU population or net immigration and anti-immigration attitudes (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009, p. 535; Dennison, 2018, p. 56; Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky, 2006, p. 439). Existing research based on media coverage of immigration, points towards a positive relationship between issue salience and anti-immigration attitudes, especially regarding people with negative attitudes towards immigration (Andersson, Bendz and Olofsdotter Stensöta, 2018, p. 331) and people who live in non-border states (Dunaway, Branton and Abrajano, 2010, p. 375). Likewise, increasing news coverage has been found to increase the support for anti-immigrant populist parties (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007, p. 413; Burscher, van Spanje and Vreese, 2015, p. 66; Walgrave and Swert, 2004, p. 404), as well as negative attitudes towards outgroups more generally (Oliver, 1999, p. 56; Peffley, Shields and Williams, 1996, p. 321). The importance of salience is further highlighted by studies showing that resulting from higher levels of information, people are motivated to engage more actively with this information (Bullock, 2011, p. 512) and are more prone to deviate in their opinion from positions of their party (Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014, p. 60). Thus, the level of information is important for how and on what basis the individuals’ form their attitudes.

However, research on the effect of issues salience on public opinion more broadly also indicates that salience reinforces existing attitudes rather than alters them (see for example Gitlin (1978, p. 216) or Miller and Krosnick (1996, p. 79).

## 2.4 Contextual Factors: Characteristics of Mass-Elite Relationship

The extent of existing analyses on the effects of trust, populist right-wing parties (PRP) and elite discourse on anti-immigration attitudes vary between the different factors. Evidence exists with regard to trust and the presence of PRP, whilst the role of the elite discourse with regard to immigration has not yet been examined. Studies indeed indicate a negative relationship between institutional trust (Halapuu *et al.*, 2014, p. 572; Husfeldt, 2006, pp. 369–370), interpersonal trust (Andreescu, 2011, p. 61; Herreros and Criado, 2009, p. 352; Rustenbach, 2010, p. 70), and anti-immigration attitudes as well as more restrictive immigration policies.

Table 3: Characteristics of Mass-Elite Relationships

	Negative effect	Positive effect	No effect
<b>Trust</b>	Halapuu et al (2014) ( <i>inst. trust</i> ) Husfeld (2006) ( <i>inst. trust</i> ) Andreescu (2011) ( <i>social trust</i> ) Rustenbach (2010) ( <i>social trust</i> ) Herreros & Criado (2009) ( <i>social trust</i> )		
<b>Presence of PRP</b>		Semyonov et al. (2006) Matthes and Schmuck (2017) Schmuck (2015)	Bohman and Hjerm (2016) Larsen (2011)

Regarding supply side research of the impact of PRP on anti-immigration attitudes, prior studies indicate that PRPs decrease support for multiculturalism (Sprague-Jones, 2011, p. 535) and increase anti-foreigner hostility (Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky, 2006, p. 439). Likewise, populist advertisements increase anti-immigration attitudes among low educated, young individuals (Matthes and Schmuck, 2015, p. 1589, 2017, p. 571). Furthermore, the presence of a right-wing immigration discourse on social media strengthens antipathy towards right-wing populists amongst left-wing individuals, implying stronger issue polarization (Heiss, Sikorski and Matthes, 2019, p. 9). In addition, Schmidt and Spies (2013, p. 519) show that a negative immigration discourse within a society has adverse effects on connected policy areas, such as lower support for distributional measures.

In contrast, some studies did not succeed in establishing a relationship between the presence of political right-wing parties or politicians on anti-immigration attitudes (Bohman and Hjerm, 2016, p. 1738; Larsen, 2011, p. 351). The inconclusiveness of the results in this area can

be partly explained by the enormous variety in measures, covered timeframes and different research designs. Accordingly, the impact of populist radical-right parties on individual attitudes needs further examination.

The influence of elite discourse has not yet been examined with regard to its relevance regarding anti-immigration attitudes. However, there is evidence that high elite consensus on the benefits of EU internal migration cues the public successfully to adopt this perspective as well (McLaren, 2001, p. 101) Furthermore, Sniderman (2002) shows how the focus on the distinctiveness of the immigrant, emphasized by elites, alters people's considerations evaluating immigrants as a whole (p. 53). This suggests that political elites are indeed an important point of reference for the individual's own evaluation of immigration.

Research on elite-public relationships in the context of the information environment, particularly in a cross-country comparison, remains fragmented and inconclusive. The paper adds cross-country evidence to existing research, where individual country studies dominate. Furthermore, it contributes by focusing on two aspects, the analysis of specific characteristics of the mass-elite relationship and the context of issue salience. Regarding the mass-elite relation, the analysis focusses on political trust, the elite discourse on multiculturalism and the presence of populist right-wing parties. Political trust accounts for the overall quality of the relationship between political leaders and mass public and, thus, serves as the fundament of liberal democracies. The elite discourse picks up the dominant direction of communication regarding multiculturalism among the political leadership. Including this variable makes the examination of the extent to which the elite impacts the opinions of the broader public possible. The third factor, the presence of populist right-wing parties, accounts for rising vote shares of populist right-wing parties in many European countries and examines their impact on public attitudes towards immigration.

Secondly, different levels of issue salience, which potentially alter the relationship between the aforementioned characteristics and the individual's attitudes towards immigration, will be encountered. While public salience of immigration is generally high throughout the regarded time period, there still is substantial variation both between countries and over time.

## CHAPTER 3

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This analysis examines the interplay of media, political elites and general public and the impact of these interactions on individuals' attitudes towards immigration. The great significance of media coverage for individual opinion formation has been indicated in Chapter 2. Media structure the information environment in which the individual is confronted with immigration, impacts the problem perception of individuals and, eventually, influences the opinion formation process. Aspects of mass-elite relations are embedded in this informational context and likely vary in their significance for the individual's opinion formation process depending on the level of public salience. This chapter examines the impact of media in shaping the public agenda and connects the aspects of political trust, impact of right-wing parties and elite discourse to a theoretical framework.

#### 3.1 Attitude formation

How individual political attitudes are formed is central for examining the research questions of this paper. The formation of political opinion starts with political socialization from early childhood on. Political socialization is understood as the "transmission of key political values and norms from one generation to another" (Clawson and Oxley, 2013, p. 44). It sets the foundation for the individual's political identity and convictions (ibid.). Throughout the paper (political) attitudes are understood as judgmental assessments of issues, individuals, groups or institutions (Clawson and Oxley, 2013, pp. 17–19). The terms attitude and opinion are used interchangeably. The resulting individual-level determinants of political opinion, such as beliefs, ideology, group identification and partisanship, are complemented by contextual factors. These are variables of the political-institutional environment, the economic situation but also geography or climate. Of these contextual factors the paper focusses on the relationship between political elites and mass public embedded in the societal information environment.

### **3.1.1 Attitude formation under constraints: The role of the information environment**

The emphasis on contextual factors benefits from the assumption of bounded rationality, which is directly related to psychological research highlighting the individuals' natural constraints when absorbing and processing information (Kahneman, 2003, p. 1449). Particularly regarding the complexity of the world, the assumption of the rationality paradigm that the individual bases her attitude formation on all relevant determinants is untenable (Lippmann, 1954, p. 31). Rather than engaging in a complex evaluation of all possible factors of influence, the individual relies on heuristics that yield evaluations under constraints of time, mental capacity, and information (Gigerenzer, Todd and Group, 1999, p. 14). This leaves the individual with a fairly passive role: instead of actively collecting information to base an evaluation on, the individual relies on facts provided to her by the information environment (MacKuen and Coombs, 1981, p. 59).

The theoretical foundations for the importance of the information environment and public communication were set by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) and Zaller (1992). Focusing on the evaluation of information, Petty and Cacioppo (1986) suggest that individuals possess two information processing mechanisms. In most cases, individuals rely on heuristics when evaluating messages due to lacking political knowledge. The authors refer to this as peripheral route processing. Specific circumstances, such as great personal relevance, induce the individual to engage in more complex elaboration of the political issue, which is referred to as central route processing (p. 172). Zaller (1992) emphasizes that communication affects both cognition and affect. While cognition is understood as information an individual possesses about an issue, affect refers to the favorable or unfavorable evaluation of a topic. Both aspects are highly relevant for the individuals' final considerations, which describe the overall assessment of an issue (pp. 40-41). The effect differs among individuals depending on the degree of political awareness and the extent to which the individual monitors the elite's assessment of different topics. Higher political awareness makes people less susceptible to communication effects, such as cues and heuristics, while people with low awareness but a moderate exposure to the elite discourse are most receptive for communication effects (*ibid.*, p. 21).

The information environment and, thus, the public agenda are influenced by both political elites and the media. However, considering the media as the main information channel of

society, which establishes a vital link between political elites, the mass public and real world events, media possess considerably more agenda-setting resources compared to the political elite. As Weaver, McCombs and Shaw (2010) put it, “media are among the most important agenda setters of the 21<sup>st</sup>-century societies” (p. 277). Dearing and Rogers (1996, p. 21) prove agenda-setting and issue salience to be particularly influential for the process of opinion formation. Agenda-setting can be understood as a zero-sum game. Given natural constraints of space, increasing attention paid to one issue automatically reduces attention to other issues. Therefore, the agenda determines issue salience, which is defined as the “degree to which an issue on the agenda is perceived as relatively important” (ibid., p. 23). Considering the assumption of bounded rationality, media have a “map-making” function (Cohen, 1963, p. 12), which is employed through accommodating the mass public with varying political conceptions and interpretations of real-world events (Iyengar and Simon, 2000, pp. 156–157; McCombs and Shaw, 1972, p. 185). Furthermore, media play an important role not only in drawing an individual’s attention to an issue but also in maintaining attention by continuous coverage.

The importance attached to a certain issue over others plays a crucial role when it comes to the individuals’ evaluation. Salience functions as a heuristic for the individual. Given a high degree of automatization of the opinion formation process, individuals respond without much consideration with what is most salient to them. Thus, a higher position on the public agenda influences what is “on the top of the head” (Taylor and Fiske, 1978, p. 252) for the individuals and what serves as a fundament for the individuals’ opinions. Similarly, higher salience implies that more issue specific information is easily accessible for the individuals (Kahneman, 2003, pp. 1453–1454; Zaller, 1992, pp. 310–311). These aspects are especially relevant when relying on survey data, where individuals replies are based on considerations most accessible to them (Zaller, 1992, p. 49).

Additionally, higher salience is connected to a change in perception of importance, which encourages individuals to invest greater mental resources in the attitude formation process (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986, p. 128). In contrast, low salience topics come with the inclination to rely more heavily on heuristics (Ciuk and Yost, 2015, p. 330). Thus, the context of low or high issue salience plays an important role for the individuals’ overall evaluation of immigration as well as

the extent to which other contextual factors gain importance. This directly relates to the impact of aspects of mass-elite relations on individual positions towards immigration, which is addressed in the second section of the theoretical framework.

