LISTENING TENACIOUSLY: POLITICS, LANGUAGES, AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

IN THE WORK OF J.G.A. POCOCK

by

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This work is dedicated to my husband, Isai, for your constant encouragement and support. To my children, Levi and Luna. Everything has been for you. To my parents, for years of believing in me and hoping for me. To my sensei and constant mentor, Dr. Timothy Hoye. This is for you.

Thank you.

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by

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IN THE WORK OF J.G.A. POCOCK

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This dissertation seeks to honor the maieutic arts in the Western philosophical tradition, by engaging the space, which lies between intellectual history and political theory in the history of ideas through the study of J.G.A. Pocock's works. This study seeks to establish three main points. First, Pocock's methodology can be described as linguistic contextualization, which I call "tenacious listening." Second, Pocock's work has challenged the traditional narrative in political theory and intellectual history in its approach to Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the canonized paradigmatic figures of the West. For Pocock, the three paradigmatic figures of early modern Western political theory are Niccolo Machiavelli, James Harrington, and Edward Gibbon. Third, through his methodology of tenacious listening and linguistic contextualization, Pocock presents a distinct and particular view of Machiavelli, Harrington and Gibbon. The points explored in this study are meant to offer scholars of political thought across disciplinary lines a more precise and holistic portrayal of J.GA. Pocock. In so doing, I intend to consider the idea of a republic in Pocock's work, its place in the interdisciplinary landscape, and its relevance to the political climate in the United States today.

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# CHAPTER 1

# INTRODUCTION

*"The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them".*

Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*

**Why J.G.A. Pocock?**

The history of ideas has expanded itself into a sub-discipline of intellectual history rich with the contributions of many profoundly significant scholars beginning with Lovejoy, Ernst Cassirer, Bernard Bailyn and continuing through the work of J.G.A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and so many others. These scholars engaged processes of exploring issues of political thought with mainly Western inclinations. In the spirit of honoring the maieutic arts in the Western philosophical tradition, scholars are called to be *philosophers*, lovers of wisdom. The history of ideas creates the space for this kind of thought, and in this study, the space engaged is that which lies between intellectual history and political theory.

Pocock's work inhabits this space, though he defined himself as a historian. Yet, I argue that the delineations made between disciplines are so rigid that the definition of historian must be examined with strict scrutiny- to borrow a concept from constitutional law. Pocock is not just a historian; he is a scholar who tenaciously listens. I argue that his work provides a paradigm shift for intellectual history akin to the Kuhnian paradigm shift for science. I argue further that Pocock's work has shifted the understanding of who has been foundational to the modern world. The term "paradigmatic individuals" is used throughout this study in reference to Karl Jaspers'

concept of the Axial Age and the Hegelian idea of Jesus as a paradigmatic individual, to which Jaspers added Buddha, Confucius, and Socrates in *The Great Philosophers* (1962).[1] As will be demonstrated, for Pocock, the paradigmatic figures of Western political thought on the idea of a republic are not Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, but Niccolo Machiavelli, James Harrington, and Edward Gibbon. Harrington's influence is certainly not a new idea for intellectual historians; however, this study inhabits a space between. In the traditional narratives in Government, the Lockean paradigm remains dominant. Therefore I argue that Pocock's work is particularly compelling for political theorists as a historical understanding of Western political thought. Pocock's work shores up the understanding of the foundations of the American republic, which are at stake in our current political climate.

**Principal Points**

In a revealing 2019 essay titled, "A response to Samuel James's 'J. G. A. Pocock and the Idea of the "Cambridge School" in the History of Political Thought'" Pocock writes, "Once again, though, I must resist James's contention that I always move from historiography to political theory; the two are co-existent and interactive and have always appeared so to me."[2] Therefore, this study seeks to establish three main points. First, Pocock's methodology can be described as linguistic contextualization. While this description is useful in navigating classification compared to other approaches to scholarship in intellectual history, the essential component of Pocock's work is what I call and present as "tenacious listening." I argue that at

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[1] Karl Jaspers, *The Great Philosophers.* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962).

[2] J.G.A. Pocock, "A response to Samuel James's 'J. G. A. Pocock and the Idea of the 'Cambridge School' in the History of Political Thought," *History of European Ideas* 45, no. 1 (2019): 102.

the heart of Pocock's method of contextualization, there is an intensely focused ability

to *listen.* Pocock tenaciously listens to political language itself, and the surrounding sounds of

context, in the form of foundational ideas, contemporary reception, political stability, varying

forms of the power structure, and the lives and habits of political actors. Identifying this

particular element of Pocock's methodology allows me to gain insights absent in previous

scholarship about Pocock by viewing his methodology holistically. Pocock's "tool-box" as a

historian is complimented by cross cultural experiences, a focus on linguistics, and the

interdisciplinary nature of his ideas about intellectual history and paradigmatic figures.

Tenacious listening is a holistic approach to scholarship. It is a practice of viewing political

actors as whole, and one that calls forth practices particularly suited for the Humanities.

Second, Pocock's work has challenged the traditional narrative in political theory and

intellectual history in its approach to Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau

as the canonized paradigmatic figures of the West. For Pocock, the three paradigmatic figures of

early modern Western political theory are Niccolo Machiavelli, James Harrington, and Edward

Gibbon. Third, through his methodology of tenacious listening and linguistic contextualization,

Pocock presents a Machiavelli whose *Discourses* is more critical than his *Prince,* a Harrington

who applied Machiavelli's theory of mixed government to the question of property in a republic,

and a Gibbon who shifted the focus to the problem and place of religion in a republic.[3] The

aforementioned points are explored in this study to offer scholars of political thought across

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[3] Harvey C Mansfield Jr. and Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).; Niccolò Machiavelli and Mark Musa, *The Prince* (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1998).; James Harrington, *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (London: Routledge, 1887) Originally published 1656.; Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (United

Kingdom,1880) Originally published 1776.

disciplinary lines a more precise holistic portrayal of J.GA. Pocock. In so doing, I intend to

consider the idea of a republic in Pocock's work, its place in the interdisciplinary landscape, and

its relevance to the political climate in the United States today.

Further, in his reply to James' work on the Cambridge School, Pocock exemplifies the

points I argue in the following description of his work and intellectual trajectory,

"I can envisage a history (I'm not calling on James to write it) in which the Laslett-Pocock-Skinner thesis could be investigated by examining the work of the latter two through the 1970s (which I spent in Cambridge beyond Cambridge; Canterbury 1958-65, Washington University 1966-74). This would conclude with my *The Machiavellian Moment* (1975), a 'Cambridge' treatise in an American setting (suggested by Caroline Robbins and Bernard Bailyn); the concurrently constructed *Political Works of James Harrington* (1977), a strictly 'Cambridge' work linking ACFL with TMM, in which Laslett, Skinner and John Wallace of Chicago all had a hand; and Skinner's *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (1978), the recognised masterwork of the ' Cambridge School.' The investigation of my original assertion would now be completed.
I would add, however, the claim I have made elsewhere: that Skinner emerges from the English Interregnum on the shoulders of Thomas Hobbes and leans toward political theory and rhetoric, whereas I emerge on those of James Harrington and lean towards political historiography, ending with Gibbon and the Scottish Enlightenment. By this terminal date (1975-78), Skinner and I had discovered Machiavelli (mentioned by me as far back as ACFL), and we're writing about him as *politico e storico*. My concluding work, the six-volume *Barbarism and Religion* (1999-2014) is undeniably a history of historiography, concerned with its origins in political thought only in part, and to mention it here is to travel an unconscionable distance from the starting point of James's essay. I do so only to reiterate my point that I have always seen political thought and historiography as co-existent and have traveled to the latter no less than from it."[4]

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[4] Pocock, "A response to Samuel James's 'J. G. A. Pocock and the Idea of the 'Cambridge School' in the History of Political Thought," 103.

Thus, I argue that at the heart of Pocock's work is the idea of a republic; this is the transcendent dimension and unexpressed first premise of his work from *The Ancient Constitution* through to *Barbarism and Religion,* and as most clearly presented in *The Machiavellian Moment*.[5]

**Chapter Overview**

This study begins with a brief personal and intellectual biography of J.G.A. Pocock's life and the personal and professional influences on his work. Chapter one focuses on framing Pocock's work and providing the foundational context for its later development. As the purpose is to provide a background for understanding Pocock holistically, I have begun with his familial lineage and moved on to his academic influences. The particular influential members chosen were selected with their proximity to Pocock in mind and their individual academic and intellectual achievements. For the familial exploration, I have included Pocock's father, L.G. Pocock; Pocock's mother, Antoinette De Gros; and Pocock's paternal aunt, M.A. Pocock. My reasons for beginning with these three are rooted in the intention to do for Pocock what Pocock did for his paradigmatic individuals, that is, to understand them holistically and in context. My choices stem from the idea that a person is best understood through both nature and nurture. Nature, in this respect, refers to Pocock's lineage of scholarship, curiosity, and academic excellence. Nurture refers to those who Pocock was exposed to as a student, studied under, and who he chose to surround himself with, thus being influenced by and intellectually indebted to them.

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[5] J.G.A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957).; J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016) Originally published 1975.; J.G.A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion: The Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon, 1737-1764. Volume 1.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

I begin by framing my approach with a literary example from *The Rector of Justin,* a novel by American writer, lawyer, and historian, Louis Auchincloss.[6] This particular reference was selected because I find it to be serendipitously appropriate to both time and place. The novel was published in 1964 while Pocock created his academic presence, but before he wrote his magnum opus, *The Machiavellian Moment.* The setting is the New England region of the United States, coinciding with Pocock's teaching experience at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. The novel serves as a helpful juxtaposition as the narrator considers writing the life of a school's headmaster, while I considered how best to approach an exploration of Pocock's life and work. I have found it to also be appropriate as an example of the Humanities: History of Ideas program, as the program is by nature interdisciplinary and aims to combine history, philosophy, literature, and art.

Chapter one's primary goal is to lay the groundwork for understanding Pocock's contribution and legacy to the history of ideas through secondary literature and Pocock's collected essays in *Political Thought and History* (2009).[7] With Pocock's familial and academic lineage, his intellectual biography begins to take shape, thus opening the door to the later exploration and analysis of his methodology. Through this analysis, I will challenge the limits implied by Pocock's classification as a Cambridge School historian. In exploring his intellectual foundations and the context of his later work, I will show how essential parts of his scholarship were written outside Cambridge and, I argue, are best understood outside that delineation. To clarify, I do not take issue with Pocock's identification as a Cambridge School historian,

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[6] Louis Auchinloss, *The Rector of Justin* (London: Panther Books, 1964).

[7] J.G.A. Pocock, *Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

alongside Quentin Skinner, Peter Laslett, and John Dunn.[8] Instead, I argue that while the label is appropriate for Pocock's early work *at* Cambridge, his methodology naturally grew through experience and became a process of tenacious listening rooted in linguistic contextualization. I argue further that this methodology is characteristic of his standalone contribution and independent of the Cambridge School. The Cambridge School is *a* component, but *not* the whole of Pocock. I further argue that Pocock's work has elevated paradigmatic individuals as a singular approach to the practice of intellectual history. The practice has significantly added to our understanding of the idea of a republic and the civic humanist tradition, especially concerning the American founding.

This study also explores what I refer to as 'the space between' as Pocock's life and work were spent in-between and among cultures. I argue that Pocock's inclinations for interdisciplinary research and scholarship add to his work's multidimensionality and disrupt the rigidity of disciplinary constructs. Considerable space will be given to analyzing Pocock's work, his ideas on the role of the historian, and his methodology for studying history. I will build on Herbert Butterfield and Michael Oakeshott's influence in Pocock's early career and later on in the shared academic endeavors of his contemporary scholars.[9] In the chapters that follow, I consider how Pocock concentrated his efforts in intellectual history through paradigmatic

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[8] Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume 1, The Renaissance* (Kiribati: Cambridge University Press, 1978).; John Locke and Peter Laslett, *Two Treatises of Government : a Critical Edition with an Introduction and Apparatus Criticus* (New York: New American Library, 1965) Originally published 1960.; John Dunn, *The political thought of John Locke: an historical account of the argument of the 'Two treatises of government'* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

[9] Herbert Butterfield, "Moral Judgments in His Butterfield." *History and Human Relations*, (1951): 101-130.; Michael Joseph Oakeshott, *Experience and its Modes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933).

individuals. For Pocock, these were James Harrington, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Edward Gibbon, which I explore in separate chapters of this work by elevating major work such as *The Ancient Constitution, Politics Language and Time, The Machiavellian Moment,* and his volumes on *Barbarism and Religion.*[10] One of the purposes for exploring Pocock's life and work holistically is to situate his scholarship within its broader implications; for example, the comparative and complementary aspects of Thomas Kuhn, Friedrich Hegel, Hannah Arendt, and Eric Voegelin, thus bringing attention to the interdisciplinary depth of Pocock's legacy.[11]

One of the purposes of beginning with a holistically contextual approach to Pocock's life and scholarship is in preparation for understanding his work on languages and time, which is seminal to his contribution to History. Understanding languages and time particular to Pocock's experience as a cross-cultural Anglophone historian provides the foundation for exploring what I call Pocock's methodological practice of 'tenacious listening.' In Chapter two of this study I will explore Pocock's linguistic contextualization and argue that his methodology amounts to a paradigm shift in intellectual history. Pocock's methodology takes shape through a conceptual exploration and analysis of *The Ancient Constitution,* and *Politics, Language and Time.*[12] I also argue that contemporary considerations of language and time are, in part, indebted to Pocock, his contributions, and legacy. Furthermore, Pocock's work helped develop the "linguistic turn" of

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[10] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law.*; J.G.A. Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).; Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment.*; Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion.*

[11] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, T. M. Knox, and John Sibree. *The Philosophy of Right* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1955). Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*, with introduction by Jonathan Schell (London: Penguin Books, 2006) Original work published 1963.; Eric Voegelin, *The Ecumenic Age* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1990) Originally Published 1975.

[12] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law.*; Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time.*

the 1980s and 1990s as part of the landscape across disciplines created by Jürgen Habermas, Reinhart Koselleck, and Thomas Kuhn.[13] Thus my central argument throughout this study is that Pocock's contribution to intellectual history comes through his methodology, which I understand as composed of tenacious listening and linguistic contextualization.

After the "linguistic turn," intellectual historians grappled with the changes in the discipline and how to create a 'history of meaning' centered on language. As will be explored in chapters to come, William J. Bouwsma encouraged historians post the "linguistic turn" toward inclusivity and an interdisciplinary focus.[14] However, as the discipline's progression demonstrated, he was misguided in his predictions of the decline of rigid academic structures. It remains a credit to the History of Ideas program that the combination of history, philosophy, literature, and art is elevated in a humanities doctoral program. These serve as proof that scholarship post "linguistic-turn" aided by J.G.A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, Richard Rorty, and others written in service to the unification of disciplines were fruitful and worthwhile endeavors.

Nevertheless, they did not lead quite to the blurring of disciplinary lines Bouwsma suggested.[15] One of the sub-aims for this study is to inhabit the Metaxy or in-between space between intellectual history and political theory. I present an exploration of a seminal scholar whose work embodies a quintessential interdisciplinary approach. My method for this exploration is to navigate Pocock's work in intellectual history and its intrinsic connection to

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[13] Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Germany: Wiley, 2015) Originally published 1962.; Reinhart Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1988).; Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.*

[14] John E. Toews, "Intellectual history after the linguistic turn: The autonomy of meaning and the irreducibility of experience." *The American Historical Review* 92, no. 4 (1987): 879-907.

[15] Toews, "Intellectual history after the linguistic turn: The autonomy of meaning and the irreducibility of experience."

political theory, examining the idea of a republic in the classical sense and its shadow on the American founding. The intentions are to blend intellectual history and political theory supported by political literature in service to the aims of the history of ideas.

I approach the aforementioned aims by spending a considerable portion of this study on what I argue is Pocock's magnum opus, *The Machiavellian Moment* (TMM). However, instead of dedicating the majority of analysis to content details in TMM, the focus is kept on the spirit of the work, its broader implications, and its character and lasting influence. As the clearest example of Pocock's methodology, TMM will be situated alongside secondary scholarship to explore the context surrounding Pocock's writing, the idea of a republic, and the paradigmatic figures of James Harrington and Niccolo Machiavelli. The purpose is to analyze TMM and provide a context for considering the roots of the American founding regarding Pocock's ideas on the classical republic, political languages, and historical time.

The third chapter of this study explores political thought and the idea of a republic. I argue that the central point of TMM lies in Pocock's tenacious listening to the underlying ideas of the American founding, which are rooted in the legacy of the ancients and directly opposed to all "isms." A considerable portion of the chapter will concern secondary work for understanding TMM holistically, as a monumental part of Pocock's career and a major contribution to contemporary scholarship. Through his practice of listening tenaciously, Pocock remained attentive and aware of other scholar's work in his area of particular interest while drawing from a wide net of resources across disciplinary lines. Pocock's work demonstrates a commitment to the maieutic arts as it engaged with, responded to, and listened for diverse scholarship. By remaining intellectually flexible in his approach to scholarship, I argue that Pocock's work remains relevant

to the current political climate in the United States, offering worthy insights into the existing power structure. Pocock's work continues to speak for the idea of a republic, the structures of power, and the function and limitations of democracy, which remain topics of the utmost importance to modernity.

Scholars have welcomed Pocock's contribution of *The Machiavellian Moment* and spent decades responding in kind with careful critiques and high praise. Now a classic, TMM is in danger of being overlooked, more from reverence than disinterest. In my exploration of the work and its impact, I provide a fresh look at its intention. I am convinced of its continued applicability to the current political climate in the United States and its ability to cross traditional disciplinary boundaries. TMM is explored in the interest of understanding Pocock's paradigm shift and what he believed to be the proper role of the modern scholar, including historians of political thought and political philosophers, theorists, and scientists. To be clear, while I have dedicated this study to the specific exploration of Pocock and his work as an intellectual historian, one of the greatest lessons of this endeavor is that Pocock saw himself and his work as woven into the fabric of cooperative scholarship and never as set apart or independent of other scholars. The interconnectedness of his ideas and the tenacious listening with which he approached academic contributions lent itself to a commitment to interdisciplinary work, which is evident throughout the trajectory of his professional career.

*Barbarism and Religion* affords another opportunity to explore Pocock's cooperative approach to intellectual history.[16] The final chapter of this study is dedicated to understanding and applying Pocock's methodology to his work on Edward Gibbon. In it, I explore the selected

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[16] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1.*

portions of Pocock's six volumes that are ideally suited to parsing out the details of Pocock's tenacious listening and linguistic contextualization of historical actors. In chapter four of this study, I situate Pocock's work on Edward Gibbon, his final paradigmatic figure. Pocock's *Barbarism and Religion* analyzes in detail the context, political climate, and religious inclinations of Gibbon's time. Religion becomes the bridge between Harrington and Gibbon as 18th-century religious tensions bring depth to how best to understand the Western Enlightenment. The central purpose of my final chapter is to understand Pocock and his work through his particular methodology. By tenaciously listening to Pocock in his endeavors to listen to Gibbon, I can get closer to the heart of Pocock's contribution. By beginning at Pocock's beginning and working through his work's trajectory culminating in his volumes on *Barbarism and Religion*, Pocock's thought process and methods are revealed.

Further in chapter four, I juxtapose James Harrington with Thomas Hobbes and Edward Gibbon with Edmund Burke. Thomas Hobbes and James Harrington were central to Pocock's understanding of early modern political thought. For Pocock, Harrington's political thought embodied Aristotelian virtues with Machiavelli's political structure, making both central to understanding the idea of a republic, especially in the early American experiment. In this chapter, I present how the reduction of religion for Hobbes was critical to the monarchy's success. To understand Harrington's *Oceana,* Hobbes' *Leviathan* first needs to be understood.[17] As will be discussed in chapter four, *Oceana* intensified *Leviathan* and engaged it on details of religious perspective and power structures. Consideration of Hobbes within Pocock's

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[17] Harrington, *The Commonwealth of Oceana.;* Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan.* (United States: West Margin Press, 1651).

understanding of Harrington is beneficial concerning the classical tradition, especially regarding Machiavellian realism, on which he constructed his ideas about human motivation and natural law. Hobbes' theory that fear and appetite were the primary motivating factors for human activity led to constructing the social contract theory. It was naturally adopted post-Hobbes by other political actors. Though with alterations particular to their suppositions such as James Harrington and later John Locke, this came in rejection to the idea that humanity naturally seeks the good. Chapter four demonstrates how Pocock argues in part for Hobbesian philosophy's validity, specifically regarding self-preservation and society.

I argue further that an exploration of Pocock's Edward Gibbon would be incomplete without situating Gibbon contextually alongside Edmund Burke. Gibbon's antagonistic view of Christianity and his argument that it was the force behind Rome's fall culminates in charges of Christian intolerance and dogmatic condemnation of the *other*. However, Gibbon joined politically, though not religiously, with Burke in their mutual conservatism. Akin to Hobbes, Burke found intrinsic flaws in human motivations but sympathized with Harrington's inclinations toward Aristotelian foundational republican concepts. I explore how Gibbon and Burke primarily disagreed concerning the role of Christianity in civil society. For Burke, it was central, and for Gibbon, its intrusion's consequential danger outweighed any possible benefit to its presence. I demonstrate how Pocock's work reflects a commitment to understanding these two scholars individually and in relation to each other to comprehend better their impact on the civic humanist tradition and the problem of religion in a classical republic. Burke also affords Pocock a counterpart to his study of language and political thought. In chapter four, I consider how Burke's study of language in *Philosophical Enquiry* helped Pocock frame his understanding

of the conservative perspective in early modern political thought, shaping the reception of

Burke's arguments for the essentialness of Christianity as a shaper of morality in a republic.[18]

Thus I argue that for Pocock, understanding the role of religion in the republic, according to

Burke, was foundational for unpacking the juxtaposing view of its destructive nature found in

Gibbon.

      I also clarify the larger implications of Pocock's work through selected volumes within

Pocock's collection on Gibbon and complimentary secondary scholarship. I show part of what

Pocock did in *Barbarism and Religion* is world-building through intense contextualization of

Gibbon, thus creating a full picture of his life, language, and time. In the absence or corruption of

religious structure, republican government and the possibility of its decay into barbarism are also

considered in chapter four. I argue that religion and the republic share a complicated relationship

fraught with tensions. While a genuinely secular republic may very well be impossible, Pocock

commits to an in-depth exploration of the religious question in early modern political thought.

In *Barbarism and Religion,* eighteenth-century religious concerns are the primary focus

alongside how to understand enlightenment in Western civilization best.[19] This study features a

selected exploration of volumes 1,2,3 and 6 alongside secondary literature, primarily through

Jonathan Israel's work to apply Pocock's methodology to his work on Gibbon.[20] The point of

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[18] Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (United Kingdom: J. Dodsley, 1757).

[19] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1*.; J.G.A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion: Narratives of Civil Government, Volume 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).; J.G.A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion: The first decline and fall. Volume 3.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).*;* J.G.A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion: Triumph of the West. Volume 6.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[20] Jonathan Israel, *Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and*

particular interest within this exploration comes forth in Western civilization's organization of enlightenment thought. I analyze the differences in Pocock and Israel's arguments and argue that the crux of the matter lies in the classification and categorization of the various Enlightenment movements. I explicate how for Pocock, the various Enlightenments were best understood as a family of enlightenments. For Israel, this terminology was too vague, and he countered that there was a Western Enlightenment far too intertwined to be organized into a structured regional approach. Through analysis of both, I argue for compromise in understanding the entirety of the Western Enlightenment as a whole, but with regional consideration.

J.G.A. Pocock's contributions to the history of political thought are significant and profound. Decades of substantial scholarly literature already exist that engages with, critique, and adopt Pocock's arguments and methodology in intellectual history. However, this dissertation seeks to present a holistic study of Pocock's life and work to identify his methodology, and engage with it by practicing it on Pocock as the paradigmatic figure in focus. In this regard, I seek to clarify his idea of a republic. For scholars of the American experience, understanding the idea of a republic has been paramount to understanding the American founding, a perennial concern still pressing today in light of our current tumultuous partisan political climate. The narrative of American exceptionalism and exemption has permeated a post-modern Lockean individualism prevalent in American politics. Today, while Pocock's work helps to shift the misguided focus from the individual to the classical republic by tenaciously listening to paradigmatic figures at the roots of the American political system. I argue that J.G.A.

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*Human Rights (1750-1790)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).; Jonathan Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His Barbarism and Religion.'" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 77, no. 1 (2016): 107–127.

Pocock is the most compelling intellectual historian due to his idiomatic use of language and conceptualization of the idea if a republic.

# CHAPTER 2

## THE SPACE BETWEEN: INFLUENCES AND INDEBTEDNESS

Scholars must take care, and modesty must be observed when attempting to "write" other scholars' lives. In Louis Auchincloss's 1964 novel, *The Rector of Justin,* Brian, the central character, reluctantly takes on writing about Frank Prescott.[21] So too, when we set out to write anything close to an intellectual biography of an important figure such as J.G.A. Pocock, we must take care not to erect idealized bronze statues with our pens. As Brian writes about Prescott concerning his own experience with the seemingly larger-than-life figure, so too must any attempted chronicling of Pocock be focused on how his life and work have impacted the trajectory of historical scholarship as a function of the larger discipline. One of this dissertation's goals is to understand Pocock's real contribution and how he has impacted future scholars' work and the practice of historical inquiry, rather than how he has erected a monument to his ideal of what history should be. After all, there is no 'school of Pocock' in thought or practice. This chapter seeks to explore Pocock's intellectual biography, his familial, academic lineage, and the most significant influences to which his work is indebted to understand better how and from what Pocock developed his methodology and commitment to intellectual rigor.

My method for proceeding is to select one of Pocock's major works and thematically explore its contents, context, and consequence. The primary work examined in this chapter

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[21] Brian Aspinwall, the unifying narrator of the novel, comes to Justin Martyr Academy and eventually writes Reverend Francis Prescott's life in Louis Auchincloss's thoughtful novel analyzing American institutions of education. This example is presented here in part to honor the commitment to interdisciplinary considerations, namely in the intersection of literature with history and politics so uniquely exemplified in the Humanities and History of Ideas. Other works of literature are consulted and considered throughout the study for the same purpose.

is *Political Thought and History* (2009), along with the substantial amount of secondary

literature necessary for exploring the relevant points of interest. The essays contained

within *Political Thought and History* represent an excellent collection of Pocock's thoughts on

the role of the historian, how he sees his work as a contribution to intellectual history, and his

thoughts on the interconnectedness of history and political theory. In short, it is the best

representation of Pocock's interdisciplinary nature, presented thematically. In the chapters to

come, one of Pocock's major works will be elevated according to that chapter's theme and

situated contextually among Pocock's other works and the corresponding scholarly conversation

within the larger intellectual context. To accomplish this, I intend to remain careful not to create

myths beyond where Pocock's influence extends, or "bury him with praise, [and] mummify

[him] with laudation."[22] To make him into a souvenir of his own life would be a disservice to

Pocock and those interested in his work; however, to move forth with such an endeavor and

ignore the fundamental influences of his early biographical history is to truncate the experience

of studying Pocock and his work. One cannot seek to understand J.G.A. Pocock, the scholar, and

his subsequent legacy, without beginning with a footing in the person first.

**A. A Lineage of Scholarship**

As a second-generation academic, J.G.A. Pocock was fortunate enough to be born in a

time shared with some of the most eminent and productive minds of the twentieth century. A few

notable influences that J.G.A. Pocock and his father L.G. Pocock were contemporaries include

Albert Einstein, Marie Curie, Betrand Russell, Neils Bohr, Maria Montessori, Alfred North

Whitehead, Oswald Spengler, and Charles Beard. In the process of understanding J.G.A.

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[22] Louis Auchinloss, *The Rector of Justin*, 120.

Pocock's biographical history, work, and legacy, the most prudent beginning is with his father. The latter's work left a lasting impression on him and constituted a lingering orientation toward language and the classics. His father, Lewis Greville Pocock (1890-1975), was a Classics professor at Canterbury College from 1928-1955. L.G. Pocock was a creative and competent classicist who advocated for the continued teaching of Latin in New Zealand's schools. He pressed upon his son an early understanding of the importance of language in scholarly research and a favoring of the linguistic components of subjects, which rooted itself in the minds of both scholars respectively. A collection of his work is kept for reference at Christchurch City Libraries and includes his published works, newspaper articles, and personal written effects. His major works include *A commentary on Cicero 'in Vatinium* (1926), *The Sicilian origin of The Odyssey* (1957), and *Reality and allegory in The Odyssey* (1959).

As a classical scholar and historian of the ancients, L.G. Pocock was fascinated by the origins of Homer's *Odyssey* and spent considerable time analyzing the claims of Samuel Butler in *The Authoress of the Odyssey.* With skillful use of linguistics, literary, and historical evidence, he concluded in *The Sicilian origin of The Odyssey: A Study of the Topographical Evidence* that Scheria and Ithaca were, in fact, Trapani and that the author wove in comedic clues for his present audience and an educated posterity. Both the elder and younger Pococks functioned under the assumption that an intimate understanding of Greek Mythology is critical for intellectual history, particularly concerning what J.G.A. Pocock would later intend by seeing Enlightenment philosophers' work and early American founders through the lens of historical contextualism.

In *The Odyssey,* we need the ritualistic account (ship records, feast records, names and personages, lineages, ritual descriptions) for the immersive experience in a world in which we do not dwell. As one of the Great Books, the Odyssey lends itself to a basic reading without this background knowledge, and one could still glean a cursory understanding from an initial survey reading of the text. However, if the more profound desire is to spend one's life in a Great Book, it is worthwhile to research the work's depth. As scholars and admirers of the classics, we elect to partake in the traditional disciplinary parameters set forth by academia for History, Philosophy, Literature, and Politics, *or* we endeavor to dance across the lines, blending flavors and traditions to understand and dialogue with others in a more holistic fashion. For both approaches, it remains necessary to entrench ourselves in a historical understanding of the text and its time. We must submit to being swept away by the work because it is deep enough to dwell in for a lifetime. When one re-reads, choosing a specific angle from which to view the work and lets the rest sweep past, then reads again, assuming a different angle, a cathedral is formed in the mind for understanding a Great Book. This type of effort was familiar to L.G. Pocock. Through his father's model, J.G.A. Pocock had his first beginning in creating the methodology of contextualization and tenacious listening, which will be explored in all subsequent chapters. Close reading of the text; whether it be his father's work on *The Odyssey* or his mature work on *The Decline and Fall*, it is evident through biographical research that J.G.A. Pocock's methodology had a foundational rootedness in L.G. Pocock's work on classical literature. Themes such as homecoming, hospitality and the Virtue of Xenia, fatherlessness, sacrifice, and place are the most telling of all are present in this particular work and lend themselves quite beautifully to both Pocock's engagement with context and language. Yet, while *The Sicilian*

*origin of The Odyssey* proved to be an admirable exercise in learned interpretation, overall, it was received with considerably less enthusiasm by classical scholars than could be hoped. Nevertheless, in L.G. Pocock's work, the seeds of interdisciplinary and creative scholarship that would later bear fruit in J.G.A. Pocock's work are evident.

Unfortunately, less is known about J.G.A. Pocock's mother, Antoinette Le Gros (1889-1976), whom he credits with teaching him more history than any school.[23] Through Le Gros, the daughter of a French-speaking Methodist minister, Pocock understood that he was of settler descent and a fourth-generation colonist on his father's side and "descended from an island people" on the side of his mother. The knowledge of this created within his identity a multi-faceted understanding of language, place, and time. Le Gros was a Channel Islander and daughter of a Methodist minister whose roots reached between the Atlantic archipelago and the European peninsula.[24]

I believe the credit of historical instruction which Pocock attributes to Le Gros was that of an intimate understanding of the importance of *place* as a foundation for what it means to be human and the process of understanding humanity historically. In my reading of Pocock's *The Discovery of Islands,* I find him to have a grounding in place, akin to those ideas found in Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* and Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time,* to which we will return in later chapters. As the flightless birds so beautifully referenced in this work and his valedictorian speech, *The Owl Reviews his Feathers, there* is something to be said about the point of origin and the ability to return that is at odds with the experience of Pocock as an ex-

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[23] J.G.A. Pocock, *The Discovery of Islands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),4.

[24] Pocock, *The Discovery of Islands*, 4.

patriot, voluntary exile, or transient scholar.[25] Pocock's idea that "There is no history which is not many-sided and no reading to which there are no alternatives" lends richness to interpretation and creative musings within the often-dry landscape of intellectual history and political theory.[26]

Within Pocock's work, we find an authorial prowess adept at navigating larger ideas by breaking them into smaller, more manageable components. For example, collections of essays containing the possibility of expansion and discussion by other scholars, and the ability to compose works of great length, such as his later six-volume work on Edward Gibbon in *Barbarism and Religion,* which the final chapter of this study will explore. Pocock's work resists rigidity of discipline, as do his life's identity questions such as 'place' amidst colonization and the indigenous rooted in his mother's experience and familial history, while creating a space conducive to the inclusion of thought and dynamic dialogue among contemporary and future scholars.

Lending further depth to the lineage of scholarship of her nephew is the relatively unknown explorer, botanist, and phycologist, Mary Agard Pocock (1886-1977). M.A. Pocock began her higher education journey at Cheltenham Ladies College in Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, England, after attending Bedford High School. Both institutions were boarding schools for girls aged 11-18. M.A. Pocock later studied botany at the University of London and earned a preliminary degree, a B.Sc., in botany, geology, and mathematics in 1908, an Honours degree from the University of London in 1921and later a Ph.D. in Phycology in 1932 from the

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[25] J.G.A. Pocock, *J.G.A. Pocock's Valedictory Lecture: The Owl Reviews his Feathers.* (The Archangul Foundation, 1994).

[26] Pocock, *The Discovery of Islands*, ix.

University of Cape Town in Cape Town, South Africa.[27] M.A. Pocock worked as a teacher in schools for girls in London and South Africa and lectured in the botany department for Rhodes University. She went on expeditions for the collection of various flowering plant specimens on behalf of the Royal Botanical Gardens and the British Museum, and established the Rhode University Herbarium (RUH) in 1942. In 1967 The Selmar Schonland took on the housing of the Pocock Collections, containing approximately 28,000 specimens. The RUH incorporated them into the Schonland Herbarium (GRA) in 1993. M.A. Pocock served as a member of the South African Women's Auxiliary Service during World War II and was the first president of the Grahamstown branch of the South African Association of University Women. She was also a recipient of the Linnean Society's rarely awarded Crisp Medal and a fellow of both the Linnean Society and the Royal Society of South Africa.[28] One must admire the spirit of a scientist who traveled on foot during a seven-month expedition through Northern Rhodesia and Angola to Lobito Bay with one partner, Dorothea Bleek, and a team of seventeen porters. As a student of Pocock's work, there is little doubt in my mind that his focus and commitment to academic excellence have their roots in M.A. Pocock's example. It is to the credit of J.G.A. Pocock that such capable and brilliantly learned members of his own family first paved the road to academic notability.

In reviewing the work L.G. and M.G. Pocock and the life of Le Gros, I argue for situating J.G.A. Pocock's work within the context of their influence. Threads of their thought and spirit are seamlessly interlaced in how Pocock understands the classical tradition, historical inquiry,

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[27] Tony Dold, "Mary Agard Pocock: Botanical Artist and Intrepid Explorer." *Veld & Flora.* (2001): 174-177.

[28] Marilyn Bailey Ogilvie and Joy Dorothy Harvey. *The Biographical Dictionary of Women in Science : Pioneering Lives from Ancient Times to the Mid-20th Century* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1035.

and the nature of political theory. While there are no footnotes explicit to family history, ignoring their imprints in his research and methods would amount to willful folly. The spirit of Pocock's life and work reflects an understanding of himself as a part of his family's intellectual tradition, and he never moves forward with a major argument without looking back to their influence. I argue that Pocock's earliest form of tenacious listening was practiced on L.G. Pocock, Antoinette Le Gros, and M.A. Pocock's lives and work. From this lineage can be gleaned the interesting notion of scholastic inheritance and the bravado required for a scholar to take often the roads less traveled in academia, as J.G.A. Pocock's work does across disciplinary lines. Thus, we turn to J.G.A. Pocock.

John Greville Agard Pocock was born in London in 1924 and grew up in Christchurch on New Zealand's South Island. Young Pocock was an undergraduate in history at Canterbury University College in the University of New Zealand and took courses in comparative government and political philosophy from Greek antiquity to the present, now known as "Plato to Nato."His early academic experiences were mainly shaped by G.H. Sabine's *History of Political Theory* (1937). Sabine's great project spans 2,500 years of history from pre-Platonic Greeks to communism and fascism in the 20th century, akin to the ambitious enterprises of Jonathan Israel that were to come, and to which we will return for modern comparison and context in chapter four of this study. George Holland Sabine was a philosophy professor, dean of the graduate school, and Cornell University vice president in New York. In *History of Political Theory*, he traces political ideas' connections to philosophical thought and aligns them with

developments in contemporary politics.[29] Sabine's writing focuses on select political writers and their respective movements. One could argue that in so doing, he plowed the field of historical scholarship that Pocock would later cultivate by his practice of contextualism.

Though Pocock found inspiration, and ultimately his career's direction in intellectual history, he described this time and reading as being akin to "the sensation of growing into something, like a snake feeling its new skin." He acknowledged as a later scholar that Sabine's work, while useful still in survey courses, was obsolete as a history, and its method not conducive to its aims.[30] Even a cursory reading of Pocock indicates that he did not begin his work with the idea that he would become an acclaimed scholar. His work suggests that he spent immeasurable time listening, ever curious and imaginative, a credit to his worthy lineage. One of Pocock's work's striking aspects is the diversity of methodological influences and inclusionary tendencies shown throughout his writings. Grounded in his father's classics, driven by the question of place from his mother, and armed with the creativity and breadth of knowledge from his intellectual mentors, Pocock provides a methodological approach for studying the history of ideas through contextualization and tenacious listening.

## B. Butterfield's Historical Conscience and Identity in Pocock

Pocock later moved to Cambridge and studied chiefly under British historian Herbert Butterfield (1900-1979). Under Butterfield's direction, Pocock redefined his doctoral research interests, shifting his focus from anti-Normanism in the English Levelers' thought to the less crowded endeavor of studying conservative and royalist thought later in the seventeenth century.

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[29] Francis W. Coker, "Sabine, George H. 'A History of Political Theory' (Book Review)." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 200, no. 1 (1938): 326.

[30] Pocock, *Political Thought and History*, 20-21.

Butterfield was a devoted Augustinian Christian who allowed his religious beliefs to permeate his work as a historian and public intellectual, especially regarding his views on diplomacy. Despite his many academic honors and professional achievements, including being a Master of Peterhouse, serving as Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, and being named Regius Professor of History, Butterfield was never able to "fit" into any life resembling that of fashionable academic society. As Ian Hall explains, "He was no 'fashionable don' in the mould of A. J. Ayer or Isaiah Berlin, fêted by society and the political élite. He did not fit, as one historian commented, 'either into the ranks of the elegant Cambridge grandees or into those fashionable rebels represented by the Apostles with their glittering Bloomsbury connection."[31]

A lifelong conservative and a private man in nature, Butterfield shunned public debate, preferring instead to pour into his capable students- among whom Pocock flourished. Much like his early mentor, Pocock leaves no defined school of thought to take up his ideological or philosophic charge. Yet, it is a safe assumption that Pocock admired and respected Butterfield's engaging style of research and writing, as he was widely known to be both an epigrammatic and contrarian scholar whose work encompassed a breadth of areas across history, politics, and historiography.[32]

As a pioneer of interdisciplinary study, Butterfield produced work in history and political science. Through his efforts to better understand the intricacies of conflict and diplomacy, he earned the admiration of leading American scholars and prominent figures, including George

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[31] Ian Hall, "History, Christianity and Diplomacy: Sir Herbert Butterfield and International Relations." *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 4 (2002): 719.

[32] Kenneth McIntyre, *Herbert Butterfield: History, Providence, and Skeptical Politics.* (United Kingdom: Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ORD), 2014) Originally published 2011, vii.

Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and President Dwight Eisenhower and Kenneth Thompson. Although largely unexplored by British scholars, Butterfield's work on international relations was finally given focused attention in 1985 by Dr. Alberto R. Coll, then at Georgetown University in his work, *The Wisdom of Statecraft. Sir Herbert Butterfield and the Philosophy of International Politics.* Coll's extensive and knowledgeable background includes having earned his graduate degree in history from Princeton University, a J.D. and Ph.D. in government and foreign affairs from the University of Virginia. He held a faculty position at Georgetown University and was later appointed secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow at the Naval War College, and served as principal deputy assistant secretary of defense at the United States Pentagon. Among numerous accolades, Coll notably spent considerable time researching and seeking to draw interdisciplinary attention to the work and importance of Herbert Butterfield, and was in fact, the first to write a scholarly study of one of the most important if neglected minds our time.[33] As one capable of seeing the larger picture and connecting seemingly disconnected ideas clearly through lenses of history and politics, he is fundamental to our understanding of the history of ideas and Pocock.

As with R.G. Collingwood, Herbert Butterfield's work on international politics came in part as a reaction to the symbolic and dreamlike world of theorists and philosophers such as Friedrich Hegel, Auguste Comte, and Karl Marx; as what was gave way, in the minds of the many, to what could be. Butterfield resisted the mythical realm of possibility and visions of final revolutions. Ever rooted in his Methodist Christian faith, he shifted his focus and work from

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[33] Gerhart Niemeyer, "History Without Blinkers." *The Review of Politics*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 631-633.

speculative history to "non ideological historiography," thus rejecting any absolutism and reductionist forms of understanding history at any point in time.[34] According to Gerhart Neimeyer, "basically, Herbert Butterfield perceived the depth-dimension of reality not as utopia, or 'horizontal transcendence,' but as man in relation to God, human action in history against the background of history's mystery. 'History,' he wrote, 'is not the study of origins; rather it is the analysis of all the meditations by which the past was turned into our present."[35] In doing so, we ought to credit Butterfield with sharpening the historian's tools for understanding politics, political theory, and political science in action by way of international relations.

Bentley synthesizes the particularities of Butterfield's methods for historiography in a concise manner worth re-presenting here,

"But Butterfield's commitment to history as the *theater* of the ethical communicates both paradox and urgency: paradox because this author is the same one who frequently *attacked* moral judgment in history; and urgency for it operates on a number of planes, and it operates when it does not appear to be operating. It penetrates his specific style of Protestantism; it lurks between the lines of his historical works and appears explicitly in his more polemical and proselytizing publications. More than that, it stands behind what he recommended as the task of historiography itself, understood not simply as the act of writing specific histories but as the appropriate way in which to understand the historical process as a whole. The commitment did not turn him into a philosopher of history: he mistrusted the genre in this speculative form precisely because its practitioners tended to deem history as self-enclosed and capable of being understood without reference to the eternal verities. Moreover, he had little aptitude for its analytical form. His mind functioned with a biting intelligence, and he proved more than able to effect some distinctions that the philosophically-trained may have missed, but he lacked the instinct for philosophical abstraction and maintained a lifelong resistance to all forms of "theory" despite our picture of him today as a significant historical theorist. But that very free-ranging quality kept him clear of what he would have seen as clockwork systems operating without sensitivity to individual personality and uniqueness."[36]

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[34] Niemeyer, "History Without Blinkers,"632.

[35] Niemeyer, "History Without Blinkers,"632.

[36] Michael Bentley, "Herbert Butterfield and the Ethics of Historiography." *History and Theory,* 44, no.1 (2005): 110.

Useful in the classroom for academic discussion and equal measure around planning tables at the Pentagon, Butterfield's work provides practical insight to understanding history and what to do with that knowledge. It is impossible not to connect Pocock's fluidity of disciplines and nonjudgmental reading historical idioms to Butterfield's influence.

Butterfield's work cemented the idea that actual and historical pasts are distinct from each other, thus opening the space to create the history of historiography. In his unsystematic collection of historiographic essays, *The Whig Interpretation of History (1931),* Butterfield argues for "the autonomous character of historical investigation and explanation." Yet, he remained true to his distinctly Christian interpretation of history and assertions that understanding the past must remain independent from the weight of modern judgments or linkages to current events.[37] In his lecture draft for "Moral Judgments in History," Butterfield asserts that "the ethical issue is always with us, and it is deeply embedded in historiography."[38] By understanding the past instead of pressing the present upon it, Butterfield's influence on Pocock and the Cambridge School can be distinctly gleaned and includes the trait that Pocock deemed "Das Herbert Butterfield Problem."[39] The *problem*, or better - *paradox* referenced, I argue, consists in the tension between Butterfield's recognition of and concentration on the ethical issues in historical writing and his resistance to imposing modern standards or moral judgments on the latter. Further, I argue that Butterfield's work carved out the

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[37] McIntyre, *Herbert Butterfield*, 161.

[38] Bentley, "Herbert Butterfield and the Ethics of Historiography," 55-71. With reference to Butterfield, "Moral Judgments in His Butterfield," 101-130.

[39] Pocock, *Political Thought and History*, 47.

place of ethics within a historiographic study. At the same time, Pocock, indebted to Butterfield on these points, refined this endeavor by carefully crafting the historian's role.

Pocock describes his "formula" for endeavoring to understand how one works on ideas in time and the overlapping of time structures, akin to the fluid intellectual process of making sense of oneself in history and our interdisciplinary nature. He says, "A possible formula would be: I locate others in social time – this is history; I study how others located themselves in time – the study of historiography; this is related to the way in which I locate myself in time – the element of historicism."[40] In his ever self-aware fashion, Pocock grounds his work in the effort of legitimately rooting scholarly inquiry in personal narrative as our experience, which more often than not, is the force that drives our interest and methods.

"What I wish to present, therefore, is far from being the record of another boring struggle for identity. I cannot offer any account of personal perspective; but the proposition between ego and cosmos has to be a proportion, and the perspective I aim to describe originates not merely in a personal and cultural problem but in the need to practice certain self-testing intellectual disciplines….many of the themes I wish to treat contain the idea of the traversing of wide distances, both between cultures and between disciplines, and the successful establishment of homes and settlements upon distant shores."[41]

Pocock's work from this point forward was a decided non-attempt at creating an original philosophy of politics and more a humanist examination of political thought in its particular historical context. In his essay, "Working on ideas in time," Pocock provides a telling personal reflection of his mind-space in this endeavor. He shares that, "for over twenty years I have been increasingly interested in the ways in which men in political societies find and explore languages

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[40] Pocock, *Political Thought and History*, 20.

[41] Pocock, *Political Thought and History*, 21.

for conceptualizing their lives in such structures, and in the ways in which these languages carry patterns of thought about the continuity of society and politics in time and history."[42] Thus Pocock takes his cues for scholarly inquiry and historical craftsmanship from Butterfield's legacy of scholarship shaped by his specific inclinations of personal faith and the gentle insertion of the human element divorced from the judgmental imposition of modern standards.

## C. Pocock & Collingwood: On the Historical Imagination

Herbert Butterfield was not alone in his examination of the ethical study of history. Michael Bentley explains, "in the Anglophone tradition of historical thought, contributions to that ethical strand have assuredly come also from others, explicitly and notoriously from Arnold Toynbee, implicitly from R.G. Collingwood, nihilistically from Michael Oakshott, not to mention endless versions of ethicism across the social-democratic spectrum in the generation of R.H. Tawney."[43] Indeed, Butterfield and J.G.A. Pocock were both familiar with R.G. Collingwood's work in metaphysical philosophy and the posthumously published *The Idea of History (1946).* In *The Idea of History*, Collingwood describes history as a science of the human mind and its affairs. His theories on the historical imagination bear strong similarities to the historical consciousness for Butterfield.

R.G. Collingwood's historical imagination grants access to not only the fruits of historical actor's thoughts but the thought itself, as ideas are singular and accessible to persons across time and space. They are not the possessions of philosophers' past, though present thinkers may need

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[42] Pocock, *Political Thought and History*, 20.

[43] Bentley, "Herbert Butterfield and the Ethics of Historiography," 56.

to engage in a meditative and methodological reenactment to reconstruct the paths and grooves worn by their predecessors.

Collingwood explains his 'History as Re-enactment of Past Experience' in this way,

"What is required, if I am to know Plato's philosophy, is both to re-think it in my own mind and also to think other things in the light of which I can judge it. . . .When I read Plato's argument in the *Theatetus* against the view that knowledge is merely sensation, I do not know what philosophical doctrines he was attacking; I could not expound these doctrines and say in detail who maintained them and by what arguments. In its immediacy, as an actual experience of his own, Plato's arguments must undoubtedly have grown up out of a discussion of some sort, though I do not know what it was and been closely connected with such a discussion. Yet if I not only read his argument but understand it, follow it in my own mind by re-arguing it with and for myself, the process of argument which I go through is not a process resembling Plato's, it actually is Plato's so far as I understand him rightly. The argument simply as itself, starting from these premises and leading through this process to this conclusion; the argument as it can be developed either in Plato's mind or mine or anyone else's, is what I call the thought in its mediation."[44]

If Collingwood's explanation of historical imagination seems to reach out across distinct disciplines and traditions, it is because Collingwood's scholarly imagination was quite varied and far-reaching. Among the various manuscripts found after his death were works on "religion, literary criticism, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, cosmology, folklore and magic, politics, philosophy of history, Roman Britain, and archaeology."[45] Indeed, history as self-knowledge of the mind would have been an invaluable concept had Collingwood been able to publish his intended manuscript before death as his life's chief work, *The Principles of History.* The publication would have included a final chapter devoted to self-knowledge of the mind as historical study endeavored to serve self-knowledge.[46] It stands that Collingwood's somewhat

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44 Robin George Collingwood, *The Idea of History.* (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1994), 301.

45 Collingwood, *The Idea of History,* x.

46 Collingwood, *The Idea of History,* xi-xiii.

dogmatic stance on historicism is problematic and can be interpreted as unscientific in its treatment of historical methodology.[47] Yet, when differentiated from his later (and harsher) views, his historical imagination's principles blend well with Pocock's methodological approach to history, in the sense of his contextualism, and with Herbert Butterfield's historical consciousness.

Collingwood's historical imagination consists of two parts: *a part objecti* and *a parte subject, which* form the foundation of history as a totality of thoughts past and how the historian re-enacts past ideas. The ensuing literature revolving around Collingwood's philosophy of history is diverse and quite unwieldy in its interpretation of Collingwood's history of thought and reenactment. Whether his approach breeds skepticism or leads to total relativism is a subject on which a surprising number of scholars simply cannot come to a consensus. It is worth noting that as historians and scholars of political thought and theory, we too are bound by our time and place- our historicity. It can no more be freed from it than could the historical actors we attempt to analyze. This method's limitations are evident in bypassing economic, political, and social events and trajectories. However, the acorn at the center remains amenable to contextualism. The methodological re-enactment doctrine is more palatable when taken in a philosophical context and not applied to the actual study of history and the historian's role. It is a helpful way to engage historical actors and a worthwhile practice in scholarly intuition in terms of a more broad approach to the philosophy of history.

With some surprise, I have found there to be areas of lingering space for exploring Collingwood's sometimes provocative and murky work, specifically on the nature of thought, the

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[47] Collingwood, *The Idea of History,* xxii.

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relation between thought and action, and the role of objective conditions in history. While there is certainly more to discover on the relevance of re-enactment to historical explanation, some of Collingwood's obscure objectives are made more evident through Pocock's work. Pocock was able to capture historical imagination so that Collingwood was not as successful, but he did pave the way for future scholars of Pocock's caliber to explore the idea. Scholarly reaction to Collingwood's arguments in *The Idea of History* was critical of the theory being "too overtly intellectualistic." They charged that it failed to "take into account the less rational aspects of human actions" or "account for social and economic history which tends to be concerned with aggregates or groups and mass behavior, rather than individual actions." Pocock saw these peculiar seeds in Collingwood's work and watered them.[48] To both their credit, the importance of imagination in the writing of history also calls forth Plato's Divided Line in Book VII of the Republic, in which imagination is first.

By now, scholars across disciplines have an intimate understanding of Plato's *Allegory of the Cave* and his presentations of the ontological and epistemological doctrines implied in the divided line within his view of the universe. The divided line is a visual metaphor of Plato's doctrines divided into two essential parts, creating a separation between the realm of Forms and the physical world. The Forms are ideas, unchanging, and universal, while the physical world is visible, tangible, and ever-changing. The first of Plato's four levels of knowing is imagination. I would offer a counterpoint to Fainos Mangena's notion that imagination, as the first of the four, is the lowest. I argue that imagination is the beginning for Plato, the foundation on which all-subsequent knowledge is built and thus an exceedingly important concept. Only when

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[48] Collingwood, *The Idea of History,* xxv.

imagination is nurtured and deeply rooted in a person's core foundational experience can they, whether scholar or layman, craft any semblance of the higher forms of knowledge: belief and thinking, to reach the highest form, perfect intelligence/knowledge. As Mangena recognizes, "knowledge according to Plato is a function of the mind as it negotiates its way from imagination to perfect knowledge," the base of which must be firmly rooted, to begin with.[49] To put this line of thinking into context, Alfred North Whitehead, to which so much of the humanities is indebted, makes this statement,

"The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them. His personal endowments, his wide opportunities for experience at a great period of civilization, his inheritance of an intellectual tradition not yet stiffened by excessive systematization, have made his writing an inexhaustible mine of suggestion."[50]

Suppose Alfred North Whitehead was right about the whole of Western tradition being, but a footnote to Plato and Plato begins his theory of knowledge with imagination. In that case, Both Collingwood and Pocock are in good company.

Pocock scrutinized Collingwood's scattered thought process and successfully focused it into the historical imagination that most scholars before and after have not been able to wrap their minds around-let alone put into actionable scholarship methodology. Frankly, it is a testament to Pocock's genius. Pocock was able to channel his fluidity and creativity of thought in service of

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[49] Fainos Mangena and Maxwell Mukova. "Shona Epistemology and Plato's Divided  Line," *The Journal of Pan African studies* 3, no. 9 (2010): 65.

[50] Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, (Free Press, 1979), 39.

shaping Collingwood's intent with the master hands of a craftsman scholar. Reading the many reviews of Collingwood's work by numerous scholars throughout the decades following his life, he is either not to be taken seriously or nothing short of a mastermind. Yet, there is a lack of representation for a solid middle-ground understanding of his work, untinged by either contempt or lavish praise. I argue that Pocock is the middle ground to understanding Collingwood and appreciating his significant, albeit discombobulated, influence.

Perhaps it is unfortunate that Collingwood's work on magic and the metaphysical imagination moved to center stage for him in the latter part of his career. Pocock no doubt felt a similar pang of disappointment with the late trajectory of one of his partners at Cambridge, Peter Laslett, which we will come to in the future chapter on language and time. Yet scholars too often discard the transcendental or obscure in disciplines that are not designated to it, such as philosophy, evidenced in part by Collingwood's relative disappearance from the scholarly conversation on intellectual history after his work on magic. How disappointing that today, the mentioning of transcendental experiences or scholarship is mainly viewed through a lens of jaded skepticism when some of the most influential people who shaped the United States, such as Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Margaret Fuller, were all transcendentalists.

Collingwood possibly went over the tipping point with these ideas, but I argue that there are meaningful questions to be explored even there, and the tipping point is where one is truly and most fruitfully challenged. There is no real work to be done without the tipping point because if it is all known and comfortable, then why does *it,* whatever it is we are working on, matter? I argue that after the three principal family members and Herbert Butterfield, R.G. Collingwood was a significant force in shaping Pocock's thought. These apparently divided

pieces do not seem, at first, to come together are the best way of understanding Pocock—for he is a complicated jigsaw puzzle and dynamic in all things scholarly. To understand Pocock's work, which is the central thread in this study's tapestry, one must be willing to paint a picture of the Zen-like approach to scholarship to which Pocock subscribed. It was a process that was open to all different methods, listening tenaciously, carefully picking, and choosing while keeping an open mind. Ultimately this is the mark of any good scholar, as one must, as Aristotle urged, be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.

## D. Linguistics and Political Language

Next, we turn to Pocock's approach to political language, which largely reflects the impact of Michael Oakeshott's work. Pocock proposes that "the business of the historian of thought is to study the emergence and the role of the organizing concepts employed by society, and the knowledge that this role has necessary limitations…"[51] Pocock outlines the process by which this study can be undertaken in his essay, "The History of Political Thought." The first is for the historian to grow familiar with the political language and vocabulary for their specific time and place of scholarly inquiry and then to situate the event or intellectual abstraction within the context of that language. The two-fold interpretation project is then undertaken by interpreting thought as social behavior and later identifying the concepts the thinker was using and what fashion contemporaries received those concepts. Finally, the historian must, after journeying through these levels of language exploration and abstraction interpretation, move from "student of thought as the language of a society, and become a student of thought as philosophy..." The shift enables the historian to reconstruct the thinker in questions thought

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[51] Pocock, *Political Thought and History,* 15-17.

based on its coherence and completion, form an estimation of the different languages and methods employed by a said thinker, and the effectiveness of their thought to propagate that language its abstractions.[52]

In this area of Pocock's methodology for political languages, the necessity for exploring his work is made clear. The better we understand our subject's languages, the overall better understanding we can come to as historians of their thought, context, reception, and legacy. In his valedictory lecture presented in 1994 at Johns Hopkins University, J.G.A. Pocock shed light on the eventual trajectory and focus of his life's work: "In 1948, I left Canterbury and went to Cambridge to engage in doctoral study, and it was there that I discovered what I wanted to do and would spend my life doing with the history of political thought: namely, converting it into the study of political language by exploring the vocabularies of speech and writing available for the discussion and practice of politics at particular times; in my case, early modern England, where there was a very great deal available indeed."[53] I contend that Pocock's methodological approach, built on political languages and contextualism, places his work among current scholarly interests and highlights his continued relevance in our current political and academic climate. The United States in the 21st century continues to grapple with questions of extremism in partisanship, religion, and widespread socio-cultural injustice. I argue that the extremism of today, including pervasive racism, sexism, homophobia, polarization of political parties, and a simmering sentiment of general intolerance, and growing nationalism, are the groaning of

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[52] Pocock, *Political Thought and History,* 18-19.

[53] Pocock, *J.G.A. Pocock's Valedictory Lecture*, 13.

a political structure that is calling for a careful reconsideration of its foundation. I contend this is what Pocock's work offer to scholars of political thought today.

I would further argue that Pocock's work on political language serves to cement his place in a category all his own. His linguistic approach to the history of political thought has dealt with various disciplines' traditions in transformative ways. The trouble with Pocock's approach is that rigidly defined academic boxes are unable and even unwilling to bend to allow for the fluidity of thought and movement within the realm of ideas. Programs inspired by and indebted to Arthur Lovejoy and molded by J.G.A. Pocock, which engage in the bending of light this way and that, and in the aqueous movement of thought between political history, theory, science, and linguistics are quickly fading in the decline of the humanities. Pocock's work is less a history of thought and more a history of language, discourse, and literature. He says,
"We have been studying texts and authors—who can be perceived in distinction from one another—and communities of people who share languages and use them in exchange and debate among themselves. These languages are political, in the sense that they derive from political institutions and political experience; and using them is political, in the sense that speaking, writing, and publishing constitute series of political actions, though some of these are at the same time acts of reflection, which describe, enlarge, criticize and even contest the acts being performed."[54]

For Pocock, society's languages vary according to their culture and institutionalized methods of governance; for example, in western civilization, we have the primary language of political thought as a language of the law. Among the possibilities of societal languages, there

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[54] Pocock, *J.G.A. Pocock's Valedictory Lecture,* 17.

are languages of theory, languages of philosophy, traditional and theoretical languages that serve to bring both continuity and reflection to abstraction. Once political thought is defined as the "language of political discussion," the practical and theoretical are no longer seen as separate endeavors. The historian must first observe by what means of critique or defense a society establishes claims on legitimacy in rule and by what vocabulary practices they do so.

Concerning the larger intellectual context and the history of linguistics in the twentieth century, the "linguistic turn" offers several points which are hereafter addressed in limited respect as their reach continues to shape the trajectory of historical theory and historiography. In addition to Michael Oakeshott, another comparison that illustrates the linguistic landscape in which Pocock's work is situated is exemplified by the work of German historian Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006). Koselleck is widely recognized for his development of conceptual history and contributions to linguistics, the epistemology of history, anthropology of history, and social and political history. Directly of import to this study is his conceptual history, which is concerned with changing semantics and pragmatics of concepts in their social and political contexts. Pocock's work on the political thought and language of the western Enlightenment overlap's with Koselleck's argument that between 1750 and 1850, the German language went through such significant transformations as to make it the language of modernity.[55]

After Koselleck's *Critique and Crisis* (1959)*,* which began as his dissertation, was finally translated into English, he retired from his position at the University of Bielefeld in Germany. He then accepted an invitation to serve as a Visiting Professor of History at the University of

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[55] Melvin Richter, and Michaela W. Richter. "Introduction: Translation of Reinhart Koselleck's 'Krise,' in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67, no. 2 (2006): 343–356.

Chicago in 1988.[56] Just as Pocock's work reflects indebtedness to familial and intellectual

mentors among his original thought, so Koselleck's work is a product heavily intellectually

influenced by Carl Schmitt, resulting in its being dismissed at times as conspiratorial while

recognized as theoretically seminal. The intersection of Pocock and Koselleck's work as a

reflection of the "linguistic turn" is a necessary interlude for understanding how Pocock's work

fits with the larger intellectual landscape; therefore, let us turn to Koselleck through secondary

literature for an exploration of linguistic context.

According to Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, "If Koselleck claims with Schmitt that all basic

concepts emerge historically out of social and political contestations, he articulates the only

shared methodological premise of *Bergriffsgeschichte,* Pocock and Skinner's contextual

approach or Foucault's genealogy (or, in fact, of most historians of political languages)."[57] In

contrast, cultural historian Bedrich Loewenstein charges that while Koselleck brilliantly

formulated questions his analysis was "highly one-sided" and his "overemphasis on parallels

with the twentieth century (the development of moralizing, pseudo logical philosophy of history

leading to rigid political fronts and ideological terror) is not fair to the

Enlightenment."[58] Koselleck's reception among Anglophone scholars was problematic

concerning his decision to connect criticism with revolution, opening to the opinion that less

societal reflection concerning politics was better for the governmental structure and stability.

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[56] Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis.*

[57] Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, "Koselleck in America." *New German critique* 44, no. 3 (2017): 172.

[58] Hoffmann, "Koselleck in America," 174.

This is one reason Koselleck's work and reception in Anglophone scholarship seem to have been intentionally delayed and thus remains a compelling and open area of study.

In 1992 Pocock and Koselleck were part of a symposium coordinated by Melvin Richter on the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,* where they were brought together for the first time to discuss scholarship on language and history. Pocock was largely unfamiliar with Koselleck's work due to the lack of access and translations available and had to rely primarily on summaries by Richter. Koselleck was likewise unfamiliar with Pocock's work, as evidenced by his library's contents and the annotations in the three books by Pocock contained within. Koselleck appears to have read only the introduction to *Virtue, Commerce, and History* and the chapter "Languages and Their Implications" in *Politics, Language, and Time.* Though *The Machiavellian Moment* was also part of Koselleck's library, he does not appear to have read any part of it.[59] Pocock joined Skinner in a skeptical reception of Koselleck's ideas on conceptual history-believing instead that such a history was inherently flawed and could only be understood through the use of concepts. While its Anglophone reception was limited and not enthusiastically received, Koselleck's work has been more widely circulated and considered among Scandinavia, eastern Europe, and Spanish academics. However, Michel Foucault's work provides a bridge for Koselleck and Anglophone scholars much more than Pocock or Skinner's, yet both are part of the "linguistic turn" of the twentieth century.[60]

In Gabrielle Spiegel's 2005 work *Practicing history,* the "linguistic turn" is defined as "the notion that language is the constitutive agent of human consciousness and the social

[59] Hoffmann,"Koselleck in America," 179.

[60] Hoffmann,"Koselleck in America," 179-180.

production of meaning, and that our apprehension of the world, both past, and present, arrives only through the lens of language's precoded preconceptions."[61] Pocock's work supports this definition and views political and historical languages in a similar light. Through continued analysis by scholars from Ferdinand de Saussure through Richard Rorty's questions of language and the "semiotic challenge" it posed to historiography, the "linguistic turn" merged the study of history with linguistics so inextricably that it is now impossible to discuss one without the other.[62]

Unfortunately eclipsed by *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1960)*,* Koselleck's quietly joined Jurgen Habermas' in creating German theoretical work which would occupy the minds of Anglophone academics for generations to come. Yet Habermas' clear and engaging writing style had the advantage over Koslleck's prose, whose style was described as "hard to understand, as it 'soars into a metaphysical stratosphere and has no discernible relation to what was happening on the ground.'"[63] Habermas's work has been widely analyzed and adopted across disciplinary lines, while Koselleck's work took almost twenty years longer to gain its footing in the intellectual landscape of political language. Then the serendipitous leanings of academic interest began to shift in the direction of linguistics during the 1980s, opening the door for a more nuanced exploration of language. In his 1982 essay, "Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn?" Martin Jay grapples with the structure of language in history and the Habermas-Gadamer debate, which centered on issues such as "the

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[61] Gabrielle M. Spiegel, *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn,* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

[62] Spiegel, *Practicing History,* 1-2.

[63] Hoffmann, "Koselleck in America," 171.

evidence of experience" and the "extralinguistic preconditions of linguistic change."[64] The

rigidity of disciplinary lines remained an issue. For Koselleck, historians best serve their

discipline by developing their own epistemological approaches rather than engaging in

cooperative analysis. When in accordance with Heidegger's theories of being in time, Kosellck

argued that historians would benefit most from the approach of conceptual history, as all

disciplinary studies need theory as their fundamental base for knowledge.

       For historians consistently concerned with language, such as Pocock, Koselleck provided

a counterpoint in recalling the "*prelinguistic* conditions of all possible histories" and advocated

for the separation of history and linguistics based on their inherent differences. For Koselleck, "it

is language above all that decides about the potentialities of history in actu," thus history is

always just out of reach of language, as language "bundles, as a storehouse of past experiences,

conditions of possible events," and history is experiential. Historians operate in three planes

depending on their abstract position about their subject. Their first position is temporal

concerning how contemporaneous the events are to themselves, second if they are part of the

historical victors or not, and third whether they identify with their subject or are viewing it as an

outsider. Once their abstract position is established, historians can write linguistically through

their temporality by transmitting meaning to events or representing events with new

meanings.[65] The basic concepts aligned with this understanding of the past, such as "causality,

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[64] Hoffmann, "Koselleck in America," 180.

[65] Hoffmann, "Koselleck in America," 181-182.; Koselleck, "Linguistic Change and the History of Events,"*The Journal of Modern History* 61, no. 4 (1989): 656.

change, authorial intent, the stability of meaning, human agency, and social determination," must all be understood through a linguist and contextual approach to the general temporal lens.[66]

Yet amidst the initially sparse reception of Koselleck's theories, Melvin Richter served as a liaison between him and Pocock through a 1992 symposium on the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Basic Concepts in History) at the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC., and "it appeared as if many of Koselleck's theoretical concerns—language, time, secrecy, civil society, public and private, dreams, death, monuments and memory—became mainstream in the 1980s, especially with the linguistic and subsequently the cultural turn in the humanities."[67] The textual "linguistic turn" of the 1980s and 1990s has undergone even more challenges in recent years. Among contemporary historians historical actors "are now seen as engaged in inflecting the semiotic constituents (signs) that shape their understanding of reality so as to craft an experience of that world in terms of a situational sociology of meaning, or what might be called a social semantics" in effect moving from "culture as discourse to culture as practice."[68] Thus the historical actor has made the transition to an intentional and conscious agent of their time.

One of the particularities of the "linguistic turn" was a loss of the particularity of meaning of concepts central to studying the history of ideas with which Kosellck and Pocock were concerned. They would need to "compete for a position of hegemony" such as "God, State, Absolutism, Parliament, Constitution, History, Nature, Science, Empire, Nation, Commerce,

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[66] Spiegel, *Practicing History,* 3.

[67] Hoffmann, "Koselleck in America," 168.

[68] Spiegel, *Practicing History*, 3.

Anarchy, Republic, Liberalism, Communism, Capitalism or Socialism" to which historiography aims to shed light on the intrinsic meanings.[69] According to Marcelo de Mello Rangel, "For Koselleck, the'space of experience' or a specific set of meanings and senses provided by certain pasts, and the 'horizon of expectation,' a tendency toward projections, hopes, and desires, cause tension within and from experiences of time and specific historical happenings resulting in differentiation and establishments of 'History.'"[70] Consequences of the "linguistic turn" for historiography include an unfolding of historiography with contemporary theory, the reconstitution of thought concerning autonomy and the political actor, and the thematization of the past as a historical, methodological approach to historiography.[71] Through Thomas Kuhn's work, the "linguistic turn's" layered legacy moves fluidly from Habermas, Koselleck, and Pocock's early work to another significant influence on his more mature and developed understanding of language and politics. In effect ushering in a new era in Pocock's scholarship, creating a linguistic and political paradigm shift for the humanities.

**E. Kuhn's Paradigm Shift & Pocock's Political Languages**

Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) was educated in decidedly and intentionally progressive schools throughout his academic journey. He began his scholarly career as a scientist, with an undergraduate trajectory in science and physics, and in 1949 earned a Ph.D. in physics from Harvard. As a Harvard Junior Fellow, Kuhn moved from physics to studying the history and

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[69] Marcelo De Mello Rangel and Valdei Lopes De Araujo. "Introduction - Theory and History of Historiography: From the Linguistic Turn to the Ethical-Political Turn." *História da Historiografia* 8, no. 17 (2015): 334-335.

[70] De Mello Rangel and Lopes De Araujo. "Introduction - Theory and History of Historiography: From the Linguistic Turn to the Ethical-Political Turn," 336.

[71] De Mello Rangel and Lopes De Araujo. "Introduction - Theory and History of Historiography: From the Linguistic Turn to the Ethical-Political Turn," 344.

philosophy of science. He exemplified how disciplines should be considered fluid paths through the collective intellectual mind instead of rigid accreditation gatekeepers. One example of this collective intellectual mind's fluidity was the publication of Kuhn's 1962 work *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* on the heels of Pocock's 1960 work *Politics, Language, and Time,* shared with, as has been explored Koselleck and Habermas' work published in such proximity. In this serendipitous time of linguistic scholarly inquiry and the language model, epistemology was making its way into various disciplines, including Kuhn's realm of science and Pocock's history. Both scholars drew from their respective disciplines to create new worldviews, which challenged the previous methodologies and practices while simultaneously deepening the scholarly understanding of language. The result was a transformation in paradigmatic thought, etymology, and linguistics, which modern scholars have built upon while continuing to parse out. To understand and contextualize the larger discussion of mid-twentieth-century social science and the particular focus on linguistics, we start with Thomas Kuhn's work and later on to Noam Chomsky's significant works as relevant on structuralism.

According to William Shea, "Thomas Kuhn thought the problem of translation from one language to another is mirrored in the problem of interpreting one scientific worldview in terms of a different scientific worldview. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that. In contrast, members of one linguistic community generally recognize that other communities may have their own, equally valid languages, the members of a given scientific tradition usually consider that theirs alone is genuinely scientific."[72] Similarly, the perennial challenge of translation, which

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[72] William Shea, "Thomas Kuhn and the Dialogue Between Historians and Philosophers of Science," *Shifting Paradigms* (2016): 163.

Shea refers to and Pocock himself explores throughout the breadth of his career, reaches the pinnacle in questioning what the best practices are for dialogue between disciplines and across time. There can be no universal point of departure, no, "universal grammar that underlies all languages," as Shea describes. Yet, the need for engaging dialogue rests in a scholar's ability to enter creatively into a space of co-creation with historical actors and explore the world's past from their perspective, inviting on the journey tolerance and relentless curiosity. We see in Kuhn a prime example of this journey as for him, "the worlds of science, arts, and philosophy are coterminous; several strands are intertwined, and there is a constant interchange of information at the boundaries."[73]

Similar to the trouble with translation of Galileo's work and the insertion of terms particular to experimental science not found in the original Italian of the text (and problematically assumed to be implied within Galileo's intention) so too are careful readers of Pocock's work attune to the subtleties of his approach to political languages. Historians, scientists, and linguists alike can learn foreign languages and recognize a problematic interpretation. Yet, one can never be entirely sure that the translation of any work produced is free of all slips of language or encoded meanings particular to the original. Those who endeavor to translate or build upon translations continue to *practice* translation and inquiry to the best of their ability. Just as Galileo is now best understood as "bringing a long process that began in the Middle Ages to its culmination," rather than "virtually single-handedly, found[ing] the new science of mechanics," so too can Pocock be thought of as synthesizing work across history,

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[73] Shea, "Thomas Kuhn and the Dialogue Between Historians and Philosophers of Science," 164-166.

linguistics, and politics in service of a more complete understanding of the idea of a republic and the paradigmatic contexts surrounding it.[74]

Alas, Kuhn's work in *Structure* illuminated that, "…though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a different world". While it is not in dispute that this work was a definite break-in time as science and scholarship can arguably be classified as pre or post *Structure,* Kuhn eventually moved on from the topic.[75] Kuhn shifted his focus from the concept of paradigms and spent the latter part of his career exploring linguistic and philosophical components of scientific theories and inquiry. In *The Road Since Structure,* Kuhn took a 'linguistic turn' and evolved his view of paradigms from a 'change of paradigm' to definitions based more on the taxonomic structure of the theoretical language of science.[76] Kuhn's post *Structure* work explored a more organic and evolutionary process of scientific proliferation and specialization. In contrast with the idea of paradigm shifts- whereby the new paradigm by its very nature replaces the old one, science is increased by the deep-diving of scholars into specialized, even niche, research.

Noam Chomsky's work on linguistic structuralism helps clarify Pocock's contextualization and political languages' modern implications. Chomsky, an American linguist, interdisciplinary scholar, and political activist, is known as the 'father of modern linguistics' who first developed the theory of transformational grammar. Chomsky considered that as a tool for particular languages, grammar generates operational rules, which he called transformations, to

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[74] Shea, "Thomas Kuhn and the Dialogue Between Historians and Philosophers of Science," 167-168

[75] Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* 121.

[76] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Road Since Structure* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 207-221.

create and substantiate new sentences and move the language forward through organized

practice. Chomsky developed this theory during his doctoral program (1955) and expanded it in

his seminal work *Syntactic Structures* (1957).[77] Chomsky's work moves fluidly from linguistics

to behaviorism to issues of modern politics. His widely read and cited essay 1967, "The

Responsibility of Intellectuals," was published in opposition to the United States' involvement in

the Vietnam war, and I argue a prime example of the interconnected nature between history,

linguistics, political theory, and their relation to current political dynamics. Linked here with

Pocock's understanding of history, political theory, and the classical tradition running through

both, I contend that Pocock's work is no less critical to understanding our current political

climate than Noam Chomsky's was in previous decades. Thus new specialties emerge and gain

their standing in the scholarly conscience.

Whether new science comes by way of the scientific revolution and paradigm shifts, or

evolutionary processes and specialization, I would present the case that these are nuances to the

greater argument that science is an evolving craft that changes through revolutions.[78] An

exploration of Pocock's essay "Languages and Their Implications" reveals two main points.

First, Pocock's belief that the history of political thought is separate activity and discipline from

that of political philosophy and that language provides the same structuring function and

contextual limitations as a paradigm.[79] For Pocock, the revolution, or more appropriately the

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[77] Noam Chomsky and David W. Lightfoot, *Syntactic Structures* (Germany: De Gruyter) 2009.

[78] Jouni Matti Kuukkanen, "Revolution as Evolution: The Concept of Evolution in

Kuhn's Philosophy." In *Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Revisited*, in edited by Vasso Kindi and Theodore Arabatsis, 144–162. (New York: Routledge, 2012).

[79] J.G.A. Pocock, "Languages and Their Implications: The Transformation of the Study of Political Thought." In *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History,* 3-41(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 3-41.

"radical changes" that "scholars interested in the study of systems of political thought have had the experience of living through," signals a move from the traditional practice of historical chronological ordering and chronicling the order of systems of thought to instead a focus on political language, idioms and their changes over time. These changes, he argues, have occurred primarily to the disciplines of history and philosophy but have also significantly impacted political science, literature, and even sociology. Thus, the latter exemplifies "the interdisciplinary nature of what is going on" and where they are left "uncanonized" by the powers at be and not discouraged as avenues for intellectual inquiry- they are the better for it.[80]

In Pocock's work on political language, which upcoming chapters on political language will explore in detail and as a thread throughout this study, we find the argument for linguistic contextualization of political thought built in great part upon the foundation of Kuhn's work in *Structure*. Through the lens of linguistic philosophers, Pocock applies his methodology to political discourse across various branches of political theory. The methodology is chiefly applied, for this study, to civic humanism and the idea of a republic by highlighting the work of paradigmatic figures including James Harrington, Niccolo Machiavelli, and in his mature career, Edward Gibbons; supported by the classical canon through their philosopher status. Further, Pocock refers to the "maladjusted relationship between history and philosophy" as among the slowest and most painful structural revolutions for scholars of the classical tradition.[81] Pocock does not suggest that language is a paradigm unto itself. Still, he does present the idea that there is a linguistic component to paradigms in the social sciences and can be used to define the limits

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[80] Pocock, "Languages and Their Implications," 3-5.

[81] Pocock, "Languages and Their Implications," 5.

of work. These are produced by maintaining authorial intention and historical reception, which originated from his experience with scholars like Peter Laslett, Quentin Skinner, and John Dunn within The Cambridge School.

**F. Pocock and The Cambridge School:**

Pocock's early intellectual career under Herbert Butterfield's guidance has been explored in some detail in previous portions of this chapter, culminating in completing his Ph.D. program in 1952. Yet, Pocock's time at Cambridge has blossomed, as is now well known, into a school in its own right, with connection to Laslett, Skinner, and Dunn. In the 1960 publication of John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*, Peter Laslett tells the story of how Eric Stokes, a member of Christ's College, went scouring bookstores throughout Cambridge searching for a copy of John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government.* Finding them out of stock, he serendipitously stumbled upon an original copy of Locke's work which included extensive additions and rendered the widely circulated copies of Locke's work essentially useless. Thus ensued the discoveries of Locke's personal libraries kept by a cousin that served to fuel Laslett's view that his work on Locke was a duty. Laslett was affronted by what he viewed as the depth of negligence on scholars' part to do more actual work on Locke.[82] Peter Laslett went to great lengths to reconstruct John Locke's life biography and situate his work among the immediate social and practical contexts in which he existed. The man and his work were not separated.[83] What ensued was a fascinating story of an extraordinary political thinker.

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[82] Samuel Charles James, "The Cambridge School in the history of political thought, 1948-1979," PhD dissertation., (University of Cambridge, 2012),16.

[83] Samuel, "The Cambridge School in the history of political thought 1948-1979," 37.

The historian of political thought undertakes the study of political theory and historiography in often traditional and conventional methods. J.G.A. Pocock's work from the Cambridge School to his later lines of inquiry-based on contextualism and political language as philosophical abstraction laid the path for a restructured understanding of political thought as a discipline. Here the Laslett-Pocock metaphor ends as Laslett's work is mainly revisionist and revises our understanding of history. At the same time, Pocock's thoughts are contextualist and assert that work cannot be separated from its time. As opposed to concentrating on the "large" thinkers of the time, Pocock's early work included taking an interest in seemingly minor players like James Harrington. Other historians saw Harrington as developing a "proto-Marxian theory in which political power rested on an economic base" and as only really having insights on how land transference to the gentry had impacted the social processes of his time; these two impositions on Harrington, Pocock resisted.[84]

Peter Laslett's work on Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha* was the first indication of a "distinctively Cantabrigian approach to the history of political thought," which would carry all four scholars here explored.[85] Indeed, while the Cambridge school's modern view seems to lack proper regard for Peter Laslett's early contributions, his work was integral to forming Pocock's vision of paradigmatic individuals that would follow Pocock throughout his career. Laslett's work set to the task of illuminating Filmer as a dynamic personage, as he did with Locke, learned and a literary critic, and not to be condescended by posterity. To situate Filmer in his historical context meant to know and understand the place from which Filmer wrote personally alongside

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[84] Samuel, "The Cambridge School in the history of political thought 1948-1979," 26.

[85] Samuel, "The Cambridge School in the history of political thought 1948-1979," 10.

his friends and family, seated in the larger context of his times. Laslett concluded that people could not be placed into neat, historically constructed boxes. They are fundamentally unclassifiable, and in Filmer's particular case, insisted that political philosophy should be recognized as historically conditioned in much the same way as natural science.[86] Laslett's work in this area was fundamental to creating what Pocock would later call political languages and his particular approach to their contextual study. For Pocock, Laslett got it right with his work on individual figures, observing that Laslett engaged in "the true beginning of the study of political writings by assigning them to their proper contexts."[87] Interlaced as "a junior colleague of Laslett and Forbes in the 1950s and a senior member of the generation of Skinner and Dunn in the 1960s and after"[88] at Cambridge, Pocock developed into an intergenerational figure worthy himself of Laslett's type of applied scholarly scrutiny.[89]

Laslett's contribution on the individual, Quentin Skinner's focus on authorial intention, and John Dunn's concentration on biography united with Pocock's mindful attention to political languages to create a distinct approach now regarded as the "Cambridge School" of the history of political thought and discourse, best explored in Pocock's *Political Thought and History.* The linguistic study of political discourse for Pocock included, "...speech, literature, and public

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[86] Samuel, "The Cambridge School in the history of political thought 1948-1979," 13.

[87] J.G.A. Pocock, "Present at the creation: With Laslett to the Lost Worlds." *International Journal of Public Affairs* 2 (2006): 7-17.

[88] Samuel, "The Cambridge School in the history of political thought 1948-1979," 7.

[89] B. W. Young, "Enlightenment political thought and the Cambridge school." *The Historical Journal* 52, no. 1 (2009): 235-251.

utterance in general, involving an element of theory and carried on in a variety of contexts with which it can be connected in a variety of ways."[90]

Pocock defines political languages as "idioms, rhetorics, specialised vocabularies and grammars" considered as "a single though multiplex community of discourse" and are interpreted within their contexts by scholars, namely historians who must learn them according to their particularities and situational characteristics.[91] Subsequent chapters will explore these "linguistic universes" and their connections to Skinner and Dunn's work on Pocock's lasting contributions to the historian's role and the "traditions" within the study of political thought and discourse within the shadow of Kuhnian paradigms.[92]

## G. Conclusion: The Space Between

Pocock is typically understood through his standing as a "Cambridge Contextual Historian," and while relevant and essential for understanding Pocock's foundations, the limitations inherent to this delineation essentially ignore that Pocock did the bulk of and most important work outside Cambridge. To continue to seek through Pocock's work a better understanding of the historian's role and the implications for contextual analysis of paradigmatic figures in history means Pocock's work must be understood as a standalone contribution to intellectual history. In part, this study aims to address the nuances of Pocock's work to come to a richer and more fruitful understanding of those topics he devoted his lifelong work to; namely

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[90] J.G.A. Pocock, "What is Intellectual History?" In *Historiography: Ideas.* Edited by Robert M. Burns (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2006), 24.

[91] J.G.A. Pocock, "The concept of a language and the métier d'historien: some considerations on practice." *The languages of political theory in early-modern Europe* (1987): 21–25.

[92] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* Preface.

civic humanism and the American founding, time and language as guides to a contextual

understanding of history, and the role of the historian in the study of political thought.

Pocock lived in-between and among the two distinct cultures of New Zealand and

Brittan, and later added a third dimension, the United States. His cross-cultural experience was

coupled with his penchant for interdisciplinary research and scholarship. He spent his career

navigating history, political theory, and philosophy while carefully drawing lines between

philosophers and historians. Pocock describes history as the process of abstraction from

traditions and experiences. Advising historians, as a practice, guard themselves against usurping

the role of philosophers by staying close to studying the relations between thinking and

experience.[93] Further, shaped by the post-WWII academic revolution in New Zealand, Pocock

argued for professorial teaching and research's intrinsic partnership. He viewed it as

interdependent and as the very nature of academic freedom.[94] Especially in Pocock's older work,

we find indebtedness to his first academic mentor, Herbert Butterfield, in how Pocock

understood the historian's role. This role is essentially defined as, "the man who studies the

history of history must avoid the disjointed chronicle, the temptation to give a straggling,

meaningless string of names. He must examine the internal development of historical

scholarship, always relating it to movements in general history…"[95] This is in line with Michael

Oakeshott that historians ought to practice history themselves instead of critiquing it from the

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[93] Pocock, *J.G.A. Pocock's Valedictory Lecture*, 10.

[94] Pocock, *J.G.A. Pocock's Valedictory Lecture*, 12-13.

[95] Samuel, "The Cambridge School in the history of political thought 1948-1979," 26.

outside.[96] Pocock's three primary familial influences, his father, mother, and aunt, which led to Butterfield's later mentorship, and the guiding influences of Oakeshott, Laslett, and Kuhn, are critical situating Pocock in the context of his life. Situating Pocock in this manner does for Pocock what, as will be illustrated and explored throughout the remainder of this study, he endeavored to do for the three primary paradigmatic figures of Niccolo Machiavelli, James Harrington, and Edward Gibbon. By beginning this way, through lineage, influence, and engagement with his work's intellectual landscape, I am attempting to practice Pocock's contextual methodology and tenacious listening to understand Pocock's work and legacy in as holistic a fashion as I am able.

 With this base, scholars can better understand the trajectory of Pocock's career. In 1952 he earned his Ph.D. and returned to New Zealand to teach at Canterbury University College and later to the University of Otago. He then returned to the University of Canterbury and chaired the political science department until 1966, when he moved to the United States. His previous academic positions led to this last settling in his long-term and final teaching position at Johns Hopkins University. He was also able to root into what I argue is the space between; the crux of his professional contribution to scholarship. Now, in the shadows of Friedrich Hegel and Eric Voegelin, Pocock can be understood to be joining in the battle of 'isms' so essential to understand today given our current political climate and the crisis undergoing the republic and its stability. Pocock's work attempts to clarify what it means to live in the space between. My attempt to clarify Pocock and his work is best approached at the beginning, his beginning.

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[96] Samuel, "The Cambridge School in the history of political thought 1948-1979," 21

Finally, Pocock- from personal accounts of previous students and mentees, was a man generous with his time, extremely diligent about his scholarship, and inspired and challenged by his parentage and familial legacy in the same way. One cannot understand Pocock's work without understanding where he came from. Pocock was driven by his familial and professorial legacies to do great scholarship, but he was also, from personal accounts, generous, humorous, and an impressive person all around.[97] At the center of Pocock's work is the transcendental idea of a republic best seen in his 1975's *The Machiavellian Moment*, where he began to unpack an incredible paradigm of global politics. He did not start with the question: 'Where did the idea of a republic come from?' He began with British history and law but was moved and academically enamored by the emerging concept that fired up his imagination and followed him throughout his professional career. At the heart of his mature scholarship are a republican paradigm and the pregnant tension between place and the republic, to which we next turn our attention.

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[97] One of Pocock's previous students shared this insight in an informal interview. "The last day of a seminar with 12 graduate students, he brought a 6-7 page paper to read to them about his notes on their papers and spent time forging connections between their ideas. He went through the trouble of writing a paper on their papers and incredibly integrating them and showing how they were all working toward some common insight. This suggests that he was always multi-dimensional and searching for some way to bring it all together in a synthesis that makes sense, and he did it best in his reading of the American Republic."