### **3.2 Characteristics of the Mass-Elite Relationship**

The relationship between the general public and political elites builds the foundation for democratic political systems. A stable relationship is of crucial importance for the inclusion of the wide variety of societal interests in the democratic decision making process, but also for ensuring political accountability. Likewise, the quality of the relationship has important implications on vulnerability of the political system for example regarding the destabilizing impact of external shocks or the threat by actors aiming at establishing an alternative order. These aspects increased in their significance for the European Union particularly in recent years when the relationship between public and political leaders became tenser. The migration crisis and its future implications can therefore be perceived as an endurance test for the relationship both on the national level as well as for the EU as a whole. This section addresses three characteristics of the mass-elite relations, namely the role of political trust, the presence of populist right-wing positions and the role of the elite discourse on multiculturalism. Each aspect is put in its theoretical context and then examined with regard to its significance for the process of attitude formation towards immigration.

#### **3.2.1 Political Trust**

Political trust can be conceptualized empirically as a function of the individuals' perceived performance relative to the expected performance of the government (Hetherington and Husser, 2012, p. 313; Miller, 1974, p. 989; Stokes, 1962, p. 71). Thus, political trust reflects the "confidence that authorities will observe the rules of the game and serve the general interest" (Citrin and Muste, 1999, p. 465) and, as it is connected to the elite's credibility, functions as a quality indicator for the relationship between political elites and general public. Political trust, therefore, lies at the heart of liberal democracies, as they rely on a small number of people for governing the entire country. Political trust is included in the broader concept of social trust

which has proved to be an important precondition for cooperation (Coleman, 1990, p. 91). Additionally, trust functions as an ordering mechanism for individuals when facing uncertainty (Sztompka, 1999, p. 25) and supports the reduction of the world's complexity (Luhmann, 1989, pp. 7–8). Trust increases the higher stability of the social, political and economic system (Luhmann, 1989, pp. 60–61) as well as sociability and participation (Sztompka, 1999, p. 105). These implications of trust are particularly relevant in the complex context of immigration that is indeed connected to a high level of uncertainty.

The moderating effect of political trust on anti-immigration attitudes is channeled through the individuals' perception that costs and benefits of immigration are balanced in the interest of the society as a whole. On the individual-level, immigration is economically costly to some members of society or threatens individuals on a cultural level. Higher political trust in the government, its representatives and authorities is connected to people's notions that politicians act in their best interest (Clawson and Oxley, 2013, p. 48; Miller, 1974, p. 989) and convinces people of the economic necessity, e.g. for tackling problems of aging populations, and the overall welfare benefit of immigration (Hetherington and Husser, 2012, p. 313). Likewise, it ensures the expectations that adverse effects of immigration, e.g. affecting crime rates or economic outcomes, are effectively addressed by the authorities.

Moreover, trust is not only expected to decrease hostility towards immigration but can, at large, yield higher levels of tolerance (Halapuu *et al.*, 2014, p. 572), and a more agreeable setting for people of different origins (*ibid.*, p. 580). All in all, countries with higher levels of trust are perceived as more socially cohesive, which is highly relevant for increasingly diverse societies across Europe (Herrerros and Criado, 2009, p. 337).

Decreasing trust and growing disparity between the general public and the political elite creates an environment in which it is easy for new actors to gain a foothold on the political landscape, as already indicated in the introduction. Populist right-wing parties increasingly took this to their advantage in recent years, which motivates their consideration in the following section.



### 3.2.2 Presence of Populist Right-Wing Parties (PRP)

Populism is a multilayered concept with different facets that can be found on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Following Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) populism is defined as “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into [...] “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (pp. 5-6). Therefore, populism often forms symbiotic relationships with other ideological concepts depending on the prevalent context of the country (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6). In Europe there is a particularly strong relationship between xenophobia and populism, with anti-immigrant positions functioning as the unifying power for PRPs across Europe (Dustmann *et al.*, 2017, p. 4; Ivarsflaten, 2007, p. 14; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 2).

Of special interest in this paper are social effects induced by the presence of PRPs and the question of whether PRP can activate anti-immigration attitudes. The relevance of PRP follows the implications of agenda-setting theory, which was established for political elites and the media at the beginning of this chapter. The same implications, however, are valid for PRP. As Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) highlight, the agenda-setting power of PRP is substantial even though parties might be small or without considerable influence on policy making (p. 98). Thus, these parties possess considerable power to signal the importance of the immigration topic to the society (Alonso and da Fonseca, 2011, p. 5; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007, p. 407; Westin, 2005, pp. 116–117). Additionally, PRPs are able to reframe the national immigration discourse at their discretion, such that anti-immigration rhetoric becomes more socially acceptable and manifested in growing hostility towards immigrants. The lower stigma then encourages people with latent negative predispositions towards immigrants to also articulate such positions (Hopkins, 2011, p. 508; Rydgren, 2003, p. 52; Westin, 2005, pp. 116–117).

The impact of rhetoric and political communication are considered in more detail in the next section, which focusses on the extent to which a dominant pro-multiculturalism discourse among political leaders impacts mass opinions on immigration. It therefore focusses on the very political elite who are frequently under attack from PRP.

### **3.2.3 Elite Discourse on Immigration**

The political elite are understood as politicians and higher level government officials. Along with Zaller (1992), this paper argues that the elite discourse on immigration has considerable impact on individual anti-immigration attitudes. The elite discourse serves as a heuristic for individuals on which they base their attitude formation process. The minority of individuals is well informed about political topics. Therefore, elite positions, particularly if in line with one's own partisan identification, serve as a shortcut for evaluating complex topics and drawing conclusions for one's own view (Gilens and Murakawa, 2002, p. 15). The elite discourse becomes particularly influential when issues are multifaceted or less central to the individual's reality (ibid., p. 19). With immigration having complex implications on society of often unclear direction, the issue exhibits the preconditions to make individuals especially susceptible to influence by the elite. Therefore, a dominating positive or negative evaluation of immigration among the governing elite is expected to affect individual attitudes on that topic. This is what Zaller (1992) refers to as the mainstreaming effect. A high elite consensus typically signals individuals to adopt the dominating position (p. 98). Regarding the geographical focus of this paper on (mostly) liberal democracies in Europe, the elite discourse is expected to be more favorable towards immigration (Freeman, 1995, pp. 882–883; Lax and Phillips, 2012, p. 15). A positive evaluation by the elite results in pro-immigration cues which induce the individuals to adopt the pro-immigration mainstream. This argument is expected to be particularly valid in times when immigration is not highly ranked on the public agenda.

### **3.3 Hypotheses**

Drawing from the theoretical framework outlined above as well as from findings of prior studies, increasing salience of immigration is associated with increased public awareness and perceived importance of immigration related topics. As visibility of immigration and, thus, the evaluation of issue importance fluctuate over time, their impact on individual's anti-immigration attitudes is expected to be subject to change. In addition, problematizing properties of news coverage and the negative connotation of the "most important issue" question (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009, p. 522), which is used as a salience measure in this analysis, salience of immigration is expected to increase hostility towards immigrants.

**Hypothesis 1** Increasing salience of immigration increases hostility towards immigration.

Both the initially presented theories as well as results of prior studies suggest the importance of the concept of political trust for the individuals' evaluation of immigration. Political trust reflects the degree to which individuals believe the government acts in their best interest and is able to cushion potential negative effects on the host country's population (Miller, 1974, p. 989).

**Hypothesis 2A** Higher political trust decreases anti-immigration attitudes.

Issue salience of immigration conditions the proposed relationship between trust and immigration attitudes. Higher public salience is connected to perceived societal change. Thus, the ordering mechanism of political trust is of particular relevance as immigration becomes an important criterion by which the government is being evaluated (Hetherington and Husser, 2012, pp. 313–314). The difference between individuals with lower and higher levels of trust can then be decisive for how the individual perceives the topic of immigration.

**Hypothesis 2B** As issue salience increases, the effect of political trust on hostility towards immigration intensifies.

As a second characteristic of the public-elite relationship, populist right-wing parties possess resources to impact the societal discourse on immigration through agenda-setting power (Westin, 2005, pp. 116–117). Moreover, PRP not only put immigration on the public agenda, they change the narrative and impact the tone of the discourse, drawing formerly intolerable positions to the center of the debate (Hopkins, 2011, p. 508; Rydgren, 2003, p. 52).

**Hypothesis 3A** Increasing presence of PRPs positively affects anti-immigration attitudes.

Of particular relevance is the issue ownership hypothesis, which implies that individuals ascribe issue specific knowledge and abilities to certain parties (Petrocik, 1996, p. 826). With PRPs being the main voice of politicizing immigration topics, the notion that immigration is a core competency of these parties increases (Klingemann *et al.*, 2006, p. 116; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 19). Ascribed issue importance catalyzes the effect of PRP on anti-immigration attitudes

and people increasingly turn towards parties which they perceive competent in handling immigration issues (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007, p. 407; Budge and Farlie, 1983, p. 25; Petrocik, 1996, p. 826). Therefore, with immigration moving closer to individual realities, people become more receptive for populist rhetoric (Hopkins, 2011, p. 523; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 103–104).

**Hypothesis 3B** Increasing presence of PRP given high salience strengthens the positive effect of PRP on hostility towards immigration.

Given that people are insufficiently informed about political topics, particularly if these are highly complex and low on the political agenda, the elite discourse becomes a structuring entity for the individuals' evaluation of the issue (Gilens and Murakawa, 2002, p. 15; Zaller, 1992, p. 45). As none of the European governing parties “own” the issue of immigration, they have no interest in politicizing the issue and avoid a public discourse (Freeman, 1995, p. 884). Thus, the dominant narrative amongst elites functions as a cue and is expected to impact opinions.

**Hypothesis 4A** A positive elite discourse on multiculturalism decreases hostility towards immigration.

Issue salience is expected to condition the effect of elite attitudes on individuals' opinion. Theory suggests that increasing issue salience decreases the tendency to rely on elite cues and motivates individuals to engage in a more thorough evaluation process (Ciuk and Yost, 2015, p. 339; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986, p. 172). A single-sided narrative in times of high issue salience can lead to diverging interest between public and elites and a feeling of unresponsiveness (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 101). The public becomes more receptive for information and opinions outside of the political elite circle (Guisinger and Saunders, 2017, p. 426), implying a shift towards greater hostility to immigrants and overall polarization of opinion (Ford, Jennings and Somerville, 2015, p. 1394).

**Hypothesis 4B** Higher salience in countries with a dominant pro-multiculturalism discourse among political elites increases hostility towards immigrants.