# CHAPTER 3

# LANGUAGE AND TIME

While reading J.G.A. Pocock's work, one is unavoidably reminded that each person is a world in themselves, an ocean of complexity and particularities of perspective.[98] As a twentieth-century Anglophone male historian from New Zealand, educated in England, with a background rich with the distinct advantage of having had a familial lineage of scholarship and having spent a significant portion of his adult life in the United States, Pocock has a unique vantage point disposed for exploration. Pocock's work began as an early exploration of 'the common law mind' and progressed as his experience deepened, and interests expanded. I contend that the success of Pocock's scholarship and the time-tested relevance of his work is due, in good part, to his particular professional perspectives and foundational personal history. These points joined together to create continuity in Pocock's work that follows the flow of the history of political thought. This chapter will explore how Pocock wants scholars, especially intellectual historians, to cultivate tenacious listening. His work is a persistent call for historians to become conversant in civilizational studies, theology, linguistics, and political theory. I contend that this is the paradigm shift Pocock intended to midwife.

Such is the basis for this chapter's main threads, supported in part by Glenn Burgess's article on Pocock's intellectual journey.[99] Burgess argues that "the ways in which a society's

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[98] Full quote: "Everyone is an ocean inside. Every individual walking the street. Everyone is a universe of thoughts, and insights, and feelings. But every person is crippled in his or her own way by our inability to truly present ourselves to the world." By KhaledHosseini, an Afghani novelist.

[99] Glenn Burgess, "From the Common Law Mind to "The Discovery of Islands": J.G.A. Pocock's Journey." *History of Political Thought* 29, no. 3 (2008): 543-561.

consciousness of its place in time are fundamental to its political identity";[100] to which I would

add that Pocock's earliest work in *The Ancient Constitution* set the foundation for his career

length approach of contextualism in the history of political thought. Pocock's understanding of

Peter Laslett's account of Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha* and later of John Locke's *Two Treatises of*

*Government* were the first examples of what he would later develop into his trademark

methodology. This methodology was composed of tenacious listening and contextual

understanding through considerations of the importance of when a text was written, published,

and subsequently received as critical to its proper understanding. Concerning Filmer Pocock

shared that Laslett's exploration,

"led my researches into the work of Robert Brady to the discovery that the republication of
Filmer led to two concurrent debates in different idioms (I began calling them 'languages') of
political argument: one concerned with the origins and rights of government—the classic field
and definition of 'political thought'—the other with the historic origins and vicissitudes of
government in England. . . Locke, it emerged, had taken part in the first debate, but hardly in the
second."[101]

       Thoughts of language and time now seem to be embedded in the current methodology of

the history of political thought, even if not made explicit by all historians applying it. These

advances in scholarship fall within the shadow of Pocock's legacy first explored through English

common law and have permeated the fabric of historiography. As discussed in the previous

chapter, the "linguistic turn" of the 1980s and 1990s offered a landscape where the work of

Habermas, Koselleck, Kuhn, and Pocock could transform paradigms across disciplinary lines and

offer up new approaches, sensitive to language in intellectual history, political theory, and the

relative sciences.

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[100] Burgess, "From the Common Law Mind to The Discovery of Islands," 543-44.

[101] J.G.A. Pocock, "Foundations and Moments." In *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought,* ed. Annabel Brett, James Tully, and Holly Hamilton-Bleakley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 37.

## A. History and Linguistics

Pocock's two-pronged methodology includes first, a decidedly contextual approach to history and second by developing, "a body of theoretical and empirical work reflecting on the human experience of time, whether in 'traditional' and customary societies or in societies that possessed a truly historical approach to their past."[102] In *The Ancient Constitution*, Pocock first began to develop the ideas he would later refer to as the 'role of the historian,' where the sense of continuity between the past and present was broken. The historian stepped in to offer better contextual understanding and linguistic clarity.[103] While all historians, by training and inclination, consider the relationships between past and present, Pocock's consistent practice of tenacious listening and contextualization constructed a new methodology to be considered and emulated. Pocock is master at putting into practice those points he drew upon in his John's Hopkins Valedictory Address, 'The Owl Reviews His Feathers,' having their seed in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*.[104] The historian must remain inclined to revisit and reconsider their work in light of new developments in understanding and be committed to remaining a student of history- developing a softness of ego and a careful, tenacious, listening ear. By seeking to produce interesting work and remain interested themselves, historians following Pocock's example can create engaging works of scholarship that invite discussion and promote further inquiry while holding space for interdisciplinary approaches, examples, and influence.

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[102] Burgess, "From the Common Law Mind to The Discovery of Islands," 546.

[103] Burgess, "From the Common Law Mind to The Discovery of Islands," 547-48, With reference to J.G.A. Pocock, "The Origins of Study of the Past: A Comparative Approach," *Comparative studies in society and history* 4, no. 2 (1962): 209–246.

[104] Burgess, "From the Common Law Mind to The Discovery of Islands," 551; Pocock, *J.G.A. Pocock's Valedictory Lecture;* Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right,* 12-13.

Pocock is one among other historians who considered the larger intellectual stakes of History as a discipline. Others whose minds and work pointed in similar directions were Fred Matthews, Linda Gordon, Thomas Haskell, and Peter Novick. The latter to which we now briefly turn our attention for considerations of other twentieth-century writings about historiography. American historian Peter Novick (1934-2012) explored "the objectivity question" in History and the role of the historian in his 1988 book *That Noble Dream*. Novick's work seeks to answer whether true objectivity is present in historical research, whether historians can be objective, and if objectivity is even a worthy goal. While Novick's book spans the work of a century's worth of American historians, the primary concern for this study are those portions and insights contained within the parameters of "The Postwar Reconstruction of Objectivism" (1941-1967) and "The Crisis of Objectivism" (1967-Present). In particular, those concerning the 1960s when Pocock's work began to emerge as an essential contribution in intellectual history, through to the mid-1990s after the "linguist turn.[105] Novick defined objectivity as "the rock on which the venture [professional historical study] was constituted, its continuing raison d'etre. It has been the quality which the profession has prized and praised above all others—whether in historians or their works. It has been the key term in defining progress in historical scholarship: moving ever closer to the objective truth about the past."[106] Objectivity in this regard could not be understood as a single idea, but a "sprawling collection of assumptions, attitudes, aspirations, and antipathies. At best, it is what the philosopher W.B. Ballie has called an 'essentially contested concept,' like 'social justice' or 'leading a Christian life,' the exact meaning of which will always be in

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[105] Tommaso Pavone, "A Critical Review of Peter Novick's *That Noble Dream*," (Princeton, 2014), 4.

[106] Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1.

dispute."[107] Historians could interact with objectivity as a concept by committing to history over fiction in their neutral role. For Novick, a historian is neutral and must act as a "disinterested judge" not an advocate or partisan critic. Overall their efforts ought to present the material free of biased opinion without falling into the arguably equally detrimental error of relativism.[108]

Matthews joins Richard Rorty and Novick in a shared position that relativism is "a pejorative used by objectivists to try to paint enemies into the untenable corner where all beliefs are seen as equally valid."[109] Matthews prefers the term 'perspectivists' instead of 'Antiobjectivists' for those who, in their acknowledgment over conflicts in gathered research within databases, have led to conflicts of interpretation. Critical dialogue is the only way to do justice to the analysis of this issue in History without leading to a breakdown in productive communication among historians. In Linda Gordon's "Comments on *That Noble Dream"* (1991), she recognizes the lasting debt of gratitude for considering the role of the historian concerning objectivity. However, she takes two issues with his work. First, she finds in his erudite explication of one hundred years of historical scholarship the consistent "dichotomy—objectivity/relativism—which only partly characterizes the approaches of historical scholarship over the past century."[110] The pinning of one extreme the other to the forefront of considerations on the role of the historian is problematic and simplistic. It need not be objectivity against relativism alone—as there is much space between to inhabit and consider.

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[107] Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 1.

[108] Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 1-2.

[109] Fred Matthews, "Peter Novick: 'That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession' (Book Review)." *Isis*. Washington, D.C., etc: Smithsonian Institute, etc, (1990): 314.

[110] Linda Gordon, "Comments on That Noble Dream." *The American Historical Review* 96, no. 3 (1991): 683.

Even if pure objectivity is not possible, it does not follow that anything else always degenerates into relativism. Second, Gordon believes that Novick's "approach privileges an epistemological issue, when his evidence suggests that the present-day political agendas of historians were often the more fundamental determinants of their theoretical choices."[111] Historians, as holistically understood by Pocock, are products of their time, place, and language, as well as scholars of history. They are not immune to the political conflicts of their time. Novick privileges "metahistorical rather than historical statements," but Gordon counters that "many historians—and this includes those whose theoretical views are studied in the book—use more complex, nuanced, even ambivalent and contradictory, assumptions regarding objectivity in their actual historical writing and teaching. There is room for ambivalence about the very question of whether historians *should* articulate their epistemological assumptions abstractly."[112] One of these areas is political conflict and its humanitarian effects.

Novick's work provides an interesting backdrop from which to consider the political and social implications of academic ambivalence. Even more so now as we move further into a tumultuous political climate in the United States rife with polarization and so far removed from objectivity that even the idea of moderation in political dialogue seems a far-fetched proposition. Pocock's work suggests that historians, as Burgess lucidly expresses, ". . . . are participants in the day's events. They might not fight battles in the noonday sun or labour in the fields from dawn; but they are there, alert and reflective, at dusk. There is no discontinuity between the time of the owl's flight and the rest of the day: the historian is immersed in the flow of time that also forms

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[111] Gordon, "Comments on That Noble Dream," 683.

[112] Gordon, "Comments on That Noble Dream," 683.

her or his subject matter."[113] History as a fluid endeavor is a particularly potent repercussion of the work J.G.A. Pocock created. Repercussions beginning with his early *The Ancient Constitution* and through to his senior work on Edward Gibbon as a historian working on 'ideas in time,' which will be explored in chapter four of this study.[114]

Between 1941 and 1967, there was a postwar reconstruction of objectivism in History as historians aided the attempt to combat fascism and the right-wing nationalist during the Cold War. Historians did their part to "'rearm the West Spiritually for the battle with the totalitarians" and sought to combat the growth of Historical relativism, which was "characterized as implicitly supportive of authoritarian modes of political and socioeconomic organization in service of the defense of the West.[115] Post-war historians had engaged in war efforts-to their credit, but it cost them and the discipline "critical distance" from their subject matter.[116] Further, in their classrooms, historians struggled with an objective narrative and presentation of History. According to Novick, "the late forties and fifties saw a wide-ranging effort to remove 'educators from American campuses—an effort which resulted in hundreds of dismissals and a climate of caution and self-censorship which endured for several years."[117] This forced historians to voice their political leanings. Those who did not align with a strictly American viewpoint in favor of the Western narrative were dismissed from their positions because objectivity in teaching was impossible without sanctioned ideological viewpoints.[118]

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[113] Burgess, "From the Common Law Mind to The Discovery of Islands," 551.

[114] J.G.A. Pocock, "Working on Ideas in Time." In *The Historian's Workshop: Original Ideas by Sixteen Historians*, edited by L.P. Curtis, Jr. 151-65. (New York, 1970), 151-65.

[115] Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 282.; Pavone, "A Critical Review of Peter Novick's *That Noble Dream*," 4.

[116] Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 304.

[117] Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 325.

[118] Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 326-329.

After 1967 the crisis of objectivism was characterized by the "American ideological shift to the left."[119] Novick describes the post-war to present transition the "consensus which provided the foundation for the comity congenial to objectivity collapsed, and it was not to be reconstructed in subsequent decades […] consensus was replaced first by polarization, then by fragmentation; affirmation, by negativity, confusion, apathy, and uncertainty."[120] This process is ongoing as the political moderate is a rare species close to extinction. The objective center scholar is, at best, battling uphill with disciplines becoming more rigid in their lines, accreditation standards so much less willing to blend approaches scopes. Specific orientations and focuses such as race and gender are becoming more and more closed to those outside their specific scope. As an example, Novick argues that "in these days, any white man who devotes himself to teaching and writing about black history must have the fortitude and strength of a bull elephant, because blacks will let him know that his presence is unwanted and undesirable."[121] Novick's assessment of Black Historians is unfair and cannot be substantiated. I do not believe this statement can or should be used as a blanket characterization of their perspective, however, as an example of one of the problems of such closed disciplinary practices, it does serve to illustrate how the approach fosters the construction of walls which neither help scholarship nor advance its goals of shared understanding.

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[119] Pavone, "A Critical Review of Peter Novick's *That Noble Dream*," 5.

[120] Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 415.

[121] Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 476.

**B. An Interdisciplinary Methodology:**

Changes in the way historians approach the history of political thought have extended to political scientists, scholars of literature, and sociologists. Nevertheless, while Pocock's collected essays on the political language and time were written under the formal disciplinary "denominations of historian and political scientist," they were dedicated to "a Cambridge student of history and philosophy and a Chicago student of English literature," highlighting the interdisciplinary nature of Pocock's ultimate aim in scholarship.[122] In the progressive exploration of Pocock's work, methodology, and legacy, the next question to turn to is what can be gleaned from Pocock's understanding of political languages through a contextual approach benefitting an interdisciplinary examination of the history of political thought?

Pocock's work on political languages and the contextual approach to authorial intention provides a lucid model for the historian to follow in their craft. The scholar's work is to (re)present the text in question as its original author would have intended it- that is, within their specific mind-space and historical context, and how their contemporary reader would have received it- bound to their specificity. However, it is not the interpreter's prerogative to clarify the author's original work or aid in restructuring the argument in such a way as to bring coherence to the writing. Doing so would be "unhistorical," meaning that it falls out of Pocock's prescribed range for the historian's proper role. According to Pocock, "The most the historian may attempt is to show that, once we realize as historians that a man's ideas are to be interpreted in a certain way, we may understand in the light of that knowledge what his problem in achieving coherence was, and why he believed that he had solved it by proceeding as he

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[122] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* 3.

did."[123] Ultimately this is where one can see the crux of the difference between the lay reader of Pocock's work on language and the focused historian. The interested but non-historical practitioner need not be so concerned with what the author meant in their own time but rather what can be gleaned for modernity through the text, for what purposes the text may be used as a vehicle for change or clarification. In practice, Pocock urges historians to avoid even prefacing their thoughts with "Hobbes said" or "Hobbes says" since these particular phrases erroneously presume a conversation being held with the dead in the present tense. Historians should use something more akin to, "if we repeat these words of Hobbes under given conditions, there ensue the following results" since that is what historians mean and comes closer to the proper role and prerogative of the historian.

Suppose one reads Pocock within the present context of modernity. What would follow is an engagement with the fluid parsing out of the roles of historian, philosopher, linguist, and theorist, and the complex ways in which, while seemingly separate, they are essentially engaged in a common intentional activity of scholarship, especially with regards to civic humanism and the humanities.[124] The work of a humanist specifically in the Humanities discipline in comparison to that of a historian, for example, is in part that the humanist can parse out the work of the ancients to learn from them what they would have (presumably) thought or said about aspects of modernity and the humanist's present-day dilemmas. To clarify, the humanist is of course inspired by the Humanities, but the historian, depending on their research interests and goals, needn't always be. Part of the practical application of Pocock's principles in this study is an

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[123] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 6.

[124] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* 7-8.

attempt to engage his work on the proper role of the humanist historian within their particular

context in conjunction with a civic humanist approach to historiographic inquiry. Contrasted

with the historian is the philosopher whose business is, according to Pocock, "to formalize the

relations between ideas, he very properly drew out the bodies of political thought presented to

him into systems of philosophy at least as formalized as their authors had sought to make them,

and at times more so."[125] Historians must resist the urge to expand upon authorial intention,

make sweeping philosophical claims, and avoid other failed attempts at proper history through

the mistake of reductionism. In his essay "Languages and Their Implications," Pocock refers to a

transformation of scholarship in his time, which was the "emergence of a truly autonomous

method, one which offer[ed] a means of treating the phenomena of political thought strictly as

historical phenomena."[126] One must then consider the canonization question of the very nature of

political thought.

       Are scholars to study classical texts in their own right or ponder them in light of perennial

human condition problems? Are scholars to study what is *said* of that which is or

directly *that* which is? At the heart of this particular consideration is the idealist versus

materialist functions of scholarship. In turn, this provides yet another area of Pocock's work that

touches on the problematic nature of what can be considered proper historical scholarship and

the issues with rigidly built walls of disciplines. Rigid walls of academic discipline which allow

no fluidity of thought, no mixing of languages and methodologies, no interdisciplinary

collaboration, cannot reconcile themselves to any creative approaches such as the history of ideas

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[125] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 9.

[126] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* 10.

and its implications for academia. This failure goes further than the superficial boxing in of scholars and scholarly inquiry into GOVT, HIST, HUMA, ENG, etcetera denominations; it truncates the possibility of scholarship before the possibility of greater fruition of thought. Nevertheless, Pocock observed, "But we are beginning to see historical daylight; and since it has been emphasized that much of the previous confusion originated in a confounding of the functions of the historian and the philosopher, it is gratifying to record that philosophic analysis was the agency which began to liberate the historian for the pursuit of his method."[127] This approach functions as a solid depiction of how philosophy, theory, and history are all so interrelated his reader understands that the proper functioning of one depends largely on the concise ordering and proper functioning of the others; thus, it is more of a scholarly web than a cubicle approach.

Similarly, political philosophy presents a unique problem for scholarship. Since the philosopher makes statements of the first order, then the scholar of political philosophy makes statements about the second order's statements or statements. Both employ, "language—or languages, or language structures, or language 'games' possessing 'rules' by which they might be 'played'…"[128] Therefore, the latter leads historians to view language best, "as a product of history and as possessing history of its own, to reach the point where it could be seen, first, that the exploration of language might yield historical results, might produce second-order statements about languages used which would be historical statements; second that this activity could be considered a historical agent, helping to produce changes in linguistic consciousness and so in

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[127] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 10-11.

[128] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 11.

the history of language-use itself."[129] That is to say first that historical inquiry from the historian's standpoint could be best served by applying a linguistic approach, which first leads to an understanding of the particular history of the language within the context it was employed and received. Insight of that nature could lead to similar second-order statements like those of the philosopher but with rather a different aim- not to expand on first-order statements in kind, but to deepen the linguistic understanding of the language of those statements. Second, considering language in the aforementioned ways, the historian engages in history creation by fostering an atmosphere where *linguistic consciousness* changes. So the history of that language does as well. Instead of subversion of political philosophy, an attitude exemplified circa 1956, Pocock's work presents the idea that the changes necessary to bring about new facets to the discipline of political thought lend them to a new sophistication. I would further add that the changes suggested by Pocock's work open the door for a more creative and engaging approach for future interdisciplinary scholarship.

Engagement with the text then would lend itself to a wholly new approach. Imagine reading historical accounts or similarly engaging with political philosophy to scholars of literature. Recall the work done in courses relating poetry to political philosophy, for example, the poetry of Paul Celan concerning Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time*. However, there are certainly many other options. If historians of political thought were to engage with the text line by line, and on some lines word for word, drawing out linguistic analysis, parsing out meaning and context, reordering ideas in their particularities – it would be quite a different beast

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[129] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 12.

altogether. I would argue that, in part, this is what Pocock implied through his contextual

methodology and linguistic approach to historical scholarship on political thought.

There is a need for a point of qualification about a Pocock-inspired approach to political

thought's linguistic analysis. It is not implied here that Pocock's work on political languages and

the aforementioned linguistic analysis brings about a neat and unflawed understanding of the

language's "concrete character as a historical phenomenon." Rather an approach of this nature

would seek to apply the worthy techniques, "which critics and students of literary expression

employ to uncover the full wealth of association, implication and resonance, the many levels of

meaning, which a living language contains when used by those who are masters of its powers of

expression."[130] To clarify, what Pocock is doing is by its very nature and arguably is his single

most significant contribution to scholarship in the general sense, a breaking down of disciplinary

barriers by engaging with practices from the same various disciplines. In this particular case,

Pocock's work calls forth-literary analysis from literature departments for historical engagement

and language appreciation from departments of linguistics and translation practices in application

to the creative exploration of political thought. When the phrase "dancing" in chapter two of this

project was used to describe Pocock's interaction with interdisciplinary endeavors, this is a bit of

what was meant. He holds no regard for arbitrary administrative walls in academia but rather

views the business of scholarly engagement with historical text as worthy of using all the

intellectual tools available in current practice to deepen understanding and conversation.

The next question that necessitates consideration is if there is any danger in blurring lines

through Pocock's intended approach to historical engagement and if his methodology is a threat

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[130] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 12.

to practical barriers between disciplinary studies. I posit that the answer is both yes and no. It would be foolish and detrimental to the kind of scholarship this project seeks to deepen to equate all studies with the same aim. A linguist, for example, would not engage in the attempt to recover the historical past of their text as a historian would. Therefore the blurring of the lines goes only so far in practice but not so far as to change the scholarly intent. In his essay "Languages and Their Implications: The Transformation of the Study of Political Thought," Pocock asserts that "the methodological autonomy of the history of political language remains to be established."[131] I would argue that this particular portion of Pocock's work has not yet been disentangled, and its contents have not been put in practice within modern scholarship. For examples of the methodology expanded upon in this chapter, Pocock's approach in *The Machiavellian Moment* and after his six-volume study of Edward Gibbon as the mature synthesis of his methodology are best consulted. Both of which will be explored in upcoming chapters of this study.

**C. Pocock's Paradigm Shift:**

As previously introduced, Thomas Kuhn's work in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* opened the way for political language history's methodological autonomy. A pause is necessary here to observe what is perhaps the seed for the creation of a new sub-discipline within the context of this history of ideas, which Pocock's work alluded to. Words matter to Pocock. The difference between the history of ideas or the history of political thought and what he calls the history of political language is a subtle nod toward a paradigmatic shift of focus for

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[131] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* 13.

intellectual historians. An etymological approach to the history of political thought would restructure the work of historians of political thought and theory. In *Structure*, Kuhn regarded "normal science," which for the disciplines in question here, namely history, philosophy, political thought, and theory, references the regular day-to-day explorations of the historical community, defining the subject of dialogue and ongoing work.

A scientific revolution occurs when the paradigms in place no longer function well. A reordering is necessary to establish what needs to be studied in light of a new understanding of previous thought now deemed misconceptions. Restructuring of the sort called for by a scientific revolution also implies a change of leadership; change of the 'leading experts' if you will, a game change where the rules of engagement have been altered. Some disciplines may remain flexible, outside the dynamic and sometimes volatile changes that a revolution in paradigm can bring. However, for the most part, a radical restructuring is necessary. Applying Hegel's dialectic model to new approaches to historical inquiry into the history of political languages would culminate in the opposition of rigid disciplinary lines colliding, for example, the lines between history and linguistics, history and philosophy, or history and political theory. The Hegelian relationship between thesis and antithesis would lead to an intellectual and scholarly revolution. With any luck, it would synthesize in a more fluid approach to the history of ideas, friendlier to the blurred lines Pocock demonstrates in his work.

Kuhn's *Structure* supports a Pocockian view that the history of political thought has both linguistic and political processes. If scholars were to define "the 'paradigm' both in terms of the intellectual (heuristic) function it performs and in terms of the authority, both intellectual and political, which distributes as between human actors in a social system…" and in doing so view

the structure of historical scholarship in light of the verbal paradigm as presented by Pocock, meaning, "a historical event or phenomenon to which there can be many responses" then scholarship would, "retain much of the character of Kuhn's concrete *exemplum.*" The later is of course quite independent from Kuhn's practical purposes but is as Pocock puts it, "proof of the essential value of his theory."[132] This is another example of the interdisciplinary nature of Pocock's work and a prime example of this thought process. By adopting Kuhnian principles, Pocock shifted and molded Kuhn's paradigms to exemplify changes in the trajectory of the history of political thought. While aware the aims of history of politics differ from disciplines of science, the application of Kuhnian principles was in overall service to a contextual approach to history and an unfolding of interdisciplinary possibility

A historian requires a complex understanding of context, made tangible by the communication of language systems to situate events, actions and thoughts properly. Quite contrary to the idea that the inclusion of political language systems as a methodological point of origin complicates the historian's work beyond what is called for in reasonable scholarship, language systems open alternate dimensions of historical inquiry and portals to paradigmatic possibility. In other words, the study of language systems does not encumber the historian; it rather invites them into a more ample and fertile ground for historical exploration. According to Pocock, "What has hitherto been rather vaguely termed 'political thought' is now redefined as the exploration and sophistication of political language, and the connections between language system and political system begin to seem possible to draw."[133] However, it is clear Pocock

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[132] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 14-15

[133] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 16.

recognizes that the science community has its own issues to contend with, and it is impossible to equate the field of science with the field of history exactly, though where there are similar concerns, they could benefit from applying worthwhile Kuhnian principles to the social sciences.

The scientific community's paradigms are paradigms concerning "intellectual specialists" and are more of a collective endeavor. In contrast, the disciplines of history, political thought, and literature as previously described are engaged in more dynamic, organic, and fluid approaches to inquiry and scholarship. Pocock goes so far as to deem the community of historians "maddeningly elusive." One must remember that what Pocock calls for is not a linguistic analysis of secondary thought, that is- of the political scientists themselves in their particular communities; these are seen as second-order actors in the process. Instead, he urges scholars to analyze language systems employed by independent political thinkers, "assumed to be thinking as a member, and in the context, of the political community itself, and therefore to be speaking a specialized variation of its political language."[134] To understand Pocock on the topic of political rhetoric and its various implications, it behooves his reader to be familiarized with the definitions handed down by Aristotle on the subject of rhetoric.

The influence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* has permeated nearly every area of the Humanities, from the peripatetic tradition of writing to philosophical interpretation, history, literature, linguistics, and beyond.His doctrine of *sullogismos* provides a foundation for dialectic, logic, and theories of demonstration, providing a venue for its application in the natural sciences as well, by

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[134] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 16-17.

which Thomas Kuhn was most certainly aware of and impacted.[135] For its application to Pocock's idea of and approach to political languages, Aristotle's three technical means of persuasion are essential. Technical, meaning that the speaker engaged in the language act of persuasion "must rest on a method," that methodical persuasion "must rest on a complete analysis of what it means to be persuasive."[136] Political languages as speech acts of rhetorical persuasion; a speaker (or author), discussion topic or foundation for the implementation of persuasion, and an audience are needed. In this approach, the original author would need to be speaking through their work on a particular topic in political thought and sending out their thought and language to a contemporary audience in the hopes of persuading said audience to arrive at similar conclusions. At the very least, the author's rhetorical engagement would seek the audience to be amenable to the author's intent through rhetorical impression and reason and the process of Aristotle's formal requirements of the enthymemes structure of premise and conclusion.

In light of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Pocock's work on political languages, Kuhn's paradigms need to be theoretically restructured if they are to be thoughtfully applied to the history of political thought. While speech is political, it does not necessarily seek to problem-solve. Instead, speech- much like the kind of historical inquiry Pocock's work implies historians ought to engage in, simultaneously presents ideas, draws attention away from others, synthesizes varying viewpoints, and provides valuable commentary on authority structures. All of which is part of what Pocock beautifully refers to as "the linguistic and therefore political texture of the

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[135] Christof Rapp, "Aristotle's Rhetoric", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2010.

[136] Rapp, "Aristotle's Rhetoric"

human societies and lives whose history the student is ultimately tracing."[137] Ever the craftsman, Pocock's work serves as a consistent reminder that the work that historians of political thought are engaged in is a delicate process, holding to the idea that this particular kind of scholarship is a careful examination of the intricate tapestry that is the human experience. Not unlike scientists who study the smallest forms of matter, historians of political thought are called to take simultaneously a bird's eye view of the whole of particular civilizations to see the broad spectrum of connections and the labyrinth of meaningful actions. Joining that approach with the magnified and meticulous study of specific places and their particular times; the languages they employed, the layers and tones of meaning, their contextual importance, and reception and original authorial intention.

The last difference between Kuhn's paradigms as revolution and Pocock's paradigms as threads in the larger tapestry rests on the disconnect between a shift in political paradigms and an inevitable political revolution, for idioms can be altered and paradigms in political thought. At the same time, influx does not necessitate real and practical political revolutions in power-structures. As such, Pocock dates modern historiography to the sixteenth century as opposed to the previous methods of historical study used by the Greeks and Romans, whose methods bore little resemblance to the paradigms to come.[138] While the ancients demonstrated noted lucidity regarding the analysis of human customs and circumstances, they were limited as well. They stopped short of understanding customs and circumstances from ages past as the prerogatives of

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[137] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* 19.

[138] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 1.

a different time, times with distinct societal constructions contingent on particularities of their time and place unable to be replicated in any other eras.

The ancients' modes of study were gradually built upon until they grew into history's modern approach. Modern historians would later focus on "reconstructing the institutions of society in the past and using them as a context in which, and utilizing which, to interpret the actions, words, and thoughts of the men who lived at that time."[139] According to Pocock, ancient and modern historical study methods had distinct approaches to constructing narratives versus contextual examination. In *The Ancient Constitution,* Pocock writes that "the Greco-Roman historians did not develop a special technique for the exploration of the past because— paradoxical though it may seem in the pioneers of historiography—the past as such was not surpassingly important to them."[140] Essentially, they were busy philosophizing; they were busy studying and attempting to perfect their institutions and were as a whole unready to take a macro approach to their historical presence. For the Greeks, history was happening in the now. Only after the decline and fall of Rome did the epicenter of consciousness shift akin to a Kuhnian paradigmatic movement; thus, the process of reflecting on the past and its importance as a scholarly endeavor is formed.[141]

One alternate paradigm grown out of previous endeavors was humanism and was defined by Pocock as the method of classical scholarship's approach to the ancient world. In being part of the tradition of Western civilization, as Alfred North Whitehead asserts, we are all but a

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[139] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 2.

[140] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 2.

[141] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 3.

footnote to Plato.[142] Medieval, Renaissance and modern persons have since sought to unpack the legacy of the ancients in all humanist aspects and emulate as much as their particular historical contexts will allow the models and modes of their reason and institutions. The humanist tradition came to explore the underlying roots of antiquity present throughout all later societies, albeit in a roundabout fashion.[143] Humanists were crafting the practice of primary scholarship, contextualization, and historiographic practices by calling on a stripping down of classical texts and the un-layering of applied commentary to original work. Practices that would later call for antiquity to be viewed within its domain as a separate space-time from post-antiquity. The humanist aim was to understand the workings of antiquity intimately to resurrect the same models for themselves. However, by the practice of uncovering the legacy of the ancients and viewing it within and concerning its context, humanists were able to understand that what "belonged to the ancient world, was bound up with and dependent upon innumerable things which could not be brought back to life, and consequently, it could not be simply incorporated with contemporary society."[144] Therefore while the humanists were unable to resurrect for contemporary society a living antiquity, they did establish the need for historical inquiry and historiography as an independent field of study for modern historians. Pocock argues that much has been explored on the history of the Greco-Roman tradition. However, perhaps less credit than is due has been bestowed upon early humanists for the formation of a new angle in historical studies, which has been ever so fruitful to future generations of scholars.

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[142] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 3.

[143] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 4.

[144] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 5.

**D. Politics and Language:**

In carefully parsing out the role of the historian in contrast to the philosopher, one must recognize that political philosophy and the history of political thought are separate endeavors seeking to engage in the same activity but for distinct purposes. Both philosophy, classical or modern, and historiography are "specialized intellectual activities that can be generated by discussion and exploration of the language in which the articulation of politics is carried on" and, as such, efforts to understand a particular context linguistically. Pocock defines the politics of a language as "a series of devices for envisaging the varieties of the political functions which language can perform and of the types of political utterance that can be made, and how these utterances may transform one another as they interact under the stress of political conversation and dialectic."[145] As political thinkers and scholars share in the acts of language interpretation, political languages are by nature organic in that they are living at the time and actively explored in the future for their clarification to illustrate the narrative of their time and space.

Pocock's work on political languages pries open the door for creative engagement with political thought and linguistics in various forms. For example, the study of politics and literature seeks to explore the human experience through the lens of great works of political thought, philosophy, and literature, which I believe Pocock would readily approve. Interdisciplinary by its very nature, an exploration of this kind blends the formal disciplines of literature, political philosophy, and the history of political thought within the Humanities. Courses offered on politics and literature in modern academic spaces are doing the groundwork necessary.

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[145] Pocock references his later essay, "Time, Institutions and Action: An Essay on Traditions and their Understanding."; Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 19-20.

Hopefully, a more dynamic approach to the study of political thought will occur in the future, unencumbered by disciplinary rigidness. Recognizing that to ask essential questions about the relationship between humanity and political structures, one must include looking to the literary artist to be the mirror by which a thinking society measures itself as only the artist can hold up a mirror to society for the facilitation of change.

This concept is beautifully expressed by William Shakespeare in *Hamlet* when he writes:

"Suit the action to the word, the word to the action, with this
special observance that you o'erstep not the modesty of nature:
for any thing so o'erdone is from the purpose of playing, whose
end, both at the first and now, was and is, to hold as 'twere the
mirror up to nature: to show virtue her feature, scorn her own
image, and the very age and body of the time, his form and
pressure."[146]

The study of political languages must also be undertaken to understand a particular historical context's institutional idioms. Political speech is so much of the time specialized to industry and business politics for specific purposes. While institutional idioms are specifically practiced in narrow constructs of society, society itself is never insular- and specialized political speech seeps through the flowing activities of communities, including science, education, academia, politics, and socio-economic culture. As elucidated by Pocock, "A complex plural society will speak a complex plural language; or rather, a plurality of specialized languages, each carrying its own biases as to the definition and distribution of authority, will be seen converging to form a highly complex language, in which many paradigmatic structures exist simultaneously…"[147] Pocock's affinity for the words paradigm and idiom denote his inimitable ability to listen carefully.

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[146] William Shakespeare, *Hamlet* Act 3, Scene 2, Lines 17-24.

[147] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 22.

Reading Pocock, there is a distinct reluctance to jump to conclusions in any way and a commitment to tenacious listening for the nuances of language. In this regard, his contextual methodology exemplifies his skilled listening to the idiomatic expressions of time. As with Harrington, Machiavelli, and Gibbon, Pocock's particular approach to scholarship affords the original author the ability to be seen from sometimes opposing viewpoints with plausibility in an attempt to find a synthesis by listening without imposing.

The history of political thought has a rich historical landscape where the composition of political language is complex and overlaps with different cultural aspects. The creation and use of political language is then an interrelated endeavor where words and phrases "may convey more than one meaning and be of more than one order," which contain various points of origin and implications for their audience.[148] Careful listening and the delicate parsing of ideas and phraseology are imperative as texts of political thought are typically constructed of multilayered syntax, meanings, and insinuations. The historian must also take care not to interject modernity's approaches to texts of antiquity or to read into authorial intent meanings that could not have been present at the time of writing, thus circling round once more to the importance of a contextual methodology to studying political thought through language.

From the man who wrote six volumes on one author, through a most careful reconstruction of context, thought, and language, Pocock is ever aware of the slipperiness of the dichotomy present for the scholar. He elucidates the juxtaposition's complexity between fleshing out the meaning and stopping short of taking license with interpretation. Pocock concedes that while there is room for the author or text to "mean more than he said or to say more than he

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[148] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 22.

meant," it is not the prerogative of the historian to clarify or add to the original thought.[149] One of the most exciting points in this thread of Pocock's work is that the parsing out need not be limited to merely those wheelhouse tools handed down by the historiographic tradition.

Taking cues from literary analysis, the dissection of poetry verses, the exultation of narrators and characters in fictional work, and the guidance of the literary artist, the historian can swim in the deepest waters of political thought armed with a greater capacity to understand what without these tools would be obscured by the passage of time. In his essay on "Languages and Their Implications," Pocock even uses the example of Lewis Carroll's Alice, the cracked egg Humpty Dumpty. The perturbed Red Queen illustrates that while the original author may have meant one thing, once the language has been exposed to time, interpretation, and scholarship, meanings become flexible and often resist the imposition of hardened and unyielding narrative structures. This idea is best articulated when Pocock states that, "once history is seen in linguistic depth such as this, the paradigms with which the author operates take precedence over questions of his 'intention' or the 'illocutionary force' of his utterance, for only after we have understood what means he had of saying anything can we understand what he meant to say, what he succeeded in saying, what he was taken to have said, or what effects his utterance had in modifying or transforming the existing paradigm structures."[150] Thus the author is by degrees separated from their work. Much like the artist's craft, once work is released into the world, there is no guarantee of how it will be received and what conclusions those exposed to it will draw.

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[149] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 23.

[150] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 24-25.

Authorial intention and political speech, therefore, fluctuate in a delicate balance between being historical artifacts and organic renditions of political thought. Specifically, the balance is a practical adaption of the Greek sense that political speech must be constantly engaged in if we are to speak well about things that matter; in doing so, we are joining in an ongoing cultural conversation adapted to academic ends. How then are scholars to do work which appropriately falls into the "role of the historian"? Pocock begins to answer this query by delineating a first step for the scholar focused on intellectual history. To begin, the historian ought to "identify the 'language' or 'vocabulary' with and within which the author operated, and to show how it functioned paradigmatically to prescribe what he might say and how he might say it."[151] The practice is best accomplished by considering the particular idioms of the time and laying them out with consideration to their use by the author. How and for what purposes the author employed cultural idioms to explicate political principles is the first "tell" in proper historical scholarship on political languages. For example, to know what Pocock means by the word paradigm, a scholar must first familiarize themselves with Thomas Kuhn's work. After, they must consider the contemporary threads of scholarship and academic conflict where these phrases were in use and what meanings they had for Kuhn and later Pocock. Only then, and in light of the trajectory of the idea of shifting paradigms and contextual analysis, can one begin to grasp a more holistic view of the meaning of Pocock's work on language.

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[151] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 25.

For clarity, Pocock's methodological explanation out to be consulted in the following passage:

 "…If at this stage we are asked how we know the languages adumbrated really existed, or how we recognize them when we see them, we should be able to reply empirically: that the languages in question are simply there, that they form individually recognizable patterns and styles, and that we get to know them by learning to speak them, to think in their particular patterns and styles until we know that we are speaking them and can predict in what directions speaking them is carrying us. From this point, we may proceed to study them in-depth, detecting both their cultural and social origins and the modes, linguistic and political, of assumption, implication, and ambiguity which they contained and helped to convey."[152]

One example of the above methodology is in regards to republicanism. Pocock's ideas about the American founding's linguistic origins come as he explains that Puritan political thought and language were composed primarily of eschatological and apocalyptic concepts that so preoccupied early Americans of this particular tradition.[153] The charge leveled at scholars who limit their study of a political thinker only to the portions of their work that coincide with generally accepted theories, and time-tested philosophies (such as Locke's theory on Tabula Rasa versus Plutarch's idea about the kindling of a flame regarding education or Machiavelli's arguments about learning from the past in *Discourses* versus Heraclitus' views on perpetual change) is that they miss the nuances and the possibility in the minutia of the portions of that thinker's work that do not seem to fit. Within these portions, the use of political languages can be explored. The thought process of paradigmatic figures like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, or Niccolo Machiavelli can be (re)viewed, and interpretations made anew. For a careful reader and listener such as Pocock, even classical texts that scholars have long subjugated can be refreshed

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[152] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 26.

[153] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 27.

and revived in light of new methodological paradigms, including the contextual analysis of political languages throughout history.

Pocock's process demands a careful methodology, including first locating, "in the contemporary texture the level of meaning on which it is most illuminating to conduct our interpretation; and this necessitates our proceeding both by rendering explicit what may have been implicit before and by selecting the area or level of implication to be explicated."[154] The process, or contextual methodology, must first seek out the meaning conveyed within the original society culturally and its colloquial engagement. Only after situating the narrative in its natural context must scholars clarify, with the utmost humility, the meanings with portions of the work embedded in the original text.

The layers of meaning derived from the original author of political thought's work are out of the thinker's symbolic hands. Once an act of political speech has been produced and released to readership and audiences, it becomes the recipient's prerogative to attach meaning. The contextual receipt of the work remains to be studied by the scholar. What the author *may* have meant is not the same as how their work was received in its original space-time or what it has come to mean as later, more modern readers have received it in light of their contexts. Pocock intends to use the parsing out of these layered contextual meanings as the chief employment of a scholar of the history of political thought.[155]

Scholars must actively research the possible meanings in the context they wish to engage in and later verify those meanings through historical processes. The spirit of Pocock's

[154] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 29.

[155] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* 29.

instructions for verification of meaning is as follows: "The latter part of this operation—the verification—must be conducted by methods which are rigorously historical; the former part maybe, but need not."[156] Pocock provides cautious encouragement to fellow historians involved in the historiographic craft and interpretation of political languages. "As historians," he says, "we are justified in seeking to make the implicit explicit and to find levels of meaning in a man's thought which he did not directly express and of which he was not consciously aware. We have, however, to be particularly careful—more careful than has sometimes been the case—to indicate the historical moment at which the implicit is seen as becoming explicit."[157] Perhaps what is being implied was not made explicit because it lay below the original author's conscious observation and not at the intentional forefront of their thought. The historian must ask if the original author's writing matches the interpretations of their thought, as they necessarily would if the conclusions drawn were correct assumptions since actions are generally congruent with internal thought processes. Further, it behooves the historian to find at least one example to mirror the implicit thought and the explicit meaning they are attempting to attach to the author's work. It is also likely that elsewhere in the trajectory of their language, they would have clarified themselves. If these stipulations fail to be met, the historian must relinquish the adherence to tried but indemonstrable and thus unfounded claims of contextual interpretation. Such an exercise can be demonstrated by Pocock's 1957 work, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law*.

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[156] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 30.

[157] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time*, 32-33.

Working alongside, and with much personal respect and professional courtesy, to Peter Laslett, Pocock's work in *The Ancient Constitution* found John Locke to be "a political thinker more Exclusionist radical than Revolution Whig."[158] Largely due to the omission of conservative language and modes of argument shared by his contemporaries but absent in his work and writings, the character of Locke's influence needs redefinition, and further than what Pocock's original claim calls for, so to the degree of import afforded to Locke on the American Founding. Dismantling of the type described by Pocock here would raise significant objects to scholars who have traditionally viewed Locke and expressed his influence as radical and universal, providing critical clues about eighteenth-century political thought. That is to say- through his contextual approach, the conclusions Pocock arrived at concerning John Locke were far from the accepted assumptions of historians and unwelcome hindrances to the accepted narrative across disciplines like political theory.[159] In *The Ancient Constitution,* Pocock began the vital work of identifying and examining political languages. The particular languages identified in that work were languages of "precedent, common law, and ancient custom," which were used throughout a significant period of English history beyond this work's scope, which ends in 1685. Pocock's work elucidates the workings of the French universities in the sixteenth century and the systems in place to transition from medieval to modern scientific faculties, namely theology, medicine, and the law of which history was a component as an off-shoot of rhetoric.

Contrary to the idea that history was not being developed during this time, Pocock explains that the French were engaged in a slow drawing out the history of historiography

[158] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* x.

[159] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* xi.

through Justinianean text with Roman principles, jurisprudence, and modern societal concerns.[160] In the search for Roman meanings' exactitude, sixteenth-century scholars have engaged in the type of linguistic analysis that Pocock's work calls for modern historians to consider and apply to their endeavors. As Pocock says they, "set about comparing and establishing the various meanings which all such words bore, first in the separate legal texts which employed them, and secondly, in any other works of ancient provenance in which they might be found; and thus it was that detailed and conscious historical criticisms made its appearance in the schools of jurisprudence under the name of 'grammar,' the science of meaning and use of words." The historian's consideration and active participation in linguistic contextualism have their roots in a much earlier form of exploring political thought and discourse through philology and its four comparative, textual, cognitive, and decipherment branches.[161] When principles of the latter are intentionally applied to historical texts, the role of the historian shifts to accommodate a contextual approach, and in so doing, the historian grew out of the legal humanist; methodological growing pains notwithstanding, a new breed of scholar had evolved.

These scholars' questions had to contend with form the foundation for the perennial problems of historical and legal study. My (re)presentation of Pocock's questions comes in three parts. First, were the endeavors to study history with a contextual and linguistic approach counter to modern Western civilization's political structural purposes? Second, if the approach was counterproductive to current contexts, would this method of study be fruitful or detrimental to

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[160] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 9.

[161] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 10.

modernity? Third, could ancient laws be studied for modernity's sake, and if so, should they be? Some objections to Pocock's methodology will naturally arise after exposure to the critique of other scholars. One critique may be leveled in the sense that the method of contextual analysis Pocock means is more abstract, unreal, or of an idealist nature and equated with "intellectual sin." To contend with these charges, one must remember that they stem from an ineffectual and problematic idealist-materialistic dichotomy to which we next turn our attention.[162]

Political language as an organic tool for communication is seeped in particular cultural aspects, contains historical references, and uses colloquial idioms that are not just political text for a political purpose. While political text is one thread in the overall tapestry of political language, it does not constitute the whole of the linguistic and theoretical fabric. The careful consideration of political language as living and fluid makes *listening* key to its proper interpretation instead of a more inflexible academic analysis. That this is a more intricate approach must not be conflated to take it for being a convoluted or abstract approach- simply, a more complex and holistic one. The overall process must begin with the language and work out from there, instead of the faulty assumption that all language will necessarily reflect the society in which it was created, thus limiting the thought's root reach. Political language then is less like a mirror and more like the depth of a reflection, best expressed by Pocock as the scholar being interested in "what elements of social experience are articulated in political speech, in how the process of articulation goes on, in how the articulations come to be organized in paradigmatic

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[162] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* 35.

languages and elaborated in theoretical, philosophical, historical and other intellectually autonomous structures, and in the history of the entire process thus rendered visible."[163]

Pocock's methodological process of contextualization includes asking questions about what the political author was saying, what languages were being used to say it with, and what was being discussed. The process is an exploration of language more than a one-sided dialogue with the historical time and the parallels between events and text. In practice, Pocock urges historians engaging with contextual linguistic exploration to refrain at all costs from succumbing to the misguided assumption that "extra-intellectual or extra-linguistic" is real, and in doing so, imply that the "intellectual or linguistic equipment" is non-real. Doing so would be the greatest disservice to the process of historical inquiry Pocock sought to contribute.[164] Pocock so abhors the drawbacks of the idealist-materialist dichotomy that he states, "The absurdity of the implication should remind us that the paradigms which order 'reality' are part of the reality they order, that language is part of the social structure and not epiphenomenal to it, and that we are studying an aspect of reality when we study the ways in which it appeared real to the person to whom it was more real than to anyone else."[165] The idealist-materialist dichotomy speaks to the problem intellectual historians face in conjunction with linguists and scholars engaged with socio-political issues. At first, Pocock's ideas about language seem to be at odds, for example, with the French philosopher, intellectual historian, social theorist, and literary critic Michel Foucault's arguments about language and reality.

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[163] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* 36.

[164] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* 38.

[165] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* 38.

Foucault presents a compelling theory on language and social politics in his 1976 work, *The History of Sexuality*. In his first chapter, "The Incitement to Discourse," Foucault presents an argument for language in service of our notion of reality and the relationship between what *is* and what *can be* discussed. According to Foucault, "As if in order to gain mastery over it [in this case, sex] in reality, it had first been necessary to subjugate it at the level of language, control its free circulation in speech, expunge it… and extinguish the words that rendered it too visibly present."[166] Foucault argues that language has clear power over concepts and ideas and that without tools for dialoguing about a subject, its reality is necessarily limited. For Foucault, language gives meaning, space, and form to ideas that otherwise could not exist. I would suggest that both Pocock and Foucault approaching language and reality from different vantage points are not necessarily on opposite sides. While Foucault is generally accepted as espousing postmodern and post-structure ideology, and Pocock's work lends itself to a more traditional, even at times conservative approach, they nonetheless resemble each other in attempts to reconcile living history with language and society. Through Pocock's practice of conceptualization working within the temporal context (except where he makes an exception for concepts which are time immemorial such as the ancient constitution) and Foucault's work, on the whole, makes more strict distinctions between time and timeless concepts.[167]

For the narrow-minded charge of abstraction, historians practicing Pocock's contextual methodology for political languages may reply that what they are studying is "precisely, the

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[166] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* (United Kingdom:Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2012), 17.

[167] William S. Corlett, "Pocock, Foucault, Forces of Reassurance." *Political theory* 17, no. 1 (1989): 86.

history of abstraction, that is to say, the history of systematic thinking."[168] As an ever-evolving scholar, Pocock attempts to engage in a macro-level self-critique. He endeavors to charge himself with "a neglect of romanticism in order to see what comes of *orations accusatorial etdefensoria*," presupposing possible criticism by other scholars that his work has a bias towards "early-modern themes in history and toward an unacknowledged classicism and conservatism in politics." Such critiques may be viable as Pocock's concentration of work within the classical canon of Western literature leaves much to be desired in the way of a more global approach. However, a counter charge may be presented in that scholars who attempt global approaches cannot delve as deeply into their research as those to take a more limited approach. Pocock's work has its limitations- and this is one. His approach is an Anglo-centered, Western-focused version of intellectual history that does not take into its center or deal with in any real sense non-Western epistemologies. Understandably this may leave scholars with more to be desired. Nevertheless, I would argue that for the kind of tenacious listening Pocock practices, limitations and clear delineations of interest work in favor of depth and are a safeguard against the temptation of globalization, rendering the work that is accomplished fuller in substance but narrower in scope.

## E. Humanism & Historiography:

In opening the door to modern history, humanists posed central and perennial questions about history and the connection between past and present. Questions which included whether the past was relevant to the present, and even if it was, whether there was truly any point in studying it, and perhaps most critically, how had it become the present? Historians, beginning

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[168] Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* 39.

with the humanist tradition of moralizing the ancients, sought examples to emulate and avoid. They made the slow transition to historiographic study. They later applied advanced methodological techniques like those developed by Pocock through contextualization and the linguistic analysis of political thought and discourse. While the humanist approach to the moralization of history was beginning to be unpacked as a problematic system for understanding the past, Pocock's work highlights the slow rise of new methods at work across disciplinary value judgments reorganization of methodological practice and priorities. According to Pocock, "the history of historiography cannot, therefore, be written as the study of a single evolution; all that can be done, at least for the present, is to trace the growth of the historical outlook in some of the fields where it most plainly manifests itself."[169]

The intellectual landscape has broadened and diversified since 1960. Great have been the advancements in historical scholarship. However, I would stop short at saying that the landscape has changed or been fundamentally altered since Pocock made his claims concerning historiography. For Marcello de Mello Rangel and Berber Bevernage, modern historiography, rooted in history's solidity, is independent of modernity's interpretations of it. Pushing back against "the constructivist formula that posits that the past would only exist insofar as it was (re)invented by the historian," essentially making the present more real than the past, Bevernage offers an alternative for historians of modern historiography. For Bevernage, the "metaphysical concepts of subjectivity and memory would become central. In this world where everything is constructed, including the nation, 'only' the belief in the reality of the subjects would

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[169] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 6.

remain."[170] Further, De Mello Rangel points out what is evident throughout the literature on the history of historiography and its modern expression. He argues that while historiography should be viewed as an important "rigorous intellectual activity of our time," as Heidegger and Derrida would agree, there are many paths for scholarship. Answers to historical questions remain ambiguous for "the very modern historical discourse tends to congeal the representation of the past as something simultaneously unstable and available (…) The present cannot ground the past and, at the same time, attempt to be grounded on this invented past."[171] For historians from 1960 to the present the "innumerable discourses" written by scholars across disciplinary and sub-disciplinary lines contains a trove of knowledge to be considered and shared. From traditionally academic methods of history where readers are expected to have prior knowledge of content to historical narrations that present a contextualized approach to understanding historical events, there is still much to do. Pocock argues that "the history of historiography, it is worth adding, is a recent and still unformed sub-discipline."[172] The more areas of study historians open to, the more the "fuzziness" of the past will be easier to navigate as modern historiography makes the way more clear for historical contextual analysis.[173] The slow pace paired with the problem of rigid separations even between sub-disciplines such as literary history and political history, I argue, is all the more evidence of the importance of Pocock's work as the interdisciplinary (i.e., social/historical/theoretical) scholar of our time.

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[170] De Mello Rangel, and Lopes De Araujo. "Introduction - Theory and History of Historiography: From the Linguistic Turn to the Ethical-Political Turn," 341.

[171] De Mello Rangel, and Lopes De Araujo. "Introduction - Theory and History of Historiography: From the Linguistic Turn to the Ethical-Political Turn," 343.

[172] J.G.A. Pocock, "Hard, Soft, and Fuzzy Historiograhy." *Common Knowledge* 20, no. 3 (2014): 517.

[173] Pocock, "Hard, Soft, and Fuzzy Historiograhy," 517.

The importance of Pocock's work in marrying disciplines within the social sciences with sub-disciplines and even reaching out to more scientific disciplines serves to firmly root Pocock at the center of creative and inclusive approaches to scholarship. From his work forward, historians, political theorists, linguists, and literary experts have wheelhouses containing diverse and dynamic tools for interpretations of their particular concerns and an open horizon for the blending and interlacing outside of their scholarly corners. It is a paradigm shift in itself to transform disciplinary viewpoints from rigid to fluid mechanisms without collapsing the integrity of the one by its connection to the other. I argue that in propagating such a bold view of scholarship, Pocock lifts the humanities to a higher form of academic excellence.[174]

In recognition of his historical astuteness and commitment to listening with Aristotelian habitual excellence, Pocock was awarded the Benjamin E. Lippincott Award in 1993. The Lippincott Award, which honors and recognizes the scholarship of a living political theorist still considered significant after 15 years since the date of publication, cemented the continued importance of contextual listening and the idea of a republic presented in *The Machiavellian Moment* to which this study will turn in the following chapter. As a historian, Pocock joined other recipients of the American Political Science Association's award, including Jürgen Habermas, Quentin Skinner, Michael Oakeshott, Eric Voegelin, Louis Hartz, and Hannah Arendt. It is a telling reality that Pocock's work in *The Machiavellian Moment* is so highly regarded as a work that transcends the lines of history and crosses so successfully into political science since Pocock himself remained firmly rooted as a historian. *The Ancient*

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[174] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 7-9.

*Constitution* serves as a representation of his work in the history of political thought and historiography though the two are not, in his mind, interchangeable.

Chapters two and three in *The Ancient Constitution* focus on 'the common law mind' and were built on the foundation of Pocock's two assumptions regarding the nature of English original law. The first assumption was that the ancient constitution was "immemorial" because laws were based on customs that were generally already well established before the era of widespread literacy. This led to the assumption of Jacobean Englishmen that "the forms and institutions of action—juries and courts, shires and parliaments—were as immemorial as the customary law which they maintained."[175] The second assumption attempted to explain why the common law mind so readily accepted the presumed immemorial customs as modes and therefore instituted them into formal law by Jacobean Englishmen who were ill-equipped to recognize the connections of custom with other neighboring or contemporary legal systems. These two chapters have elicited numerous criticisms throughout their years in publication. However, the central problematic thread lies in the charge of a Whiggish predetermination for history's outcomes, starting as Pocock does with Spelman and later Brady.[176]

While Whig history was, as Pocock puts it, "constitutionalist before it was progressive," the critique seems to be narrow-minded in missing that the book is an exploration and not a mirrored representation. *The Ancient Constitution* was "a study of a constitutional myth and its overthrow," not an expounding of Whig principles. Therefore it could be deemed Whiggish only because it successfully explores the historical Whig viewpoints in such a profoundly contextual

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[175] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 261.

[176] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 264.

way that the writing within is immersed in the concepts. Pocock's work clarifies the court's

reliance on customs in place of formal statutes to uphold decisions that would otherwise need

significant explanations were it not that law as the custom was the mode of anti-constitution

thinking.[177] Customs in court did not necessarily preclude opposition to monarchical sovereignty

or progressive thought. However, it does provide a bridge to understanding that between

'common custom' and 'common (or legal) reason,' the space is small enough that "the making of

new law and the changing of old were entirely compatible with the persistence of old law since

time immemorial."[178] Ultimately this was, in Pocock's view, the most accurate reading of *The

Ancient Constitution.*

  Readers must emulate Pocock's tenacious listening, as it is the only way to draw out the

layered fruitfulness of Pocock's historical methodology. At times, it seems to be the road less

traveled to read deeply into a fellow historian's work free of assumptions and without imposing a

preconceived agenda onto their work, as seems to be the case with the critiques leveled at

Pocock's work such as those made by G. R. Elton on the grounds that, "the notion of a 'historical

revolution' is a whiggish exaggeration and the enterprise of 'history of historiography' itself

prone to whiggism, but also on grounds which call for modification of a central thesis of *The

Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law.*"[179] Within this work, Pocock is primarily focused on

the history of English constitutional historiography instead of early English political thought.

The dynamic of this difference underscores the reason for some of the critiques, which Pocock

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[177] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 269.

[178] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 264.

[179] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 260.

attempts to address in his Revisiting section, especially the charge of Whiggism. While one may be able to have glimpses of what has been construed as Whiggism, I argue it is only in light of the recognized trajectory of modern thought as Pocock avoids the glossing over of historical merit in favor of exultation of modernity. However, historians must have a grounded sense of the progression of historical thought without imposing modern viewpoints.[180] In this regard, it seems challenging for Pocock to wrap his mind around explicating more modern thought without first locating the past contexts which led to its eventual modernization. In David Hume and William Robertson's work, Pocock sees a direct line drawn between the distinctions made by Brady and saw them delineated even better, albeit implicitly, in the work of Edward Gibbon. Perhaps this was one of the core reasons for the singular focus on Gibbon afforded by Pocock in the last years of his scholarship that produced his ambitious six-volume series.

By being firmly rooted in Collingwood and Oakshott's theories about history, Pocock illuminated the role and craft of the historian as that space between the exposition and compilation of historical narratives within a prescribed period. The commentary provided by scholars seeking to reflect on the historical text while being consistently worthy of revisitation, (re)presentation, and continued relevance across disciplines, an importance that the Lippincott award would later recognize.[181] While it is questionable whether Brady considered his work as a scholar in light of the specific role of the historian as a model to inspire future scholars, it is clear that for Pocock, to be a historian in practice necessitates the tenacious listening to the flow of scholarship across disciplinary lines. To understand the meticulous details within a historical

[180] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 270.

[181] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 256.

context, historians must balance both narrative introductions to historical thought and quantifiable expositions of canonized texts. They must do this independently of the particular issues within the classification of historiography, a practice that has continued to preoccupy historians past and present. By this, I do not mean only a textual analysis that accounts for change over time, but an approach, which honors the element of storytelling and narrative exposition of historical thought without discarding it as an inappropriate expression of historical thought. It is here that I believe the humanities do well in seeking interaction between history, political theory, and literature. The literary components are rightfully undesirable in quantifiable endeavors. However, when scholars engage in the more holistic attempts of tenacious listening and contextualization, they do well to have interdisciplinary tools for listening.

The history of historiography has generally been slower to capture consistent scholarly attention, as has been the case for the history of political thought, thanks again to the latter's interdisciplinary nature. However, progress continues to be made with journals that publish interdisciplinary articles such as *History and Theory* or *Modern Intellectual History*.[182] To do justice to the communities, he studied Pocock was a voracious reader in a wide variety of subjects and was ever careful to remain conscientious and abreast of developments in historiography literature. As such, in revisiting *The Ancient Constitution,* Pocock writes that F. Smith Fussner's *The Historical Revolution* (1962)*,* F.J. Levy's *Tudor Historical Thought* (1967), and Arthur B. Ferguson's *The Articulate Citizen and the English Renaissance* (1965) were attempts to clarify the subject of English historiography post *The Ancient Constitution*, thus

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[182] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 258.

maintaining a level of distance from his work which ensured he would not lose the forest for the trees.[183]

In synthesizing scholars' arguments after him, Pocock returns to situate his work among newer scholarship, thus engaging in yet another kind of tenacious listening, reconsidering the contributions he has made and their sustained relevance. In so doing, Pocock commits to changing his mind when necessary. He exemplifies another application of Aristotelian principles, namely that "the mark of an educated mind is the ability to entertain an idea without accepting it," while the mark of an even greater mind is to be amenable to changing presupposed and accepted ideas graciously. Pocock joins other scholars in his willingness to re-read his work in a new light, holding it up to ask whether it has stood the test of time in the face of new publications in history. Thus, exposing a commitment to the gauging of new information, examining new contributions, and juicing material from all possible sources and unexpected angles. While he is certainly not the only scholar to do this, for those new to the world of scholarly writing, this one example of Pocock demonstrates that scholars cannot be found resting on their laurels, no matter their status or standing. Even their most classic works are opened up for revisitation and reconsideration; in essence, one ought never to write scholarship so stubborn, in particular opinion, to be left out of future historical contemplation.

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[183] For details see: Frank Smith Fussner, *The Historical Revolution (Routledge Revivals): English Historical Writing and Thought 1580-1640.* N.p.: (Taylor & Francis, 2010), Originally published 1962.; F.J. Levy, *Tudor Historical Thought* (Huntington Library, 1967).; A.B. Ferguson, *The Articulate Citizen and the English Renaissance* (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1965).

**F. Contextual Analysis in Practice:**

While Roman law and particularities could be deemed antiquated past the point of usefulness for modern application in law and society, the customary behaviors, practices, and cultural embeddedness of the Roman legacy were not up for debate regarding continued usefulness in modern society.[184] Threads of antiquity in the fabric of modernity were, and are, to a greater degree than at first glance may be supposed, engrained in the habitual practices of the citizens of a political state and therefore cannot be considered outdated or irrelevant. The need to parse out the legacy of the ancients remains as long as our institutions and habits recall that past and call upon those legacies for their defense and future progress, "custom was *tam antiqua et tam nova,* always immemorial and always perfectly up-to-date."[185] Thus the habit of relying on 'the ancient constitution' regarding a superior line of thought not artificially developed has lasted up to the present day. It is exemplified in the United States Constitution's implied justification of a system of equality divinely inspired and not to be subjugated by law-making finite persons.[186] Therefore, views in line with constitutionalism immemorial needed to be constantly protected by historical criticism in service to the monarchy. They relied heavily on historical mysticism and vague assurance that the principles within dated earlier than the earliest monarchs.[187] To this point, we shall return on the topics of republicanism and Machiavelli's field of legal history and the man 'chi ordino' in later portions of this work. Therefore, the

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[184] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 15.

[185] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 16.

[186] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 17.

[187] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 19.

consideration of custom became a practice, which I argue can best be understood as one cloaked in fear.[188]

As *The Ancient Constitution* presents, written history and research were primarily done, pre-sixteenth century, in service of the sovereign and used to bolster the establishment of the monarchy. Historians engaged in pre-revolutionary thought's subversive actions were apt to consider custom as helpful and problematic in equal measure. From Pocock's work, historians can glean insight into the tightropes walked by their predecessors, understand that the constant temptation to deny that the law's history could be known, to wrap its origins in mystery and assert that it always had, since time out of mind, been as it was now," and to establish sovereignty in nations of free people later.[189] Burgess explains, "Continuity, rule of law, parliament, and king—these were the essential terms of the ancient constitution. Though French and Scottish scholars possessed much more historically sophisticated approaches to their past, along with a capacity to see their history in comparative perspective, English lawyers well into the seventeenth century were happy with the myths of the ancient constitution, as much out of choice as out of ignorance."[190] Long after his direct mentorship, Pocock continued on Butterfield's work *The Englishman and His Past.*

Throughout his discussion and exploration of François, Hotman's work on neo-Bartolism, the attempt to move from normative interpretations of law to metanormative legal study, in *Anti-Tribonian* Pocock exemplifies for his reader what he means by a contextual

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[188] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 20.

[189] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 15-24.

[190] Burgess, "From the Common Law Mind to The Discovery of Islands," 545.

approach in practice. He situates Hotman within his historical realm, considering the mindset and situational limitations of the period and conducting a close reading of his work to systematically analyze its historical placement and contribution. At times this practice reaches into the contemporary analysis, but only in the briefest sense, and only to remind the reader not to lose the forest for the trees just yet. Indeed, "the end of Hotman's plan," Pocock assures us, "was to fill the pupil's mind with unwritten principles of equity, which he could apply to all circumstances and cases without need of a law-book," thereby establishing the dichotomy between custom immemorial and monarchical law in future favor of the Roman originated the idea of popular sovereignty.[191] Thus the contextualization of Hotman's work provides the groundwork for the underlying assumption of freedom and equality later. Pocock's future explorations of political thinkers of the American founding further embedded the American revolution and founding in the greater fabric of Western political thought. Pocock avoided the error of writing on the topic as though its inception had occurred in a philosophical vacuum. This later lent further intrigue to his claim in *The Machiavellian Moment* that the American founding was less the first great act of the Enlightenment than the last great act of the Renaissance.[192] Custom and codified law jockeyed for the attention of both historical and political thought, aiding the fusion of both practices and forming a solid foundation for their interdependence on each other.[193]

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[191] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 25-26.

[192] This is in reference to points, which will hitherto be discussed, in the next chapter of this work.

[193] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 26.

Pocock also affords a significant portion of his work in *The Ancient Constitution* in the eighth chapter of the work entitled The Brady Controversy. This portion of the work provides a solid example of what Pocockian contextualism is like in practice. Pocock sets himself the task of analyzing Robert Brady's distinctions between history and 'introductions to history' in 1957 while Rose in 2007 sought to explore "Brady's history of Catholic and Calvinist political theories, assessing its typicality by contextualising it in contemporary royalist argumentation and discovering its sources in Restoration, Civil War, and late-Elizabethan loyalist polemic."[194] Pocock found Brady's conclusions marked by Spelmanist historiography; therefore, he had expected Brady's attempts at reinterpreting medieval politics would be found to be outdated, useful only to study for their own sake and not for future application. Yet, Brady's royalist conclusions were different because of his intended support of the Filmerian theses and his challenge of engagement with Petyt and Atwood in his *Answer* within the *Introduction to the Old English History.*[195] Meanwhile, current historians can consider how Rose compares Brady's use of the language of property to his contemporaries through analyzing the notions of antipopery in their literature and concluding the nature of their intents; such as David Owen's *Herod and Pilate Reconciled* (1663) and John Nalson's *Foxes and Firebrands* (1680).[196]

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[194] Jacqueline Rose, "Robert Brady's Intellectual History and Royalist Antipopery in Restoration England." *The English Historical Review* 122, no. 499 (2007): 1288.

[195] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,* 209-211.

[196] Rose, "Robert Brady's Intellectual History and Royalist Antipopery in Restoration England," 1307.

Although Brady was hesitant to level charges of popery onto his "opponents," he did pepper his writings with implications that both Catholics and Calvinists were engaging in sedition through their education systems and treasonous ideas. Brady's work bolstered Nalson's idea that faithfulness hinged on the proper hierarchical alignment to power. With regards to morality and sovereignty, Nalson's work puts forth that "the excellence, both for subjects and kings, of hereditary monarchy, may be discerned by any rational man (a tautology), by any who has not 'deposed Reason the King of his Soul and elected in its place Prejudice and Passion to Govern there.' Anyone who rebels is thus monstrous, intellectually subhuman."[197] Brady also deeply sympathized with Thomas Hobbes' negative view of the university as another power structure, which endangered royalist priorities. By teaching the legacy of the ancient Greeks such as Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, and Seneca, universities across Europe and England were churning out persons degraded by subversion and dangerous links to republicanism. Rose's work exemplifies the importance of Pocock's scholarship and the legacy begun with him of contextualization. According to Rose, "Understanding their [Restoration royalists] readings of past political thinkers is a crucial step to comprehending the intellectual struggles of the Restoration."[198] Contextualism is one of the most beneficial and lasting tools left to future scholars by Pocock as a means of becoming intimate with the form and fabric of time past.

**G. Conclusion**

In the interest of situating Pocock's work on contextualization and language within the larger developments of the discipline of history of the time, it is worthwhile to give space for a

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[197] Rose, "Robert Brady's Intellectual History and Royalist Antipopery in Restoration England," 1309-1313.

[198] Rose, "Robert Brady's Intellectual History and Royalist Antipopery in Restoration England," 1317.

brief survey of the corresponding intellectual landscape. As discussed in earlier portions of this chapter, Thomas Kuhn's work provides a valuable backdrop for thinking about other disciplines. However, in this section, I would like to focus on the time just past the "linguist turn." In 1981 William J. Bouwsma published an article on the future of the history of ideas which predicted its decline as a sub-discipline and the future rise of "pace-setting participant in a more broadly conceived 'history of meaning.'"[199] Further, Bouwsma urged historians "to resist debilitating defensive anxieties regarding their professional identities and the autonomy of their field and to recognize that the 'remnant chiefly worth saving' from their traditional concerns—the focus on the production, reproduction, and transmission of meanings in various historical periods and cultural contexts—placed them at the center of the most interesting and innovative work currently being produced, not only by their fellow historians but more generally in the humanities and social sciences."[200] While Bouwsma's thinking was a step toward more inclusivity of thought across disciplinary lines in hopes of culturally and perhaps even more holistically inclined methods of study, he was wrong in his prediction of the decline of intellectual history. His assumptions were based on the breakdown of the belief that reason was the highest of human activities and that meaning would overtake reason as the primary avenue for historical inquiry. According to Bouwsma works published after the "linguistic turn" such as Quentin Skinner's *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences* (1985), Skinner, Richard Rorty, and J.B. Schneewind's *Philosophy in History* (1984), Mark Poster's *Foucault, Marxism and History* (1984), Pocock's *Virtue, Commerce and History* (1985), Dominick

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[199] Toews, "Intellectual history after the linguistic turn," 879.

[200] Toews, "Intellectual history after the linguistic turn," 879.

LaCapra's *Rethinking Intellectual History* (1983), and David Hollinger's *In the American Province* 1984), were written in the shadow of hopes of creating an interdisciplinary unification movement, where historians saw themselves as answering critical questions of modernity with their scholarship on the past.[201] History post the "linguistic turn" would, hopefully, be able to engage in interdisciplinary projects with art, philosophy, anthropology, politics, and science through "a more systematic use of linguistic models and procedures, since the primary medium of meaning was obviously language."[202] Bouwsma was validated in his hopes of interdisciplinary overlap, but I would argue too hopeful in his regard for interdisciplinary ventures becoming mainstream. Language, post the "linguistic turn," is a serious consideration across disciplines but meaning and contextualization still operate within, for the most part, traditional academic categories.

John E. Toews's analysis of historical work after the "linguistic turn" agrees that the above mentioned works, which he reviews in his article "Intellectual History after the Linguist Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and Irreducibility of Experience," "can be seen as participating in a common discourse in the sense that they address themselves to the promises and the problems of sustaining the dialectical unity of and difference between meaning and experience (as all historians must) in the wake of the linguistic turn."[203] In short, Bouwsma's hopes were well intentioned but did not pan out as predicted. Intellectual history post the "linguistic turn"

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[201] Toews, "Intellectual history after the linguistic turn," 880.; William J. Bouwsma, "Intellectual History in the 1980s." *Journal of Interdisciplinary*

*History* 12, no. 2 (1981): 283, 288.

[202] Toews, "Intellectual history after the linguistic turn," 881.

[203] Toews, "Intellectual history after the linguistic turn," 882.

has shifted to make discourse its focus for understanding meaning. However there are, of course, issues with making the term "discourse" the center point in intellectual history. Drawing influence from Foucault, Mark Poster "insists that redefining the object of intellectual history as discourse(s) implies a radical, revolutionary break with the rationalist, subjectivist, evolutionary assumptions of the Western cultural tradition and thus also with the practices of the conventional intellectual history that have served as its preserver and mouthpiece."[204] Intellectual historians post the "linguistic turn" have found it necessary to engage in studies of discourse, but not necessarily engage in an interdisciplinary approach to do so lending credence to Foucault's ideas that methods of analyzing discourse are through more narrow domains of meaning. Pocock's work naturally pushes against Foucault's domains of meaning and points instead to a "concept of heterogeneous, compound, interacting, open discourses in a constant state of dynamic change both within themselves and in their relations to each other" best articulated by Skinner, Dunn, and Pocock.[205] For Pocock, the three dimensions of discourse are structural (languages), speech-acts, and experience. Through these dimensions, intellectual history and its study of language, time, and discourse can reach higher interdisciplinary cooperation levels and a better-integrated perspective of historical understanding. As Toews says, "it is essential for our self-understanding, and thus also for fulfilling the historians' task of connecting memory with hope, that we recognize and examine the recent turn away from experience as a specific response to particular events and developments in the history of experience, a response, to be sure, burdened, limited, and shaped by the already constituted, inherited world of meanings in which, and from

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[204] Toews, "Intellectual history after the linguistic turn," 890.

[205] Toews, "Intellectual history after the linguistic turn," 891.

which, it was constructed."[206] Today, sixty or so years after Pocock's first major contributions and post "linguistic turn" scholarship in intellectual history has fared well with regards to open disciplinary dialogue. However, there is still much room for cross-collaboration, growth, and rigid disciplinary walls to chip away. One particular area where these actions have been underway since the "linguistic turn," led in part by Pocock, is in the cross-over between intellectual history and political theory to which we turn our attention in the next chapter with the idea of a republic and Pocock's contribution of *The Machiavellian Moment.*

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[206] Toews, "Intellectual history after the linguistic turn," 907.

# CHAPTER 4

## POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE IDEA OF A REPUBLIC

Thus far, this study has established the importance and depth of J.G.A. Pocock's contributions to the history of political thought and theory. The natural progression for considering Pocock's work focuses on the idea of a republic as a theme throughout his scholarship, wherein Pocock demonstrated his intellectual abilities most profoundly. *The Machiavellian Moment* (hereafter referred to as TMM) is, for this subject, the clearest exercise of his methodology. In addition to select portions of TMM, secondary scholarship will be explored to contextualize Pocock's work in the scholarship of the time of its publication, as well as its continued relevance and influence. For Pocock, the Machiavellian moment of the American political tradition is rooted in the idea of a classical republic. That is to say, the core nature of American political ideology is a blend of Protestant, romantic, and republican ideas, which are best, understood through the speech acts of the political actors engaged in the formation of the American experiment. This chapter seeks to unpack critical points in Pocock's work while holding at the core the importance Pocock placed on political languages and historical time through his practice of linguistic contextualization.

First, this chapter attempts to clarify that for Pocock, the point of TMM lay in the tenacious listening to a moment in time through linguistic context. Pocock sought to distance Hegelian principles from intellectual history by dismantling the practice of "isms" in his work. Pocock distances himself from terms like civic humanism and republicanism by presenting a more nuanced approach to the idea of a republic as an idea (not an ism) that is both ancient and contextual.

Secondly, this chapter seeks to practice Pocock's methodology by holistically situating TMM within the body of his work. While Pocock was unique in his approach, he did not operate in a vacuum. Pocock's work was an exercise in the maieutic Socratic arts. There is a latent idealism in Pocock, which I argue is rooted in the classical tradition. As such, it pushes back on the materialism of modernity. Pocock was committed to his methodological approach to the history of political thought while demonstrating a persistent attentiveness to others' work and sensitivity to his critics. To be clear, Harrington, and Machiavelli, and Gibbon, as paradigmatic individuals, are the pillars for Pocock's understanding of the idea of a republic; as such, Pocock reserves his linguistic contextual approach and tenacious listening for them. Nevertheless, secondary and essential to his understanding are other intellectuals presented in this chapter, including Hannah Arendt, Hans Baron, and others.

Lastly, this chapter's underlying intention is to help illuminate today's concerns about the United States' current power structure by elucidating what Pocock believes the meaning of republic to have been at the American founding. By tracing his ideas on the republic, an essential component is added to this project overall, and a synthesis of Pocock's linguistic approach to contextual analysis is presented. For the American founding, in particular, Pocock's work provides a solid foundation for thinking about the republic meaningfully, which continues to be relevant from the publication of TMM more than forty years ago. In light of our current tumultuous political climate, I hold that now more than ever, scholars have a pressing responsibility to explore the idea of a republic, including the functions and limitations of democracy and the role of power structures. Further, I would argue that our political world is shifting on its axis, and the earth is moving under our feet in new and previously unimagined

ways. The American republic today is facing cultural, societal, and political challenges of which I contend scholars of political thought and intellectual history are equipped to offer critical perspectives.

I argue that Pocock's linguistic contextualist approach anticipated and midwifed the paradigm shift now recognized to have occurred during the 1960s through numerous publications, which served to guide historians and usher them into a new era in the study of the history of political thought and the history of ideas. A more traditional 'heroic theory' of invention, where there is a sole creator, and all others compete and are even directly accused of intellectual theft, is opposed to the cooperative approach. In reconsidering Collingwood, perhaps he was not so far off in his interests surrounding magical/supernatural phenomena. As expressed in the theory of multiple discovery, the cooperative approach seems relevant to the paradigm shift called forth through Pocock's work. Concerning the idea expressed in multiple discovery (or simultaneous invention), which in essence states that many of the great scientific discoveries come forth at almost simultaneous times through multiple thinkers who are sometimes continents apart from each other and connected solely through a transcendent spark of brilliance. The spark, seemingly so intent on being brought forth that it is 'invented' by these multiple vessels, suggests something greater at play. For example, Pocock's "The History of Political Thought: A Methodological Enquiry," John Dunn's 1968 "The Identity of the History of Ideas" and Quentin Skinner's 1966 "The Limits of Historical Explanations" and 1969 "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas" all hovered around the central point of a restructuring of how historians ought to understand an author's original work from that point forward. Perhaps calling on the

same muse, Pocock, Dunn, and Skinner, while operating independently, produced a parallel approach, building on principles and branching out from *The Ancient Constitution*.[207]

This study offers an alternative view of Pocock's relationship to Skinner and Dunn as a kinship aside from only the "Cambridge School" label. Within Quentin Skinner's "A Reply to My Critics" and John Dunn's, *The Political Thought of John Locke,* is the idea that in listening tenaciously to Pocock, the "Cambridge School" label is too narrow. Richard Whatmore also alluded to a similar view in his introduction to the New Princeton Classics edition of TMM as a point worth developing and exploring more fully. It is also here that we learn Pocock in North America wrote to Dunn in West Africa and Skinner at Cambridge about these areas through Whatmore's access to the private papers between Pocock and Skinner.[208] He was experiencing the surprising delights of multiple discovery within political thought. To Skinner, Pocock wrote, "It sounds very much as if you were working on the same thing [political thought as an activity] from a standpoint less sociological and more philosophical than mine…I wonder if we should consider some kind of joint manifesto."[209] Whatmore adds "over the following years Pocock seriously contemplated writing a monograph on method to be entitled either 'The Cave of Speech' or 'How to Do Things to People with Words.'" This provides an excellent insight into how Pocock saw his methodological process taking shape and viability when implemented in the history of political thought.

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[207] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* x.

[208] See Quentin Skinner's "A Reply to My Critics," in *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics,* ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 233.; Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke,* 101, 143.

[209] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* xi.

As is the case in most research, a primary step is honing in on purposeful research questions and using those to shape and give life to the thought process. The Kuhn-Skinner-Pocock approach to paradigms explored the questions, "How to Do Things to People with Words and How to Respond to People's Attempts to Do Things to You." The approach included using complementary but distinct terminology through Kuhn's scientific inquiry and Pocock's political languages.[210] Pocock invited Skinner's comments and sought his critique throughout the writing of *Politics, Language, and Time,* and even dedicated it to him, having sent significant portions of the work to Skinner to pre-read and offer feedback. While *The Ancient Constitution* was his first exposition of the new method for studying the past, TMM was the "vindication" of that method. TMM revealed Pocock engaged in stretching his intellectual abilities, in essence showcasing what the linguistic contextualist approach to political thought made available for historians.[211]

## I. The Problem and Its Modes

## A. Methodology

As previously presented, TMM is arguably the most vital and most telling contribution Pocock makes to the fruitful creation and paradigmatic shift of contextualism in history and political thought. J.R. Champlin states, "the substantive theme of the book is the struggle of the ideal of active citizenship in a republic to maintain itself in the context of ideas about time and historical existence."[212] Part one of the work concerns Florentine republicanism and situating Machiavelli's among contemporaries and peers in thought. According to Pocock, "the revival of the republican ideal by civic humanists posed the problem of a society, in which the political

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[210] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* xi.
[211] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* xiii.

[212] John R. Champlin, "Review of *The Machiavellian Moment*." *The Review of Politics* 39, no. 1, (1977): 106.

nature of man as described by Aristotle was to receive its fulfillment, seeking to exist in the framework of a Christian time-scheme which denied the possibility of any secular fulfillment." Pocock believed this rendered secular time intelligible during this period of European thought.[213] According to Champlin Pocock finds that "Jefferson and Hamilton may emerge in a broadly discernible relationship to Rousseau and Marx."[214]

Pocock further defines TMM in two parts. The first "denotes the moment and the manner in which Machiavellian thought made its appearance" instead of a cohesive history of political thought during the final moments of the Florentine era. "The 'moment' in question is selectively and thematically defined" by Pocock, in that there existed identifiable and knowable patterns of consciousness in early modern European thought. These are best explored through the lens of the republic, "and their 'moment' defined as that in which they confronted the problem grown crucial." The second is indicative of the problem itself as a substantive entity. The moment in this regard refers the hand to hand grappling with the challenges of a rapidly changing system and the awakening of a republican consciousness shared among Machiavelli and other political thinkers through a particular language developed for and through this time which called on "' virtue' with 'fortune,' and 'corruption.'"[215]

Through the two-fold study of TMM, Pocock presents what he believed to be the lasting legacy of Machiavelli on the idea of a republic through the context of secular political thought. For Pocock, the idea of a republic in Machiavelli is integral to how modernity and its historians

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[213] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* xxiii

[214] Champlin, "Review of *The Machiavellian Moment*," 462

[215] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* xxiii-xxiv.

understand "the journey of Western thought from the medieval Christian to the modern historical mode." Through "concepts of balanced government, dynamic *virtu,* and the role of arms and property in shaping civic personality," there comes a culmination of the application of republican principles and Machiavellian thought in the English tradition and American experiment.[216] In TMM, Pocock concerned himself primarily with both kinds of histories, political thought and historiography. Through intellectual maturity, the persistent practice of and commitment to tenacious listening, and contextualizing, Pocock moved from *The Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law* to TMM. Next, he would turn to the expansive *Barbarism and Religion,* making TMM more history of political thought and BAR more a history of historiography.[217] The idiom of political theory is sacred because it is set apart and, many times, entrenched with ideas concerning divine providence. At the same time, it remains a secular promise of a broader landscape.

In crafting TMM, Hans Baron's *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance* and Caroline Robbin's *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman* made great impressions on Pocock. Professionally, Pocock describes his contextual situation at the time of writing TMM as follows: "To understand (if possible) what I was attempting in the earlier part of that work– especially its treatment of political thought in quattrocento Florence–it is necessary to emphasize that in those years I held appointments in both political science (as the term was then employed) and history and that TMM' s opening chapters are exercises in political theory carried out to illuminate a period in the history of that discipline. In those chapters, I asked how a political society might

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[216] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* xxiv.

[217] J.G.A. Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion; The Machiavellian Moment, the history of political thought and the history of historiography." *History of European Ideas* 43, no. 2 (2017): 129.

visualize the time it lived in and the ways in which political action might be carried on in that history; but I did so with specific reference to the species of political society which Florence might take itself to be at the historical moment when Hans Baron's narrative begins."[218]

Through a civic humanist perspective, one would realize that to be a person meant to be a citizen of a "free city, republic, or *polis.*" Pocock linked the origin of this idea with Aristotle's man as a political animal in *Politics.*[219] The primary criticism against this point comes from Quentin Skinner. Skinner argued that rather than Athenian and Aristotelian roots, the concept of the republic and its citizenry had their roots in Roman thought by way of Cicero. Pocock attempted to reconcile a similarity in focus but with a different approach. I contend that Pocock and Skinner were not doing the same kind of history on republican thought.[220] Skinner's work follows the trajectory of citizens' liberal and republican actions in free cities, while Pocock's work focused on the transition from Greek to Roman thought. One of the keywords that encompassed the republic's finite nature instead of the divinely ordained monarchial structure, for Pocock, was fortune. *Politics, Language, and Time* and the TMM elucidate the "triad custom, grace and virtue," with *virtu* grounded in Machiavelli's development of the concept in particular, for Pocock.[221]

Pocock defines *virtu* as "the practical and intellectual capacity to act in time, and there achieve the end of man, which is to be a political animal, capable of both the relations between citizens and the relation with other cities, for which – it must now be faced—the appropriate

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[218] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 131.

[219] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion,"131.

[220] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion,"131.

[221] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion,"131-132.

term may very well be war."[222] "The republic," Pocock explains, "is a particular and exists in the plural; *fantasia,*" or what people may imagine themselves to be. This "makes its relationships what they are, *Fortuna,*" the fickle force personified as a female, and "renders them unpredictable, and *virtu,*" as described most compellingly by Machiavelli, "consists in their management."[223] This model speaks the most truth concerning what the ancient conceptions of political philosophy mean by the concept of a republic. It addresses what histories can be parsed out of the Roman narrative and later applied to modern western experiments like the American founding.

One of the pillars of construction in Pocock's work is considering paradigmatic figures that embody and exemplify the political thought of their time in context. The figure in TMM is in significant part James Harrington, whom Pocock argues, "brought about a synthesis of civic humanist thought with English political and social awareness, and Machiavelli's theory of arms with a common-law understanding of the importance of freehold property," and to whom we shall turn in an upcoming section of this chapter.[224] To make sense of the idea of a republic, Pocock carefully parsed out the language and context of critical political thinkers, committing to his methodology in a way that made listening the activity that permeated all his scholarly endeavors. For example, the juxtaposition between the free confederation of Etruscan cities and the Roman Empire, as essentially the contrast between Bruni and Machiavelli's work, becomes apparent. Pocock explains this tenuous relationship as "the key to Decline and Fall, and to the

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[222] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion,"132.

[223] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion,"132.

[224] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* xxiv.

mortality of the republic for expansion; the *virtu* of one ate up the virtue of others and last of all itself."[225] Meanwhile, Edward Gibbon's contribution to understanding these breakdowns of the system and the collapse of republican virtue are rooted in the "divorce between civil and military virtue, which only the republic could keep united."[226] Pocock's work continues to provide fodder for considerations of modernity's most complex and perennial issues.

Through tenacious listening in the interest of a careful study of Pocock's work, one can trace the line of thought in TMM's final chapters to a preoccupation with Anglophone mercantilist political thought historically and what kind of impact it made on the American founding. For this inquiry, Pocock selected the reigns of Anne and the first Hanoverians. The primary consideration of TMM was centered on republican thought's origins with specific emphasis on Florentine interpretations of Roman concepts of participation and citizenry. For the American experiment, the right to bear arms and the pursuit of property was primordial, while commerce and procedure would need to be in the next tier down of essential importance. On the other hand, representation revealed itself to be a critical concept and a process requiring particular attention for the American experiment. It served to demonstrate what I believe to be the continued relevance of TMM as it "expresses the discovery of history as a dilemma, threatened at once by a barbaric past and a corrupt future."[227]

A telling personal passage in Pocock's 2017 article From *The Ancient Constitution* to *Barbarism and Religion; The Machiavellian Moment*, "The History of Political

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[225] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion,"134.

[226] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion,"135, in reference to Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1*, 438.

[227] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 140-141.

Thought and the History of Historiography," attempts to reengage with TMM and its lasting legacy. The article illuminates the trouble with the history of American political thought as a sub-discipline and American 'neo-Machiavellianism.' Pocock shares, "It was at this point that I realized that, in debating the fundamentals of their government, Americans debate who they essentially are; and that since I did not intend to become one, it would be fitting to leave the debate to them."[228] Through this insight, Pocock again modeled tenacious listening and demonstrated particular forethought and skillful limiting of his scholarship's scope, making way for scholars, such as Gordon Wood, to take the lead over questions of classical politics in American political thought. The recognition did not negate interest or continued work for what I argue can be called the American question in Pocock's work. However, it did narrow the focus and illuminated the guideposts for scholarship in this area.