## CHAPTER 4

### METHODOLOGY

#### 4.1 Data and Variables

Because prior studies seldomly analyzed variation across countries and over time simultaneously, this paper analyzes Eurobarometer data of 27 EU countries<sup>1</sup> between fall 2014 and fall 2017 as relevant variables were only included starting from fall 2014. The dataset consists of repeated cross-sections as respondents of the Eurobarometer survey vary between different waves. Merging the datasets of the respective timeframe and excluding respondents holding a different nationality from the country they live in, as they potentially bias the results, yields 106,432 observations. Both post-stratification and population size weights were applied in line with the guidelines for the use of Eurobarometer data.

Table 4. Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Anti-immigration	106,432	0.616	0.486	0	1
Trust Index	91,832	1.329	1.454	0	4
Presence PRP	106,432	11.753	14.401	0	65.09
Elite discourse	106,432	0.576	0.494	0	1
Saliency (individual)	106,432	0.210	0.407	0	1
Saliency (country)	106,432	0.209	0.161	0.0076482	0.7616279
Political Interest	106,391	2.599	0.951	1	4
Ideology	101,762	2.957	2.552	1	9
Education	106,432	2.141	0.761	0	3
Sex	106,432	1.544	0.498	1	2
Age	106,432	51.262	18.149	15	99
Economic difficulties	104,743	1.491	0.685	1	3
Perception national economy	103,990	2.726	0.796	1	4
Voice counts	102,621	2.362	0.997	1	4
Blue collar	106,432	0.194	0.395	0	1
GDP per capita	106,432	95.386	33.503	47	269
Inflation rate	106,432	0.576	1.045	-1.6	3.7
Gini-Coefficient	106,432	30.387	3.967	23.2	40.2
Unemployment rate	106,432	9.101	4.787	2.9	26.5
Immigration (raw)	104,371	177947.800	267503.200	3904	1543848
based on unweighted values					

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<sup>1</sup> Countries included in the analysis are all members of the European Union except for Malta due to missing data.

### 4.1.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of *anti-immigrant attitudes* is based on answers to the question “Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you” with the statement “Immigration of people from outside the EU”. Answers are categorized from 1 very positive to 4 very negative. The item was recoded into a binary variable, which takes the value 1 if the respondent’s evaluation was negative (=3) or very negative (=4) and 0 if the respondent’s evaluation was positive (=2) or very positive (=1). This was done as the distinction between the two positive and the two negative categories is rather vague and cannot be captured quantitatively.

### 4.1.2 Explanatory Variables

#### *Political trust*

The individual-level measure of *political trust* is based on the Eurobarometer questions covering trust in local and national authorities, national parliament, national government, and political parties. In order to reflect the complexity of the concept of *political trust* and account for all political trust items included in the Eurobarometer, an index variable was formed that averages the individuals’ response to all four aspects of political trust. Additionally, the index mirrors the individuals’ level of political trust more comprehensively compared to individual items. A similar measure was used by Halapuu *et al.* (2014, p. 580). To facilitate interpretation, the index was rescaled so that high values indicate high political trust.

#### *Populist right-wing parties*

The identification of parties as populist right-wing parties was based on Mudde (2007, pp. 305–307), who used the concepts of nativism, populism and authoritarianism as the “ideological core” for his classification (*ibid.* p. 22). For parties that entered the political landscape after 2007, classifications by Bohman and Hjerm (2016, p. 1746), Rooduijn *et al.* (2017, p. 547) and ParlGov were used as a yardstick. However, there are cases, like Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Poland), Fidesz (Hungary), and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Germany) for which there is great division amongst scholars. This paper includes these parties in its PRP definition, based on

a very recent assessment by Rooduijn in the context of a Bloomberg study (Tartar, 2017). Especially the AfD experienced a noteworthy shift to the right, at least since the retirement of party founder Bernd Lucke in July 2015 (Berning, 2017, p. 19; Lees, 2018, p. 297). A full list of all included parties can be found in Appendix A.

Comprehensive election data is provided by ParlGov. The overall sample of parties was reduced by cases in which initially classified parties did not receive any vote shares in parliamentary elections between 2010 and 2018 or did not stand for election. No overall vote shares to PRPs within the regarded period were detected for Spain, Portugal, Estonia, Slovenia and Ireland. This results in the PRP classification of 47 parties over the regarded time period. The sum of shares rather than the number of gained seats was taken as a measure for *presence of PRP* in order to account for the variety of party systems and different numbers of available parliamentary seats throughout Europe. The Eurobarometer data was matched with the data for the most recent elections at the time of data collection. Thus, in case of parliamentary elections between 2014 and 2017 the vote share of PRPs was adjusted to the new election result for the following survey wave.

#### *Dominance of elite discourse*

The measurement of the *elite discourse* was constructed using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), which conducts quantitative content analysis of party manifestos (Krause *et al.*, 2018). Based on a variety of categories, a percentage value is assigned to each category reflecting the relative emphasis a party puts on a certain issue. Unfortunately, most recent elections were not covered for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, Italy, and Slovenia. The main category of the CMP data used in the analysis is *per607*, which measures a positive evaluation of multiculturalism of the respective party. A more specific measure of immigration did not cover the whole time frame and sample of countries. In order to quantify the *elite discourse* on multiculturalism, the salience of favorable evaluations of multiculturalism within the manifesto in country *k* is multiplied by the party's vote share in the particular country. Then, the overall sample mean is taken as a threshold level determining whether the elite discourse is particularly positive in one country (=1) or not (=0), creating a binary predictor.

Even though some scholars refrain from multiplying the vote share by arguing saliency of positions is not necessarily connected to party success (Guisinger, 2017, pp. 237–238), this paper follows the notion that vote share matters for turning dominant party positions into policies and, thus, manifesting the dominant discourse by adjusting policies accordingly (similar measure was constructed e.g. by Alonso and da Fonseca, 2011).

### *Public Saliency*

Public *saliency* is determined by the “most important issue” question in the Eurobarometer, which asks individuals to name two issues they perceive most important for their country at the moment from a total list of 16 items (Hatton, 2017, p. 6). The individual-level perception of *saliency* was aggregated on the national level to create a country-level measure that varies between countries and over time. While it would have been desirable to follow agenda-setting literature and rely on an article count as a measure of public *saliency*, common databases did not provide sufficient coverage of all European countries. A *saliency* measure based on the media agenda is used for a smaller sample as a robustness check.

### **4.1.3 Control Variables**

Relevant control variables were drawn from existent research on determinants of anti-immigration attitudes. Table 5 gives an overview of the control variables and their expected effect on the dependent variable anti-immigration attitudes. While individual-level controls were drawn from Eurobarometer data, country-level controls were included from Eurostat. A full list of all variables and descriptions can be found in Appendix B.

Based on prior research, higher *political interest*, higher *education*, a leftist *ideology*, a higher perception that one’s *voice counts* in national political affairs, as well as a favorable *perception of the state of the national economy* are expected to be negatively associated with anti-immigration attitudes. This expectation also applies to *GDP per capita*. *Age*, *blue collar* employment, and individual *economic difficulties*, on the other hand, are expected to be positively associated with anti-immigration attitudes. A negative effect is expected for country-level *unemployment rate*, *number of immigrants*, *inflation rate*, and the *Gini-coefficient*.



Table 5. Overview Expected Effects

Variable	Expected effect	Variable	Expected Effect
<i>A1) Individual-level predictors</i>		<i>B1) Country-level predictors</i>	
1) Trust Index	–	2) Elite discourse	+
<i>A2) Individual-level controls</i>		3) Presence of PRP	+
Political Interest	–	4) Immigration salience	+
Ideology ( <i>low value=left</i> )	+	<i>B2) Country-level controls</i>	
Education	–	Unemployment rate	+
Age	+	Number immigrants	+
Blue Collar	+	GDP per capita	–
Difficulty paying bills	+	Inflation rate	+
Voice counts/ country ( <i>low value= voice counts</i> )	+	Gini-Coefficient	+
National economy ( <i>low value=good</i> )	+		

## 4.2 Model

The structure of the data is hierarchical as visualized in Figure 1. Because respondents belong to a specific survey wave and a specific country, they cannot be treated as independent observations. Ordinary linear or logit regression models can yield biased estimations due to ecological fallacy, which occurs when inferences on the individual level are based on higher-level data (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012, p. 1). A method to approach this type of data is hierarchical modelling which allows for a varying intercept, implying random effects, at country and wave level. In addition, hierarchical models account for the specific effect of group-level predictors on the individual-level outcome, which this paper is particularly interested in with regard to the country specific elite discourse and vote share of PRPs.




Figure 1. Hierarchical structure of the data

Due to the binary nature of the dependent variable, a three-level hierarchical logit model was fitted to account for variation in log odds of holding anti-immigration attitudes across respondents, waves and countries.

$$\log\left(\frac{antimmi_{=1ijk}}{1 - antimmi_{=1ijk}}\right) = b_0 + b_1Trust_{ijk} + b_2VotesharePRP_{jk} + b_3Multiculturalism_{jk} + b_4Salience_{jk} + b_5X_{ijk} + b_6\Omega_{jk} + v_k + u_{jk} + e_{ijk}$$

The left-hand side of the equation represents the likelihood that a respondent  $i$  in country-wave  $j$  from country  $k$  holds anti-immigration attitudes.  $b_1$ ,  $b_2$ ,  $b_3$ , and  $b_4$  are logit coefficients of the explanatory variables of interest.  $X_{ijk}$  is a vector of individual-level control variables, while  $\Omega_{jk}$  contains country-wave level control variables.  $v_k$  is the country-effect, indicating the deviation of odds of holding anti-immigrant attitudes in a specific country from the overall odds of holding anti-immigration attitudes across all countries.  $u_{jk}$  reflects the same deviation for the country-wave level  $j$  and  $e_{ijk}$  denotes the respondent level error term. In order to test hypotheses 2b, 3b and 4b, interaction terms are introduced to the model which examine potential conditional effects of *political trust*, the *elite discourse* and the *presence of PRP* through the *salience* of immigration within the society.

Estimating a null-model (presented in Table 7) , which includes the level structure of the model but no explanatory variables and comparing it to potential two-level models using a LR-test, justifies the application of the three-level structure proposed above. The intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC) show that 9.4 % of the variation in anti-immigration attitudes lies between countries, while 10.9 % lies between waves. Even though these numbers indicate that hierarchical clustering is not particularly strong, the three-level model is significantly preferred over the single-level model.

Table 6. Intra-Class Correlation Coefficients

Level	ICC	Std. Err.	95% Conf. Interval	
Country-level	0.0937872	0.0211976	0.0596881	0.1443758
Wave-level	0.1087445	0.0203582	0.0747906	0.1555217

The magnitudes of country and country-wave effects are depicted in Figure 2. The top caterpillar plot shows very high variance across countries: 19 of the 27 countries differ significantly from the average country. This implies that anti-immigration attitudes in these countries are significantly above (e.g. Latvia, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary) or below the average country (e.g. Sweden, Spain, Ireland and Portugal). The graph on the bottom shows the variation is less strong for the country-wave level. This suggests that the effect of time, e.g. the variation between 2014 and 2017, does not cause very high variance compared to the underlying differences between countries.




Figure 2. Country (top) and country-wave (bottom) variation in anti-immigration attitudes

### 4.3 Descriptive Statistics

The top graph of Figure 2 indicates that the likelihood of holding anti-immigration attitudes is above the average European country in Latvia, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Estonia, while the likelihood is below the average country in Sweden, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. Descriptive statistics for two of the main explanatory variables indicate that there could be an association between trust levels, the presence of populist right-wing parties and hostility towards immigration. Figure 3 shows that mean levels of political trust in Sweden, Ireland, and Portugal have been higher on average compared to the countries with a higher likelihood of hostility. This is particularly visible since 2015, when political trust increased substantially in both Ireland and Portugal while political trust remained on the same level in Slovakia, Latvia, and Czech Republic.




Figure 3. Political trust in 8 EU members between 2014 and 2017

The vote shares of PRPs for Sweden, Latvia, Slovakia, and Czech Republic are depicted in Figure 4. No PRPs managed to enter the national parliaments throughout the regarded time period in Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Estonia. The graph shows, however, that vote shares in countries with a higher probability of hostility towards immigration have been considerable. In

Czech Republic the euro-sceptic and anti-immigrant Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD) received 10.6 percent of the votes in the 2017 elections and since then, holds 22 seats in parliament (ParlGov, 2018). Likewise, in Slovakia the populist far-right Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko (LsNS) and nationalist Slovenská národná strana (SNS) increased their vote shares together with the right-wing Sme Rodina (SR) to overall 23.3 percent in the 2016 elections. In Latvia, the populist right-wing National Alliance for Fatherland and Freedom (NA) won 16.6 percent of the votes in the 2014 election and entered a governing coalition of liberal-conservative, agrarian parties (ParlGov, 2018).




Figure 4. Vote share of PRP in 4 EU members between 2014 and 2017

These relationships suggest an association between higher political trust and lower probability of hostility as well as higher vote shares of PRP and a higher likelihood of hostility towards immigration. The next chapter presents the results from the estimation of the hierarchical logit model and allows further insights on the interrelations between factors of the mass-elite relationship and anti-immigration attitudes as proposed in the hypotheses.

## CHAPTER 5

### RESULTS

Logit coefficients for five different models are presented in Table 7.<sup>2</sup> The model includes two specifications of *saliency*, one at the individual-level and one at the country-level. The individual-level *saliency* measure, whether or not an individual perceives immigration to be an important topic for the country, increases the likelihood of the individual being hostile towards immigration. The average marginal effect implies that an individual, who perceives immigration to be an important topic, has a 9.5 percentage point higher probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes, compared to an individual who does not perceive immigration to be an important issue. The measure is highly significant in all five models. The aggregated country-level *saliency* measure, on the other hand, does not impact the individual probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes. Thus, whether or not immigration is high on the public agenda in a specific country does not seem to influence the individuals' attitudes towards immigration keeping all other factors constant.

Prior studies have frequently used raw *numbers of immigrants* as a real-world indicator of country-level saliency of immigration. This variable was included as a control variable in all models. Though highly significant across all specifications, quantitatively the impact of numbers of immigrants on the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes is equal to zero, which is in stark contrast to prior research (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009, p. 535; Dennison, 2018, p. 56; Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky, 2006, p. 439). This indicates that even though immigration has soared in recent years, particularly during the migration crisis in 2015, the effect on anti-immigration attitudes is marginal.

Looking at the variable *political trust*, it is evident across all five models that trust reduces anti-immigration attitudes. Thus, individuals with higher levels of *political trust* are expected to have a lower likelihood of possessing anti-immigration attitudes. More informative, however, are

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<sup>2</sup> In order to address heteroscedasticity robust standard errors have been used for all presented models. Collinearity among explanatory variables has been checked using variance inflation factors and no problematic relationships were discovered.

average marginal effects (Appendix C). An individual that has low political trust (=1) is 2.4 percentage points less likely to possess anti-immigration attitudes compared to an individual with very low levels of political trust (=0). On the other end of the scale, an individual that has very high levels of trust (=4) the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes decreases by 18.5 percentage points compared to an individual with very low levels of political trust.




Figure 5. Average marginal effects of trust with 95% CIs

Hypothesis 2B was tested through the inclusion of an interaction effect of trust through *salience* in model 2. Figure 5 visualizes this relationship in terms of average marginal effects for very high (=4) and low (=1) levels of *political trust* and different levels of *salience*. The line for very low levels of trust (=0) serves as the base level. It becomes evident that *political trust* functions as a moderator because the negative effect of trust on hostility towards immigration increases in times of higher *salience*. Around the mean levels of *salience* of the regarded time period (approx. 0.2), an individual who possesses high levels of trust is 8.9 percentage points less likely to hold anti-immigration attitudes compared to an individual with very low levels of *trust*. This effect becomes stronger with a 15.6 percentage points lower probability for high trust and 25.9 percentage points for very high trust levels in times of the highest salience in the observed periods (around 0.7). Thus, *political trust* matters particularly in times of higher issue salience of immigration and its overall effect becomes stronger when conditioned on *salience*.

Table 7. Results of Baseline Models

DV: Anti-Immigration=1	Model (0)	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Political Trust		-0.217*** (0.028)	-0.132*** (0.025)	-0.217*** (0.028)	-0.217*** (0.028)	-0.132*** (0.025)
Presence PRP		0.006 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)
Elite Discourse		0.156** (0.071)	0.158** (0.070)	0.155** (0.073)	0.207* (0.124)	0.157** (0.072)
Political Interest		-0.027* (0.014)	-0.025* (0.014)	-0.027* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)
Education		-0.184*** (0.039)	-0.182*** (0.039)	-0.184*** (0.039)	-0.184*** (0.039)	-0.182*** (0.039)
Sex		-0.042 (0.030)	-0.043 (0.030)	-0.042 (0.030)	-0.042 (0.030)	-0.043 (0.030)
Age		0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)
Economic difficulties		0.095*** (0.035)	0.096*** (0.035)	0.095*** (0.035)	0.095*** (0.035)	0.096*** (0.035)
Perception national economy		0.248*** (0.082)	0.259*** (0.082)	0.247*** (0.082)	0.248*** (0.082)	0.259*** (0.082)
Voice counts		0.173*** (0.052)	0.171*** (0.052)	0.173*** (0.052)	0.173*** (0.052)	0.171*** (0.052)
Blue collar		0.200** (0.086)	0.196** (0.087)	0.200** (0.086)	0.200** (0.086)	0.196** (0.087)
GDP per capita		-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Inflation rate		-0.080*** (0.027)	-0.076*** (0.027)	-0.085*** (0.026)	-0.078*** (0.030)	-0.081*** (0.026)
Gini-Coefficient		-0.040 (0.025)	-0.040 (0.025)	-0.040 (0.025)	-0.039 (0.025)	-0.040 (0.025)
Unemployment		-0.047** (0.020)	-0.043** (0.020)	-0.048** (0.021)	-0.046** (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)
Salience (individual)		0.511*** (0.134)	0.511*** (0.136)	0.511*** (0.134)	0.511*** (0.134)	0.511*** (0.136)
Salience (country)		-0.080 (0.290)	0.438* (0.256)	-0.434 (0.334)	0.180 (0.652)	0.064 (0.251)
Immigration		-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Ideology		0.055*** (0.013)	0.055*** (0.013)	0.055*** (0.013)	0.055*** (0.013)	0.055*** (0.013)
Salience*Trust			-0.297*** (0.091)			-0.298*** (0.091)
Salience*Presence PRP				0.025* (0.013)		0.027** (0.012)
Salience*Elite discourse					-0.353 (0.624)	
Constant	1.602*** (0.190)	1.271 (0.824)	1.071 (0.825)	1.362 (0.836)	1.186 (0.823)	1.166 (0.837)
Variance country-level	0.346*** (0.086)	0.240*** (0.064)	0.232*** (0.062)	0.251*** (0.065)	0.237*** (0.065)	0.243*** (0.063)
Variance wave-level	0.055*** (0.011)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.009)	0.030*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.009)	0.030*** (0.008)
Observations	106,432	82,346	82,346	82,346	82,346	82,346
Number of countries	27	27	27	27	27	27
Number of waves	4	4	4	4	4	4
Wald Chi <sup>2</sup>	-	7272.14***	11762.63***	9649.99***	7854.98***	14134.55***
AIC	133108.3	102267.3	102177	102266	102268.7	102175.3
BIC	133137	102472.3	102391.4	102480.3	102483	102399

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1



The *presence of PRP* on anti-immigration attitudes by itself does not reach standard levels of significance. The average marginal effects of the *presence of PRP* conditional on salience is depicted in Figure 6. The effect of right-wing party presence increases the probability of holding negative attitudes towards immigration only for higher levels of salience larger than 0.4. For these levels, a one percentage point increase in votes for PRP is expected to increase the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. Put into context, recent successes of these parties showed that gains in vote share of over 10 percentage points were not uncommon. The German AfD, for example increased its vote share from 4.7 percent in 2013 to 12.6 percent in 2017. So did the Italian Lega Nord (LN) which gained 13.3 percentage points between 2013 and 2018. Overall, this translates into an increase in the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes between 1.6 and 2.6 percentage points in the cases of AfD and LN, at medium high levels of salience. This probability increases to 2.4 and 3.99 percentage points at high levels of salience at 0.7.




Figure 6. Average marginal effects of vote share PRP

The impact of a positive *elite discourse* on multiculturalism on anti-immigration attitudes is positive across all specifications and reaches standard levels of significance. This implies that a positive, above-average evaluation of multiculturalism by the political elites is expected to increase the likelihood of the individuals holding anti-immigration attitudes. The average marginal effect suggests that the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes increases by 3.2 percentage points if the individual is from a country with a positive *elite discourse* on multiculturalism. The insignificant interaction term in model 4 suggests that the effect of the *elite discourse* is not conditional on the level of salience of immigration topics, but impacts the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes directly.