Such is the move from "the language of citizenship" to the "language of rights" for Pocock in the transition from "Machiavellian to Lockean discourse" as arms become property, which is essential to the individual. Her/he moves from being her/his lawyer to be her/his police officer Pocock's discussion of the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution equally illuminates his analysis of rights in TMM as well as our current political plights. He says,

"It may seem that the Machiavellian moment has come to an end. Nevertheless, viewed in historical sequence, it can be argued that this is not so. To understand the Second Amendment, we must read its history as layered rather than transformed; the past is not dead or even past; and the surest proof of the persistence in America of the republican as a challenge to the federal is the passion, both ancient and modern – sometimes indeed populist to the point of paranoia – with which a measurable sector of the public identify the private possession of arms with civic freedom and public personality….Mass killings, more psychopathic than political in character, occur occasionally (but often) in the arms-bearing society, and the response to them is

[228] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 143.

conditioned by that society's complex ideological history, including that of 'the Machiavellian moment.'"[229]

The self and the individual are at the heart of Pocock's discussion of an armed citizenry, and modernity's struggle to reconcile the political animal with the armed, property-owning citizen is a concept still perplexing to historians of political thought.

For Pocock, the structures and fluctuations of paradigms were never an abandoned methodological pillar. While the explosion of the phrase 'paradigm shift' did lead in time to the new terminology, 'language systems,' the essence of Pocock's particular linguistic contextualism was not altered. Pocock expands on his views of the history of the American political system, saying, "Liberal historicism offered consolation if not a solution; the history of the nation-state – a term I now use for the first time – became a dialogue or dialectic between opposed concepts of freedom and their opposites, and the political animal might know himself as a citizen of history."[230] By rooting his methodology to recognized paradigmatic structures, Pocock avoided the danger of abstraction in linguistic contextualism. Thus, his work's continuity provides a legacy to emulate and not an example of another outdated approach to the history of political thought. Further, "…as J.A.W. Gunn has pointed out, the language of 'discourse' functions for Pocock as an umbrella for paradigm, language, author and intention."[231] Pocock offered up consistent methodological and substantive evidence that viewing political languages as the

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[229] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 143-144.

[230] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 146.

[231] J.C. Davis, "'Epic Years': The English Revolution and J.G.A. Pocock's Approach to the History of Political Thought." *History of Political Thought* 29, no. 3 (2008): 536.

primary paradigm builds continuity and guards against the imposition of modern standards and assumptions on the history of political thought.

**B. Critical Analysis**

In his article "The Machiavellian Moment Revisited," Pocock addresses critics of his work in TMM. Pocock re-defines his aims, explains his particular focus on political language and discourse and identifies the significant threads of critiquing his ideas on republican and liberal ideologies. Some criticisms identified are Nathan Tarcov's accusation that Pocock is a historicist, John H. Geerken's accusation that he is a structuralist, accusations by social realist historians that Pocock denies "the historical shaping of languages and ideas," and Neal Wood's charge of dehumanizing history.[232] Pocock asserts that those that accuse him of making too much or too little of history charge him with "unhistorically abstracting from the texture of history those languages and thought patterns" of those whose history he aimed to write.[233] In response, Pocock states that the only relevant claim his historical technique entails is that TMM is concerned with the ways people perceived changes in political awareness and activity in their times rather than how scholars endorse those perceptions.[234]

Mauricio Suchowlansky and Kiran Banerjee argue that "Pocock's TMM offered a provocative reading of a singular intellectual phenomenon—that of a neo-Aristotelian ideal of communal life and liberty—and its subsequent impact and legacy in the history of political

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[232] Neal Wood, "Review of The Machiavellian Moment" *Political Theory* 4, no. 1 (Feb. 1976): 101-104. Wood states Pocock's readers have to remind themselves that he is writing about actual people with urgent conflict. He goes on to accuse Pocock of dehumanizing history.

[233] J.G.A. Pocock, "The Machiavellian Moment Revisited: A Study in History and Ideology." *The Journal of modern history* 53, no. 1 (1981): 52.

[234] Pocock, "The Machiavellian Moment Revisited," 52.

thought." They are correct in narrowing of potential focuses for TMM. However, in order to unpack its influence, readers must first understand that "neo-Aristotelian" is new Aristotle. TMM is rooted in the ancient Greeks and in modern and contemporary conversations on the ideas of a republic in theory and practice, where they consider what it means to live in a community of like-minded citizens operating for the benefit of the whole who are also "free." To that, one may ask where the individual is and what freedom means in the Republic. Historians attempt to shape how we understand the world. We must engage with historiography and the close reading and study of other scholars to explore how they have approached the question of republican thought in history. In essence, we must model Pocock's tenacious listening practices to get closer to historical writing's core values.

Through his work in TMM, Pocock reveals his skills as a world builder, and I would argue further as a historical mythology shaper in his field. In other words, I argue that through Pocock's work, readers and historians are invited to reconsider the origin story of Western political thought, altered by changes in paradigmatic figures and linguistic contextualization. Mainstream narratives may not be overturned but challenged through future scholarship, creating a lasting legacy of tenacious listening and encouraging the practice of re-examination of what we think to be true of the history of political thought in the western context. Pocock is a crafter of stories and a painter of narratives working with tools that seek to explore the tension between the secular ideals of civic politics from their rootedness or setting in Christian views on finality. Thus, by becoming separate from Christian tradition (in modern scholars' minds), the secular meanings of politics can return to their rightful Greek/Aristotelian roots. Suchowlansky and Banerjee see a "revival of an Aristotelian triad of concepts—*isonomia, polis,* and *zoon*

*politikon—"* by Renaissance Italian thinkers that the 'Machiavellian moment' is "inaugurated." Thus, they continue, "the universal Christian worldview is contested and displaced, when transitioning from Florence to England and coming to a close at the American founding, in an attempt to grapple with the inherent limitations of the Republican model of political structure."[235]

Machiavelli and the other Italian civic humanists came to terms with the republican ideal within the particular confines of their time and space of the Renaissance. They parsed out, "republican language in politics, time and history." Pocock characterizes this tension as the struggle between *virtu,* linked to public life, which we will later explore through the lens of Hannah Arendt's work, and *Fortuna* as linked to divine providence. What comes from Pocock's work in TMM is a clear exposition and acceptance of a republican tradition.[236]

Suchowlansky and Banerjee have located four areas of concern in the breadth of Pocock's work. First, Pocock has "blurred the distinctions between the ' classical' and ' modern' conceptions of republicanism." Second, that his work exaggerates republican roots in Aristotle; third, that Aristotle may be superimposed as the predecessor to Machiavelli's thought; and fourth that Pocock makes too much of the "Machiavellian' character of Harington's republicanism. Suchowlansky and Banerjee also present the criticisms shared by other scholars questioning Pocock's methodology and focus on "the diachronic, as opposed to synchronic, structures of moments in time."[237] Suchowlansky and Banerjee deem TMM to be ' a metahistorical narrative'

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[235] Mauricio Suchowlansky and Kiran Banerjee. "Foreword: The Machiavellian Moment Turns Forty." *History of European Ideas* 43, no. 2 (2017): 125.; Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment:* viii.

[236] Suchowlansky and Banerjee. "Foreword: The Machiavellian Moment Turns Forty," 125.
[237] Suchowlansky and Banerjee. "Foreword: The Machiavellian Moment Turns Forty," 126.

or a ' network of structural relations,' which may create a disconnect between political theory as an activity engaged in by political thinkers and the history of political thought as a discipline.[238]

In an attempt to isolate places in Pocock's on linguistic contextualization, which would arguably need revising, there are two possibilities. First, as Davis' work also proposes, is State and religion. Pocock writes primarily about the King-in-Parliament issue, espoused best in *The Ancient Constitution*. Davis isolates areas needed to supplement Pocock's work, and I would agree with the delineations made. Davis indicates parts of Pocock's work as a supplement to and not a rejection of Pocock's central thesis or a critique of his approach's worth, which still beckon to be explored by posterity. Pocock did not build a brick-and-mortar monument to linguistic contextualization, but rather something more akin to a breathable sieve that allows ideas to flow through but ensures that they do so slowly, with care to detail, and consistent time for reconsideration. According to Davis, the "growing depersonalization of the central machinery of government."[239] Pocock does not show much interest in the increasing depersonalization of the church and monarchical structure. Thus he leaves an entry point for those future scholars of religious history to merge with the linguistic contextualization approach. While his focus is more on the period's legal practitioners, clergypersons are open to consideration by others following Pocock's model.

Davis also isolates the problem of "fiscality and bureaucracy in the face of the dramatically changed demands of maintaining a military establishment adequate to a Europe of

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[238] Suchowlansky and Banerjee. "Foreword: The Machiavellian Moment Turns Forty,"127.
[239] Davis, "'Epic Years,'"537.

endemic religious and dynastic warfare."[240] Thus, indicating that Pocock's work did not pay

detailed attention to maintaining and funding standing armies in drastically different political

European political climates. Davis is correct in this critique, which is a central problem in

building and maintaining republican models of governance. However, I would counter that

scholars of military and economic/fiscal history or mathematical politics/political arithmetic may

insert themselves here and carry on where Pocock has afforded them space to do so. Harrington,

Hobbes, and Locke all expressed interest and regarded economic components to be of great

import in the latter. However, I argue that to critique Pocock's lack of attention to this particular

area would be misguided and superfluous criticism. Pocock's research spanned more than 50

years, and his work has midwifed innumerable offshoots and entry points across disciplinary

lines. Creating openings for thought and space for dialogue is, I argue, enough, for how can one

scholar fully expand on all points to the depth and detail that would satisfy their entire

readership? To give attention to some areas necessitates the leaving of others unexplored.

However, Pocock has left the model by which others may endeavor to explore where he did not

tread.

Part of what Pocock's linguistic contextualization does, I argue, is to humanize historical

actors. His approach provides a holistic viewpoint of recognized seminal and seemingly marginal

thinkers alike and beckons scholars to consider a more comprehensive, more organic approach to

historical thought. He sees broadly and listens carefully- calling us to do the same. The

methodology developed and employed by Pocock for understanding the history of political

thought is timeless, compelling, and wonderfully nuanced- but not all-encompassing. There

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[240] Davis, "'Epic Years,'"537.

remains space for differing scholarship angles and the open invitation to continued engagement, which is why after more than thirty years, the work continues to provoke thought, hold its value, and serve as a cornerstone for its discipline. For Pocock, TMM served to provide a central focus in anticipation of Pocock's masterful account of Gibbon, spanning six volumes, to which we shall return in the next chapter.

Rightly understood, republicanism is rooted in Latin, not Greek, therefore in situating Pocock's work in TMM into context with what other historians have said, the best way to connect Aristotle with the Republic is through his idea of the mixed constitution. The Aristotelian concept *of polity* (the politics) describes the rule of the many for the good of all, a decomposed version of *demos kratia*. Conceptually, *Res publica* leads to "The Greek Paideia" and further exemplifies Pocock's inquiries' interdisciplinary nature. Pocock creates critical pathways between his work and the work of Hannah Arendt and Eric Voegelin. Pathways are in partial service of classical realism, and a tradition that begins with Greek continues to the present, which continues to be alive in liberal arts colleges. Pocock remains important since his work continues to ensure the relevance and dignity of the classical tradition. While modern bureaucratic concerns may unintentionally serve to blur the classical tradition, the lasting legacy of TMM continues to spark meaningful conversation and offer fodder for classical conversations among historians and political theorists/philosophers.

In considering Pocock's work in TMM, Edward Andrew provides another thoughtful critique, observing that Pocock largely ignored C.B. Macpherson's *Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* and Leo Strauss's *Thoughts on Machiavelli. This charge* is not dismissed here. Pocock's TMM presents the idea of a republic from the perspective of civic

humanism while viewing liberalism and possessive individualism as misguided theories of political thought, which have left damaging lasting legacies in both practice and the contemplation of political thought. In concurrence with Andrew's point that "Pocock was not concerned with Machiavellian interpretations of early twentieth-century Italian politics but with the interpretations of Machiavellian thought in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English and American political thought and practice," one must also note that TMM was not intended to be a historiographic reflection on the leading scholarship on political thought. Had this been the case, Pocock would have written a work considerably different in substance and, by necessity, included Friedrich Meineke and Ernst Cassirer's work in his analysis. Fitting TMM between Louis Hartz and C.B. Macpherson on the left and Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin on the right, Pocock gave space the reasonable middle ground.

C.B. Macpherson's 1962 *Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* was, in essence, the presentation of the idea rooted in a neo-Hegelian ideology that formed the basis for Canadian idealism. For Macpherson, the individual who was in full possession of her/his knowledge and was not indebted to society— was transformed into the ultimate market commodity, which essentially collapsed Aristotelian thought on community and was intrinsically opposed to the socialist views Macpherson subscribed. Nevertheless, Pocock's view of Macpherson's work regarding Harrington on property as it meant by serving (at least during the late seventeenth century) a primarily moral purpose was more open to finding common ground between the possessive individualist and the civic humanist.[241] In this sense, property became a method for

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[241] Edward Andrew, "The Absence of Macpherson and Strauss in Pocock's Machiavellian Moment." *History of European Ideas,* 43, no. 2 (2017): 148.

partial liberation from the crown and a necessary step toward civic engagement as for

Harrington, power followed property.[242]

Macpherson made a point to decidedly ignore Pocock's contributions to Harrington and

chose not to engage with Pocock on civic virtue. Edward Andrew shares a valuable memory of a

conference he attended at the Australian National University in Canberra, during which

Macpherson "slept noisily and pointedly in the first row while the challenger [Pocock] spoke to

the rest of the audience." Andrew points out that "Macpherson's rudeness and his unwillingness

to engage in debate with Pocock did a disservice to Macpherson's own thought, and limited the

enduring legacy of his ideas."[243] The late erudite Isaac Kramnick, as well as Joyce Appleby both,

critiqued Pocock's lack of engagement on John Locke and Macpherson's possessive

individualism in trans-Atlantic republican thought, especially with regards to the American civic

humanist perspective; thus cementing the irreconcilability between Pocock's view of the

American experiment and the Locke dominant narrative espoused by Hartz.[244]

Leo Strauss's view on Machiavelli as a wicked and un/antichristian thinker, as presented

in his 1958 publication, *Thoughts on Machiavelli,* has now been canonized. Strauss espoused the

approach to broad and deep reading in *On Tyranny.* His work on Machiavelli seems as many

critics attest, more an attempt to vilify personally than an attempt to carefully and contextually

understand history. Pocock was in profound disagreement with Leo Strauss, and more pointedly,

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[242] J.G.A. Pocock, "*Early Modern Capitalism—The Augustan Perception*," in *Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond*, edited by Eugene Kamenkaand R.S. Neale (Australia: National University Press, 1975), 66.

[243] Andrew, "The Absence of Macpherson and Strauss in Pocock's Machiavellian Moment," 148.

[244] See Isaac Krammnick, "Republican Revisionism Revisited," *The American Historical Review* 87, (1982): 632.; Joyce Appleby, *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 133.; Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (Harcourt Brace,1955).

Straussians. Reflecting on Strauss's *Thoughts on Machiavelli*, Pocock criticized the disregard for republican thought in Machiavelli's *Discourses* in favor of a manipulative aristocrat through a distorted view of *The Prince.*[245] The argument's crux may be closer to a problem with the conceptualization of liberalism versus republicanism between Straussians and Pocock. Part of the contention could be eased with a broader approach to the contextualization of Machiavelli, for which Pocock's work offers a model.

Ian Shapiro joined in critiquing Pocock on his views of early modern political thought and the extent to which Pocock was willing to see the modern concept of republican thought in a liberal light. At the same time, Paul Rahe asserted that civic humanism stemmed more from Pocock's 'scholarly imagination' than from any truth supported by historical inquiry.[246] I remain unable to find a place in Pocock's work in TMM or otherwise where he definitively dismisses Lockean liberalism from the civic humanist perspective. However, it is interesting that Straussians and their more moderate sympathizers raise these points of critique, highlighting the gaps in Pocock's work on Locke while seeking to maintain the Lockean dominant paradigm and Montesquieu's liberal influence on the American founding.[247]

Locke seems to be a persistent contention point between scholars of Pocock's work and Straussians/Straussian sympathizers. Yet, equating the resituating of Locke by Pocock with total removal of Lockean ideals from the American founding moves Pocock's work in a direction that I would argue it is not intended to go. While the Hartzian narrative of Lockean liberalism as

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[245] Andrew, "The Absence of Macpherson and Strauss in Pocock's Machiavellian Moment," 150.

[246] Andrew, "The Absence of Macpherson and Strauss in Pocock's Machiavellian Moment," 150.

[247] Andrew, "The Absence of Macpherson and Strauss in Pocock's Machiavellian Moment," 150-151.

possessive individualism in American republicanism is understood by Pocock as radically

overstated, I contend that the more significant point is that American republicanism is also

indebted to Harrington and civic humanism rooted more in the Renaissance than the

enlightenment. Perhaps a more open and thus balanced idea as presented by Andrew that

"Machiavellian republicanism was a crucial part of the mix along with Lockean liberalism and

Montesquieu's liberal republicanism" would come closer to the varied ideological forces at play

at the creation of the American experiment.[248] Pocock supported this view and softened the

edges of his argument in TMM by stating that "the deemphasizing of Locke is for the present a

tactical necessity. The historical context must be reconstructed without him before he can be

fitted back into it."[249]

Pocock sought to understand and help conceptualize ideas that shaped the historical

actors at play and created a paradigm shift for intellectual historians working on republicanism as

civic humanism, political speech, and the American founding as revolutionary in many respect as

Thomas Kuhn's work in science.[250] In short, the seeming 'omissions' of Macpherson and Strauss

from Pocock's TMM were deliberate and well thought out by Pocock. By choosing not to

include these two ideological adversaries, Pocock makes the points he intended to make and

saves more room for the dissection of more worthwhile endeavors. It is not my intention here to

excuse Pocock's omissions, rather present them as legitimate critiques and to indicate the parts

of his scholarship where he intentionally stopped short of including viewpoints outside of his

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[248] Andrew, "The Absence of Macpherson and Strauss in Pocock's Machiavellian Moment," 151.

[249] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 424.

[250] Andrew, "The Absence of Macpherson and Strauss in Pocock's Machiavellian Moment," 153.

own. I contend that he recognized other ways of viewing his subjects and settled on a method he chose not to enlarge or deviate from within the context of TMM. Thus, leading to more worthy critique such as those brought forth by Harvey Mansfield Jr. in his 'Reply to Pocock.'[251]

Mansfield charges that Pocock "wrongly portrayed an essential continuity spanning Aristotle through Machiavelli to Jefferson," and that he "neglected Machiavelli's originality, his break with Aristotelian teleology, his repudiation of the view of human nature as essentially political, as needing to exercise reasoned speech with fellow citizens to discover what is advantageous to the polity and what is just."[252] In exposing the nature of these critiques, Andrews makes the telling point that "Pocock's elevation of the active life of the civic humanist," with relation to the juxtaposing *vita activa* of Plato and Aristotle and the civic engagement of the practical Machiavelli, is based on Hannah Arendt's existentialism, not Aristotle's essentialism. Pocock's skillful and intentional inclusion of seeming marginal figures is more than an endearment to the under-dog. It is an example of contextual immersion and consideration of a consistently broad view of the history of political thought.

## II. Particularity and Time: Focus on Paradigmatic Individuals

### A. James Harrington:

Pocock had a penchant for assumed periphery thinkers, as in his treatment of James Harrington, whom Davis describes as "a marginal and somewhat eccentric thinker." Pocock aimed to elevate Harrington through demonstrable historical significance.[253] The drive to see the

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[251] Harvey C. Mansfield Jr, "III. Reply to Pocock." *Political Theory* 3, no. 4 (1975): 404.

[252] Andrew, "The Absence of Macpherson and Strauss in Pocock's Machiavellian Moment," 153.150.

[253] Davis, "'Epic Years,'" 534.

historical picture more fully and understand historical context, players, and variables more broadly led Pocock to reconsider the importance of accepted political thought leaders and ponder the interdependence with and importance of seemingly nominal actors upon the same stage. Harrington's previous considerations had primarily centered upon his views on property, the aristocracy, and the English gentry. However, Pocock saw the spark of the republican idea in Harrington's work within civic humanism and the Aristotelian/Polybian vestiges. Through Charles I's "importation of these paradigms into official English political discourse," Harrington moved these ideas from their limited scope of the Greek-inspired polis to larger territories such as France and America.[254] Future thinkers could then translate Harrington's civic humanism adaption for the larger spaces into the sweeping commercialized society and modernity.[255] This shift has been paramount for the history of political thought. According to Davis, "by recasting the role of civic humanism and republican discourse in the English Revolution in this way, Pocock triggered a still ongoing debate about the dominant paradigm transmitted by that discourse to the Enlightenment and beyond."[256]

From his work in *The Ancient Constitution,* Pocock continued to produce essential contributions to the historical study of seventeenth-century English revolutions and the political discourse, which grew out of such complex political movements. Throughout his lifetime involvement with paradigms in political languages and their expression throughout socio-political circumstances, Pocock provides fodder for "both historiographies and political theories." These necessitate the involvement of historians and political theorists who have grown

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[254] Davis, "'Epic Years,'" 534.
[255] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 450-51.
[256] Davis, "'Epic Years,'" 534.

weary of constricting disciplinary boundaries and are willing to explore a more organic understanding of the idea of a republic and the American founding through an assessment of his recounting of English revolutions.[257]

Pocock was committed to understanding Harrington as a whole person, situated in a particular time and context, and from there, engage in a broader, more long-lasting idea of history. Pocock's immersion in the life and work of James Harrington led to several conclusions. One such conclusion was that "Following John Selden, he [Harrington] said that Anglo-Saxon tenures and armed services belonged to a common pattern of proto-feudal rule imposed by all conquerors of the western provinces of the Roman empire." These included Gaul, Spain, Italy, and Britain or 'the Gothic balance.' For Seldon, this called forth the ancient constitution. However, for Harrington, Pocock identified, it meant, a narrative central to the history of western Europe in opposition to "the 'modern prudence' of the 'Gothic Balance' to the 'ancient prudence' by which the republics of antiquity" which were for Harrington, Greek, Roman, and Hebrew. Next, Pocock identifies the idea of lex agrarian in Harrington, "an equal distribution of lands among the arms-bearing citizens of free city-states." Through Pocock, Harrington's narrative concerning the revolutionary thesis that "Gothic politics had disappeared along with feudal obligations to a baronage or a king, and that free republics of armed citizens were once more possible" pointed to an armed and free citizenry.[258] Pocock connects the work of antiquity on "the concept of the republic" with contemporary issues, primarily the gun debate in the 21st century, the United States, especially writing from the U.S. in December 2015.

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[257] Davis, "'Epic Years,'"Abstract.

[258] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 129-130.

Concerning Harrington and Hobbes, Pocock spends time in consideration of the word *libertas*. TMM presents Harrington's belief that the concept of *libertas* signaled the idea of free people as those who, in their natural personhood, become political through self-governance, albeit through the means of a legislature. In comparison, Hobbes maintained a monarchial view loyal to the belief that persons became political through their consent to be governed by a representative, ideally a divinely ordained monarch ruling in their best interest. Through land and property, a person maintains his free personhood, and in Harrington, here rests the foundation of citizenship possible to an armed and free people.[259]

Pocock's research on Harrington provided the conclusion that "the stability of the state required the establishment of a permanent or 'standing' army – less to control the people than to deliver them from civil war – and therefore a means of financing it year by year. It was this that Harrington had thought possible only by making soldiers proprietors; the discovery that he was wring constituted the 'Machiavellian moment' of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."[260] Are people political animals, as in engaged in the public good, or social beings, engaged in exchanging goods? This question provoked Harrington's thoughts on trade and commerce and advanced Harrington's central thesis on what advances in all areas of life: transportation, science, literacy, education, property, wealth distribution, communication, could be brought about through republican government.[261]

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[259] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 137.

[260] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 138.

[261] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 137-138.

Instead of an active and informed citizenry rooted in their foundational legacy of the ancients, modern political actors are apt to dismantle ancient structures without the slightest consideration for Plato's Philosopher-Ruler; republican *virtu* has given way to barbarian commerce. This is especially true when partisan legislators control enough wealth and property to sway and impose their interests onto the American political system, exposing the fault lines in the American political system. Pocock illustrates this point in saying, "the move from 'political' to 'social' appeared the central transformation of eighteenth-century thought, and it became a question of whether there was any more a 'citizen' engaged in ruling and being ruled in company with other citizens sharing his concept of a public good and bearing arms in its defence. The function of the public might become the defence of the private…"[262]

Pocock's glides over the dance between the idea of a republic and its friction with commerce and the private individual, not haphazardly, but also not with the focus of stopping and nestling into the questions left to historians of more socio-economic interest through David Hume's essay on public credit. He can trace the threads of thought in his work trajectory, which moved him toward a more philosophical approach to historiography. He shares, "after 1975, my interests turned increasingly towards the history of historiography and focused on the 'philosophical' histories which joined with the slightly older 'philological' histories to transform, without replacing, the rhetorical narrative historiography had inherited from antiquity. I was led to situate Gibbon's '*Decline and Fall* in the context formed by the growth of two grand narratives: the first framed by Bruni and Harrington, in which the 'ancient prudence' of Rome was overcome by Gibbon's 'triumph of barbarism and religion,' meaning first the challenge of

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[262] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 139.

'modern prudence' formed by the establishment of feudal tenures and second that of the Christian churches, met about 1650 by the formation of the European states system."[263]

When the bearing of arms, an essential component to the individual's definition of citizenship, is relegated and reassigned to the power structure's standing army, "the danger of rule by the sword" decreases in the colloquial sense. Power is transferred to the State and subject to the dangers of parliamentary corruption, thus creating a space for the need for a plebian militia and introducing the conjunction of monetary control and inevitable warfare. Pocock traced the distrust of representative government back as far as 1675, positing that the American Revolution was inevitable as the parliamentary monarchy's collapse began. However, the parliamentary system as a whole was not on trial. Pocock elucidates, "the criticisms of that [English] monarchy that already existed were neo-Harringtonian and neo-Machiavellian in character, and to a considerable extent suggested republican alternatives in both Britain and America; but there was not, and arguably could not have been, any proposal to replace representative government by direct participation."[264] This is more aptly described as the restructuring of power, rather than a total overhaul of an increasingly unpopular system. The restructuring would come, not by direct involvement of "the people" with the political, but the reconsideration of the power structures modeling the monarchy and nobility using a rebranding of terms and a limiting of the scope of power allotted to each level.

Early Americans sought to bring forth a negation of the traditional Whiggish English practices, the cutting of ties with the monarchial legacy, and a new ideological structure for

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[263] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 140.

[264] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion,"140-141.

republican constitutional democracy. However, practice, as opposed to theory, tended to thwart their best intentions. Pocock's understanding of John Adam's *Defense of the Constitution of the United States* and Alexander Hamilton's "blueprint" led to his interpretation regarding the neo-Machiavellian nature of early Federalist politics. Which created the tumultuous conversation among scholars of early American political thought about the indebtedness to John Locke, whom Pocock did not entirely remove, but rather renegotiated a place for somewhat left of the center stage where the spotlight did not concentrate its focus.[265]

## B. Niccolo Machiavelli:

Through his analysis of Machiavelli's work, Pocock constructed the understanding that a person's primary nature could only be realized through "self-rule and liberty" as would later come to be pivotal to understanding human rights the American founding.[266] The two primary types of republics in Machiavelli- for expansion or preservation narrow the focus of Pocock's work in TMM and give a particular application for his understanding regarding the American founding. The 'republic for expansion' also highlights the continued relevance of Pocock's work and shed light, which could be understood and fruitfully applied in modern politics even (so many) years after TMM's publication.

For Pocock, Machiavelli is doing the work of "a political theorist looking toward historiography." Machiavelli's prince placed a higher weight on *fortuna.* Without relying on custom or grace, Pocock reserves his judgment regarding European princes in their

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[265] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 142-143.

[266] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 132-133

Machiavellian shadow almost exclusively for Napoleon Bonaparte.[267] The roots of American political life are in ancient Mediterranean thought. While this is not a new or even enlightening concept at this point, it is worthwhile remembering; particularly in light of our current political climate. As we, hopefully, make our way back to a political process and mindset rooted in Greco-Roman political theory, Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli provide necessary grounding best filtered for our American experiment through Pocock's lenses of language and context.

The connection between an armed citizenry, property rights, and a productive and free empire comes to us from Roman thought and principles in practice. While radical partisan politics have since corrupted it in the modern age, Rome still has time-immemorial lessons in political philosophy for us to learn. For Pocock, these lessons linked Machiavelli, Harrington, and Gibbon. His work serves as a helpful guiding narrative of what the concept of a republic entails and why it is worthy of continued protection and preservation by ensuring both "internal balance" and "external security" through an armed, and I would add, informed citizenry. TMM follows the threads of thought in both Gibbon and Harrington. Later Pocock would spend considerable time and life effort in exploring Gibbon's 'barbarism and religion,' to which we shall return in the next chapter, while the focus of TMM is primarily Harrington's threads of "'ancient prudence' and the *lex agrarian* to 'modern prudence' and the 'Gothic balance.'"[268] Pocock sees his actual work as beginning with ACFL and moving through TMM. The latter came to be the crucial and pivotal midpoint, leading to his culmination in the magnum

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[267] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 133.

[268] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 134.

opus of BR in all its six-volume glory, which moves from the history of political thought to a more clearly centered intention historiography.

**C. John Locke**

Never before in American history have scholars in higher education across disciplines needed Pocock's work on the American founding more than today. I argue this in light of the extreme partisan polarization of American politics in the 21st century, particularly the last decade, from 2009 to the present. The American political system seems to be self-imploding amidst divisive ideology, systematic racial, gender, sexual, and economic inequality, and seemingly rampant abuses of power and disregard for civic virtue. In the classical sense, the idea of a republic, I argue, now more than ever holds the possibility for a (re)membering of the civic humanist tradition so absent in the United States today. The underlying thread of nostalgia in TMM illuminates the romanticism of the original intentions of a republic's idea at the founding. While a careful reader of Hegel must contend all isms pointing to the future claiming to understand what that is, Pocock's concentration on Harrington was foundational to his understanding of the American founding, breaking with the accepted and traditional deference to Louis Hartz and the narrative of John Locke. Louis Hartz's worldview remains the dominant paradigm in most introductory American Government textbooks, as he is the counterpoint to Thomas Hobbes in introductory American government texts from publishers such as Pearson and Norton. His worldview is woven with Cold War ideology that attempted to simplify the American political tradition to compete with the Marxist tradition and a widespread political culture of fear and uncertainty. The central issue argued here is that the narrative espoused by Hartz is irrational in its posturing of Lockeanism, which reduces America to a footnote to

Liberal(ism). Pocock's work in TMM serves as a substantial push-back for Louis Hartz. As a seminal work of political theory, TMM expands on the classical tradition. Through it, Pocock makes sense of the tradition and provides a Classist antidote to isms and ideologies rooted in a Hegelian perspective. So crucial was Pocock's work in TMM concerning political science and theory that it even won the Lippincott award in 1993, joining Louis Hartz in the ranks, including Hannah Arendt, Eric Voegelin, and many other primordial figures in the political thought.

In his essay "Languages and Their Implications," Pocock states, "…Hobbes's *Leviathan* can be located as a contribution to the Engagement debate of 1649-51, that the significance of Locke in eighteenth-century political discussion requires a complete reassessment,; …that the American revolutionaries and founding fathers were obsessed by the fear of Machiavellian corruption."[269] From which he drew from analyzing the work of Quentin Skinner in "History and Ideology in the English Revolution," John Dunn in "The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century," and Bernard Bailyn in *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution."* While the dawning of an understanding of the flow of plural political languages was beginning to take shape among other intellectual historians in a way akin to the discussion of Multiple Discovery, it was Pocock's work, which shifted the process on its axis. Pocock established the "discourse of history or historiography" and, in doing so, created a "gap between political thought or political theory and philosophy, the consequence being that history or historiography became a form of political thought and central to its enunciation through time."[270] Through a dedicated practice of paradigm identification and

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[269] Pocock, "Languages and Their Implications," 27.

[270] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* xxi.

careful linguistic analysis Pocock served as the conduit for moving the history of political thought into a new sphere. He opened a path for the plurality of focus from legal and political philosophies to economic and civic humanist interests in British history. Thus Pocock's scholarship culminates in his extensive and ambitious multi-volume work on Edward Gibbon, which we will focus on in the subsequent chapter.

## III. The Americanization of Virtue

### A. Hartz and the American Experiment

Through TMM, Pocock makes the compelling point that self–evident truths become the basis for the logical process. Only by Aristotelian common experience can Platonic abstract universals be applied to the particular. According to Pocock, "such principles become the foundations from which reason can derive further propositions, whose truth can be demonstrated by showing them to be necessary logical consequences of the truth of the first principles."[271] Tellingly, Pocock reflects that "When in the course of human events, unstable and fluctuating in time as they were, a contingency arose which was not already integrated into usage, the first steps must be taken toward attending to that integration. Statute was based upon experience and expected the confirmation of further experience; it was, therefore, a step taken at a moment when a new emergency had arisen a number of times, and experience had accumulated to the point where the process of generalizing it into custom could begin. Experience, in the shape of prudence, performing this generalization, was Janus-faced; it bridged the gap between innovation and memory, statute and custom, present, future, and past."[272] While the absolute

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[271] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 22.

[272] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 25.

monarch has the prerogative to set aside custom in favor of their interpretation of abstract justice, they should be willing to employ the tactic only sparingly and with consideration of providential time to which Pocock turns in his second chapter on Providence, Fortune, and Virtue.[273]

Pocock gives detailed and lucid responses to critics of TMM and of his contextualist methodological structures throughout his work, including *Politics, Language, and Time.* He also responds to British critics, whom he believes assert the "primacy of the 'liberal' over the 'republican' component in late eighteenth-century thought" and American critics who place upon him "the posture of an apologist for the 'liberal' view." Pocock believes that the mainstream understanding of the American founding and political tradition has become monolithically Lockean due to Louis Hartz. Pocock finds the Hartzian narrative on Locke to be problematic and his thesis "unsound."[274] Pocock argues that scholars dominated by the Hartzian narrative do not acknowledge how the inherent tension between republicanism and liberalism. As a scholar who used both a civic humanist perspective and a conceptual republic interchangeably and sought to redirect American intellectual history and political theory away from the Lockean narrative, it is necessary to know more clearly what Pocock means by the "myth of liberalism."[275]

The following are three works of recent scholarship, which still rely on Louis Hartz's work and either replicate or hardly diverge from his thesis. Here they serve to illustrate the continued persistent presence of the Hartzian narrative in American government, which, while not significant to mainstream History, still impacts Government as an academic discipline,

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[273] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 30.

[274] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 69.

[275] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 545.

especially regarding courses on introductory thought and the foundations of the American political system. In his 2006 article, "Creed & Culture in the American Founding," Bradley Watson attempts to reconcile the claim that America "was founded upon a principled understanding of natural rights" with the idea that "America grew primarily from a set of inherited or customary understandings." Watson places these two positions within schools of American conservative thought neatly alongside each other, postulating that it was both creed and culture which formed the foundational American ideology.[276] Watson not only asserts that "the founders relied most notably on ideas articulated by John Locke and David Hume," but also that America is a nation defined by its liberalism and its adherence to natural rights, which created an exceptional American experience. It is difficult to ignore the Hartzian thesis between each line of Watson's work. He evokes other scholars like Ellis Sandoz when considering founding characters like James Madison and Thomas Jefferson with a purposeful bend to Christianity and Lockean natural law.

Patrick Deneen's 2008 article, "A House Divided: Peter Lawler's America Rightly Understood," places again at center stage the Hartzian narrative.[277] According to Deneen, Lawler implies that the transcendent constitutional truths put forth at the founding are "admirable and deserving of loyalty in spite of the explicit intentions of the Founders, not because of them" and that the official founding philosophy "echoing the liberal consensus thinker Louis Hartz and his own teacher at one remove, Leo Strauss—draws deeply on the philosophy of John Locke."

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[276] B.C.S. Watson, "Creed and Culture in the American Founding," *Reprinted from Intercollegiate Review* 41, no. 2(2006): 32.

[277] Patrick J. Deneen, "A House Divided Peter Lawler's America Rightly Understood," *Perspectives on Political Science.* (2008):147.

Deneen presents Lawler's thought as the correct version of the American founding and articulates his extensive debt of thought to both Strauss and Hartz. Though Deneen is also sympathetic to the narrative that the real influential voice in the minds of the founders was Thomas Aquinas and not Locke, he still firmly "acknowledges the basic liberal and Lockean presuppositions at the heart of the American constitutional order."[278]

Another clear proponent of the Hartzian narrative is George Thomas. In his 2013 article "John Locke's America," Thomas argues that it was a Lockean ideology most present at the American founding despite progressive republican claims.[279] Thomas's indebtedness to the Hartzian thesis is evident as he argues that Hartz's characterization of America's "absolute" and "irrational attachment" to John Locke made America "indifferent to the challenge of socialism and unfamiliar with the heritage of feudalism."[280] Thomas is inclined to agree with and support Hartz and Lawler's critical claims about Lockean liberalism. Thomas's seemingly politically liberal positions include allowing individuals the freedom to make essential choices for themselves while simultaneously remaining comfortable with the political status quo. Thus creating a shortsighted and illogical adherence to the brand of Lockean liberalism that Louis Hartz and his followers maintain.[281]

Hartz's work situates Alexis de Tocqueville and John Locke as the center points that radiate the central thesis that America was a wholly new endeavor broken away from any enduring classical ideology. Hartz asks whether a "people 'born equal' ever understand peoples

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[278] Deneen, "A House Divided Peter Lawler's America Rightly Understood," 149-151.

[279] George Thomas, "John Locke's America." *Society (New Brunswick)* 50, no. 5 (2013): 464.

[280] Thomas, "John Locke's America." *Society (New Brunswick)* 50, no. 5 (2013): 464.

[281] Thomas, "John Locke's America." *Society (New Brunswick)* 50, no. 5 (2013): 467.

elsewhere that have to become so? Can America ever understand itself?"[282] Instead of expanding

on the American experiment's ideological origins being the Greek tradition, Hartz lays the

groundwork for ideas about American exceptionalism. Hartz builds his thesis on his

understanding of Tocqueville's assertions that America had achieved a level of "natural

liberalism" without a genuine revolutionary tradition that enabled equality to be established by

birth instead of by process. What is problematic throughout Hartz's work is the broad

applications of John Locke in the absence of deep consideration for the context and political

language of Locke's work and its place within republican thought at the founding. These

applications anchor Hartz's reactive political scholarship during the crucial post-World War II

era and the Cold War years. Hartz's work welcomes the juxtaposition of American liberalism

and socialism, a comparison between American absolutism and isolation that is mostly absent of

discussion on race, religion, or classical ideology.[283]

       The narrative of exceptionalism and exemption is a significant paradigm in the

scholarship on early American political thought and is what Pocock's work engages. In

countering Hartz and reading the founders in the context of their own time and political

language, Pocock helps us better understand what they meant when they attempted to construct a

republican government. His work elucidates why they found a republican government the only

form of government that was defensible. This study seeks to contribute to understanding what

the concept of a republic is for J.G.A. Pocock. By engaging with his work on Machiavelli, the

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[282] Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America,* 309.

[283] Gordon Arlen, "Cold War Prophecy and the Burdens of Comparative Thought: A Case for Revisiting Louis Hartz." *Polity* 49, no. 4 (2017): 549.; and James T. Kloppenberg, "In Retrospect: Lous Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in America." *Reviews in American History* 29, no. 3 (2001): 461.

theory of Florentine republicanism, and political languages and their implications for intellectual history and political theory, it is clear why Pocock identifies as a political theorist and historian.[284]

J.C. Davis presents a compelling reflection on Pocock's thoughts on political actors and context. Concerning John Locke, Davis asks, "Why was a thinker, so readily dismissible by the twentieth century, so important to the seventeenth? The answer had to be that they were operating to different rules within different intellectual paradigms. It was the function of the historian of political thought to recover those paradigms. Similarly, engagements with John Locke's immediate context made him appear more radical and less influential than the nineteenth-century interpretation of him as a forerunner of modern liberal thought would have suggested."[285] I agree with Davis in his assessment that Pocock's main concern was with how political actors interacted with and responded to their context in the moment. In Locke's case, his context revealed less influence than Hartz suggested in scholarship on republicanism and the American founding.

Eric Nelson's 2004 book, *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought*, argues that Pocock assumes cohesive republicanism that is classical. He argues that Pocock and his followers have misunderstood ancient Greek and Roman political theory and created a false "synthetic Graeco-Roman political theory."[286] According to Nelson, both Ronald Hamowy and Johnson Kent Wright accept Pocock's definition of "republicanism as a theory of active civic participation and scorn for commerce." Wright applied Pocock's understanding of republicanism

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[284] Pocock. *Politics, Language, and Time, 42.*
[285] Davis, "'Epic Years,'"532. Pocock, *J.G.A. Pocock's Valedictory Lecture*, 13.
[286] Eric Nelson, *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2006),4.

to his work on Cato and John Locke and his work on Mably.[287] Nelson claims that Pocock's conception of a republic has been generally accepted and sustained by scholars on both sides of the historiographical debate. He argues that while scholars such as Lance Banning and Joyce Appleby disagree on many other points, they accept Pocock's concept of classical republicanism as rooted in the Aristotelian belief of the political necessity of participation for human virtue. According to Nelson, though, "the 'republicanism– liberalism' debate has been reduced to a controversy over the extent to which Pocock's template can be applied to the political theory of the founding; neither side has brought critical scrutiny to bear on the template itself."[288] Nelson's work illuminates the area in intellectual history where there is a lack of exploration.

**B. The Idea of a Republic and the American Founding**

In the final chapters of TMM, Pocock considers the Americanization of virtue and attempts to tackle the Jeffersonian problem under the Machiavelli-Harrington umbrella of civic virtue that the book had created.[289] The question of Aristotle and the Republic is consistently considered in TMM through "depicting early modern republican theory in the context of an emerging historicism, the product of the ideas and conceptual vocabularies which were available to medieval and Renaissance minds—such as C.S. Lewis called 'Old Western'—for the purpose of dealing with particular and contingent events and with time as the dimension of contingent

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[287] Nelson, *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought*, 141.; Ronald Hamowy, "Cato's Letters, John Locke, and the Republican Paradigm." *History of Political Thought* 11, (1990): 273 – 94.; Johnson Kent Wright, *A Classical Republican in Eighteenth-Century France: the Political Thought of Mably (*Stanford University Press, 1997).

[288] Eric Nelson, *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought*, 196-197.

[289] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 506.

happenings."[290] Pocock refers to the republic as mostly interchangeable with the Aristotelian polis regarding civic humanist thought of the fifteenth century and as having a set particularity in time while espousing universal values. In his work on Aristotle and the republic, Pocock situates republican theory in its particularities and presents his plan for a contextual approach to its history. By applying linguistic analysis to the understanding of republican theory, Pocock includes the words "usage," "providence," and "fortune" as examples of how sixteenth-century historical actors spoke about and understood "history" through various other concepts which are no longer consistent with modernity's understanding of the term. The attempts to grapple with what Pocock refers to as "the ideal of active citizenship in a republic" or *vivere civile* are his intended focus for TMM and part of the foundational mechanisms to understanding Pocock's idea of a republic throughout his career.[291]

Throughout TMM, Pocock operates on the generalization that "Medieval philosophy tended to debate whether the sole true objects of rational understanding were not universal categories or propositions which were independent of time and space." While historical thinkers were attempting to operate within the constraints and familiarities of their particulars, they found within republican theory a more "timeless and non-circumstantial" nature.[292] Usually, the concept of history is broken down into two parts: narrative and processes. However, narrative (akin to storytelling) is generally viewed as inferior below poetry and philosophy. Narrative would need to rise above its particulars to consider the universal, which became the processes for

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[290] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 3.

[291] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, 64.

[292] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 4.

Pocock's attempts to adopt an Aristotelian view of the flow of existence and time to be a worthwhile endeavor. For example, *physis* is how a thing "came to be and then not to be" or how an idea or historical manifestation came into existence. Its trajectory moves circularly as opposed to linearly. It culminates either in its disappearance or dismantling but is not altogether intended as a tool for making sense of the universe or meaning in human affairs.[293]

For Pocock, secular time is an 'etymological tautology.' Within the section on Christian thought, whether Pocock means that all time is secular for the historian or perhaps that time is best understood cohesively from a secular viewpoint is obscure.[294] The Christian temporal perspective seeks to connect particulars to the universal or eternal insistently but fails to view the importance of particulars unto themselves. In this regard, it is more evident that the particulars for Christian time form part of the whole but are not overly significant on their own. According to Pocock, "It is a useful simplification to say that the Christian world-view—while of course containing the seeds of what was to supersede it—was based upon the exclusion from consideration of temporal and secular history, and that the emergence of historical modes of explanation had much to do with the supersession of that world-view by one more temporal and secular."[295] Perhaps philosophy was not yet understood or able to incorporate the consideration of the secular and temporal. However, on its margins, there were attempts to reflect on political particulars within a historical context. Nevertheless, Pocock attempts to "expound three such modes of thought and, in so doing, to construct a model which will help to elucidate what

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[293] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 5.

[294] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 8.

[295] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 8.

happened when the republican ideal posed the problem of the universal's existence in secular particularity."[296]

Suppose intuition is considered mystical in the tradition of the history of political thought. In that case, Pocock may be leaning into the mysticism of intuition in seeing reason as facilitated by and intrinsically linked to intuition and principles, which are self-evident. He says, "Reason in the strict sense of the term is simply that by which we are enabled to perform deductions from principles; induction is the mental process by which we arrive at knowledge of principles; but that by which we recognize what cannot and need not be proved, namely the truth of principles, is neither reason nor induction—intuition, though not used by Fortescue, is possibly the best word for it."[297] As opposed to using "reason in the strict sense of the term," Pocock backs away from this first argument by applying a loser construction of reason. In taking reason to mean, "that faculty of the mind by which the consequences of principles are detected and validated," Pocock presents the idea that principles are universal statements from which universals can be extrapolated. For example, drawing upon Fortescue's *De Laudibus* Pocock clarifies that, "the law of nature consists of those self-evident principles of justice, and their universally deductible consequences, which are true and have binding force among all men. Human laws may be simply the translation of the commands of natural law into the formalized commands or rules of a particular kingdom."[298] These ideas naturally transition into discussions of natural law and its inherent relationship with the polis and government. Is government a

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[296] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, 9.

[297] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, 11.

[298] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 11-12.

natural rendering of order for humans, reflective and indicative of the natural world, or is it an artificial creation? The answer would be yes to both accounts, for we see even further than the natural hierarchical orders in the animal kingdom to the precise ordering of even the most necessary species of flora. However, the study of and varying government practices is created by humanity to control what cannot be fully understood and delineate the parameters of natural expression among peers.

In considering the wisdom of Aristotle in his *Ethics,* Pocock applies the principle that natural law has the same force among all men to the ideas of justice, reason, and jurisprudence. In English law, where custom and statutes were primary, lay the foundations for the idea of a republic, founded upon republican maxims, and later explored these ideas concerning the American experiment.[299] To understand how natural law was translated and applied to a particular place and time, it is "custom" and "statute," which must require examination. In these, we find the particularities befitting their context. "Custom," or *lex non-scripta*, mostly followed on tradition and social order, and "statute," or *lex scripta* created by some foundational authority within the accepted power structure. Outside of the rationality of statute and accepted custom, laws of place are shaped by peculiarities.[300] The laws of the early American experiment reflected the young nation's hunger for the ideal, the independent, the idea that men were masters of their fate and subject to natural law, but not artificially imposed sovereign king. This is not to say that the early American experience was not rife with contested political concerns; rather that the enthusiasm of beginning the American experiment drew together political ideologies that,

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[299] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 12.

[300] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 13.

although varied, were hopeful of an independent nation. These ideals made the American experience unique at its inception- as opposed to the particularities of English law, which Pocock explores in the TMM or French law for that matter. The laws of any place reflect commonalities across cultures but most closely mirror the nation's priorities and character. Only through "usage or experience" can the quality of the laws be tested against their suitability for the peculiar needs of those subject to them, in line with a Burkean "Prescriptive" or "presumptive" reasoning.[301]

Pocock concludes this line of reasoning by going through Sir John Fortescue's *De Laudibus Legum Anglie* (1468-1471), a legal treatise "In Praise of the Laws of England." From this treatise, the idea that a free guilty person is better than a jailed, innocent person arises to form a cornerstone of American jurisprudence and the legal system. Fortescue was an integral part of the monarchal family education. It was a great supporter of Henry VI and the English constitution so long as they ruled "by law and consent."[302] He suggested reforms in a way, which was amenable to the crown, and still clearly presented itself to the literate and educated public. Pocock then presents a discussion of Plato's *Republic* and the place of Philosopher-Rulers and fixed law. Illuminated directly by the forms, the Philosopher-Ruler would be wise enough to apply fixed laws to particular situations. However, over time and practice, the concession was most likely that the ruler would employ generalizations and attempt to reconstruct natural justice to concrete situations, rendering the process imperfect. There came a marked decline of faith in the absolute sovereign as a suitable philosopher-Ruler with imperfection in both ruler and process. Their "lesser breed of ruling intellect must be doubly disciplined by law, first by the

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[301] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 14-16.; Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time,* chapters 6 & 7.

[302] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 19.

need to submit his individual decisions to the law's general rules, secondly by the necessity to accept some sort of guidance when it came to converting them into particular decisions—for if his only knowledge was of imperfect generalizations, imperfect too must be his understanding of particular cases."[303] Thus the need for an expanded ruling body and clearly defined fixed legal structure arises and is met through constitutional law. Aristotle supported it in *The Politics* through his limitations of the ruler's reach based on their natural intelligence level regarding abstract forms and where they were peculiarly situated in time.

## C. The Arendtian Component

In his article, "Recent Tendencies in the History of Political Thought," Samuel Charles James seeks to trace the Cambridge School additions to and achievements. He claims that founders like Pocock, Peter Laslett, John Dunn, and Quentin Skinner have pioneered the theoretical frameworks adopted by more recent historians of political thought such as Lauri Tahtinen, Martha Nussbaum, Mira Siegelberg, and himself.[304] James highlights Mira Siegelberg's work on Hannah Arendt and Pocock.[305] His discussion of Siegelberg's arguments about Pocock's indebtedness to Arendtian philosophy (as acknowledged in TMM) opens up the scholarly landscape for more investigation of Pocock's thought. According to James, "a comparison of Pocock and Arendt revealed a shared preoccupation with the practical and theoretical problem of political stability, particularly as it arose in societies which had abandoned appeals to either transcendental theology or immutable tradition." Arguably, the American

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[303] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 21.

[304] James, "The Cambridge School in the history of political thought, 1948-1979," 398, 401.

[305] James, "The Cambridge School in the history of political thought, 1948-1979," 401.

political culture has largely abandoned these principles, making Pocock's study on the idea of a republic timely and relevant.

In her 2013 article, "Things Fall Apart: J.G.A. Pocock, Hannah Arendt, and the Politics of Time," Mira Siegelberg continues her study of J.G.A. Pocock and his connection to Hannah Arendt.[306] Siegelberg's article seeks to examine the Pocock-Arendt connection and argues that Arendt's classical politics in *The Human Condition* the secularity of the American foundation in *On Revolution* were important for Pocock's work on American political thought. Siegelberg's work provides a critical bridge between, at times, distinct Pocock of political theory and the Pocock of intellectual history by weaving the Arendtian component of his thinking into his understanding of republicanism while incorporating their responses to the American political climate of the 1960s and 1970s in which they wrote.[307]

Pocock also gained insight and was influenced by Arendt concerning Hegel, who on Hegel and the study of revolutions within history writes, "Theoretically, the most far-reaching consequence of the French Revolution was the birth of the modern concept of history in Hegel's philosophy."[308] Yoder reflects that "anything that was once political—words and deeds—became historical, subject to the laws of historical necessity. Human beings lose their ability to act in history; they can only observe its laws."[309] These concepts are pertinent in *The Human*

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[306] Mira L. Siegelberg, "Things Fall Apart: J.G.A. Pocock, Hannah Arendt, and the Politics of Time." *Modern intellectual history* 10, no. 1 (2013): 109.

[307] Siegelberg. "Things Fall Apart," 109.

[308] Arendt, *On Revolution,* 42

[309] J.L. Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality: Hannah Arendt's Critique of Individualism in Enlightenment and Romantic Thinking.* (ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Global, 2008), 95.

*Condition.* Arendt remarks on the timeline of action, with the primary importance placed at the action's start. One cannot know the ultimate end of free action, thus chipping away at the belief in Providence's ultimate control over humanity. Arendt applauded the novelty and positive potential in intentional revolutions' outcomes but drew a line between the French and American Revolutions. Her line denotes the French Revolution's wasted potential that served only to misuse the technique needed to fight "tyranny and oppression." This ultimately leads to terror, poverty, and the destructive force of the "oppressed against their oppressors," instead of creating a sustainable new world order as in the American founding.[310]

Explored in Yoder's work is Hannah Arendt's "critique and ultimate rejection of the ideas of individualism developed during the Enlightenment and Romantic periods." Arendt rejected both the idea of the 'abstract man' in the Enlightenment period and the "Romantic introspection that followed." She focused instead on human plurality based on the experience of the "French Revolution, Jewish history, and totalitarianism…"[311] Through her critiques of the intellectual and political systems that supported individualism, Arendt sought to elevate the West's neglected idea of human plurality. The need for a reconsideration of individualism was clear to Pocock, and it is no stretch to consider that Hannah Arendt, as will be shown through this brief exploration of her work, influenced his views.

Reflecting on Arendt on individualism and the space between her work and Pocock's is as timely now as it could ever be, especially amid our current political climate and the trials that republican democracy has undergone most recently in the United States. The American idea is

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[310] Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality,* 96.; Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958),102.

[311] Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality,* iii.

under threat, and one way to understand our time's nuances is through the joining of Arendt's work with Pocock's. Yoder explains that Arendt "turned to the eighteenth/earlier nineteenth centuries precisely to understand the problems of her own time." Much like so many scholars who sought out the "origins of modern thought, modern society, and modern politics," though true to her shared tendency with Pocock to listen carefully and tenaciously, she did not accept the majority of mainstream arguments. Instead, Arendt employed her careful conglomeration of information by meticulous analysis to arrive at original conclusions.[312]

As Yoder explains, "at the center of modern political thought is the debate over the rights of individuals versus the authority of the state."[313] Arendt carefully weighed the philosophies of thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Moses Mendelssohn, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Wilhelm con Humboldt, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Edmund Burke, G.W.F. Hegel, and Friedrich Nietzsche, among many others. Arendt was loath to supply a ready definition for either the concept of enlightenment or romanticism. Her ideas must be "drawn out from her historical, political, and philosophical analyses."[314] According to Yoder, "at the center of Arendt's thought is the concept of human plurality: the idea that 'men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world'" thus refusing to "reconcile the individual with any greater whole, be it state, nation, or mankind itself."[315] For Arendt, human plurality enables people to take part in the political society successfully alongside others, in opposition to enlightened and romantic thought, which elevated

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[312] Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality,* 1-2.

[313] Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality,* 2.
[314] Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality,* 4-16.

[315] Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality,* 16-17.

the individual "while at the same time subjugating him to a universal whole," the consequences of which are felt throughout the twentieth century.[316]

Threads of Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* (1958) and *On Revolution* (1961) are woven among the underlying fabric of thought of which TMM is constructed. Considering Arendt's view of the American Revolution as a positive example and the French Revolution as a negative example, Pocock was afforded another layer of consideration.Arendt and Pocock share a sense of nostalgic appreciation for the Greek *polis*. However, neither can be logically demonstrated to be anti-modern and wrote in considerable measure to respond to their turbulent times. Margaret Canovan argues in her work *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought* (1992) that "virtually the entire agenda of Arendt's political thought was set by her reflections on the political catastrophes of the mid-century," which is a natural reaction to the types of cataclysmic events that occurred during her lifetime and was a reaction, shared to an extent, by Pocock concerning his own time.[317] For Arendt, the *vita activa* and the *vita contemplativa* characterize both actions and inaction and situate speech and action as fundamentals of the human political process. In her work, *The Human Condition,* Arendt organizes *vita activa* for modernity categorically as labor, work, and action in juxtaposition to the "pre-Socratic polis," where "thought was secondary to speech and action." For Arendt, "the *polis* was the only place man could reach his highest potential as man," through freely

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[316] Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality,* 17.

[317] Margaret Canovan, "A New Republicanism." In *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought,* 201-252 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 7.

expressed public action as best demonstrated by Homer's Achilles' was, "the doer of great deeds and the speaker of great words."[318]

For Arendt, the ancients' legacy makes its great transition under Platonic and Aristotelian influence. The *vita activa* is replaced as the ultimate goal for political humanity by the *vita contemplativa.* Plato and Aristotle argue that for humanity, it is not the possibility of immortality through legend and memory that is the driving ideal, but rather the ability to reason, the space to consider, the capacity for contemplation that provides the unique connection to divinity, which Arendt refers to as eternality. As Yoder explains, "Plato and Aristotle began a tradition of political thought that placed thought *(vita contemplativa)* above any kind of action *(vita activa).* Arendt argues this tradition lasted into the modern era, until Marx finally turned it back on its head, placing action over thought once again," opting instead for labor as the essence of human action.[319] Throughout Pocock's work, we find sensitivity toward the ancient way, and I argue, this highlights the consistent underlying component of Arendtian thought in TMM. For Pocock, the aim, in part, is to re-consider the implications of Marx's reversal of the *vita contemplativa* with *vita activa* through language. As an intellectual historian, Pocock focuses his attention primarily on the thoughts, reasoning, speech, and language of historical actors. In so doing, it demonstrates an active example of Plato and Aristotle's *vita contemplativa.*

While the "pre-Socratic *polis* was identified by its sharp distinction between private and public," modernity is "defined by the combination of both private and public" into a new social realm. Arendt argues that "it expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior,

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[318] Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality,* 79-80.; Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 7-21.

[319] Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality,* 80-81.; Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 15-21.

imposing innumerable and various roles, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement."[320] For Pocock, it is the public *polis* where the private *vita contemplativa* manifests its most compelling predilections within political thought. On route to Revolution, one may find the ground underfoot shifting with outgoing paradigms and taking new form through political language, all, which may be misinterpreted or unnoticed without the trained ear, inclined and occupied by tenacious listening.

Circling back toward Macpherson's possessive individualism and Locke's ideas of property, the "first and most basic idea of ownership is that the individual owns his person, and it is something he can share with no one," or at least not be compelled to do so outside of her/his own volition. Therefore, "the loss of property then goes hand in hand with the loss of individuality."[321] As Yoder explains, "both Locke and [Adam] Smith judged production by the durability of its products. The more durable a product, the easier it is to own property (Locke) or exchange for something else (Smith). Arendt calls this activity work because, unlike labor, its products are meant to build a lasting world of things in which human interaction can occur. Labor, on the other hand, produces for the sole purpose of consumption."[322]

Arendt's *homo faber* centers, to his detriment, around the potential end and possible gain, missing the legitimate beauty of the abstract, the possible for the sake of the intangible benefits of the ancient *vita contemplativa* entirely. This component of Arendt's work is markedly explored, if not named explicitly in Pocock's ideas of speech and action, as the plurality of humanity is considered. Arendt says, Speechless action would no longer be active because there

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[320] Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality,* 81.; Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 40.
[321] Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality,* 82.
[322] Yoder, *The Case of Human Plurality,* 82., Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 39-41.

would no longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if, at the same time, he is the speaker of words. The speaker of words humanly discloses the action he begins. Though his deed can be perceived in its brute physical appearance without verbal accompaniment, it becomes relevant only through the spoken word. He identifies himself as the actor, announcing what he does, has done, and intends to do.[323]

Within Pocock, these threads are woven to create a conception of the contextual understanding of history. One must consider the political realm in which the speaker engaged, the particular *polis* of their time, and the political thinker chose to lay the groundwork of their thought. Arendt, serving here as a modern embodiment of Aristotle, considers speech, action, and context to be intrinsically united- an outlook that enabled Pocock's contextual methodology to reach across Machiavelli, Locke, and Marx and understand the importance of the space between the private and public, the individual and collective.

Among the consequences of reworking Enlightenment views on the individual and human plurality is another point on which Pocock and Arendt are joined. On the subject of the American Revolution, Arendt argues that "They, [early Americans] knew that the public realm in a republic was constituted by an exchange of opinion between equals and that this realm would simply disappear the very moment an exchange became superfluous because all equals happened to be of the same opinion."[324] Her view of the American Revolution's success rests on the ability to express and intellectually defend in the *polis* differing political opinions through encouraged and supported debate supports Pocock's idea of the American founding as the last great act of the

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[323] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 178-179.
[324] Arendt, *On Revolution,* 83.

renaissance and not the first great outcome of the enlightenment. From scholars of constitutional law to laypersons attempting to reconcile the contradictory viewpoints of the U.S. Constitution today continue to unpack the embedded tension of the document in which Pocock saw as so little indebted to the Hartzian Locke.

**Conclusion:**

Notably, at its initial reception, even critical readers of TMM identified the work as a masterpiece in its time. It became clear that a new discipline was established with a different model for conducting scholarship for intellectual historians. TMM is central to understanding Pocock's methodology as presented throughout this chapter as the practical model for considering political time and languages within his linguistic contextualist approach. In TMM, Pocock demonstrates his tenacious listening through his elevation of the paradigmatic figures of Aristotle, Harrington, and Machiavelli and his nuanced attention to the secondary figures and his critics engaged throughout the chapter. TMM has reached 'classic' status and, as such, has fallen, not into decay, but rather the obscurity that comes with reverence.[325] The intention here has been to revisit its pages with another set of eyes, fresh ideas, and a new perspective. The intention was not to reinterpret, contend with, uphold, or even criticize. These have all been engaged extensively by scholars of more capacity and ability. This chapter attempted to practice Pocock's tenacious listening and better understand Pocock's ideas through his own nuanced, contextualist approach. Pocock's methods consist of identifying the languages and discourses in a particular time that formed a paradigm that the political thinkers of the period engaged in and utilized to form and express their ideas. After carefully identifying the time's distinct political languages,

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[325] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* vii.

Pocock encouraged scholars to contend with the political language's particularities. He took great care to understand how the paradigm limited and structured discourse for the political thinker and his/her audience. In doing so, he created and modeled what he understood to be the historian's proper role.[326]

In TMM, Pocock modeled an approach for "…scholars who define themselves as historians of political ideas, political philosophers, political theorists, or political scientists," and those interested in considering republican thought through the lens of the Florentine tradition as understood and experienced by Machiavelli. For these, Pocock provides a path to synthesize scholars' work in "history, philosophy, science, and theory" to arrive at a better "understanding of political life."[327] Pocock, in company with Leo Strauss, Sheldon Wolin, Jurgen Habermas, and Robert Cumming were united in the effort for "continuing vitality of traditional political theory," which their work offers to subsequent generations.[328] Despite the acknowledged debts to a large number of historians, it was always the case that Pocock was doing something different."[329] Nevertheless, scholars do not work in a vacuum, and Pocock was no different in this respect. Other's work influenced his ideas, and his writings engaged with the past and his contemporaries, serving to move the trajectory of historiography in a new direction.[330]

Pocock began and remained a historian engaged in reconstructing past societies and understanding their particular histories. For Pocock to study history necessitates the study of

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[326] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, ix.

[327] Champlin, "Review of *The Machiavellian Moment*," 105.

[328] Champlin, "Review of *The Machiavellian Moment*," 106

[329] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* xx.

[330] J.G.A. Pocock, "A Method, a Model, and Machiavelli," xx-xxi.

political thought, which makes sense. It would be impossible and foolhardy to separate from the overall narrative of any time and place the inextricable political climate ideas. Historical characters worthy of study would, by necessity, be engaging in the Socratic endeavor of speaking politically, that is to say, speaking well about things that matter to and in the polis. One gets the sense from Pocock's work that the historian of historiography is doing the best they can but is increasingly aware that the past as past may be too different from the present to understand as scholars would wish. Davis uses the terms "Anglo-American variations on civic humanism" to describe Pocock's work on Harrington, dealing primarily with what it meant to be an autonomous citizen. He explains that the Anglo-American variation hinged on property ownership by a civilian army.[331] Europe had systems of power and politics too well rooted to accommodate civic humanism's inherent hopefulness; it was possible that the civic humanist perspective would well in the new American experiment and provide a path for growth in a new republic.

Pocock's work expounds on several components in service of the breakdown of ism and juxtaposition to the Hegelian shadow. First, political speech and thought were parts of particular paradigms and a foundational tool Pocock adopted from Kuhn's work in science. Pocock adapted Kuhnian paradigmatic structures and made them viable and applicable to the social sciences. These adaptions exposed modes and patterns in historical political thought. They provided the necessary framework, setting for a contextual approach to the political paradigm and enabling Pocock to apply linguistic analysis filters, authorial intent, precedence, and lasting

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[331] Davis, "'Epic Years,'" 525.

importance.[332] In support of this idea, Davis explains, "In order to understand the political language or discourse being deployed by any group of past actors, the historian had to recover the paradigmatic framework which shaped their discourse." Thus through Pocock's work, historiography and political thought are no longer constricted spaces. They are relatively free to interact intimately through their interlocking ideas, "in a structure or paradigm, and of recovering the languages which articulated, refined, defended, and sought to persuade others of the validity/legitimacy of those ideas and their interdependence."[333] Pocock believed that part of a historian's role was story-telling and narrative reconstruction through contextualization in method and the study of political languages.

In opposition to a timeless, static approach, Pocock is seemingly always at the very edge of the accepted approach, eager to invite new clarity, new methodology, and new voices to his narration of intellectual history. For Pocock, the historical actor was not merely an example espousing the prevalent ideology of his/her time. Instead, she/he was engaged in a direct response to the immediate context of their time and place, shedding light for future historians through their use of resources and engagement with history as understood by their current context.[334] Pocock committed to this methodology for the entirety of his lengthy career. He strengthened his approach to linguistics, moved quite fluidly from place and theme, incorporating modern ideas and contributions into his narrative, yet he did not find himself in need of reversing positions or dismantling the systems he built on its faults. They were either outdated or incomplete. The last legacy of commitment to tenacious and unrelenting listening

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[332] Davis, "'Epic Years,'" 526.
[333] Davis, "'Epic Years,'" 528-529.
[334] Davis, "'Epic Years,'" 532.

enables the kind of contextualism Pocock urges historians to engage in even to be possible. Pocock's contextualist methodology enables the mindful reconstruction of the past in the mind of the historian. It helps to mitigate the temptation to impose modernity's standards on previous political actors, freeing history from its confines and future judges.

A persistent problem in the linguistic consideration of historiography and political thought is what scholars mean when using the terms liberal and republican. According to Davis, liberal can be described as the "expanding" of the "private element in social existence and seeking constitutional arrangements which would protect that element." At the same time, republican signifies a commitment to "citizen activism within an open public sphere."[335] At the center, interpretations of these terms must focus on how one sees the appropriate size and scope of government, whether one applauds the protection of the private by the public or whether one wishes to advance the agenda of the private by more grassroots and individual mechanisms. These are not interchangeable or even reconcilable terms; they are at their foundations, distinct ways of viewing the world and its power structures. Pocock's work urges an essential shift in the terms involved in the discourse of these ideas. Pocock analyzed the language of political thought and its contextualization, the primary methods of understanding both Western society's political structures and their last repercussions.[336]

Looking back at the Cambridge School or the 'linguistic contextualists' discussed in the second chapter of this project, the question of authorial intention again shows its relevance in consideration of language and "socio-political circumstances and the modes (paradigms) which

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[335] Davis, "'Epic Years,'" 534.
[336] Davis, "'Epic Years,'" 535.

frame the articulations of language." These are indebted to Pocock's methodology for the history of political thought.[337] Peter Laslett impacted how Pocock thought about his work, and Pocock was proud to have been "present at the creation" of Laslett's work on Filmer and Locke. Pocock was especially cognizant of the importance of Laslett's findings on Locke's work in his *Two Treatises on Government* as "an exclusion tract, written around 1681, rather than a revolution tract justifying the events of 1688/89," going so far as to say that, "it was Laslett who 'revealed the mystery of contextualization.'"[338] I argue that Pocock devoted his life and work to tenacious listening and is quite right in refusing to make authorial intent independent from the entire context of a political thinker's life. We are not only what we write- the dynamic process of being alive, connected, and engaged with other living beings around us in a particular place, space. Time renders us tethered to our particularities. That is not to say that an author's writing is only relevant to their particularities; rather than understanding their intent, one must meet them where they are.

As no one does, Pocock did not act in isolation, yet his work stands alone in importance and legacy. His career spanned over 50 years, many of which were fraught with political unrest and intellectual, political, and cultural paradigm shifts. In light of today's political realities, Pocock's work calls forth the anxieties faced by modernity as the United States experiences, less what are growing pains, and more the groaning of a body grown too large, too dense, too heavy, and now threatens to topple over into collapse. Clarity, for Pocock, is achieved through tenacious listening to the period under consideration and contemporary ideas. In The Machiavellian

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[337] Davis, "'Epic Years,'" 535.
[338] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* xiv.

Moment's pages, one can see how Bruni and Machiavelli are not so far removed from the post-modern reality.[339] While Pocock focused primarily on the history of the sixteenth to eighteenth-century political thought, he remained wary of any attempt to understand this period without a cognizant recognition and application of the legacy of the ancients in Greece and Rome. By firmly rooting himself to the present, his arguments and their implications span well into modernity; take, for example, his mature work on indigenous identity and colonialism in New Zealand. Writing on issues concerning early modern Western political thought Pocock was a prolific writer and expanded upon in detail in the previous chapter, a tenacious and committed listener.[340] I contend that as a historian, Pocock has done for the history of political thought and historiography as much as Arthur Lovejoy did for the history of ideas. It is no wonder Pocock's work seems to actively resist categorization.

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[339] Pocock, "From The Ancient Constitution to Barbarism and Religion," 135.
[340] Davis, "'Epic Years,'" 519.

# CHAPTER 5

## ENLIGHTENMENT, RELIGION, AND REPUBLIC

What follows is an attempt at a practical application of Pocock's methodology as presented in *Politics Language and Time,* and *The Machiavellian Moment,* with a capstone analysis of Pocock's work on Edward Gibbon in *Barbarism and Religion.* I argue that Pocock's work on Machiavelli, Harrington, and Gibbon provides a holistic blueprint for applying contextualization and tenacious listening, affording historians of political thought and political theorists with valuable tools for understanding the idea of a republic in the classical sense. This final chapter aims to demonstrate Pocock's contributions for reading closely, listening tenaciously, and adequately conducting an intellectual historian's work. Through this attempt, I hope to move fluidly from Pocock's work on two of the primordial three paradigmatic individuals, James Harrington and Edward Gibbon, practicing the methodology he has outlined in his work. Contained within this chapter is a bridge between Pocock's Harrington and his Gibbon on the topic of religion through an exploration of the 18th-century religious tension in Gibbon's *Decline and Fall,* and how those tensions helped to shape the surrounding intellectual movements by way of concurring English, French, and Protestant Enlightenments. Pocock's final major contribution was a profound exploration and analysis of Edward Gibbon through primarily a religious context; thus, that topic dominates his most significant final and mature work.

My central argument is that to understand Pocock and his work, one must do what Pocock has done with his primordial paradigmatic figures. One must sift through the context of Pocock's life and work, understanding his past, familial, academic lineage, early influence, and interests. Only then can an intellectual historian have a sure footing in Pocock's methodology of

contextualization and tenacious listening in the hopes of understanding what impact his scholarship has made on the idea of a republic and appreciate his lasting legacy in the History of Ideas. In other words, to know Pocock, one must do for Pocock what Pocock has done for Machiavelli, Harrington, and Gibbon.

## I. Civic Humanism and Paradigmatic Individuals

I chose this title because it sheds light on Pocock's most signature scholarly practice. As an intellectual historian, Pocock consistently isolates figures he deems pivotal to the formation of an age or movement. Pocock's scholarship stands out for his unwavering commitment to tenacious listening by actively world-building around his central figure. By constructing a detailed context, Pocock meets his central figures where and as they are, without providing obstructing view by speaking for his central figures or drawing out conclusions from their work to bolster some argument in his narrative. He does not translate Machiavelli, Harrington, or Gibbon by inserting superfluous reworkings of their philosophies to suit a preconceived historical argument. As a historian of their ideas, he uses essential information about their lives and their time and place to contextualize their work, its impact, and as a tool for understanding and making sense of their languages. By selecting these central figures, best referred to as paradigmatic individuals, Pocock attempts to construct a living history of a time and place through the eyes of a holistic participant who was actively engaged in the dynamic of their time. From this, historians can extrapolate the importance of the *who*, as opposed to floating persons in a reconstructed era built primarily on the *whats* of the time.

## A. James Harrington, Thomas Hobbes, and the Western Enlightenment

The following section explores James Harrington and Thomas Hobbes- individuals central to the Western enlightenment, as understood by J.G.A. Pocock. Pocock spent considerable time and a significant portion of his professional scholarship on attention to James Harrington (1611-1677). I contend that to fulfill the proper role of the historian as Pocock intended, one must take care to situate Thomas Hobbes within the framework for contextualization of James Harrington as both complement and counterpoint. The relationship between Harrington and Hobbes on political philosophy is central to understanding Pocock's idea of a republic. It serves to illuminate further the areas of interdisciplinary interest in Pocock's work. By joining Harrington as Pocock's paradigmatic figure and Hobbes as arguably the most important counterweight to Harringtonian thought, both thinkers are better understood within their contexts. Thus exemplifying the intentionality and craft of Pocock's methodology. Harrington came first to modern readers through John Toland and later through Thomas Birch. The most successful version of Harrington's political work comes through the edition crafted and edited by Pocock in 1977. For *The Political Works of James Harrington*, Pocock selected only Harrington's political prose in chronological order with grammar and mechanics modernized.[341] In this edition of Harrington's work, Pocock recounts the difficulties of finding background information on Harrington before 1656 due to very little published material about him, providing a sense of Pocock's specific methodological approach to intellectual history.

Pocock maintains that a "key motivation of *Oceana*" is that "Harrington conceived an intense personal devotion to the King, and suffered so acutely at his death that for a long time he lived in withdrawal and melancholy, which turned in due time to study." Pocock's sources lead him to

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[341] J.G.A. Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), xi-xv.

understand that Harrington and King Charles had an amicable relationship when Harrington and Thomas Herbert became part of Charles' inner circle transitioning from commissioners to "the sole entourage of his bedchamber." Pocock's presentation of Harrington's relationship with King Charles leads him to assert that "the tradition of an acute and lasting emotional crisis makes it possible to speculate that Harrington needed badly to understand the King's tragedy, and found that only a macrocosmic historical explanation of how monarchy had become impossible in England could reconcile him to what had happened." Pocock adds, "It is psychologically possible; and certainly-as will be argued later on- there is a sense in which the fall of the monarchy made men republicans, rather than the ideological republicanism acting as a cause of its fall." Pocock does not rest his entire case on this, though, since Harrington does not mention or rest on his devotion to Charles I in his writings on *Oceana; therefore*, this theory needs more evidence.[342] Nor would I argue that Pocock, in this case, speaks for Harrington, rather than by understanding Harrington holistically, Pocock is able to approach Harrington's work within its proper context, thus presenting a Harrington closer to the actual historical actor than an idealized conception of him.

Despite the issues with the initial publication of *The Commonwealth of Oceana*, Pocock asserts that as a classical republican and "England's premier civic humanist and Machiavellian," Harrington was "first to achieve a paradigmatic restatement of English political understanding in the language and world-view inherited through Machiavelli."[343] In *Oceana*, Harrington presents "England as a classical republic and the Englishman as a classical citizen," the legacy of both

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[342] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 3-5.

[343] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 15.

reverberating through to the American Revolution. In his treatment of Harrington's work, Pocock intended to "establish the character of republican and Machiavellian language, and to consider the purposes for which it was used, and which modified its character, in English thought." He explains that the "languages of natural hierarchy, of ancient custom, of apocalyptic election and of prudent submission to providence" were instinctively spoken by Englishmen throughout, and in laying the groundwork for how to contextually understand the dichotomy between traditional English legal language and the language of republicanism he provides the valuable contextual foundation for understanding republicanism in England as "a language, not a programme."[344] The classical framework put forth for England by Harrington subscribed to the civic humanist tradition as represented by Machiavelli's concept of the one, the few, and the many. The respective powers of each blended Aristotelian virtues with Machiavellian political function. For the one, this meant leadership, for the few "reflective wisdom of prudence" and for the many "accumulated experience, custom and common sense" along with an expansive and disciplined military. I argue that in this regard, the legacy of Harringtonian and Machiavellian thought is evident concerning the American founding. As the President serves as the One, the United States Supreme Court represents the Few, and I would argue Plato's philosopher rulers. The U.S. Congress ought to represent the Many. However, the United States still grapples with what Pocock refers to as "the whole longstanding theoretical problem of 'separation of powers,'" which "arose from the attempt to impose the One-Few-Many triad as a grid upon the structure of early-modern jurisdictional monarchy."[345] The United States continues to wrestle with the

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[344] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 15.

[345] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 16.

implementation of limited government. Presidents produce staggering amounts of executive orders, in part to thwart the rival partisanship of Congress. The polarization of the Supreme Court threatens the existence of a "few" that can embody the Platonic concept.

By necessity, the triad would need to self-regulate as the individual components operated independently of each other according to their particular virtues. They simultaneously acted to uphold the republican ideal and work in unison for the balance of the "precarious and fragile" republic, which depended on circular balance instead of divine providence.[346] The balance of power without an intervening godhead rested on the Ploybian cycle, "in which good and bad versions of the three simple forms of government succeeded one another in a cycle of six phases." At its core, *fortuna*, instead of the Roman and Christian *virtus,* signaled the understanding that the nature of the republic was unpredictable and virtually uncontrollable by any outward participants.[347] As a 'less stable form of government,' "the republic was composed of independently existing and self-moving particulars, and these—even particular virtues—were held peculiarly liable to change and degeneration; the republic was an attempt to check this natural tendency and achieve secular immortality."[348] This first component, coupled with the transient nature of the particular republic made ever more precarious by its neighbors and the fluid nature of time itself. The reordering of the *vita active* for the participant of the republic made republican government unstable at its core but no less a worthy endeavor to pursue in the ancients' eyes and later the American founders.

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[346] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 16-17.

[347] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 17-18.

[348] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 18.

A republic was to elevate the best parts of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy while avoiding their greatest evils, namely tyranny, faction and division, and tumults. Such efforts put forth for "uniting a nation under one head to resist invasion from abroad and insurrection at home…the conjunction of counsel in the ablest persons of a state for the public benefit…and liberty, and the courage and industry which liberty begets."[349] The careful balance of power between these three structures needed preserving for the maintenance of the republican form since the precursor to its authority was balance.[350] As a reply to critics of the republican model, such as Bodin, Filmer, and Hobbes, Pocock explains that logically, the idea of mixed government was challenging at best and absurd at worst. The precarious balance is always in question, and "the moment at which the balance breaks down is the moment of confrontation between *virtu* and *fortuna*, and Lycurgus and Moses are of those whose *virtu* is so nearly divine that it can confront *fortuna* in the form of nearly total disorder." Pocock moves between the various languages of the time surrounding the conversation of the republic and identifies casuist, historical, theological, and prophetic. He treats each with the dignity bestowed the historically relevant and academically legitimate in the next section concerning the ideological context of Harrington's *Oceana. He concludes*, "the republic could be seen as a work of grace acting in history, it is not surprising that this dimension is discoverable in Harrington's republicanism in and after *Oceana.*"[351]

Next, we turn to Pocock's exploration of the intellectual relationship between Thomas Hobbes and James Harrington; by drawing the two together in saying Harrington as a republican was

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[349] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 19.

[350] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 20-23.

[351] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 26.

compatible with a monarchist Hobbes with regards to a mutual interest in reducing religion to the service of civil authority and a "complete destruction of any independently-sanctioned role for the clergy."[352] Tempting as it may be at this point to label Harrington or Hobbes secular unbelievers, it cannot be known for sure, nor does it bear importance in the analysis of their "common rejection of *jure divino* clericalism."[353] Harrington presents *Oceana* in similar terms to Israel as a theocracy as God exercised his monarchy in Hobbes' *Leviathan* regarding King Saul. Pocock explains that although their differences, Harrington's *Oceana* "was rightly to be read as a republican intensification of that of *Leviathan*."[354] Further, Israel as a theocracy did not exhibit revelation through the civil order, nor was it a commonwealth founded by God/Christ on the 'principles of nature.' Instead, "God was king in Israel in the sense that he had proposed laws which made the people a holy nation and a kingdom of priests," making God less king and more legislator.[355]

For perspective, Harrington's *Oceana* was published in 1656 and Hobbes's *Leviathan* in 1651, and Locke's *Two Treatises* in 1689. Therefore, Pocock is not even considering Harrington and Locke within the same realm. Rightly so, as Harrington and Hobbes were more aware of each other, and Harrington engaged with the arguments of *Leviathan* on every point, including the religious perspective on power structures between a republic and a monarchy. Pocock includes Matthew Wren, Arthur Seldon, and Henry Hammond in his discussion on religion and republic. God ruled through the people in a republic precisely because the people ruled

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[352] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 78.

[353] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington*, 78.

[354] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 79.

[355] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 79-80.

themselves. This seems like the weight and implication of free will as God's divine prerogative to bestow upon people and later respect the outcome was more significant than any divine imposition of consequence. Since early church leaders were selected (*chirotonia*) and not ordained in direct succession (*chirothesia*) to the apostles, ordination was indeed a "civil process leading to civil office." Thus "Harrington wanted to equate church with *ecclesia* and depict the true church as the harbinger of the republic…" Indeed, the republic for Harrington was an'*ecclesia* of the people.[356] We will return to this particular section on religion and republic further in this chapter by connecting this work to Pocock's later work on Edward Gibbon and his volumes on Barbarism and Religion.

Hobbes identified with the classical tradition of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and Cicero but believed it had failed in its ultimate civic end of achieving peace and knowing the truth. Ultimately, Hobbes was sympathetic to the Machiavellian idea that the classics failed "because they aimed too high. Because they based their political doctrines on considerations of man's highest aspirations, the life of virtue and the society dedicated to the promotion of virtue, they rendered themselves ineffective…"[357] In effect, Hobbes adopted Machiavellian realism in that he believed in lowering the expectations from idealist virtue and the perfection of humanity to what most people reach for and how for the majority of the time. For Hobbes, natural law was morally binding and could be developed into a standard for political engagement based on passion and not reason as the core source of human motivation.[358] For Hobbes, humanity's

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[356] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington*, 81.

[357] Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy*. (United Kingdom: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 396.

[358] Strauss and Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy,* 397.

motivations lie not in aspirations of the good or desires for intellectual or moral advancement. Instead, we are fueled by fear and appetite, further denying Aristotelian teaching that reason is at our center and that humans are by nature political.[359] Therefore, Hobbesian Naturalism gives rise to the idea that life would be nasty, brutish, and short in an unaltered state of nature.[360] A state of nature that has not been tested globally but found to be present in isolated pockets of temporal political strife such as civil wars in England and America. Thus the social contract best suited to meet the needs of such a fearful and potentially violent society is the sovereign monarch, as opposed to the Church or any democratic experiment. For Hobbes, the social contract is best understood as a two-part design. First as, "a covenant of each member of the future civil body with each of the others to acknowledge as sovereign whatever man or assembly of men a majority of their number agrees upon;" and second, "the vote determining who or what is to be the sovereign." The agreement is always binding and valid insofar as it achieves its end of security.[361]

Concerning religion, God, and sin, as a skeptical theist (the appropriate label for Hobbes' religious affiliation continues to be a contested point among scholars), Hobbes argued that obedience to the hereditary monarch sovereign was supreme. If the rules and laws enacted by the said monarch were sinful, the sin fell on the monarch, who would have to answer to God. However, disobedience to the monarch was sinful and would fall on the subject, "for by disobeying, the subject arrogates to himself the knowledge and judgment of good and evil,

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[359] Strauss and Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy,* 398-99.; Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (United States: West Margin Press, 1651).

[360] Strauss and Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy,* 399, and Hobbes, *Leviathan* 79-80, 103-4.

[361] Strauss and Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy,* 405-06.

conscience and judgment begin really one and the same thing."[362] If the sovereign has the power

to take or preserve the subject's life, then eternal truths of everlasting life or torment are

reflected, and political philosophy and theology are reconciled. They are further exemplified in

the model of the kingdom of God when a monarch and subjects with the social contract act as the

temporal reflection of the divine covenant, enacted by Abraham, Isaac, Moses, and carried

through to the monarch.[363]

Machiavelli provides a navigable path for the individual through the 'virtue of the

legislator' exemplified through the problematic figure of Cromwell, whom Pocock says can be

interchanged with "Nimrod, Romulus, and Moses, Lycurgus, Joshua and Brutus" as a "prince,

legislator, prophet."[364] Pocock puts the matter to rest when the conflicted individual finally

decides to obey the armed prince. Whether he does so from faith in the power structure is

irrelevant, as Pocock asserts that it is the impulse for self-preservation that is most important. It

encompasses all three (cynically, philosophically, or theologically) methods of survival. Further,

the possibility of individual survival was connected with the societal link. According to Pocock,

"To preserve oneself, it was necessary to provide for the preservation of others, and this could

not be done without some system of mutual obligation to an authority whose sovereignty

required it."[365] Though not explicitly a republican paradigm, Pocock did read the connection

between Harrington and Hobbes more clearly through the lens of self-preservation and political

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[362] Strauss and Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy,* 414.

[363] Strauss and Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy,* 416-17

[364] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington*, 31-32.; Joseph Anthony Mazzeo, "Cromwell as Machiavellian Prince in Marvell's 'An Horatian Ode.'" *Journal of the history of ideas* 21, no. 1 (1960): 1–17.

[365] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 32.

prowess. When free citizens can engage in a government of their creation and combine interests that align with their needs and collective goals, as a society, there is no need to supplant their sovereignty for that of a representative's for purposes of self-preservation.

**B. Edward Gibbon and Edmund Burke's Conservatism**

In an exploration similarly constructed as the previous on Harrington and Hobbes, Edward Gibbon as J.G.A. Pocock's final paradigmatic figure is best understood contextually alongside Edmund Burke. Pocock's *Barbarism and Religion* provides a background to Edward Gibbon woven into a larger tapestry of enlightenment historiography. Edward Gibbon (1737-1794) was an eighteenth-century English historian, writer, and member of the British parliament, best known for *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* and his use of primary sources and clear, engaging writing style- making him one of the first modern historians. As an unreligious Deist, Gibbon's *The Decline and Fall,* published between 1777-1788, included nuanced and highly critical reviews of Judeo-Christian organized religion's adverse effects. Christianity in particular, according to Gibbon, was the force behind the majority of great civilization falls, including, of course, Rome. With the Jewish faith, these effects had even applied to Egypt. Of the many faults Gibbon finds in Christianity, the most compelling arguments he makes are those in Chapter XV, where he condemns Christian intolerance of any other religion, and I would add spiritual, viewpoint, or belief system other than their own. By applying Christian doctrines, adherence to dogmatic religious principles outweighed blood, place, or friendship ties. Loyalty moved from a horizontal ligature to a vertical enterprise. Politically, Gibbon joined with Irish politician and philosopher Edmund Burke (1729-1797), best known for his work, *A Philosophical Enquiry*. Gibbon linked himself with Burke in espousing

conservative political views but was inherently distinct concerning religious leanings. Burke's work reflected careful considerations of the concept of virtue and beauty and the passions that stemmed from these motivated lives in society. Pleasure, drawn by sympathy, for Burke, lead to the simplicity of goodness and compassion. In contrast, pain is drawn from the internal recognition of an unknowable and terrible God, which was not necessarily benevolent or unflawed. Burke's ideas on virtue and beauty combined well with Gibbon's interest in political history, given Gibbon's inclination toward Aristotelian foundational concepts and his position as an "unbending Tory conservative in politics."[366] Burke's ideas about human motivation rooted in the sensorial, pleasure and pain and human motivations amidst a not altogether knowable but kind God, draw him together with Hobbes. Together, it is clear why these men are featured in Pocock's work in understanding the idea of a republic.