In line with prior research, individuals that are younger or highly educated are less hostile towards immigration. This confirms the results of Andreescu (2011, p. 74) and Chandler and Tsai (2001, p. 181) regarding age, as well as findings in the tradition of the labor market competition argument as presented in Chapter 2 (Burns and Gimpel, 2000, p. 220; Chandler and Tsai, 2001, p. 186; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007, p. 399; Mayda, 2006, p. 519; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001, p. 141). On the other hand, being employed as a blue collar worker increases the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes. This implies that workers who carry out mostly manual work are more hostile towards immigration, indicating the labor market competition argument as stated in the literature review (e.g. Ortega and Polavieja, 2012, p. 299) is valid in contemporary Europe. The notion that economic variables matter is supported further by two individual-level variables. The experience of *economic difficulties* as well as a negative assessment of the *state of the national economy* increases the likelihood of the individual being more hostile towards immigration. Thus, adding to the literature that the individuals' perception regarding economic variables matters (e.g. Chandler and Tsai, 2001, p. 183). Regarding country-level economic predictors, the results are somewhat unexpected. Both *unemployment* and *inflation rate* are negatively associated with anti-immigration attitudes. Thus, respondents in countries with higher unemployment rates or higher inflation are less likely hostile towards immigration. This suggests a disparity between individual perception and personal experience on the one hand side and country-level factors on the other. The association between higher unemployment and more positive attitudes towards immigration can be explained through an

increasing mismatch between labor market demands and local labor supply in advanced industrialized nations, which makes immigration necessary to address this imbalance. The role of inflation remains unclear in this context.

As expected, attitudes towards immigration are more likely to be positive with increasing *GDP per capita*. This could be associated with an overall higher standard of living, the presence of post-materialistic values and the increasing gap in skilled employment in richer countries, which decreases the threat perception of immigration as elaborated in more detail by Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Romero (2016, p. 170). Variables connected to the individual's political predispositions as well as perceptions of the political system generally confirm the expected effect. Higher levels of *political interest* or possessing a stronger left-wing *ideology* decrease the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes, which mirrors the findings of Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky (2006, p. 438). Political efficacy approximated by whether or not the individual thinks her voice counts in national affairs, has a highly significant impact on the likelihood of holding anti-immigration attitudes. Increasing perceived efficacy decreases the probability of hostility towards immigration. Furthermore, the results show no significant impact of *sex* on the probability of being against immigration, adding to the already mixed evidence. While some evidence points towards men having more negative attitudes towards immigrants (Chandler and Tsai, 2001, p. 181), Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) highlight that women's higher tolerance only includes immigrants from poorer countries (p. 416) and Givens (2016) finds gender has varying effects on immigration attitudes in different countries (p. 48). Likewise, the country's level of inequality, approximated by the *Gini-Coefficient*, does not impact immigration attitudes.

One last aspect regards the multilevel structure of the model. The variance in country-level intercepts of 0.35 in the null-model was reduced by about 30 percent to 0.243 in model 5. Likewise, the variance in wave-level intercepts decreased from 0.055 by about 45 percent to 0.03, indicating that the proposed models explain at least some of the variance between countries and waves. Thus, not including the varying intercepts would likely inflate standard errors and bias estimates.

## **5.1 Robustness Checks**

### **5.1.1 Varying the Dependent Variable**

In order to check the validity of the anti-immigration measure and the robustness of the results presented above, the models were replicated with a different dependent variable, which is, however, only available from 2015. The item asks for the respondents' agreement or disagreement with a number of statements, with one being "immigrants contribute a lot to (OUR COUNTRY)". The response categories range from 1 (=totally agree) to 4 (totally disagree). Again, the variable was recoded to a dichotomous variable with =1 referring to disagreement or total disagreement with the statement.

The results presented in Appendix D show that both trust and the positive evaluation of multiculturalism have an equivalent effect to the previous models. The vote share of PRP, again, does not reach standard levels of significance. Likewise, most of the individual-level and country-level predictors show similar effects as the initial models. Interestingly, however, inequality is now reaching standard levels of significance and is negatively associated with the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes. Thus, individuals from countries with higher inequality are more likely to hold anti-immigration attitudes. Additionally, the conditional effect of the vote share of PRP through country-level salience disappears in these specifications.

### **5.1.2 Using newspaper article count as measure of salience**

This robustness check draws from the standard literature of agenda-setting, which regards the number of newspaper articles as a measure of salience. However, it proved difficult in the cross-country framework of this study. Based on the database LexisNexis, a monthly article count was conducted using keywords describing immigrants, refugees and asylum in combination with a country description in order to narrow down articles covering the immigration issues with respect to the country of focus in the country's main language.

In order to determine the term which is most commonly used in the immigration discourse in a country, native speakers of the respective languages provided helpful suggestions. Following the guideline for article counts provided by Vliegenthart (2012), the accuracy of the search

results was ascertained by eyeballing the first 60-70 articles for Germany, Austria, and the UK. The count only includes newspaper articles, while newswires, press releases and online journals were excluded. Unfortunately, the database includes different numbers of newspapers for different countries and yielded no results for eastern and south-eastern European countries. Therefore, the analysis incorporating this measure of salience includes only 12 countries<sup>3</sup>. Appendix E shows that the effect of salience by itself just reaches common levels of significance. Quantitatively, however, the effect is virtually zero. The results for the interaction terms repeat the pattern of the prior robustness check with significant, though infinitesimal small, effect of the salience-trust interaction term and non-significant results for the interactions between salience and vote share of PRP and elite discourse.

Thus, in a cross-country framework the individual country evidence for the impact of salience on immigration attitudes as presented in Chapter 2 cannot be replicated.

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<sup>3</sup> Germany, United Kingdom, Austria, France, Spain, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Poland

## CHAPTER 6

### DISCUSSION

The results of the empirical analysis indicate mixed impact of different characteristics of the relationship between the political elite and general public. While trust significantly decreases the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes, a dominant positive discourse on immigration among the political elites increases the probability of immigrant hostility. The presence of PRP does not impact the probability of negativity towards immigration, but affects it conditional on the level of salience.

The empirical analysis shows that political trust is an important predictor for lower levels of hostility towards immigration. People with higher levels of political trust are less likely to hold anti-immigration attitudes. This is line with the proposition in hypothesis 2A. The effect of trust is robust across different specifications of the model and persists when changing the dependent variable. The results add to the existing evidence that political trust cushions hostility towards immigration as suggested by Halapuu *et al.* (2014) and Husfeldt (2006). Compared to social trust, the level of trust between individuals of society, political trust is a less stable concept and it adjusts to the perceived performance of the country's leaders and authorities. Furthermore, political trust is likely related to the functioning of the political and public system more generally, such as whether individuals feel to be treated fairly as well as their perception of political efficacy. The results suggest that trust indeed has properties of keeping societies together and ensures their openness for people from other countries. Regarding the interaction effect of trust and issue salience, it becomes evident that the moderating properties of trust become particularly influential at higher levels of salience. Overall these results emphasize the importance of the quality of the relationship between political elites and the general public when it comes to attitudes on immigration.

Examining the second characteristic, the presence of PRP and its impact on anti-immigration attitudes, the results indicate no significant effect regarding the vote share by itself. Thus, the simple presence of anti-immigrant parties does not affect the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes per se as suggested by Sprague-Jones (2011) or Semyonov, Raijman

and Gorodzeisky (2006). Therefore, it adds to the restricted and conditional evidence as proposed by Bohman and Hjerm (2016), Larsen (2011), and Dunn and Singh (2011). The interaction term, however, indicates that the effect of PRP operates through the level of salience. The visibility of PRP increases the probability of being hostile towards immigration only at higher levels of issue salience. Nonetheless, on a quantitative level the effect remains rather small, ranging between 0.2 and 0.38 percentage points for every percentage point increase in PRP vote share. All in all, the effect only becomes relevant in times of high salience and particularly large gains in vote shares of PRP.

Connecting the finding to the initially presented theory, the effect of the presence of PRP is channeled through the position of immigration issues on the public agenda. This supports the proposition of the issue ownership hypothesis, which suggests that PRPs politicize immigration topics deliberately. The results indicate that in times of high issue salience, increasing presence of PRP indeed makes individuals more receptive for their framing of the immigration discourse, which increases the probability of expressing hostility towards immigration. Additionally, this finding supports the more cautious evaluation of the impact of PRP in Mudde (2013, p. 2) who recognizes a general disparity between the academic and media attention to the topic of PRPs on the one side and the mixed empirical evidence on their actual impact on public opinion on the other. He links the limited impact of PRPs to a limited scope of action and their marginal impact on policy making. Furthermore Mudde (2013, p. 15) identifies the media and their tabloidization as a more pressing problem in this context as the pure presence of PRPs, which mirrors the findings of this analysis. Another potential explanation for the minimal effects of PRPs with regard to public opinion on immigration is that overall shifts in policy preferences which allowed the vote share gains of PRPs initially might have been picked up by other parties such that the continuous effect of PRPs is dampened.

Next to the small quantitative effect, the results of the robustness check, using a different dependent variable, further limit the results and show that specific question wording is essential in this context. The results using a more specific dependent variable about immigrants' contribution to the country potentially evoke a more economically based evaluation of immigrants compared to the emphasis on the individual's personal feelings in the first question.

Supporting this interpretation is the fact that inequality significantly impacts the probability of hostility towards immigration in the robustness check but not in the first models. Thus, it is likely that the contribution question frames immigration in economic terms, inducing the individual to consider a different basis of evaluation compared to the initial question.

Somewhat surprising and alarming is the result that the positive elite discourse on multiculturalism impacts the probability of immigration hostility by itself but not through salience. This effect is robust across a variety of specifications and remains present even when changing the dependent variable. Therefore, the results are opposite to what was proposed in hypothesis 4A. The fact that individuals do not adapt the dominant elite discourse but position themselves opposite to it, suggests that cues are not at work in this context. Moreover, this points towards a general disparity between the elite discourse on multiculturalism and attitudes of the general public. This could in fact be an underlying reason for the strengthening of anti-immigrant parties. Nevertheless, one could argue that during the regarded period 2014 to 2017 the salience of immigration was consistently higher compared to the early 2000s, such that the variation in salience was not high enough to establish the relationship proposed in hypothesis 4B. This then implies that immigration was of high importance for the average individual so individuals indeed engaged in central route processing mechanism proposed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), which led to the divergence between elite discourse and public opinion. Data limitations of the Eurobarometer, however, prevent from analyzing the relationship for a broader time period.

The inconclusive results regarding the different salience measures suggest that more research needs to be done on the exact concepts different measures address. While the individual-level evaluation of importance indeed increases the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes, the aggregated country-measure has no such impact. This is alarming particularly considering the increasing impact of personalized news in the context of social media and the struggle of traditional media outlets of keeping up with these new developments. The null-effect of numbers of immigrants on public attitudes can be an effect of the exceptionality of the situation between 2014 and 2017. Likewise, it also points towards the relevance of media presence, as immigration and potentially connected threats are more likely to be channeled through news coverage rather than being experienced by the individual herself.