Burke's life and work reflect an affinity for religion, politics, and philosophy. The elite's education was by duty suited to bring about positive social improvement for the less endowed. Though his work has not received the same attention from scholars as other eighteenth-century political philosophers, he is an intriguing figure to whom Gibbon was particularly intellectually indebted. Burke expressed "hostility to the intrusion of philosophy in politics," especially after observing the unfolding and aftermath of the French Revolution, which he so vehemently opposed for its theoretical base and the violent forms it took under the guise of noble humanitarianism.[367]

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[366] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 108.

[367] Strauss and Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy,* 689-91.

Concerning virtue, Burke says, "There is no qualification for government but virtue and wisdom, actual or presumptive."[368] Presumptive virtue and wisdom is the lesser, probable virtue that can be expected in "well-bred gentlemen of prominent families born into situations of eminence where they are habituated to self-respect; to the 'censorial inspection of the public eye'; to taking a 'large view of the wide-spread and infinitely diversified combinations of men and affairs in a large society; to have the leisure to reflect; to meeting the wise and learned, as well as wealthy traders; to military command; to the caution of an instructor of one's fellow citizens and thus to act as a 'reconciler between God and man'; and to being employed as such an administrator of law and justice."[369] For Burke, religion-namely Christianity, with a particular sympathy for some portions of Catholicism, was the rightful center of politics and civil society.

Pocock also found a shared interest with Burke in language. In *Philosophical Enquiry*, Burke categorized words in three ways: aggregate for simple natural ideas such as bird, person, or the English, simple abstract for concepts such as blue or round, and the abstract compound which combined the first two. Abstract compound words included concepts like justice and virtue, which the human mind could imagine, conceptualized, argued about coherently, and developed into civil law or applied to drive actions. Burke's abstract compound language was meant to shape civil conduct, which civic leaders particularly exercised through public speaking. Burke was intimately familiar with this venue and is probably why he did not feel inclined to

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[368] Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France, and on the Proceedings in*

*Certain Societies in London Relative to that Event: In a Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to a Gentleman in Paris* (United Kingdom: J. Dodsley, 1790), 290.

[369] Strauss and Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy,* 693-694.

write a treatise of law specifically since his main conduit for civil philosophy were public speeches.[370]

While Burke demonstrated tolerance and commonality among Catholics and Protestants, this softer inclination did not extend to the papacy, of which Burke was weary. Most likely, Burke was familiar with John Locke's work, especially *Letter Concerning Toleration*, and acknowledged the greater danger in fermenting rivalries among these religions than in a tolerant coexistence bending to a belief in natural jurisprudence and the natural creation of the political center as the hub of humanity's civic life. According to Burke, in every particular age, "man is made for Speculation and action; and when he pursues his nature, he succeeds best in both," limited by the peculiarities and collective manners of his time.[371] In any case, Burke did not feel inclined to clarify or explicate his views on Christian theological doctrine. In *A Vindication of Natural Society,* he clarified that Christianity's most critical consequence is its shaping of morality, which is essential to a thriving civil society. Aside from the particular theological squabbles, a standardized and thus a state-imposed Christian public was more successful for an essentially republican approach to politics.[372] Within Pocock's contextualization of Edward Gibbon, a solid understanding of Burkean philosophy is necessary for structure and balance. Edward Gibbon is perhaps best understood, especially initially within relation to Edmund Burke and given the consistent interdisciplinary nature of Pocock's work. Burke provides an excellent

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[370] Dixon Wecter, "Burke's Theory Concerning Words, Images, and Emotion." *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* (1940): 167-181.

[371] H.V.F. Somerset, *A Notebook of Edmund Burke* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 87.

[372] Ian Harris, "Edmund Burke", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

foundation for understanding the context explored by Pocock in the history of ideas as politics and religion were so central to Pocock's work on Gibbon.

## II. Pocock's Gibbon and the structure of the Western Enlightenment

The overall intention of Pocock's seminal work on Gibbon is to perform a careful methodological contextualization of Edward Gibbon through his reading of Gibbon's *Decline and Fall.*[373] My method for this section on engaging with Pocock's work on Edward Gibbon is twofold. First, I will be adopting Pocock's methodology of tenacious listening by closely reading selected portions of *Barbarism and Religion*, which add to this dissertation's overall intent, especially sections found in volumes 1, 2, 3, and 6. Second, I am incorporating the work of the respected British historian Jonathan Israel. I have selected Jonathan Israel for three main reasons. First, the scope of his work on the Enlightenment has a wide breadth of range and dimension. Second, his methodology is thoughtfully crafted, and his language concise and engaging. Third, Israel analyzes Pocock intentionally. His insights on Pocock's work offer an interesting counterbalance to the themes and particulars of the portions of Enlightenment thought and figures relevant to *Barbarism and Religion*. I intend to present a coherent description of Pocock's work on Gibbon in *Barbarism and Religion* by reading Pocock closely and weaving in the recent scholarly conversation on the Enlightenment by blending my reflections on Pocock and Jonathan Israel.

Within *Barbarism and Religion,* Pocock rejects notions that the political and philosophical manifestations within what can geographically and temporally be called Western Enlightenment can be joined together to constitute one intellectual movement. According to

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[373] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion*, *Volume 1,* 10.

Israel, Pocock's six volumes on Gibbon understood the Western Enlightenment as taking "too many forms to be comprised within a single definition and history, and that we do better to think of a family of enlightenments, displaying both family resemblances and family quarrels (some of them bitter and even bloody)."[374] This is in direct opposition to the position of Franco Venturi (1914-94), to whom Pocock dedicates *Barbarism and Religion,* and reveres citing him "as a lasting and formative influence on his own thinking,"[375] According to Jonathan Israel, "If his [Venturi] enlightenment thesis has a primary target, it is the concept of 'the Enlightenment as a unified phenomenon with a single history and definition." Of course, Pocock opposed such an approach. He is committed to understanding the universal within the context of the particular. Pocock also disagrees with Venturi in trying to commandeer Gibbon as the English philosophe, a concept that will be explored later in this chapter. Pocock finds significant fault in this idea since it would be better to decentralize the Enlightenment from Parisian thought altogether.[376] By taking a broad view and watching how these parts move and interact with each other in his study of the universal, Pocock never loses sight of the particular and applies a consistent contextualization methodology to his subjects. By this time in his career, Pocock wears the practice of tenacious listening as an expertly refined second skin.

For Venturi, the Church of England was "half apostolic and half Erastian" and at the same time "half Catholic and half Calvinist," so that the later restructuring of Calvinist thinkers into Arminian Remonstrants meant the continued support for the "sacred monarchy" and the

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[374] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 107.

[375] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 107.

[376] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 108.

"imperial power in a sacred and apostolic church…."[377] Pocock reflects on Venturi's claims and their implications for the origins of the English Civil War. He grapples with these ideas and argues that "Nowhere else in Protestant Europe was the Arminian movement within Calvinism so visibly associated with a return to Catholic though not Roman ecclesiology, and a baroque ritualism within Protestantism itself, and the politics of this paradox were to reinforce the deep confusions which characterized if they did not cause the civil war in England."[378] The high clergymen Pocock refers to, and the Enlightenment thought brought forth in the wake of early Church tensions, seem so preoccupied with the rigid doctrines of human salvation that the universalist ideas of truth, beauty, and goodness are reduced to one dogmatic truth, prescribed beauty and ordained goodness. The particulars of Spirit had been reduced to 'The Church.' Israel engages with Pocock's view that scholars erroneously apply the terms "Enlightenment" and "Modernity" to their corresponding eras bases on historical interpretation and adoption, not based on their use in the centuries we describe them as. While posterity may use certain terms, the original historical actors did not use those terms for themselves. Israel takes issue because "enlightenment" was used through the term "*Aufklarung,* and "secondly, even if terms like 'the enlightenment' and 'Luimieres' were generally later constructs, equivalent expressions such as 'this enlightened age' were frequently employed in various languages from the late seventeenth century to the early nineteenth, even if the English may have been more reluctant than others to adopt the notion that a whole new way of seeing things had dawned. The fact that the terms 'the Enlightenment,' 'Lumieres,' or 'Illuminismo' were indeed later constructions does not therefore

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[377] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 53.

[378] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 53.

necessarily mean that the eighteenth-century lacked a highly developed notion of 'the Enlightenment as a common transatlantic phenomenon that in some sense made the world anew."[379] Israel also agrees with Pocock that "Edmund Burke represented 'one kind of Enlightenment in conflict with another…"[380] If there were any true "English Enlightenment," it was primarily Gibbon and Burke and their moderate conservatism, though they did not exist in a vacuum and links to the Scottish Enlightenment with Hume's skepticism views of other aspects of historical thought. Concerning *philosophes,* or "self-appointed, secular intellectuals offering wide-ranging criticism of society and ambitious programs of reform…" Israel agrees with Pocock that there was undoubtedly an English Enlightenment.[381]

## A. A Regional Approach

There are two central issues at the heart of Pocock's six-volume work on Edward Gibbon. From my reading, the two issues are first, how The Enlightenment and its various expressions should be understood by intellectual historians, and second what role religion played throughout these expressions. For the first volume, the central question is did Pocock's fragmentation of Enlightenment thought according to time, place, and language properly restructure Western Enlightenment movements.[382] I contend that the answer is both yes and no. Pocock's fragmentary nature for approaching various factions of the Enlightenment is helpful in understanding the nuances of each strand. It is a careful approach, ever respectful to distinct dynamics and sensitive

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[379] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 109.

[380] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 109.; Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 5-7.

[381] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 110

[382] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 2-7.

to the gradations of thought within Enlightenment thought based on place, language, and time. However, adhering to Pocock's fragmented approach entirely, without recognizing that there is merit in the overall product of change brought forth by "The Enlightenment" across Western Europe, America, and extending out into other countries and civilizations who interacted with places where Enlightenments were taking place, misses the overall point. For scholars today, the idea that there was a single cohesive Enlightenment is considered absurd.[383] Nevertheless, I argue that there was a Western Enlightenment, but it is best understood by beginning with the pieces, or families, as Pocock puts it; only then can the whole be appreciated.

Pocock demonstrates the reasonableness of this approach throughout *Barbarism and Religion*, and historians have since, for the most part, adopted and agreed with this understanding. Just one year after the publication of *Barbarism and Religion,* Roy Porter's *Enlightenment* (2000) praised Pocock's distinction of the English Enlightenment. However, Porter went further than Pocock in holding that the English Enlightenment was superior to others as it began on a more modern footing. What Israel's work asks is "whether Pocock too readily supposes that Gibbon's many and deep affinities with Hume and Burke do actually support his 'pluralizing Enlightenment into a number of movements in both harmony and conflict with each other' and whether his often brilliant insights into Gibbon's performance do lend support to his overriding conclusion that there were many different enlightenments, some national in character, others, like the 'Arminian Enlightenment,' theological and international."[384]

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[383] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 6.

[384] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 111.

Israel found Pocock's interpretation of aristocracy in the Scottish Enlightenment compelling as it influenced "the British constitution, modern manners, and liberty," as Burke understood it. Israel argues, "Even Adam Smith's vision of modern commercial society had a much more pronounced aristocratic bent than many admirers today are apt to admit. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 was an essentially aristocratic revolution that consolidated the 'mixed government' system and the aristocratic character of the British state and empire."[385] In *Barbarism and Religion,* Pocock demonstrates how this aristocratic bend to Enlightenment philosophy was distributed among Scottish, English, French, and American variations.[386] Instead of a continuous and holistic interpretation of The Enlightenment, Israel translates Pocock's way of understanding the interrelated but compartmentalized European Enlightenments. He says, "In his characteristic manner, Pocock designates 'Enlightenment' without the definite article in two ways: first as the emergence of a system of states, 'founded in civil and commercial society and culture, enabling Europe to escape from the wars of religion without falling under the hegemony of a single monarchy; second, as a series of programmes for reducing the power of either churches or congregations to disturb the peace of civil society by challenging its authority.'"[387] The struggle then is how to reconcile the different Enlightenments without linking them as one movement.

By adopting Pocock's argument on continental Enlightenment historiography, the European, British, and American perspectives are inter-connected and individually substantial.

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[385] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 113.

[386] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 3,* 414.

[387] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 114.' Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 7.

This is the center point and purpose of the entire six volumes of Pocock's *Barbarism and Religion.* The methodology employed in reaching this center point is through tenacious listening and contextualization of Gibbon's work in the *Decline and Fall* with the lasting purpose of better understanding the idea of a republic. Thus, while Enlightenment movements pushed back against organized religion, and especially Christianity, throughout their scopes, they did so in particular ways unique to their location and the culture of the place and people. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* was extraordinary in its effort to reconstruct Rome's history. Pocock spent years of his mature work pouring into to carefully conduct an exploration of Edward Gibbon worthy of Gibbon's efforts on Rome. In *Barbarism and Religion*, Pocock offers so much more than a biography of Edward Gibbon and a textual analysis of his work. He has accomplished a grand study that, I argue in agreement with Arthur Williamson, "seeks nothing less than to reconfigure the Enlightenment and to reassess the origins and meanings of modernity."[388] Providing the counter-piece to his work on James Harrington and the civic tradition, Pocock rediscovers Gibbon for posterity and contextualizes his efforts in relation, as we have explored to the conservative ideology of Edmund Burke, the royalism of Robert Brady.

**B. The Religious Component**

It follows that religion fared differently in the various Enlightenment expressions. Pocock says, "Since Enlightenment cannot be understood detached from theology, it sometimes appears—even in its most viciously anti-Christian expressions—as a tissue of theological statements; and this may help explain the character of the *Decline and Fall* as a great enlightened

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[388] Arthur, Williamson, "Barbarism and Religion, Volume I: The Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon and Barbarism and Religion, Volume II: Narratives of Civil Government. (Review Article: Edward Gibbon, Edmund Burke, and John Pocock: The Appeals of Whigs Old and New)." *Canadian Journal of History.* (University of Toronto Press, 2001), 518.

history of Christian theology."[389] Added to the list of theological Enlightenments or perspectives beginning with Catholic, Anglican, Calvinist, and Lutheran are the Jewish, Greek Orthodox, and Russian Orthodox Enlightenments. Israel provides a lucid review of Pocock's treatment of these distinct theological Enlightenments by saying that "Much of the force and cogency of *Barbarism and Religion* lies precisely in its success in showing how several of these diverse currents converged, coexisted, or rivaled each other in the life, thought, and writing of Gibbon, who complicated matters by combining his powerful religious skepticism with 'regular periods of church attendance during his adult life and even possibly a streak of 'secret fideism.'"[390] Pocock accomplishes these scholarly feats by illuminating Gibbon's roots and searching among Gibbon's personal intellectual history to reveal Western European roots in England and the Netherlands. These reacted against strict Calvinism to pursue a more tolerant approach to history and theology, as a significant portion of Enlightenment thought was religious debate.[391] For example, Pocock spends considerable time exploring the Arminian Enlightenment and isolates Jean Le Clerc (1657-1737) as the paradigmatic figure for its exploration. Arminian Enlightenment refers to the derision of Protestant Calvinism called Arminianism, named after the Dutch Reformed theologian Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609), Theodore Beza student, and Calvin's successor. His supporters, the Remonstrants, held that while Calvin made essential strides in understanding Protestant theology, particular teachings needed to be reconsidered.

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[389] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 2,* 7.

[390] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 115.

[391] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 5.

Arminius' successors created the Remonstrance in rejection of Calvinist teachings that centered on five points. First is the subject of the degree of human depravity. Calvinism holds that humanity is essentially separated from God and cannot connect with the divine post the original sin committed in Eden. Arminianism counters that while this is true regarding humanity, God's grace provides a bridge for humanity to choose God and a path to reconciliation. Second is the election of those chosen for or by God. Calvinism holds that God has predestined those who are to be saved for salvation through grace, subject to his sovereign will alone. Arminianism counters that while predestination is correct as an ultimate end, the path to it is through humanity's choice to accept God. God uses foreknowledge to provide grace to those who would eventually choose him of their own volition. The third is the ultimate sacrifice of Jesus Christ. Calvinism holds that Christ atoned for the sins of all and made effective the acceptance of the predestined. Arminianism counters that Christ's atonement's effectiveness is predicated on an individual's faith and acceptance of the savior. Christ's sacrifice and atonement do not cover those who do not accept by faith. Fourth is on the subject of grace. Calvinism holds that God's grace overcomes any resistance put forth by the rebellious chosen. Arminianism counters that as humans are endowed with free will, grace must be accepted and can be rejected. Lastly, the fifth point of contention is perseverance. Calvinism holds that the chosen will persevere in their faith until the end of their earthly lives through God. Arminianism counters that salvation and grace can be lost through rebellion and humanity's turning away from God.[392]

Jonathan Israel joins Pocock in focusing on Jean Le Clerc, the Genevan theologian. Pocock's work on Le Clerc was in many ways stunted as he was unable to engage with any

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[392] Ashley Evans, "What is Arminianism theology? (5 points of Arminianism explained)."

recent scholarship past 1938. While intellectual historians focus on individual thinkers and groups of individual thinkers, I argue that Pocock presents a distinct and particular way of practicing intellectual history through paradigmatic individuals as his center point to radiate from contextually. This speaks to Pocock's lasting legacy for history in the realm of humanities and the history of ideas, as a neutral historian who practiced tenacious listening to understand historical actors and events in their context by way of paradigmatic individuals central to the time. Pocock parallels Jean Le Clerc's journey with Arminians with Gibbon's journey with the Athanasian Creed, where the equality of the parts in the Christian trinity is proclaimed, and the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England.[393] Here Le Clerc's path crosses Locke's while fleeing the English King to the Netherlands. Between the possibility for the incitement of rebellion through the manuscript for *Treatise on Government,* his dealings with the Whigs, sharp critique of Trinitarian and Socinian doctrines, Pocock identifies these Amsterdam years as a turning point for Locke. Near Le Clerc, Locke would write his *Essay on Human Understanding* and take place among the leaders of what Pocock calls the European Enlightenment- alongside the Protestant Enlightenment.[394]

Le Clerc, known for challenging Calvinism and advancing biblical exegesis, was isolated by Pocock as the figure for the Arminian Enlightenment narrative through his *arscritica.* Le Clerc's theological philology helped forge a new path for critical thought to occur and be taken seriously in all areas of the humanist tradition. Through his foundations in Grotius, Le Clerc's critical analysis of accepted theological dogma opened the doors for subversive biblical

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[393] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 55.

[394] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 56-57.

interpretations and other Enlightenment tools that challenged society's religious strongholds. Though, in hindsight, Pocock's claim of a distinct Arminian Enlightenment is not sufficiently compelling.[395] According to Israel, "The 'Arminian Enlightenment' figures prominently in Pocock's claim that the Enlightenment is irreducible to a single process or entity to be termed 'the Enlightenment,' and also in his critique, partly a continuation of his debate with Venturi, of John Robertson's definition of the Enlightenment in his *Case for the Enlightenment* (2005)."[396] Pocock's sixth volume, *Triumph in the West,* focuses on Gibbon's work on Christianity and the tensions it created for the Roman Empire in the fourth century. Volume six especially exemplifies Pocock's arguments amounting to the revelation that the various religious viewpoints battling for rightness had more in common than they were prepared to recognize or willing to admit.[397]

Lastly, while modern scholars have grappled with the arguments for a united Enlightenment espoused by Venturi and the idea of families of the Enlightenment presented by Pocock, I argue a united Western Enlightenment existed. However, it cannot be understood without the tenacious listening demonstrated in Pocock's work. The tension here lies within the juxtaposition that there either was or was not a Western Enlightenment philosophically bound together. Israel advocates for a single narrative, while Pocock's approach is by nature more nuanced. I argue that Pocock's methodology and approach to intellectual history result in an interpretation of the Enlightenment, which is both vague and diffuse, as Israel argues it is. Still, I

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[395] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 117-118.

[396] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 118.

[397] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 6,* 162.

counter that the nuanced approach to Enlightenment classification is the quintessential expression of tenacious listening as a methodology. Listening this intently gives scholars, in this case, Pocock, a view of history that is expansive and interwoven while staying close to the ground the paradigmatic individual inhabited. I do not argue that his approach led to a different conclusion than the one he gives. Instead, I argue that perhaps the question is misguided at its inception and would have a different treatment by and focus for historians if tenacious listening were practiced more and lines between schools and approaches were blurred in favor of a more holistic and cooperative approach. This does not present a path for reconciliation between the two concepts, just a simple reconsideration of the starting point and methods so firmly adhered to. Nevertheless, it is interesting that so much of Gibbon, as Pocock's figure for the English Enlightenment, was steeped in the work of William Robertson, David Hume, and the Scottish Enlightenment.

## C. Enlightenment Considerations

We next turn our attention to what the primary considerations were which preoccupied Enlightenment figures the most. According to Jonathan Israel, the two main streams of Enlightenment conscience were intellectual-scientific and socio-cultural. For Israel, this meant that regional manifestations of Enlightenment thought concerned themselves with the dismantling of long-held "scientific, theological, and philosophical premises," including heliocentrism, skepticism, and the tension between religion and reason.[398] Yet, for Pocock, Enlightenment considerations were first, the system of civil states free of oppressive monarchy and religion, and second a challenge to religious control and authority.

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[398] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 8.

First, concerning civil rights and liberties, there is the problem of property. As established, Harrington is primarily understood by historians through his doctrine of property as the foundation of political power. Unfortunately, it may be taken for granted in this statement that Harrington was essential in linking political theory with economic history and principles, regardless of the balance between land ownership and trade. Pocock elucidates that it is not precisely ignorance but disinterest that lessens Harrington's understanding of the relationship between the political and the economic. Others took the lead in this regard. He argues, "But it needs to be further emphasized that Harrington is not looking, even in the most primitive manner, at the economic society of his day and concluding that land is the most important factor in the economic determination of power. He is not doing this because he has no conception whatever that there exists a complex web of economic determination of power. He is not doing this because he has no conception whatever that there exists a complex web of economic relationships between men which can be studied in itself and which determines the distribution of power among them."[399]

For the Machiavellian Harrington, the soldier must live on land owned by freeholders and not individuals as Lords. They are not required to fight and be pledged to one person but can instead be freemen themselves act as citizen soldiers. This point, in summation, presents the central idea of Harrington's that a man's livelihood is dependent on that is what he will defend politically. Pocock understands and clearly accepts the limitations of Harrington and thus

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[399] Pocock, "The concept of a language and the métier d'historien," 128.; Richard Henry Tawney, *Harrington's Interpretation of his Age* (1941), 221-2.

elevates his political theories in measured ways. For example, he asserts that it is essential to understand that Harrington's limited knowledge of economic society or economic history creates a natural truncating effect in his political philosophy and should be understood as such by historians.[400] Pocock charges that scholars such as John Acton and George Sabine "made the mistake of assuming that Harrington knew there existed a sphere of economics apart from the sphere of politics and influencing it."[401] Pocock demonstrates impatience with any scholarly interpretation that does not employ tenacious listening to historical actors and instead imposes modernity on the past.

According to Pocock, Harrington's claim as an original political thinker lies in examining the political structure of the particular time he lived. In doing so, a system of ideas concerning the constitutional and the feudally dependent is presented. Harrington's political thought deals primarily with the "transference of land in the hands of the gentry and a consequent rise of the gentry to political power."[402] Therefore, while Pocock sees Harrington as "an interpreter of his age," he does not burden Harrington with the foresight of separating the economic from the political in any modern sense. Nor does it represent a collective understanding of time immemorial and the ancient constitution, as described in chapter 3 of this study, where property determined power. In real terms, Pocock explains the method he utilizes to understand Harrington's interpretation and his proper legacy in the history of political thought contextually.

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[400] J.G.A. Pocock, "Interregnum: The Oceana of James Harrington." In The *Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law*, 124–147 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987),129.

[401] Pocock, "Interregnum: The Oceana of James Harrington," 129.

[402] Pocock, "Interregnum: The Oceana of James Harrington," 130.

Eighteenth-century property ownership was not limited to land but turned as a growth mechanism for commodities and debts, which engendered an entirely new debt to wealth ratios and the promise of more economic possibility neo-Harringtonian viewpoint opposed. Pocock asserts that "Harrington's enduring legacy turns out to be his portrait of the proprietor of land autonomous in his defence and government- the union of 'ballots and bullets, arms and counsels'- and his passing observation that political autonomy rooted in mobile property is open to the reproach 'lightly come, lightly go' has been enlarged into a full antithesis."[403] The values of civic humanism in English political thought have become entrenched and intertwined with the Harringtonian idea that commercialism goes hand in hand with corruption as it departs from independent persons' pure land ownership.

Further, the Harringtonian paradigm that a mixed constitution with a distinct executive under the doctrine of separation of powers was the precursor to the American Revolution and the later creation of the United States Constitution. Pocock argues that ideas of "virtue and corruption," which so shaped English political thought, "struck deeper and more permanent roots" in the fresh and the new American experiment.[404] According to Pocock, "the root idea was Harrington's, in the sense that it was he who had first stated in English terms the theses that only the armed freeholder was capable of independence and virtue, and that such a proprietor required a republic in which to be independent and virtuous."[405] Pocock again takes issue with the canonized Locke and the Lockean myth in American political thought by attempting to mitigate

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[403] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 139

[404] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 144.

[405] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 145.

the true reach of Locke's hand in the argument about land, property, and citizenship. He says, "It can be argued that this perception of a historical change in the political function of property is more important than anything Locke had to say on the subject; or rather, what Locke did say has to be fitted into the context which this perception provides."[406]

While it is not necessary to trace the thread of Harrington's work on American republicanism, as H.F. Russell Smith did well in *Harrington and His Oceana (1914),* there remain areas of American political thought in which revisiting Harrington's influence would be well served. The first, and perhaps even more pressing today than when Pocock wrote his introduction to Harrington's *Oceana,* is Harrington's religious dimension. The following passage reveals the nature of Harrington's influence on American quasi-religious thought within the early republic's political structure.

"It has been sufficiently established that, both before the Revolution and in and after the making of the Constitution, the American mind displayed a deep, a quasi-religious and at times a paranoiac commitment to the ideal of virtue, perpetually threatened by corruption and capable-it was ultimately admitted-of being permanently institutionalised only in a republic, and (there was reason to fear) not even then. A neo-classical and civic humanist understanding of politics became surprisingly widely distributed in the minds of Americans and helped to produce both the neurotic fear that a corrupt Britain was plotting to reduce them to dependence, and the astonishing confidence and subtlety with which the Founding Fathers handled the paradigms of republican political science."[407]

The Whig preoccupation with the State of Israel and the American Puritan focus transformed Christian liberty into 'civil and religious liberty, linking America's freely elected leadership with Biblical Israel's promise. Harrington's view on religious freedom in an armed and secure republic

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[406] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 145.

[407] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 147.

likely influenced the later Ezra Stiles in his assertion that "the United States constituted a new Israel in which the ideas of Harrington's *Oceana* were perfectly realised."[408] The elites in the American colonies played the part of a natural aristocracy in place of an inherited aristocratic/noble class. However, their place in American culture ultimately failed, as seen in *Federalist 10,* where Madison subtly moves away from the political elite in favor of the populace's ideals.[409] Though Jefferson praised the man of agriculture as the chosen people of God in *Notes on Virginia,* Pocock argues that farming dwindled the exalted figure in the popular American mind was, "the self-made entrepreneur."[410]

Second was the problem of religion. Those who participated in regional Enlightenments were not all secular atheists. Instead, they were of diverse religious practices but resisted ideas of a divine spirit controlling secular and civil doings, such as Spinoza (1632-1677) and other Enlightenment thinkers.[411] In reflecting on eighteenth-century England and the various expressions of the Enlightenment in Europe, Pocock needed to, as has been presented, grapple with Thomas Hobbes's sovereign state, James Harrington's political citizen, and the meanings both drew Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract.* Since the English criticized but did not break with Christianity, Pocock's research naturally led him to Edward Gibbon, "For here was a major thinker at once distinctly conservative and yet unarguably enlightened."[412]

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[408] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 148.

[409] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 149.

[410] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 151.

[411] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1.* 7-8.

[412] Williamson, "Barbarism and Religion, Volume I," 517-18.

Among these Enlightenment considerations was also the world of the *Encyclopedie,* which Pocock does not delve as deeply into as scholars may have preferred. However, he did exert effort on exploring *philosophe* natural philosophy. Throughout the various Enlightenment expressions, philosophes were foundational components and primarily among the Francophone varieties so important to Gibbon's formation. Through Pocock's work on Gibbon, the *philosophe* rejection of divine revelation is clarified. According to Williamson, for *philosophes, "*particular knowledge like particular privilege was unpersuasive and destructive: whether individual revelation and enthusiastic personal liberty (Protestantism), or institutional revelation and repression (Catholicism), or ethnic revelation and identity (Judaism). Yet, at the same time, there could be no complete rationality, no final answers, no *esprit de systeme.* The criterion of truth, therefore, shifted in decisive ways: humanity became an essential category not only for political or moral reasons but also for epistemological ones. In this way, the republic of letters could devolve into the democratic republic."[413]

**C. Gibbon's Enlightenment and the Problem of Fragmentation**

In *Barbarism and Religion Volumes 1 and 3,* Pocock refers explicitly to the various enlightenments of Edward Gibbon, referring to the Enlightenment influences present in Gibbon's thought and personal past. He identifies English, Arminian, Francophone Protestant, Parisian and Scottish Enlightenments in Gibbon's work "consisting of discourses highly distinct from, though interacting with, one another."[414] According to Pocock, Gibbon saw himself as a citizen of The Enlightenment, which cannot be thought of as a "unified and universal intellectual movement."

[413] Williamson, "Barbarism and Religion, Volume I," 521.

[414] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 3,* 325.

These contexts included patterns of discourse that were humanist, philosophical, judicial, theological, and controversial.[415] Venturi Franco saw Gibbon as English but divided internally and isolated. Pocock countered that intellectually Gibbon entertained Francophone ideas and sympathies. However, he was English and even participated in concrete ways in the English political system and would have adopted *philosophe* tendencies. Here Pocock loosely defines *philosophes* as secular commentators.[416] Pocock argues that Gibbon is not a philosophe in exile. He is a Burkean Enlightenment scholar, as explored in the previous section on Edmund Burke.[417] Gibbon, greatly influenced by the Protestant Enlightenment, approached his Enlightenment thought rooted in the tensions between Calvinism and Catholicism in Early Modern England.

It is important to remember that our subject, Pocock's work on Gibbon in *Barbarism and Religion,* had its methodological focus on Gibbon's *Decline and Fall,* primarily as a history of the tensions and theological concerns, the trinity, and incarnation among Stuart and post-Stuart England. Ideas about the nature and presence of Spirit were "crucial" to English Enlightenment philosophy, and indeed for Gibbon in the *Decline and Fall.* 'High Churchmen' saw the monarch or ruling powers as Godly, set forth by divine intent but not especially endowed with spiritual gifts as Priests were. They were mostly aligned with Aquinas, Erasmus, and Hooker. However, they were "equally responsive to Cambridge Platonism, which considered a divinely implanted reason the proper antidote to self-deluded enthusiasm, and to the Baconianism found with other

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[415] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 13.

[416] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1*, 6.

[417] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 7.

positions in the Royal Society, which while sharply critical of Platonism as itself enthusiastic, was working its way towards a view of God as creating matter and giving it laws, while remaining distinct from and in no way immanent in it."[418] Thus, Pocock was not writing on Rome, but on the 18th-century culture through Gibbon, and not on the Enlightenment (in any specific expression) but the 18th-century philosophical considerations that preoccupied Gibbon as his subject as he believes there was more to the *Decline and Fall* left to explore.[419] Whether they were Socinian, Unitarian, or Deists (Pocock is not clear on particular labels), men who did not publicly renounce religious, social order were certainly non-Trinitarians such as Locke and Newton, were part of the festering issues with civil government and the Church of England. The effect was that "There came to be an explicit if only an occasional, association between strong support of the Revolution and Hanoverian succession, an ecclesiology which reduced the Church of England to a civil association, an epistemology which reduced the knowledge of God to the holding of opinions, and a theology which reduced Christ to something less than a co-equal and co-eternal person of the Trinity."[420] Young Gibbon was rooted in the historical debate on dogmatic religious affiliation. *Decline and Fall* was Gibbon's exploration of his ancestral Church past by studying papalists and Episcopalians, though Pocock believes this may have been hard for Gibbon to reckon with.[421]

Pocock takes pains to properly trace Gibbon's claims on his early readings as a youth as early as 14 and how the old text on Byzantine, Roman, and Islamic history made such an

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[418] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 22-25.

[419] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 1.

[420] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 27.

[421] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 35.

impression on him that they would last him through to the *Decline and Fall*. Though the Islamic portion remained underdeveloped for quite some time, Gibbon mostly left out the Latin Middle Ages, which Pocock recognizes as a problem, extending later to his Enlightened Historiography. Writing an exclusively Roman history from Caesar to Caesar made sense and was done by others but was problematic.[422] Gibbon's intellectual gap on Islamic foundations would later be filled in by "the father of Oxford Arabism," the English biblical and Asian scholar Edward Pococke (1604-1691). Pococke was educated in Oxford and was ordained as a Priest for the Church of England. Among Pococke's scholarly interests were Maimonides' work and the spread of Christianity to the East, for which cause he translated an Arabic translation of Hugo Grotius's *De Veritate* in 1660. Pococke was a vital component of Gibbon's understanding of Islamic *falsafa*. According to J.G.A. Pocock, "…the point is that if there could be Muslim philosophers, Islam was less a blasphemy than heresy, and might be accessible to Christian reason—whatever might be the effects of this upon Christian doctrine and belief. The way was now open for the inexhaustible curiosity of humanists, philologists, and other erudites to begin the exploration of Muslim as well as Jewish and Christian Arab texts, language and history."[423] Pocock's nuanced approach to understanding and contextualizing Gibbon's work comprises these types of layered philosophical consequences. It helps to clarify the interlacing of the various regional/national Enlightenments, for which he argues. This is especially true concerning Gibbon and his tensions with the Church of England and later religion as a pillar of the Western Enlightenment.

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[422] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 32-38.

[423] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 42.

The fault lines between Gibbon and Oxford were laid not so much on Jacobite understandings of ecclesiastical history but on the breaking point of how to understand "the history of the Church of Christ" properly. Gibbon "blames Oxford for driving him away from the Church of England, and does not thank it because he never returned in spirit to that communion," through in part, to the repudiation of miracles in the church post apostles.[424] Pocock spends significant time on early English church history to provide the first context in exploring Gibbon's work. To understand the mature historian's preoccupation with religion and the personal lack thereof, one must first understand Gibbon's England through the religious subscriber's eyes.[425] Moving from Gibbon's early life, Pocock explores how a disheartened adolescent Gibbon arrived at Lausanne, a converted Catholic, in response to the Protestant Enlightenment and the schisms of Calvinism. According to Pocock, "The religious tensions inherent in English culture had brought him [Gibbon] to Catholic conversion and exile to the Pays de Vaud; those inherent in Swiss Calvinist culture were to restore him to Protestantism but in the end to skepticism, and to intensify his involvement in the clerical erudition that underlay all religious debate, taking him in directions which we can recognize as those of Enlightenment, but of a Protestant Enlightenment active in all the Calvinist or partly Calvinist cultures of western Europe."[426] Gibbon (like Pocock) had split nationality and viewpoints. This link between subject and historian helps readers of Pocock's work to understand more deeply the references Pocock makes to place and time, especially in his valedictorian speech for Johns Hopkins University, "The Owl Reviews His

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[424] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 43-44.

[425] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 48.

[426] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 50.

Feathers." There he elucidates on the idea that the underlying current of displacement and the exilic narrative persists in most deep writing that is of any consequence to the human condition.[427] There is notable significance in Gibbon having been a natural-born Englishman and later an almost natural French speaker in what Pocock refers to as "Protestant France."[428]

We see the importance of place and displacement called forth again and again in Pocock and Gibbon, as we can also see in the life and work of Hannah Arendt, Eric Voegelin, and so many other émigré scholars and exilic political artists. The concepts of place and rootedness are common themes within the exilic narrative, and Pocock's work demonstrates sensitivity to this. Intellectual historians such as Bernard Bailyn, Quentin Skinner, J.G.A. Pocock and many others exemplify this well when they are open to the interdisciplinary nature of history and the history of ideas by remembering Aristotle and the idea that our humanity is political; all writing expresses the tensions within the human experience in the polis. The American founders were cognizant of the classical idea of a republic and created a federalist structure, which was, I argue, intended to be a macrocosm of the Just city. The foundational ideas of Machiavelli and Harrington are never quite far enough to be irrelevant to any worthwhile endeavor to understand the idea of a republic, as demonstrated by Pocock. American Christian author Wendell Berry's (1934-present) work is a modern exploration of the concepts of American rootedness and place Pocock brings forth in his study on Gibbon, as is American Calvinist novelist Marilynne Robinson (1943-present) on the inherent loneliness of our American condition. Through the work of these latter two authors, careful readers can feel the reverberations from Pocock's work

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[427] Pocock, *J.G.A. Pocock's Valedictory Lecture.*

[428] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 51.

on context, language, time, and place common to his historical moment in contemporary

explorations of place in literature and the American consciousness.

**D. Scholarly Reconciliation**

Therefore *Barbarism and Religion* serves as the subsequent narrative to *The

Machiavellian Moment, which* served to move Pocock's focus on the paradigmatic individual

from Harrington to Gibbon. Considering Gibbon's religious perspective, Pocock also begins to

sift through his origins as a historian as a lifelong vocation. It seems Gibbon would have

posterity take his word for it through *Memoirs* but Pocock counters that *Memoirs* was more an

attempt by an aged man to make a history of his past and was thus less grounded in evidence

than it ought to be taken as such.[429] Thus Gibbon's reality was consequentially and necessarily

different from other Enlightenment thinkers whose contextual experience was influenced by a

distinct linguistic and religious perspective, lending credence to Pocock's approach to individual

national Enlightenments.[430]

However, Israel argues that this portion of Pocock's argument is better suited to "support

the alternative and still broader view of an everywhere applicable and secularizing dual schema

of dialectically opposed competing Enlightenment tendencies characteristic of the entire Western

Enlightenment."[431] I would contend that it is more consistent with the idea of a Western

Enlightenment with regional variations. I do not believe that there was or that Pocock argued for

a "distinctly English Arminian Enlightenment" as Israel suggests, and does not align with my

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[429] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 28.

[430] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 8.

[431] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 122-23.

reading of Pocock's work on Gibbon. In contrast between Israel's interpretation and my approach to Pocock, it is interesting to note that Israel seems to be asking whether Locke, Toland, Blount, Price, Priestley, Paine, and Benthan could be reconciled enough to even consider English Enlightenment a proper categorization together of them.[432] While Israel does not think it possible, I argue that he is missing the nuances of Pocock's approach by forcing a dichotomy that does not serve intellectual historians.

"Democratic radicals," as Israel calls the British Benthan, Jebb, Price, Priestley, Paine, Cooper, Godwin, and the Americans Franklin, Jefferson, Young, and Barlow, among others, which among them included Unitarian and deist perspectives and were typical of the Western Enlightenment. However, Israel contends that Pocock was mistaken in identifying these as characteristics of an essential English Enlightenment at odds with Hume, Burke, and Gibbon's conservative voices.[433] Israel takes issue with how Pocock's work constructs a theory of plural Enlightenments and charges that he virtually ignores German or Dutch Enlightenments. To this point, I would add that I have often wondered how there can be no mention whatsoever of any Spanish Enlightenment in Pocock's work. I must agree with Israel that Pocock holds the whole of Western Enlightenment in the credit of Anglo-French thinkers, which is quite the intellectual burden to carry. Israel argues that these "divergent tendencies" are actually

"part of a single ongoing debate and a single Enlightenment continuum, along with the profoundly and abidingly divided French, American, British, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, and other national 'Enlightenments.' In the end, the 'family of enlightenments' idea simply disintegrates and proves to be unworkable….Arguably, what Pocock achieved with his concept of a family of enlightenments was unwittingly to prove the correctness of the view postulating two competing

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[432] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 123.

[433] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 123-24.

kinds of Enlightenment and the utter unviability of an approach stressing distinct national and ecclesiastical contexts."[434]

Nevertheless, some scholars endorse Pocock's diversity of enlightenments, including Porter, Himmelfarb, and Pagden. While all Enlightenments were revolutionary intellectual movements advocating for civil change and the procurement of civil liberties in the republic, there were essentially two camps they were can be grouped. The first were Enlightenments which believed the *ancien regime* had been modified, and the tremendous cataclysmic change had already come with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 with continued advancements to come. Second were those who believed the most critical transformations had not yet occurred but were in the works. For Pocock, Gibbon formed part of the first camp.[435] Israel puts it this way, "These were the two sides to the Enlightenment coin, a residually revolutionary but predominantly conservative bloc locked in irresolvable conflict with a more republican and democratic revolutionary tendency."[436] While Israel disagrees with Pocock's family of Enlightenments within the larger context of Western Enlightenment and makes valuable points, he does not provide a suitable remedy to reconcile the problem of not separating individual enlightenments melding them together into a single project either. Still, I believe that the Western Enlightenment is best understood through Pocock's methodology of tenacious listening to language and time within regional and religious contexts.

Further, in attempting to unpack the term *Enlightenment*, Israel makes two crucial points that Pocock would, I argue, find compelling and lend appreciation to the method, at least, if not

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[434] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 125.

[435] Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1,* 297-300.

[436] Israel"J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 126.

the conclusions drawn from it. Israel states, "first, it is undoubtedly true that as a general cultural phenomenon the Anglo-American Enlightenment placed much less emphasis on the role of reason and philosophy as the agent of change than was the case in France, Italy, and Germany; secondly, it is necessary to remember that the very term 'Enlightenment' we use today and its French equivalent *Lumieres,* or Spanish *Ilustracion,* are to a large extent later nineteenth- and twentieth-century constructions—though the German *Aufklarung*was more widely used in the late eighteenth century; the term 'Enlightenment' therefore carries an ideological baggage and resonances often superimposed later and not part of the original phenomenon."[437] Israel here makes an important point about Pocock's idea of national or families of Enlightenments. Globally, countries outside of England and France had organic national influences while they drew from international thought. Among these places, Israel includes Russia, Spain, Greece, and the United States. He calls Pocock's definition vague and sees it as mostly unhelpful, instead of presenting his notion of a single narrative of the Enlightenment, which contained competing moderate and radical perspectives. For insight, we may turn to Peter Gay's argument that "men of the Enlightenment united on a vastly ambitious programme, a programme of secularism, humanity, cosmopolitanism, and freedom, above all, freedom in its many forms—freedom from arbitrary power, freedom of speech, freedom of trade, freedom to realize one's talents, freedom of aesthetic response, freedom, in a word, or moral man to make his own way in the world."[438]

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[437] Israel, *Democratic Enlightenment,* 4

[438] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 3.

In response to Pocock, Israel seeks to retain the majority of Robertson's uniting and transforming the Enlightenment's character without Gay's excess unification or Pocock's national categorization. The definition he settled on in his work *Democratic Enlightenment* was,

"Enlightenment, then, is defined here as a partly unitary phenomenon operative on both sides of the Atlantic, and eventually everywhere, consciously committed to the notion of bettering humanity in this world through a fundamental, revolutionary transformation discarding the ideas, habits, and traditions of the past either wholly or partially, this last point being bitterly contested among enlighteners; Enlightenment usually operated by revolutionizing ideas and constitutional principles, first, and society afterward, but sometimes by proceeding in reverse order, uncovering and making better known the principles of a great 'revolution' that had already happened. All Enlightenment by definition is closely linked to revolution."[439]

Immediately restating to clarify as, "Enlightenment is, hence, best characterized as the quest for human amelioration occurring between 1680 and 1800, driven principally by 'philosophy,' that is, what we would term philosophy, science, and political and social science including the new science of economics lumped together, leading to revolutions in ideas and attitudes first, and actual practical revolutions second, or else the other way around, both sets of revolutions seeking universal recipes for all mankind and, ultimately, in its radical manifestation, laying the foundations for modern basic human rights and freedoms and representative democracy."[440] Thus we must turn to the main Enlightenment Arguments.

**Conclusion**

J.G.A. Pocock's commitment to the kind of academic endeavor demonstrated in this chapter through his work on civic humanism, and paradigmatic individuals does not come

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[439] Israel "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 7.

[440] Israel, "J. G. A. Pocock and the 'Language of Enlightenment' in 'His *Barbarism and Religion*,'" 7.

without some perceived downfalls. First, Pocock's work is dense. Reading the breadth of Pocock's work, especially in as extensive a study as Pocock's work on Gibbon, one often struggles to focus on the central point of the narrative's particular part. Pocock does such detailed contextualizations of his paradigmatic figures that, at times, it is not easy to decipher to what point Pocock is coming. So interlaced are the histories Pocock explores that one may be reading deeply in a particular area of eighteenth-century English legal history and then find that the path has meandered to such an extent that the focus has become opaque. Pocock's methodology's clear advantage is that the extensive world-building construction provides readers of Pocock's work with a beautiful setting of the central figure's world. One knows with precision to which world the figure belonged to, how they moved about in it, what repercussions their actions carried, and how their work was received and impacted the surrounding landscape. This speaks to the part of Pocock's legacy, which is lasting, as his studies on Machiavelli, Harrington, and Gibbon are illustrations of whole lives, languages, times, and contexts instead of partial representations strewn with idealized conclusions or superimposed intentions of the central figures.

Through Pocock's work on Gibbon, the considerations of republican government are explored. A republic can quickly decay into barbarism, and through Gibbon, Pocock asks what role, if any, religion may play in avoiding the breakdown. The complicated relationship between religion and republic is often tenuous, and the role of the republic in a fragile and otherwise secular republic is never secure. With the question of religion always simmering underneath the surface of our experience as political humans, *Barbarism and Religion* explores the dynamics of religion in the republic and its relation to early modern political thought. Much of the wisdom one carries with them after reading Pocock's work in *Barbarism and Religion* can help scholars

across disciplinary boundaries make sense of modernity's tumultuous political climate. While this was an eighteenth-century question, and Gibbon is the eighteenth-century endpoint for Pocock, the issues raised within Pocock's work are perennial and eternally relevant.

**CHAPTER 6**

**CONCLUSION**

In culmination, this study has sought to establish three foundational points woven into the fabric of scholarship presented here. First, that Pocock's methodology is best understood as tenacious listening through linguistic contextualization. Second, for Pocock, the three paradigmatic figures of early modern Western political theory are Niccolo Machiavelli, James Harrington, and Edward Gibbon. Third, through his methodology, Pocock presents a holistic view of his three paradigmatic figures, which add richness and the unapologetic linking of disciplinary traditions. The arguments presented were intentionally and carefully crafted to in service of understanding the idea of a republic so necessary in today's political climate. This has been a study of Pocock's life, work, and legacy, within an interdisciplinary program in the Humanities, history of ideas, created in the shadow of Arthur Lovejoy. The underlying motivation was to glimpse the transcendental, among Pocock's dedication to the origins of the classical republic and what this means for the fragility of the American political system. What remains is an abiding disquiet for the civic humanist tradition's future in light of post-modern individual(ism). The idea of a republic, so intrinsic to the survival of the future American experience, is beautifully presented in Pocock's work. Yet, a few lingering points are remaining to discuss.

The first point concerns the expansion of particularities in the classical republic of Machiavelli, and the concept of property in Harrington, to bring together Pocock's work on these first two paradigmatic figures. Three points remain to be considered within the republican realm of Machiavelli and Harrington's work on politics. First, while Rome may have been destined to

fail, Machiavelli's work speaks to the republic's survival based on the One, Few, and Many model. Second, property was paramount for self-preservation and any semblance of personal liberty in Harrington's work. Lastly, in reconstructing the ideological context for *Oceana,* Pocock's work brings Harrington forth for interdisciplinary exploration since intellectual historians have long recognized his influence. However, political theory and science disciplines have been slower to accommodate him among mainstream narratives.

The second point situates Pocock within the larger intellectual framework by considering James Kloppenberg's work on Via Media, or middle road, philosophers. In *Uncertain Victory* (1986).[441] Kloppenberg analyzes the space between faith and reason. The tenuous space has engaged thinkers diverse in backgrounds and inclinations, from Galileo Galilei to Eric Voegelin, and continues to provide fodder for continuous scholarship and thought. Their tension and reconciliation are perpetually at odds, providing a perennial space for discussion and philosophical work. Pocock's *Barbarism and Religion* joins and adds to the ongoing discussion, examining the relationship between Christianity and the republic. On these points, Kloppenberg's work and reactions to it by Andrew Hartman and Daniel Wickberg underscore the contributions Pocock has made to the practice of contextualization, albeit with implied rather than a direct reference to him. Kloppenberg's work also explains how the linguistic contextual approach can be transferred to modernity's conception of ethical democracy.

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[441] James T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920* (Cary: Oxford University Press, 1986).; James T. Kloppenberg, *Toward Democracy: the Struggle for Self-Rule in European and American Thought* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

Further, I argue that the relationship between Pocock and Kloppenberg is best understood when viewed in conjunction with Reinhart Koselleck and Hannah Arendt. These three thinkers shared a commitment to exploring the dynamics of language, history, and politics. In their particular ways, they engaged with various aspects of Pocock's methodology by listening carefully to their subjects and observing history without imposing constructs of meaning. In particular, between Koselleck and Arendt, conceptual theory and historical meaning meet in post-war reactions, which bring light to memory, language, and anthropology. Koselleck's *Critique and Crisis,* Arendt's *On Revolution*, and Pocock's *The Machiavellian Moment* reveal a shared intellectual experience between these seemingly disconnected texts which brings richness to the study of both their authors and their subjects.

The third point seeks to provide an area of consideration for the relationship between Pocock's History and Hannah Arendt's Political Theory, in what I refer to as the Arendtian component of Pocock's work. I argue that Pocock's work on the idea of a republic directly correlates to Hannah Arendt's work on her understanding of the failed American revolution with regard to its republican secularity. Just as I believe there to be a compelling link between Pocock's *Barbarism and Religion,* and Kloppenberg's *Uncertain Victory,* so too do I argue there is an intrinsic link between his *The Machiavellian Moment* and Arendt's *On Revolution.* Pocock and Arendt share a reverence for Aristotle and the classical republic and the Greek *Demos Kratia* and *Res Publica. The* Greek tradition is alive in the work of both. Scholars such as John Hallowell, Eric Voegelin, and Alfred North Whitehead were cognizant of and created scholarship in service to the relationship between classical Greek philosophy and the Western political tradition. As scholars and educators, they observed the significance of the Greek Paideia

on scholarship and the liberal arts in higher education. Within the liberal arts, the purpose of education resides- to learn to recognize and appreciate that which is true, good, and beautiful; where literature, rhetoric, and philosophy meet to form the authentic self. Scholars continue to find this particular space compelling. Ellen Rigsby's work provides a lucid example of Pocock and Arendt's rich connection that continues to fascinate scholars decades after their books were published. The Arendtian component in Pocock's work is, I argue, the key for appreciating the space between Pocock's intellectual history and Arendt's political theory.

The fourth point and final point explores the space between, or the Mextaxy, (μεταξύ), of Pocock's work. Approaching the topic with Eric Voegelin as a starting point helps point to the interdisciplinary nature of the space and how Pocock's methodology reflects Voegelin's thoughts on the Platonic concept. Throughout this study, there has been an underlying consideration of the Metaxy for Pocock presented primarily in the space between disciplines and permeated throughout his personal experiences as a scholar between cultures, studying transatlantic political thought. I have approached this concept through Pocock's life, primary works, and secondary scholarship presented by scholars across various disciplines to exemplify the space between and its consciousness in every chapter. Voegelin's work makes sense of Plato's Metaxy. It renders it a powerful tool for understanding the space between intellectual history and political theory with particular respect to language and the shared human experience.

**A. Machiavellian Mixed Government and Property in Harrington**

Regarding Pocock's work on Machiavelli and the mixed republic and Harrington on the question of property, there are three points I wish to clarify in the culmination of this study. First, for Pocock, Venice and Rome had been bound to fail, the former from isolation and the latter

from aggressive and unmanageable expansion. Machiavelli's republic could have the hope for survival if it were able to 'achieve stability' through *fortuna* and grace through the One, Few, and Many model. Through his work on Harrington and consideration of Machiavellian concepts in *The Political Works of James Harrington,* Pocock contemplated obedience to an authority based on coercion with no other legitimate claim on its subscribers' demands other than the sword.[442] *His Majesty's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Parliament,* published in 1642, just before the English civil war was to begin, provides a valuable synthesis of how a republican form of government was understood at the time. The parliamentary regime had not accomplished grounding in legitimacy for the public and continued to appear, at best, as an interim establishment. *De facto* appeals to inherent power made by the king were, according to Pocock, "overwhelmingly directed towards readers who acknowledge a legitimacy which the government has not," and served a viewpoint both "conservative and casuist, and yet bears a recognizable relation to the growth of republicanism."[443] Thinking persons needed to weigh the reality of their political climate against the inherent value they have placed on legitimate authority and decide if they will build their future actions on the foundation of personal value systems sanctioned or even preordained by providence. The other option was for the thinking persons to submit to God's perceived will and the ruler who claims to be attempting to fulfill it faithfully.[444] Both choices bore consideration for the seventeenth-century republican thinker, and each carried with it far-reaching implications for the understanding of the role of government and the divine

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[442] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 28.

[443] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 28.

[444] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 29-30.

providence. How these two are intertwined, and the limitations of their dependence must be sorted through and made sense of in the minds of independent political actors. The act of wrestling with these choices is pivotal to a well-ordered and carefully contemplated political life. Thus Pocock explains, "the moment of choice can be defined- and there is evidence that it was often experienced- as one of pain and uncertainty, in which the individual is reduced to searching for his own essence and seeking to define his own existence. 'A people', wrote Harrington, 'not actuated or led by the soul of government is a living thing in pain and misery.'"[445]

Second, Pocock's work reveals self-preservation as paramount for Harrington. Harrington understood that transferred individual freedom and its subsequent loss of power held as a natural consequence the undercurrent of inherent 'threat to popular liberty.'[446] In essence, power conducted out of range of the people was an issue, certainly for those even more liberal than Machiavelli, such as Marchmont Nedham, who praised Athenian democracy and denounced Venice as "a corrupt 'standing' oligarchy which merely masquerades as a republic."[447] Making excellent use of *Mercurius Politicus,* the weekly magazine edited by Nedham from 1650-1660, which sought to demonstrate how republican theory could obscure and replace hereditary power structures of ancient feudal law and aristocratic dominance. Through periodic popular elections ('revolutions' for Nedham and 'rotations' for Harrington), political corruption, philosophical stagnation, and power monopolization are avoided since the government is only safe when power is rotated continually not amassed by a constant few. Through Nedham's editorial endeavors,

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[445] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 30.

[446] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 33-35.

[447] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 35.

Machiavellian republican theory entered the political vernacular in response to the commonwealth's needs, serving as a precursor and backdrop for Harrington's *Oceana* and as an alternate to the *de facto* argument espoused by Hobbes.[448]

Thirdly, Pocock's purpose within his work on Harrington, beyond exemplifying his points on the proper role of the historian and practically engaging with contextualism, was to reconstruct the ideological context for Harrington's *Oceana.* In so doing, he dismantled the idea that Harrington wrote primarily as an ex-intimate of the monarchy and more as a radical who sought to offer a "civil history of the sword" within the republican paradigm as a natural transition from ancient power structures through property to freedom.[449] According to Pocock, *"The Commonwealth of Oceana,* then, is both a civil history of the sword and a civil history of property."[450] The crux of the matter is that Harrington uses Machiavelli's premise that citizenship is predicated on free and armed people to build upon, adding that land ownership predicates an armed public after the collapse of the feudal system, changing the mercenary into a citizen soldier.[451] Pocock's work demonstrates how Machiavelli and Harrington differed in their theoretical dependence on feudal society for their arguments. While Machiavelli engaged in considerations of the *res publica* and the "Caesarian corruption of arms-bearing citizenship," Harrington's viewpoint was decidedly English in that he adopted Bacon and Ralegh's contributions and put forth a new theory on feudalism and western power structures and political

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[448] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 36-37.

[449] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 41-42.

[450] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,*.43.

[451] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,*. 44-44, Niccolò Machiavelli, *Arte dela Guerra,* in *Opere*, edited by Mario Bonfantini (Naples, 1954.)

life.[452] Pocock used a close reading of Harrington's ideological context to situate him among the monarchist scholars and Levellers and explains that "it was necessary to him [Harrington] to show why the monarchy had fallen- an intention which could be considered part of the *de facto* purpose- and why it could not be replaced with a remodeling of the structure of king, lords, and commons, which the *Answer to the Nineteen Propositions* had employed to identify Ancient Constitution with mixed government, and which the *Humble Petition and Advice* was soon to recommend as a solution to the problems of the Protectorate." Harrington synthesized the instability between the monarchy and the nobility, the ideas of anti-Normans on tenets and Lords, Machiavelli and Nedham's ideas about the feudal system's incompatibility with republican government, in order to expose the precarious relationship of monarchy and nobility.[453] The point Harrington makes in *Oceana,* according to Pocock, is that within a republic, holding to the true republican form of government, the nobility cannot exist. It follows, as such, that the monarchy cannot exist either and extends to any form of 'entrenched aristocracy.' Pocock calls this Harrington's "main theoretical strength" and *Oceana's* "main predictive weakness."[454]

Harrington begins *Oceana* with the loss of 'ancient prudence' in the ancient Israelite form. In this form, God is the chief legislator, and the Few and the Many are in concurrence with each other on the republican power structure, which is modeled after the decline of the Roman empire complete with an 'incessantly engaged' purpose of conquest. To Machiavelli's arms,

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[452] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 44-46.

[453] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 46.

[454] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 46-47.

Harrington added lands as Pocock explains, "it was on the grant of lands to the army that the power of the emperors rested…"[455] The nameless fictional king of *Oceana* is left with nothing but brute military force with which to control the populace. However, they are armed, and such a free citizen army can impose the government of its choosing.[456]

In this particular portion of Harrington's fictional world, the concern over mob rule and the tyranny of the many adds an interesting component to the ideal republic. Harrington combats this concern by holding "that a people could become so morally corrupt as to be incapable of citizenship, the sole cause of corruption in government being failure to adjust the distribution of power to the distribution of property."[457] With Oceana safe from suffering from an unpopular distribution of property, a popular government was theoretically, and I would add idealistically able to support a virtuous people. For the modern republic to avoid instability and decay into an unruly democracy that would inevitably spiral down to anarchy and eventual despotism, a new form of aristocracy needed to be established which was not composed of the previous nobility. Pocock asserts that Harrington, on these notes, was not an aristocrat in the traditional sense of the term. Instead, he argues, "Harrington was a republican- an aristocrat because he was a democrat; and on the democratic side of his thought, he was nearly a Leveller."[458] As Harrington would have it created, the aristocracy would be grounded in 'the goods of the mind.' Harrington's triumvirate of antithesis pairings: "the goods of fortune, and of the mind; power and authority;

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[455] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 47-48.

[456] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 51.

[457] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 51.; Harrington, J. *The Commonwealth of Oceana,* 202-203.

[458] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 53.

revelation and reason" form the basis of government with fortune as the foundation. Property as power done in the Aristotelian sense of the mixed constitution must, for Harrington; all would possess enough property to ensure the liberty and continued nonexistence of a feudal order.[459] Finally, Pocock's work situates Harrington's legacy for modernity, though I would argue that it is traced more clearly through the American tradition than the British. Americans took Harringtonian doctrine and wove it into the fabric of American political thought. In contrast, the English observed and made use of it but remained in close intellectual proximity to Scottish philosophy creating more space between them and Harringtonian ideals. Considering Machiavelli, Harrington, and Gibbon as Pocock's three paradigmatic figures, scholars of American political thought are invited to reconsider the mainstream Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau narrative in terms of formative theory available to and adopted by the American founders. Pocock's work was the first edition of Harrington's work published in over two hundred years, providing an ideological context for Harrington, the consequences of *Oceana,* and what he believed to be Harrington's lasting legacy. As an addition to the history of political thought, Pocock provided a conceptual analysis of property, republican government, and Machiavellian thought. By applying his methodological practice of tenacious listening through the contextualization of Harrington's life and thought, Pocock, renders another example of properly conducting historical research and expands on the republic's ideological and societal roots.

**B. Kloppenberg, Koselleck, and Tenacious Listening**

In further consideration of the idea of a republic in Pocock's work, and to situate his scholarship within the larger intellectual framework on political thought, I would like to briefly

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[459] Pocock, *The Political Works of James Harrington,* 54-55.

turn to James Kloppenberg's analysis of the *via media* in his *Uncertain Victory* (1986).[460]  In *Uncertain Victory,* Kloppenberg analyzes *via media,* or middle road philosophers: Wilhelm Dilthey, Thomas Hill Green, Henry Sidgwick, Alfred Fouillée, William James, and John Dewey. In the context of Kloppenberg's work, the middle road is indicative of the space between what Andrew Hartman refers to as science and religion and Daniel Wickberg clarifies as meaning, "between philosophical idealism and materialism, and epistemological rationalism and empiricism."[461] In essence, the space between indicates a challenge to the idea of unified foundational philosophy, opening the door for ethical exploration of political structures and, consequently, the rule of law in a republican model. As Hartman explains, "for Kloppenberg, the philosophers of the *via media* were revolutionary because they 'provided the epistemological and ethical pivot on which political theory turned from socialism and liberalism to social democracy and progressivism.'"[462] Uncertainty, as opposed to skepticism, created an opportunity for cooperative scholarship and fluid analysis, quite similar to the structure of Pocock's methodology. *Via media,* philosophers were listening tenaciously in the space between canonized philosophies, and the opening of a middle way enriched scholars observant of their methods.

In this particular regard, Kloppenberg and Pocock are inherently similar in methodological approaches to seemingly peripheral subjects. For Kloppenberg, individuals and their contexts within their particular history and society were intrinsically united and could not

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[460] Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory.*; Kloppenberg, *Toward Democracy.*

[461] Andrew Hartman and Daniel Wickberg, "Kloppenberg's certain victory," *Society for U.S. Intellectual History.* (2014, September 03).

[462] Hartman and Wickberg, "Kloppenberg's certain victory."; Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory,* 28.

be analyzed separately. Thus, they were rooted in their particular "historical sensibility," best understood through "the perspective of contextualism."[463] Hartman makes this point clear by saying that in Kloppenberg's work, "concepts like "morality" or "human nature" take on different meanings in different contexts, a historical sensibility that does not deny truth as a possibility but rather shows that what is true is dependent upon matching up theory with experience." Thus illustrating Pocock's point that political actors "respond to their national contexts" in ways which scholars of their work must be particularly sensitive to if they are listening closely.[464]

Further, in reply to Hartman's assessments of Kloppenberg, Wickberg argues that "the challenge of these philosophers was to reject the forms of assurances that came from a unified philosophical foundationalism, with its necessary truths, its ordered universe, and its fixed principles, and to supplant the dualisms of mind and body, idea and matter, logic and experience with a new fluid way of thinking that found new conditions of possibility in epistemic uncertainty and what William James liked to refer to as an 'open' universe;" Thus "uncertainty" provided a path for societal ethics to be understood as separate from Enlightenment notions of natural rights, moving further toward a new progressive understanding of "cultural consciousness."[465] For Kloppenberg, this naturally leads to the idea of democracy as an ethical ideal and not solely a political one. This changes everything. It makes a marked difference between democracy as a way we *do* government and democracy as seeping into all of our relations and the very bones of our system of political thought. Reading Kloppenberg's work

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[463] Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory,* 101.

[464] Hartman and Wickberg, "Kloppenberg's certain victory."

[465] Hartman and Wickberg, "Kloppenberg's certain victory."

with Pocock's methodology as a foundation makes the interaction between philosophy, politics, and history come alive in ways that I argue would not be possible without first laying the groundwork through a career rooted in tenacious listening and linguistic contextualization. Next, I would like to briefly consider the interplay between Reinhart Koselleck, explored in earlier chapters of this study, and revisited here concerning the overlap between his work and Hannah Arendt's in light of Pocock's practice of tenacious listening. As presented previously, Koselleck and Pocock shared a fascination with language and history, which for Koselleck came together in the development of conceptual history as a path to historical thinking. As Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann argues, at the center of Koselleck's thought "stood rather the attempt to outline a theory of the conditions of possible histories," which he called a *Historik* since linguistics were always references to "pre-linguistic conditions of historical experiences.[466] As a precursor to the "linguistic turn" in intellectual history, Koselleck examined temporal structures, language, and memory with a humanistic account of their particular histories; as seen for example in his analysis of the concept of terror found in the dreams of individuals during the early years of the Third Reich. These, Hoffmann explains, "constituted prelinguistically formed modes of enacting terror," which he believed undermined traditional separations in the study of memory between fiction and historical reality.[467] According to Koselleck, "The conditions of possibility of real history are, at the same time, conditions of its cognition. Hope and memory, or expressed more generally, expectation and experience—for expectation comprehends more than hope, and experience goes deeper than memory—simultaneously constitute history and its

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[466] Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann and Tom Lampert. "Koselleck, Arendt, and the Anthropology of Historical Experience." *History and Theory* 49, no. 2 (2010): 213.

[467] Hoffmann and Lampert. "Koselleck, Arendt, and the Anthropology of Historical Experience," 217.

cognition."[468] By linking conceptual terms and then exploring the layers of linguistic history surrounding them, Koselleck's work demonstrates a singular approach to conceptual history. It is not easy to see how Pocock's linguistic contextualization differs from Koselleck's conceptual approach to history in their approach to political language. I argue they are understood better, together, and better still when viewed as a triad with Arendt on political theory.

Thus, I also argue that Koselleck's anthropological approach to history seamlessly links him to Arendt's liberal, anti-totalitarian inclinations. Though, as Hoffmann admits there are, "no indications that Arendt ever read *Critique and Crisis,"* Koselleck's 1972 work, they share a "theoretical starting point: Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein*, and a critique of the concept of history-oriented around modern anonymous social structures and processes, whether in the form of the Marxist philosophy of history or the American social sciences of the post-war era."[469] I would argue for the inclusion of Pocock in this shared theoretical starting point as Koselleck, Arendt, and Pocock did not subscribe to a logos of history, no telos, no meaning—rather it was "no more than a mixture of error and violence.'"[470] There are also no explicit indications that Pocock was reacting or responding to *On Revolution* in *The Machiavellian Moment,* but the ideological fingerprints are there nonetheless. I contend that Arendt, Kosselleck, Pocock, and Kloppenberg are within the same realm in their considerations of language, history, and meaning, thus in any holistic consideration of the space between political history and theory, there is a distinct intertwining of their thought.

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[468] Hoffmann and Lampert. "Koselleck, Arendt, and the Anthropology of Historical Experience," 218.

[469] Hoffmann and Lampert. "Koselleck, Arendt, and the Anthropology of Historical Experience," 224.

[470] Hoffmann and Lampert. "Koselleck, Arendt, and the Anthropology of Historical Experience," 224.

## C. The Arendtian Component

The last portion of the idea of a republic in J.G.A. Pocock's work is the relationship between Pocock's historical conception of the classical republic and the American founding and Hannah Arendt's theory on the failed formation of a secular republic after the American revolution. I argue that much of the underlying principles of political philosophy in *The Machiavellian Moment* (1975) reflect Arendt's *On Revolution* (1963). I argue that the foundational American understanding of the republic begins with classical realism and the Greek tradition. I argue it is rooted in the Aristotelian concept of the polity, the rule of many for the good of all, and is a decomposed version of *Demos Kratia* and *Res Publica.* The idea of a republic begins with the Greek tradition. In opposition to Arendt and agreement with Pocock, I argue that far from being dead on arrival, there is still hope for the American concept of the republic. I contend that the idea of a republic is alive in the liberal arts colleges and is part of why the study of Pocock's work is so essential for keeping the classical tradition alive. While bureaucratic mechanisms and rigid disciplinary lines blur meaningful learning, scholars who work in the classical tradition through the Greek Paideia keep the spark alive for the republic.

In Ellen Rigsby's 2002 article "The Failure of Success: Arendt and Pocock on the Fall of American Republicanism," she compares the concept of the republic in Arendt and Pocock concerning how it relates to the American founding and the possibility of its endurance.[471] As has been established in this study's analysis of *The Machiavellian Moment*, Republicanism was

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[471] Ellen M. Rigsby, "The Failure of Success: Arendt and Pocock on the Fall of American Republicanism." *Theory & Event* 6, no. 1 (2002).

present at the founding and was based on virtue. However, in the nineteenth century, the focus

turned to private interest and liberalism. While Gordon S. Wood and Bernard Bailyn regard

republicanism's influence to be passing, Hannah Arendt joins J.G.A. Pocock in arguing the idea

of a republic was more entrenched in the American experience. According to Rigsby's essay,

"Pocock suggests that republicanism remains part of the national dialogue well into the

nineteenth century, though in a more diminished role, circumscribed not only by the increasing

popularity of liberalism but also by the limits placed on classical republicanism once it has

merged with Christian theology in the European context. Arendt continues to use republicanism

to take the measure of the American political landscape by her analysis of the failure of the

Constitution to enact a republic."[472] In TMM, Pocock explores the Florentine Republic. Through

Machiavelli, he considers the republic's relationship with Christianity, to which he returns in his

work on Edward Gibbon and Christianity in early Rome. Arendt's work grapples with Christian

ideology at the American founding and how an entirely secular approach would have ensured a

more stable republican model of government after the American revolution.

Throughout TMM, Pocock argues that to create a perpetual republic, the United States

would need to reconcile Christianity's ideas on heaven, virtue, corruption, and linear time with

the classical republican idea of fate and cyclical time. According to Rigsby, Pocock's work

identifies four basic concepts for a successful classical republic which begin with societal steps

to ensure the common welfare. She states, "Society is made and preserved to promote the

common good or commonwealth. The citizens maintain the commonwealth through a voluntary

exercise of virtuous will. Only people who are independent of the will of others are capable of

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[472] Rigsby, "The Failure of Success."

exercising their will virtuously. And finally, citizens must be active in politics and political decisions."[473] For the republic to thrive and exist in a perpetual state, Montesquieu's ideas that all citizens must be equal under the law, that the republic be held in a smaller geographic area composed of similar persons both in culture and political character, must be in practice. The United States fails concerning both diversity and size. According to Rigsby, for Arendt, the American founding failed to reconcile these principles in its Constitution, and "She focuses on the secular and political aspects of the American founding, as she explains how the founding does not need to be understood as having an ontological inconsistency." Where Pocock attempt to reconcile Christianity with the republic, Arendt counters that divine time according to Christianity cannot be reconciled with secular human time.[474]

Pocock's work on Machiavelli and Harrington clarifies that virtue is compromised when the private becomes public. The overlapping of these spheres changes *fortuna* to corruption, making the liberal ideal of the individual and private pursuit of happiness public, thus nullifying the possibility of the public good.

According to Rigsby, Arendt, as a political theorist and not a historian, suggests what the early American founders could have done differently in the constitution to allow for a secular foundation for the republic, ensuring its permanence to create an institutionalized separation between the private and public realms. Once Christian thought is introduced, a secular founding is impossible. In essence, the problematic nature of the American republic began with the separation of church and state. While Arendt does not directly engage with Pocock in *On*

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[473] Rigsby, "The Failure of Success."

[474] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment,* 402.; Rigsby, "The Failure of Success."

*Revolution,* Pocock's work in TMM implies an underlying awareness of the implications and direct correlation with the points of Arendt's political theory, which uses secular terminology as her primary political language for a perpetual republic. In *On Revolution,* Arendt states, "Certainly no religious fervor but strictly political misgivings about the enormous risks inherent in the secular realm of human affairs caused them to turn to the only element of traditional religion whose political usefulness as an instrument of rule was beyond any doubt."[475] At the heart of this matter is a commitment to understanding the American experiment and the possibility of the republic's success and survival. Rigsby's asserts that "the Christianization of republican thought which occurs when divine time is borrowed brings to bear on the American republic other aspects of Christian thought, such as the transmutation of the classical concept of *virtu* into the Christian concept of virtue and the easy entrance of private interest into the public realm. This is the price for belief in a stable or perpetual republic."[476] Meanwhile, for Arendt, the Constitution can provide stability needed but not necessarily private happiness. While the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness may be a tenement of positive political life, it does not provide the stability a secular constitution would afford the republic and those dependent on its existence.

Arendt's views are in sympathy with Gibbon's in *Barbarism and Religion* in their mutual contempt for religious interference in republican government and in the belief that Christianity leads to the dismantling of civic virtue. As a historian, Pocock stays true to his delineation for his profession's role and does not engage in philosophizing on issues of religion and republic. For

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[475] Arendt, *On Revolution*, 191

[476] Rigsby, "The Failure of Success."

Pocock, these are different realms, though linked with interdisciplinary sympathies and correlations. In his treatment of this subject, Pocock *listens.* I argue that the Arendtian component to Pocock's work lies in the careful relationship between history and theory. By applying Pocock's methodology of tenacious listening to reading both his work on the idea of a republic and Arendt's, it becomes clear that the republic must be secular to work for both. Hence it is based on the public realm of stability and use and not on the private issue of salvation. For Arendt, proof of the founder's inclinations toward a secular republic is seen in the interim between the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the concept of *novus ordo saeclorum.* However, she argues that after the U.S. Constitution was adopted and failed to incorporate consistent public participation, the republic's secularization was no longer possible. Arendt argues, "It was precisely because of the enormous weight of the Constitution and of the experiences in founding a new body politic that the failure to incorporate the townships and the town hall meetings, the original springs of all political activity in the country, amounted to a death sentence for them. Paradoxical as it may sound, it was in fact under the impact of the Revolution that the revolutionary spirit in America began to wither away, and it was the Constitution itself, this greatest achievement of the American people, which eventually cheated them of their proudest possession."[477] In essence, post the revolution that created the constitution, the American people fell asleep, becoming complacent and effectively nullifying the ability to achieve a perpetual secular republic through a consistent revolutionary spirit. Pocock's work simmers with the possibility of reconciliation between the endpoint Arendt put on the American republic and the American experience's trajectory based on the continuous

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[477] Arendt, *On Revolution*. 239.

conversation about the idea of a republic from the founding through to modernity. In agreement with Rigsby, I would argue that there can be reconciliation between Pocock's hope and Arendt's disappointment. Rigsby states, "In some sense both the intellectual history of Pocock and the political theory of Arendt are needed to understand the engagement of the United States with republican discourse."[478] To understand the American political system today, the Arendtian component in Pocock is essential. I argue that the best method is founding in the space between intellectual history and political theory.

**D. The Space Between: Voegelin, Pocock and Metaxy**

In Plato's *Symposium,* the Greek Metaxy (μεταξύ) means "between," regarding Diotima's definition of the entire daimonic being between divinity (the gods) and mortals. Eric Voegelin's work is arguably the best starting place to understand what this study has consistently called "the space between" and attempted to underscore with references throughout to the interdisciplinary nature of Pocock's work. In my reading of Pocock, I do not see how his methodology's richness can be understood or applied to any real endeavors in intellectual history without first practicing tenacious listening. Beginning with his personal and intellectual history, continuing through to his treatment of paradigmatic figures, and culminating for the time being in the interconnectedness of his work with the many other secondary scholars found throughout this study, I have attempted to reside in the Metaxy of Pocock's work. I argue the Metaxy is the essence of all that has been explored up to this point. Voegelin was called to recognition of the Metaxy's importance for political history, theory, and philosophy and wrote to Ellis Sandoz that, "From my first contact with such works as the *Cloud of Unknowing*, to my more recent

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478 Rigsby, "The Failure of Success."

understanding of the mystical problem . . . the great issue [has been]: not to stop at what may be called classical mysticism, but to restore the problem of the Metaxy for society and history."[479] Setting questions of how to read Plato properly and the Platonic warnings provided for such a task aside for the moment, Voegelin's Metaxy points to consciousness.

I argue that this "betweenness," while metaphorical, succeeds in getting closer to the essence of human experience than anything else. It is especially relevant when applied to the subjects that concerned Pocock most, speaking well about things that matter in the polis-the republic, language, and listening. Pocock's work blends so well with theorists and philosophers like Arendt and Voegelin, in part, because of the effortless location of his consciousness in the in-between. I have argued throughout for the blurring of disciplinary lines in Pocock's work to be understood as primordial in the attempt to understand his legacy and will attempt to clarify further here. In *The Ecumenic Age* Voegelin says,

"The language of truth concerning man's existence in the divine-human In- Between is engendered in, and by, the theophanic events of differentiating consciousness. The language symbols belong, as to their meanings, to the Metaxy of experiences from which they arise as their truth. . . . In the prophetic literature, the word of truth can be indiscriminately said to be spoken by the God or by the prophet. Moreover, the original experience need not be auditory; the word need not be "heard"; it can also be "seen" . . . The In-Between of experience has a dead point from which symbols emerge as the exegesis of its truth, but which cannot become itself an object of propositional knowledge."[480]

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[479] James, M. Rhodes, "What is the Metaxy? Diotima and Voegelin" (July 08, 2018)with reference to: Eric Voegelin to Ellis Sandoz, December 30, 1971. Quoted by Sandoz in his introduction to Voegelin, *Order and History*, vol. v, *In Search of Order*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), p. 12. In the introduction to *Order and History*, vol. iv, *The Ecumenic Age* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), Voegelin also observed that "a massive block" of secondary and tertiary symbols now "eclipses the reality of man's existence in the Metaxy" and that: "To raise this obstacle and its structure into consciousness, and by its removal to help in the return to the truth of reality as it reveals itself in history, has become the purpose of *Order and History*," p. 58.

[480] Rhodes, "What is the Metaxy? Diotima and Voegelin."; and Voegelin, *The Ecumenic Age*. 56.

Humanity lives here, in the Metaxy, in the space between divinity and beasts. In Japanese, this can be seen in the concept of *mono no aware,* beauty, and sadness, and speaks to the door Voegelin's work opens for understanding the proper context for Pocock. Voegelin, Arendt, Pocock, like Hallowell, Sandoz, and so many other good scholars live and work consciously in the shadow of Hegel and are somewhat united thereby. This is another way of saying that they are profoundly and fundamentally opposed to all ideologies, which presume to "know" (gnosis) the meaning or logic of history, putting their work in the realm of the existentialists and calling back remnants of Collingwood's influence. There is a connection to the Arendt, Karl Jaspers, and the axial age in history, which Voegelin distinguishes as cosmological, anthropological, and soteriological "truth" in the *New Science* and later works. I argue here that to maintain that there is a "meaning" or "logic" to history is counter both to those before the axial age, those living in cosmological (mythical) times, and those today who, like Pocock, want to bring us all back down to earth. Here we find the context of our times with its language, idioms, habits, and other particularities. Finally, after listening intently to Pocock's work and what can be gleaned from his life and history, I argue that Pocock lived and wrote in the tension between place and the transcendental. While he was undoubtedly focused on relative and contextualist things, his work points his readers to the transcendental.

**Conclusion**

I conclude this study with final thoughts on the history of ideas and what it offers to our understanding of the idea of a republic, particularly in light of the current tensions in the American political system. This dissertation has been crafted in service and recognition to the structure set in place by Arthur Lovejoy. In the interest of honoring the legacy of his

contribution, attention must be paid to considering the ideas contained in these chapters as they concern the landscape of political thought today. Arthur Lovejoy and J.G.A. Pocock were similar regarding their ideas of the organization of history, and Lovejoy would have agreed with Pocock's family of Enlightenments. Lovejoy also existed in the space between philosophy (in which he was trained) and history, hence the creation of the history of ideas program in partial acknowledgment of his intellectual legacy. According to Daniel Wickberg, "Rather than abstracting ideas from historical circumstances, he [Lovejoy] was demonstrating the variety of meanings and logics arising out of the historical relationships of ideas with one another. In Lovejoy, ideas are not only the picture but also the frame; Lovejoy solved the text/context conundrum by making ideas the context in which texts were written and received. For Lovejoy, the particular context in which an idea found expression shaped—if not determined—its meaning."[481] Context shapes meaning for Lovejoy and Pocock.

Wickberg explains that for Lovejoy, "both textual history and history of ideas start from the assumption that the best way to understand ideas as historical entities is to assume that they have a power independent of the limited motives or agency of those who have utilized them."[482] As part of the same generation of thinkers as Michael Oakeshott, R.G. Collingwood, and Isaiah Berlin, previously discussed in this study in light of their influence on Pocock and his work, Lovejoy and his contemporaries existed in the space between philosophy and history. Collingwood and Lovejoy shared the view that "history was a form of self-knowledge of the human mind," though Lovejoy disagreed with Collingwood's ideas on intellectual reenactment,

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[481] Daniel Wickberg, "In the Environment of Ideas: Arthur Lovejoy and the History of Ideas as a Form of Cultural History." *Modern Intellectual History* 11, no. 2 (2014): 450.

[482] Wickberg, "In the Environment of Ideas," 451.

preferring the position that "the historian was situated in such a way as to know more than the historical actors being examined" using analysis and distance as opposed to reenactment.[483] For Lovejoy, the practice of contextualizing historical actors was a necessary endeavor that must be adopted across sub-disciplines of intellectual history, which coincides with Pocock's practice of viewing paradigmatic individuals holistically. Lovejoy says,

"But one does not, in most cases, adequately understand an author . . . unless one understands him better than he understood himself. And for this purpose, again, it is highly desirable to bring to the reading of a writer's text, not only some previous reflection on the subject with which he is dealing, but, especially, as many distinctions of meaning potentially pertinent to it, and of issues involved in it, as possible."[484]

In reflection, Wickberg makes a compelling point, saying, "The idea that ideas might have a logic of their own, that their users are in some sense coerced into positions and conclusions that they are themselves not aware of, pushes hard against the idea that ideas are tools used in arguments to reach intended ends, even if those are the ends of communities of speakers."[485] This is a reminder to return to the potential of the transcendental. In revisiting the spirit of Collingwood's later work, as discussed in the previous chapters, the quietly consistent presence of the metaphysical comes through for the historian engaged in tenacious listening, whether to actors in contemporary political thought or the paradigmatic figures of history's canon.

In the spirit of Pocock's tenacious listening, under Lovejoy's influence in the history of ideas, scholars can find the Metaxy Voegelin suggested. While this study has been primarily

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[483] Wickberg, "In the Environment of Ideas," 452-453.

[484] Wickberg, "In the Environment of Ideas," 454, and Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, 68-9.

[485] Wickberg, "In the Environment of Ideas," 454.

concerned with the space between intellectual history and political theory, for the liberal arts in general, these practices are integral to any genuine attempt at understanding. This is all the more critical today as America grapples with a decay in American public discourse. I argue that Pocock brings us back and guides the trajectory of future scholarship on a decaying culture. While it is natural that things erode over time, the perennial issues of the republic remain. Douglas Hodgson's 1973 review of Pocock's *Politics, Language, and Time* is a striking example of this point, as his 48-year-old review could have been written last week and would have so much resonance for our current political climate. Hodgson's irritation that Pocock's work would need to be defended against claims of political conservatism is palpable, made even more pointed by saying, "Given the example in the last election of an American presidential candidate calling America to return home to the ideals upon which the republic was founded, we have no reason to believe that the static limitations of the civic humanist ideal have been overcome."[486] The election Hodgson was referencing was the 1972 landslide win of Richard Nixon against democrat George McGovern in which Nixon won all states but one. If this disastrous election does not remind us of our own calamitous 2016 election, I am unsure what will. Pocock's work remains continuously timeless and relevant. I argue that we cannot understand Trump-era politics in America or contend with the potential mass confusion and distrust of the media without scholars who maintain a focus on the republic and do not allow distortions of the corrupted notion of democracy to superimpose our classical roots.

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[486] Douglas Hodgson, "Reviewed Work: *Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* by J. G. A. Pocock." *Political Theory* 1, no. 1 (1973): 106.

Finally, as has been demonstrated throughout this study, Pocock's practice of tenacious listening afforded him seamless entry to interdisciplinary work, recognized by the 1993 receipt of the Lippincott Award of the American Political Science Association. At the heart of Pocock's scholarship is a commitment to exploring the idea of a republic. Now, perhaps even more than ever, when the United States is at a crossroads in global politics and the human civic experience domestically, his work speaks to our classical roots, the tenuous religious relationship, and hope for a cooperative future. For Hallowell, "at the headwaters of the liberal tradition of politics was not Hobbes, for whom life was famously "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" nor Locke where in nature there were just certain "inconveniences" requiring a more limited government than one finds in Hobbes. Rather, there was a residue of "liberal" in the sense of the liberal arts, the liberating arts whereby one learns to read, write, think, articulate, and engage as an individual for whom truth is self-authenticating."[487] Therefore I argue his ideas on the liberal tradition are as accurate today as in 1946 when he wrote *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology*.[488]

Following Hallowell's trajectory, Pocock's work in the spirit of the liberal tradition is best understood alongside his intellectual community, including Michael Oakeshott, R.G. Collingwood, Quentin Skinner, Peter Laslett, Joyce Appleby, Arthur Lovejoy, Eric Voegelin, Hannah Arendt, and so many other's who impacted his work and who continue to advance his methodology through tenacious listening in the space between. I hope that my work on Pocock

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[487] Timothy Hoye, *Integral Liberalism: John H. Hallowell and the 20th Century.* Prepared for the Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Juan, Puerto Rico, (January 6-9, 2016).

[488] John H. Hallowell, *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology: With Particular Reference to German Politico-Legal Thought* (London: Routledge, 2013).

has served to further the discussion about the idea of a republic and openly resided in Plato's Metaxy as an example of an interdisciplinary approach to that space between intellectual history and political theory.

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# BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Monica Alfaro Rodriguez began her academic career as a student at Collin College in McKinney, Texas. There she took courses in various courses and disciplines and met two professors that changed the course of her degrees and ultimately her future. In retrospect, they went beyond what they "needed" to do. They did not only instruct her in their relative subjects, they taught her to think critically about the material, and sparked the desire to know more. They taught with passion and took a personal interest in her success. They challenged her writing, and would not accept any mediocrity. They taught her to take pride in her research and pride in her work. From both these professors, Monica developed two pillars to educational success: thirst for knowledge, and intellectual discipline.

Monica earned her Associate of Arts degree and transferred to Texas Woman's University, where she earned a Bachelor of Science degree with a major in Government and a minor in Philosophy. At TWU Monica took several courses before she settled into the niche she found intellectually irresistible: Political Theory. Political Theory combined her interests, politics and philosophy. After finishing her Bachelor's degree, Monica stayed on at TWU to complete a Master's Degree in Government. Here she concentrated on Political Philosophy and Constitutional Law. She served as a Graduate Student Assistant and was mentored by several professors in the department. Again, she found that key professors changed the course of her educational future. After joining the History of Ideas program at The University of Texas at Dallas, Monica worked diligently throughout her program and remains grateful to have been instructed by a wide range of professors who have expanded her thought and challenged her to grow.

# CURRICULUM VITAE

EDUCATION

University of Texas at Dallas, Humanities: History of Ideas August 2012- Current

• Courses taken in pursuit of PhD in History of Ideas

• Teaching Fields: Enlightenment Political Thought, Political Philosophy and the Early American Republic, and Political Philosophy in the Caribbean

University of Dallas   August 2013-May 2014

Texas Woman's University, Master of Arts   August 2009- May 2011

• Government concentrations in Political Theory and Foreign Relations.

Texas Woman's University, Bachelor of Science     August 2006- May 2009

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TEACHING POSITIONS

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| Texas Woman's University, Adjunct Faculty in Government | June 2011-Current |
| Dallas  College, Adjunct Faculty in Government | May 2014 -Current |
| Dallas College, Subject Matter Expert, Level 1 | November 2018 -Current |
| Texas Woman's University, Visiting Lecturer in Government | August 2012-May 2013 |
| Collin College, Adjunct Faculty in Government | June 2013-May 2014 |
| Tarrant County Community College, Adjunct in Government | June 2012-August 2013 |
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