The most commonly used measure of salience is newspaper article counts. Testing the relationship as proposed in hypothesis 1 for a smaller number of countries, however, did not yield evidence for any effect of salience on anti-immigration attitudes. Nonetheless, a clear limitation is that the newspaper database LexisNexis lacks newspapers from eastern and south-eastern countries, which hinders a more thorough examination of the effect of salience

Overall, these findings challenge the results of earlier studies which indeed found a significant positive relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and salience in single-country studies. The importance of the individual-level salience measure should be explored by future research, especially considering a wider variety of information sources. As indicated above, social media and online news sources, which are noticeably faster but considerably more prone to false information and specific agendas of certain individuals or groups, play an increasingly important role in this context. Future research on the relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and salience should take this new medium of information into account.

Two more points have to be considered when evaluating the results of this analysis. First, immigration attitudes are a set of implicit feelings and considerations that are difficult to address by survey research and are better assessed by experimental components (see for example Matthes and Schmuck, 2017). Social desirability bias further impacts the discrepancy between stated opinion and implicit attitude. The question addressing the individuals' feelings has advantages over the more specific question regarding immigrants' contributions in this regard, which is why it was used in the main part of the analysis. If social desirability is indeed at work, the estimates are expected to be conservative.

Furthermore, one should consider that even though the question asks about immigrants more broadly, it is likely that in the context of the regarded time period, refugees and issues connected to the topic of asylum are more tangible to the individual when answering the question compared to other types of immigration such as labor or educational immigration. The exceptionality of the events in 2015 and the inability of political elites finding ways of balancing and sharing responsibility, could have affected the presented results.

Methodologically, endogeneity is a problem with this analysis and can potentially introduce bias to parameter estimates. Endogeneity can result from measurement errors on the level of the

explanatory variables, particularly through the comparison of survey evidence in a cross-country framework. This was tried to address through the use of indexed variables as for political trust. Next to measurement errors, endogeneity can result from simultaneity, particularly regarding the relationship between the presence of PRP and anti-immigration attitudes. Here, the theoretical argument works just as well in the opposite direction such that increasing anti-foreigner hostility increases the demand for right-wing positions. This could be addressed by an Instrumental Variable Approach or a Granger Causality test. Double causality can also not be ruled out for the relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and political trust.

All in all, this study supports and extends individual country research and provides evidence that individual country-level relationships, as proposed for Sweden (Andersson, Bendz and Olofsdotter Stensöta, 2018, p. 331), the Netherlands (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007, p. 404) and the United States (Dunaway, Branton and Abrajano, 2010, p. 375), are also applicable to the broader context of the EU. The analysis gives important insights on the relationship between general public, political elites and anti-immigration attitudes. While the presence of populist right-wing parties themselves does not further fuel hostility, a high salience context makes individuals more likely to hold anti-immigration attitudes with increasing visibility of PRPs. This highlights the importance of the public discourse in times of high salience. Established parties and public figures should make an effort of addressing the concerns of individuals and should not let PRP and their representatives dominate the debate. In addition, the media play an important role as it still functions as an important information channel for the individuals. Journalists should consider how they distribute attention to different actors, how they present representatives of PRPs and they should be careful in the usage of right-wing rhetoric in the discourse. The positive effect of the elite discourse on the probability of being hostile towards immigration indicates a disparity between elite and general public. This gap can be an important demand side factor for PRP, and, again indicates the importance of how the immigration discourse is framed by the political elites. Trust, on the other side, has been shown to be an important predictor for lower hostility towards immigration suggesting that the quality of the relationship between political elites and general public is important in times of societal challenges and societal change.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

The migration crisis and a credibility crisis of the political elites have been amongst the most pressing issues for the EU in recent years. Increasing foreigner hostility, success of right-wing populism, polarization of societies and disintegration are symptoms of these crises. The objective of this paper was to establish a relationship between these two outgrowths of crisis by examining characteristics of the relationship between political elites and the general public and their impact on anti-immigration attitudes. Additionally, the broader context was accounted for by integrating different levels of public salience between EU Member States and over time. More particularly the impact of political trust, as a quality indicator for the relation between elites and public, was examined regarding its effect on hostility towards immigration. Likewise, considering recent upsurges of right-wing populism, the influence of PRP on anti-immigration attitudes has been analyzed. As a third aspect, the elite discourse on multiculturalism and its implication on individual attitudes towards immigrants has been examined, building upon increasing disparity of elites and public across the European Union. Finally, this paper has also analyzed the role of issue salience as an explaining factor for anti-immigration sentiments by itself and as a contextual factor channeling the relationships between political elite and general public.

Empirical evidence comes from Eurobarometer data, based on 27 countries of the European Union for a time period from fall 2014 to fall 2017. A multilevel logistic regression was used to account for the hierarchical structure of the data.

The findings suggest that country-level salience, approximated by the share of individuals who perceive immigration as important and a newspaper article count, does not impact hostility towards immigration per se. It rather conditions different aspects of the public-elite relationship. While political trust by itself decreases the probability of holding anti-immigration attitudes, higher issue salience catalyzes this effect further. Both hypotheses set up for the effect of trust were supported by the findings. This suggests that a trustful relationship between political elite and the public can mitigate hostility, particularly in times of societal change. As a second result, the presence of PRP by themselves does not impact individuals' probability of holding anti-

immigration attitudes. Once more salience functions as a catalyst for this relationship. With immigration issues ranking high on the public agenda, an increase in the presence of PRPs positively impacts the likelihood of hostility towards immigration. The effect, however, remains quantitatively small. Therefore, the evidence does not support hypothesis 3A whilst support for hypothesis 3B remains small. Third, an above average positive evaluation of multiculturalism by the political elites increases the likelihood of anti-immigration attitudes. The insignificant interaction-term suggests that the elite discourse is an influencing factor by itself and is not conditioned on different levels of issue salience. Thus, the results suggest the opposite interrelation to what was proposed in hypothesis 4A, while no evidence was found for hypothesis 4B.

Overall, these findings suggest that contextual factors next to the often examined individual-level determinants also impact individual attitudes towards immigration. This is particularly relevant for policy makers as contextual factors contrary to personal predispositions can be actively designed. The alarming implications of the elite discourse on multiculturalism, indicating a general disparity between political elites and general public, are somewhat relativized by the impact of political trust. Nonetheless, both findings together suggest that the quality of the relationship between public and political elites is important. The role of political trust in this context as a moderator of hostility towards immigration is of crucial importance for the overall success of integration and, thus, social cohesion in the long run. This calls for increasing investment in this particular type of social capital, which includes increasing accountability, integrity and transparency on the side of the institutions. Measures could include more transparent laws of party financing or the extension of lobby registries in order to restore and improve relations between individuals, political leaders and governing institutions.

The suggestion that the presence of PRPs themselves have no impact on individuals' hostility towards immigration is somewhat reassuring. Nevertheless, recent successes of PRP in the EU imply that a gap opened up between politically established parties and the electorate. This notion is manifested in the positive effect on anti-immigration attitudes given high levels of public salience and goes along with implications for both journalists and politicians. It suggests that the disregard of the topic by established political parties favors parties that question the

fundamentals of liberal democracies. National parties should cooperate to adjust existing frameworks to the changing circumstances. They should counter defamation and open racism with adjusted policies and social inclusion. Journalists should carefully deliberate origins and implications of terms they introduce to the public discourse, considering the connotations of “migration crisis” or “wave of refugees” as often heard in the context of 2015. Additionally, it opens up questions about the extent to which journalists should provide a platform for PRP and their representatives at all.

With immigration being the “defining issue of the century” (Betts, 2015), this analysis has shown how the quality of the relationship between political elites and mass public is of crucial importance for the extent to which European societies remain socially cohesive. This also includes collective European efforts in developing a common framework regarding immigration that ensures shared responsibilities especially in times of high influx. As the experience of the migration crisis in 2015 suggested, ignoring the necessity of a comprehensive framework puts the Schengen Agreement at risk.

Moreover, the context of high public salience gives momentum to parties that not only question core European values of tolerance and freedom of movement but aim at dismantling liberal democracies as we know them. Thus, rediscovering the binding element between general public and political elites both on the national and European level will be decisive for the EU and its current and future challenges.

## APPENDIX A

### OVERVIEW POPULIST RIGHT-WING PARTIES

Table A1. Populist/Right-Wing Parties Included in the Analysis

Country	Party Name (Abbreviation)	Party Name (English)
Austria	-Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)	-Freedom Party of Austria
	-Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZP)	-Alliance for the Future of Austria
Belgium	-Vlaams Blok (VB)	-Flemish Block
	-Debout Les Belges! (DLB)	-Belgians, Rise Up!
Bulgaria	-Ataka	-Attack
	-Natsionalen Front za Spasenie na Balgariya (NFSB)	-National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria
	-VMRO – Balgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie (VMRO)	-IMRO -- Bulgarian National Movement
	-Vazrazhdane (R)	-Revival
Cyprus	-Ethniko Laiko Metopo (ELAM)	-National Popular Front
	-Kinima Allileggiis (KINEMA)	-Solidarity Movement
Czech Republic	-Suverenita – blok Jany Bobošíkové (S-JB)	-Sovereignty -- Jana Bobosikova Bloc
	-Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti (DSSS)	-Workers' Party of Social Justice
	-Svoboda a přímá demokracie Tomio Okamura (SPD)	-Freedom and Direct Democracy Tomio Okamura
Germany	-Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)	-National Democratic Party
	-Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)	-Alternative for Germany
Denmark	-Dansk Folkeparti (DF)	-Danish Peoples Party
Finland	-Perussuomalaiset (P)	-Finnish Party   True Finns
France	-Front national (FN)	-National Front
	-extrême droite (ex-dro)	-other far-right
United Kingdom	-British National Party (BNP)	-British National Party
	-United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	-United Kingdom Independence Party
Greece	-Anexartitoi Ellines (ANEL)	-Independent Greeks
	-Laikos Syndesmos – Chrysi Avg (LS-CA)	-People's Association -- Golden Dawn
	-Laikós Orthόdoxos Synagermós (LAOS)	-Popular Orthodox Rally
Croatia	-Hrvatski demokratski savez Slavonije i Baranje (HDSSB)	-Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia & Baranja
	- Hrvatska građanska stranka (HGS)	-Croatian Civic Party
	-Hrvatska stranka prava dr. Ante Starcevic (HSP-AS)	-Croatian Party of Rights -- Dr. Ante Starcevic
	-Hrvatska stranka prava (HSP)	-Croatian Party of Rights
	-Živi zid (ZiZi)	-Human Shield
Hungary	-Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Fi-MPSz)	-Fidesz -- Hungarian Civic Union
	-Jobbik Magyarorszáért Mozgalom (Jobbik)	-Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary
	-Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség / Kereszténydemokrata - Néppárt (Fi+KDNP)	-Fidesz -- Hungarian Civic Party / Christian Democratic People's Party
Italy	-Lega Nord (LN)	-North League
	-Fiamma Tricolore (MSFT)	-Fiamma Tricolore
Lithuania	-Lietuvos Centro Partija (LCP)	-Lithuanian Centre Party
	-Jaunoji Lietuva (JL)	-Young Lithuania
Luxembourg	-Aktionskomitee Rente – Comité d'action pensions   Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (AR ADR)	-Action Committee Pensions   Alternative Democratic Reform Party
Latvia	- Nacionālā apvienība / Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK (NA/TB/LNNK)	-National Alliance / For Fatherland and Freedom / LNNK
	-Kam pieder valsts? (KPV LV)	-Who owns the state?
Netherlands	-Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)	-Party for Freedom
Poland	-Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)	-Law and Justice
	-Kukiz'15 (K)	-Kukiz'15
Romania	-Partidul România Mare (PRM)	-Greater Romania Party
Slovakia	-Slovenská národná strana (SNS)	-Slovak National Party
	-Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko (ĽSNS)	-People's Party Our Slovakia
	-Sme Rodina – Boris Kollár (SR)	-We are family -- Boris Kollar
Sweden	-Sverigedemokraterna (SD)	-Sweden Democrats

## APPENDIX B

### OVERVIEW VARIABLES

Table A2. Overview Variables

Variable	Description	Source
Dependent Variables		(all Eurobarometer)
Immigration Attitude	<i>Q: Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you. A: Immigration of people from outside the EU (1-4, very negative)</i>	
Immigration Attitude	Statements: immigrants contribute a lot <i>Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? A: Immigrants contribute a lot to (OUR COUNTRY) (1 totally agree, 4 totally disagree)</i>	
Independent Variables		
Trust	<i>Q: I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. (1 tend to trust, 2 tend not to trust, 3 don't know)</i>	
Trstpdp	Trust in political parties	Eurobarometer
Trstauth	Trust in regional/local public authorities	Eurobarometer
Trstgov	Trust in national government	Eurobarometer
Trstparl	Trust in national parliament	Eurobarometer
trstind	$\sum_{i=1}^N \left( \frac{trstpdp_i + trstauth_i + trstgov_i + trstparl_i}{4} \right) \rightarrow$ rescaled from 0 -4 with 4 =high trust	Eurobarometer
Elite Discourse	Multiculturalism: positive , sumper607	Comparative Manifesto
PRP	Vote share populist right-winged parties in last parliamentary election	ParlGov
Saliency, Individual	<i>Q: What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? (list of 13 possibilities)</i>	Eurobarometer
Saliency, Country	Binary measure, =1 if immigration issue named more often than mean of all countries in a certain year	
Control Variables Individual-Level		(all Eurobarometer)
Pol. Interest	Political Interest Index (1 strong, 3 low, 4 not at all), rescaled 1 =low 3=strong	
Ideology	<i>Q: In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale? (1 left, 10 right, 97 refusal, 98 dk)</i>	
Education	<i>Q: How old were you when you stopped full-time education? (1= 1-15 years, 2=16-19 years, 3=20+ years )</i> For people still studying, their completed years of educated were recorded.	
Age	<i>Q: How old are you?</i>	
Gender	Gender ( 1= man, 2=women)	
Blue Collar	<i>Q: What is your current occupation?</i> According to Eurobarometer coding, categories 15-18 were coded as blue collar work (employed position, service job; supervisor; skilled manual worker; unskilled manual worker), 1-0 binary variable	
Economic Difficulties	<i>Q: During the last twelve months, would you say you had difficulties to pay your bills at the end of the month...?(1 most of the time, 3 never, 4refusal) →rescaled 1 never to 3 most of the time</i>	
Voice counts	<i>Q: Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. A2: My voice counts in (OUR COUNTRY) (1 totally agree, 4 totally disagree, 5 dk)</i>	
Economy	<i>Q: How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? A1: The situation of the (NATIONALITY) economy (1 very good-4 very bad, 5dk)</i>	
Control Variables Country-Level		(all Eurostat)
Unemployment	Unemployment rate, % of active population	
Immigrants	Total number of immigrants per year	
GDP per capita	GDP per capita in purchasing power parities	
Inflation rate	Inflation rate, annual average rate of change (%)	
Gini-Coefficient	Gini-Coefficient of equalised disposable income	

## APPENDIX C

### MARGINAL EFFECTS

Table A3. Marginal Effects

	dy/dx	Standard error	P> z
<b>Trustindex (0=base outcome)</b>			
1	-0.024	0.011	0.023
2	-0.078	0.009	0
3	-0.111	0.011	0
4	-0.185	0.014	0
Vote share PRP	0.002	0.001	0.171
Elite discourse	0.032	0.015	0.03
Saliency(Country)	0.021	0.058	0.71
Saliency(Individual)	0.095	0.0244	0
<b>Vote share PRP* Saliency(Country)</b>			
1	0	0.001	0.092
2	0	0.001	0.556
3	0.001	0.001	0.27
4	0.002	0.001	0.119
5	0.002	0.001	0.057
6	0.003	0.001	0.033
7	0.003	0.001	0.023
8	0.004	0.001	0.018
9	0.004	0.001	0.016
<b>Trustindex*Saliency (Country)</b>			
<b>Trustindex=1</b>			
1	0.002	0.012	0.879
2	-0.008	0.019	0.381
3	-0.012	0.009	0.049
4	-0.023	0.012	0.017
5	-0.038	0.016	0.015
6	-0.048	0.020	0.017
7	-0.058	0.025	0.021
8	-0.067	0.03	0.024
9	-0.076	0.034	0.027
<b>Trustindex=2</b>			
1	-0.059	0.019	0.002
2	-0.066	0.013	0
3	-0.074	0.009	0
4	-0.081	0.01	0
5	-0.089	0.015	0
6	-0.096	0.022	0
7	-0.103	0.028	0
8	-0.11	0.035	0.002
9	-0.116	0.041	0.005
<b>Trustindex=3</b>			
1	0.018	-0.075	0
2	-0.089	0.013	0
3	-0.103	0.010	0
4	-0.117	0.012	0
5	-0.130	0.017	0
6	-0.144	0.023	0
7	-0.157	0.029	0
8	-0.17	0.036	0
9	-0.182	0.043	0



	dy/dx	Standard error	P> z
Trustindex=4			
1	-0.127	0.019	0
2	-0.15	0.015	0
3	-0.172	0.013	0
4	-0.194	0.015	0
5	-0.216	0.019	0
6	-0.238	0.024	0
7	-0.259	0.029	0
8	-0.28	0.034	0
9	-0.3	0.039	0

**APPENDIX D**  
**LOGIT COEFFICIENTS**

Table A4. Logit Coefficients

VARIABLES	(1) immicontri	(2) immicontri	(3) immicontri	(4) immicontri	(5) immicontri
Political Trust	-0.250*** (0.046)	-0.076 (0.049)	-0.250*** (0.046)	-0.250*** (0.046)	-0.108** (0.045)
Presence PRP	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.012)
Elite Discourse	0.298*** (0.086)	0.457*** (0.161)	0.299*** (0.086)	0.389*** (0.116)	0.298*** (0.079)
Political Interest	-0.172*** (0.038)	-0.154*** (0.042)	-0.172*** (0.038)	-0.172*** (0.038)	-0.173*** (0.039)
Education	-0.226*** (0.039)	-0.198*** (0.042)	-0.226*** (0.039)	-0.226*** (0.039)	-0.221*** (0.039)
Sex	0.010 (0.026)	0.004 (0.027)	0.010 (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.008 (0.027)
Age	0.011*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)
Economic difficulties	0.117** (0.048)	0.147*** (0.043)	0.117** (0.048)	0.117** (0.048)	0.118** (0.049)
Perception national economy	0.282*** (0.084)	0.337*** (0.075)	0.281*** (0.084)	0.282*** (0.084)	0.301*** (0.081)
Voice counts	0.254*** (0.054)	0.250*** (0.059)	0.254*** (0.054)	0.254*** (0.054)	0.251*** (0.054)
Blue collar	0.171** (0.076)	0.116 (0.083)	0.171** (0.076)	0.171** (0.076)	0.164** (0.076)
GDP per capita	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.005)
Inflation rate	-0.153*** (0.029)	-0.072 (0.048)	-0.152*** (0.029)	-0.147*** (0.030)	-0.142*** (0.029)
Gini-Coefficient	-0.061** (0.026)	-0.283*** (0.058)	-0.060** (0.027)	-0.061** (0.027)	-0.062** (0.026)
Unemployment	-0.051** (0.026)	0.026 (0.017)	-0.052** (0.025)	-0.052** (0.025)	-0.045* (0.024)
Saliency (individual)	0.406** (0.168)	0.404** (0.169)	0.406** (0.168)	0.406** (0.168)	0.405** (0.172)
Saliency (country)	-0.518* (0.304)	2.527*** (0.766)	-0.618 (0.382)	-0.080 (0.467)	0.094 (0.330)
Immigration	-0.000* (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Ideology	0.065*** (0.014)	0.074*** (0.013)	0.065*** (0.014)	0.065*** (0.014)	0.065*** (0.014)
Saliency*Trust		-0.558*** (0.137)			-0.461*** (0.113)
Saliency*Presence PRP			0.010 (0.025)		0.015 (0.022)
Saliency*Elite discourse				-0.547 (0.394)	
Constant	3.390*** (1.088)	9.589*** (2.609)	3.411*** (1.081)	3.325*** (1.082)	3.182*** (1.060)
Variance country-level	0.684*** (0.192)	3.014** (1.490)	0.689*** (0.194)	0.674*** (0.189)	0.675*** (0.193)
Variance wave-level	0.015** (0.007)	0.075 (0.049)	0.015** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.014* (0.007)
Observations	61,250	61,250	61,250	61,250	61,250
Number of countries	27	27	27	27	27
Number of waves	3	3	3	3	3

## APPENDIX E

### LEXISNEXIS SEARCH TERMS

Table A5. Overview Lexisnexis Search Terms

Country	Search term	Newspapers
Germany	(flüchtl* or immigr* or einwand*) and deutschl*	Süddeutsche Zeitung, Rheinische Post, Frankfurter Neue Presse, Aachener Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Der Tagesspiegel, Frankfurter Rundschau, Aachener Nachrichten, die tageszeitung, Die Welt, Stuttgarter Zeitung, General-Anzeiger, Berliner Zeitung, Kölnische Rundschau, Sächsische Zeitung Regionalausgaben, Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, Stuttgarter Nachrichten, Allgemeine Zeitung (18 Newspapers)
UK	(immigr* or asyl* or refugee*) and (brit* or united kingdom)	The Guardian, The Times, The Daily Telegraph, The Sun, The Daily Mail, Financial Times, The Sunday Times, Scottish Daily Mail, The Express, The Independent, Scotsman, The Mirror, The Evening Standard, Scottish Express, The Observer, The Herald, Yorkshire Post (17 Newspapers)
Austria	(flüchtl* or immigr* or einwand*) and österr*	Die Presse, Der Standard (2 Newspapers)
France	(réfugié* or fugiti* or immigr*) and franc* and not canad* <i>The add on "not canad*" was necessary to exclude results covering domestic issues in Canada</i>	Ouest-France, La Dépêche du Midi, Le Monde, Le Figaro, Midi Libre, Le Figaro Economie, L'Est Républicain, La Voix du Nord, Sud Ouest et Sud Ouest Dimanche, La Montagne, Aujourd'hui en France, Le Parisien, Le Télégramme, La Nouvelle République du Centre Ouest, La Croix, L'Humanité, Le Populaire du Centre, L'Indépendant, Les Echos (19 Newspapers)
Spain	(immigr* or refugia* or migra* or asyl*) and espan*	El Pais, El Periodico, El Mundo, ABC, El Correo, Diario Montañés, El Norte de Castilla, Diario Cordoba, Hoy, El Periodico Extremadura, La Rioja, Sur, El Comercio, Cinco Dias, Diario Vasco, La Voz de Cádiz, La Verdad (17 Newspapers)
Netherlands	(allocht* or immigr* or vluchte* or asielzoek*) and nederland*	Tagblad van het Noorden, de Volkskrant, Huis-aan-huiskranten de Persgroep, BN/DeStem, Dagblad De Limburger (PL), NRC Handelsblad, Trouw, De Gelderlander, AD/Utrechts Nieuwsblad, Noordhollands Dagblad, Nederlands Dagblad, Brabants Dagblad, Leeuwarder Courant, De Telegraaf, AD/Haagsche Courant, NRC.NEXT, AD/Rotterdams Dagblad, De Twentsche Courant Tubantia, AD/Amersfoortse Courant, AD/Groene Hart (20 Newspapers)
Denmark	(indvan* or immigr* or asyl* or flygt*) and (dansk* or danmark)	Politiken&Politiken weekly (1 Newspaper)
Ireland	(immigr* or asyl* or refugee*) and (ireland or irish*)	The Irish Times, Irish Independent, Irish Examiner, Irish Daily Mail, Sunday Independent, Belfast Telegraph, Sunday Business Post, Kerryman, Wexford People, Sligo Champion, Corkman, Drogheda Independent, The Herald, New Ross Standard, Longford Leader, Bray People, Gorey Guardian, Nationalist, Wicklow People, The Argus (20 Newspapers)
Italy	(migra* or rifugia* or asil* or immigr*) and italia*	La Nazione, Il Resto del Carlino, Corriere della Sera, Il Giorno, La Stampa, ItaliaOggi, La Gazzetta dello Sport, MF-Milano Finanza, ItaliaOggi (9 Newspapers)
Portugal	(migra* or imigr* or refugia* or asil*) and portu*	Correio da Manhã, Jornal de Negócios (2 Newspapers)
Belgium	(allocht* or immigr* or vluchte* or asielzoek* or réfugié* or fugiti* or immigr*) and (belg*)	De Krant van West-Vlaanderen, De Lloyd (2 Newspapers)
Poland	(azyl* or migr* or uchodzca or imigr*) and polsk*	Gazeta Wyborcza, Gazeta Prawna (2 Newspapers)

## APPENDIX F

### ARTICLE COUNT AS SALIENCE MEASURE

Table A6. Article Count as Salience Measure

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	antimmi	antimmi	antimmi	antimmi	antimmi
Political Trust	-0.232*** (0.031)	-0.182*** (0.032)	-0.232*** (0.031)	-0.232*** (0.031)	-0.182*** (0.032)
Presence PRP	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.000 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	0.000 (0.009)
Elite Discourse	0.239*** (0.087)	0.246*** (0.084)	0.218** (0.090)	0.082 (0.220)	0.224** (0.089)
Political Interest	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.015)
Education	-0.208*** (0.043)	-0.207*** (0.042)	-0.208*** (0.043)	-0.208*** (0.042)	-0.207*** (0.042)
Sex	-0.041 (0.031)	-0.042 (0.031)	-0.041 (0.031)	-0.041 (0.031)	-0.042 (0.031)
Age	0.014*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)
Economic difficulties	0.125*** (0.034)	0.124*** (0.035)	0.125*** (0.034)	0.125*** (0.034)	0.124*** (0.035)
Perception national economy	0.236** (0.107)	0.249** (0.104)	0.236** (0.107)	0.236** (0.107)	0.249** (0.104)
Voice counts	0.166*** (0.063)	0.165*** (0.064)	0.166*** (0.063)	0.166*** (0.063)	0.165*** (0.064)
Blue collar	0.227** (0.099)	0.223** (0.100)	0.227** (0.099)	0.227** (0.099)	0.223** (0.100)
GPD per capita	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.004)
Inflation rate	-0.079* (0.046)	-0.078* (0.045)	-0.066 (0.043)	-0.092* (0.055)	-0.065 (0.043)
Gini-Coefficient	-0.116*** (0.043)	-0.112*** (0.042)	-0.119*** (0.042)	-0.132** (0.060)	-0.116*** (0.041)
Unemployment rate	-0.046** (0.021)	-0.045** (0.020)	-0.042** (0.021)	-0.042* (0.024)	-0.041** (0.020)
Ideology	0.067*** (0.015)	0.066*** (0.015)	0.067*** (0.015)	0.067*** (0.015)	0.066*** (0.015)
Salience (Number of articles)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Salience*Trust		-0.000*** (0.000)			-0.000*** (0.000)
Salience*Presence PRP			-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)
Salience*Elite discourse				0.000 (0.000)	
Constant	3.624** (1.693)	3.367** (1.654)	3.619** (1.624)	4.314* (2.374)	3.376** (1.590)
Variance country-level	0.073* (0.040)	0.067* (0.040)	0.076* (0.043)	0.104 (0.095)	0.069* (0.042)
Variance wave-level	0.031*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.008)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.008)
Observations	40,017	40,017	40,017	40,017	40,017
Number of groups	12	12	12	12	12
Robust standard errors in parentheses				*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

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## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH**

Denise Walke grew up in Pinneberg, Germany. After graduating from high school and travelling New Zealand, she pursued her undergraduate degree in Political Science and Economics at the University of Münster, Germany. After her graduation with a Bachelor of Arts in 2017, she spent the next five months gaining professional experience with the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Hanoi, Vietnam. In October 2017, she joined the graduate program International Political Economy, a joint degree of the University of Marburg, Germany, and The University of Texas at Dallas. Since August 2018, she is completing the second part of her degree at The University of Texas at Dallas.

# Denise Walke

## EDUCATION

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<b>Master of Science in International Political Economy</b>	Oct. 2017 - Present
Philipps-University Marburg and University of Texas at Dallas; Dual Degree	GPA 3.78/4.0
<b>Bachelor of Arts in Politics and Economics</b>	Oct. 2013 - July 2017
Westfälische Wilhelms-University Münster	GPA 1.7/1.0

## EXPERIENCE

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<b>Gelzsus Marketing Research, Hamburg/ Frankfurt , Germany</b>	Oct. 2017 - May 2018
▪ Conducted computer-based interviews on different trade fairs / events as an interviewer	
<b>German Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Hanoi, Vietnam</b>	March 2017 - Aug 2017
<i>Intern "Projects and Delegations"</i>	
▪ Researched / authored an economic analysis of the metal processing sector	
▪ Supported preparations for delegation visits and took part in Business-to-Business events	
<b>LobbyControl e.V., Cologne, Germany</b>	Feb. 2016 - April 2016
<i>Intern "Projects and Campaigns EU"</i>	
▪ Thematic focus on European Trade Policy / TTIP and the influence of different stakeholders	
▪ Conducted research and wrote articles on lobbying of e.g. think tanks and law firms	
<b>Facing-Finance e.V., Berlin, Germany</b>	Feb. 2015 - April 2015
<i>Intern</i>	
▪ Focus on investment behaviour of financial service providers and ethical evaluation	
▪ Researched and wrote articles about critical cases of business behaviour	
▪ Participated in writing a study concerning the weapons industry	
<b>Political Science Institute, Westfälische Wilhelms-University Münster</b>	Oct. 2014 - Sep. 2015
<i>Student Assistant for Prof. Dr. Klaus Schubert</i>	
▪ Activities for the institute's alumni club such as event planning, PR and member support	

## RELEVANT SKILLS

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<b>Languages</b>	▪ German   native	<b>Computing</b>	▪ MS Office   proficient	<b>Professional Skills</b>	▪ Interdisciplinary thinking
	▪ English   fluent		▪ SPSS   basic		▪ Organization
	▪ French   basic		▪ Stata   basic		▪ Teamwork
	▪ Finnish   basic		▪ Wordpress   basic		

## SCHOLARSHIPS

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Deutschland-scholarship	Oct. 2018 - Present
PROMOS-scholarship	July 2018 - Oct. 2018 and March 2017
e-fellows.net scholarship	Oct. 2017 - Present
Erasmus-scholarship	Aug. 2015 - Dec.2015

## ACTIVITIES

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<b>Member of the network "Plural Economists" in Marburg, Germany</b>	Oct. 2017 - Jul 2018
▪ Organised lecture series "Ten Years after the Crash"	
▪ Responsible for designing information materials and communication	
<b>Erasmus-Scholar at Turun yliopisto in Turku, Finland</b>	Aug. 2015 - Dec. 2015
▪ Participated in seminars related to European Politics, Politics of Middle East and Finnish language	GPA 4.75/5.0

**Summerschool in Pondicherry, India**

Sep. 2014

*Organized by the University of Cologne and the China-NRW Alliance*

- Participated in lectures covering India's Culture, Politics and Economics
- One-week study trip through South India

**Member of "Grüne Jugend" Pinneberg and Münster, Germany**

Aug. 2011 - Aug. 2012

*Youth organization of the German Green Party*

Apr. 2014 - Feb. 2017

- Participated in weekly plenum and discussion of current political topics
- Support for the state election campaign 2012 of Alliance 90/The Greens
- Organisation of political actions (e.g. considerate usage of plastic bags)

**Gap year in New Zealand** (working holiday)

Aug. 2012 - May 2013