



PERSONNEL OFFICE


THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS

BOX 830688 RICHARDSON, TEXAS 75083-0688 (214) 690-2221

January 6, 1994

MEMORANDUM

TO: Dr. Robert H. Rutford
✓ Dr. Hobson Wildenthal

FROM: Jerry Robinson 

SUBJECT: Dept. of Defense Security Inspection

The DOD 9-month inspection scheduled before the holidays did not occur due to the illness of DOD rep Allen Rhodes. I have received written confirmation of DOD's rescheduling of the meeting and noted the January 13th, 2:00 p.m. time in the attached memo to all cleared personnel.

When last I checked with your offices, January 13th at 2:00 p.m. seemed clear on your calendar. Mr. Rhodes has requested both an "entrance briefing" and an "exit briefing" with UTD's "chief management official". If possible, therefore, I ask that you be available in your respective offices around 2:00 p.m. on January 13th. I will escort Mr. Rhodes to each of you and then on to his requested meeting with all other cleared personnel.

At the conclusion of Mr. Rhodes' time with me (approx. one hour), I will check with your offices to see if either/both of you are available to meet in your office with Mr. Rhodes for his "exit briefing".

As before, should both of your schedules preclude your being available on the 13th, I can represent UTD management as Director of Personnel and Facility Security Officer. Thank you for your support of this DOD program which is necessary for Space Science personnel to visit sites that contain classified material.



PERSONNEL OFFICE


THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS

BOX 830688 RICHARDSON, TEXAS 75083-0688 (214) 690-2221

January 6, 1994

MEMORANDUM

TO: Employees Holding Security Clearances

FROM: Jerry Robinson
Facility Security Officer (FSO) 

SUBJECT: Rescheduled Dept. of Defense (DOD) Inspection:
Thursday January 13th 2:15 p.m.

I have received written confirmation that the re-scheduled DOD inspection by Mr. Ernest "Allen" Rhodes, Industrial Security Representative, will take place as follows:

DATE: January 13, 1994

TIME: 2:15 p.m.

PLACE: President's Conference Room, MP2.414

The meeting is set for 2:15 p.m. rather than the earlier 2:00 time slot to allow for DOD's "entrance briefing" with President Rutford and Vice President Wildenthal.

As before, please call ext. 2130 and leave a message re: your ability to attend the January 13th meeting. Mr. Rhodes' time with you should be fairly brief and center around the contracts on which you work/have worked that necessitate a security clearance.

Thank you for your cooperation with this every-9 month DOD inspection.

→ Nelson W. Identhal



PERSONNEL OFFICE

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS

BOX 830688 RICHARDSON, TEXAS 75083-0688 (214) 690-2221

March 24, 1993

MEMORANDUM

TO: University Employees Holding a Secret Clearance
(Note: 12 hold clearances at this time)

FROM: Jerry Robinson
Facility Security Officer (FSO)

SUBJECT: New DOL Rep.; Increased Training

On Friday, March 19, 1993 our security clearance program underwent its usual every-nine-months review. We have a new Industrial Security Representative, Mr. Allen Rhodes. Mr. Rhodes' 4-hour review of the UTD program found us to be in general compliance with DOD guidelines, however, he did find our training in security matters to be lacking. Accordingly, I will periodically be sending security-related articles and/or appropriate reminders on the subject of industrial security. A sign-off sheet provided each time will ensure record that such information has been transmitted and received.

Following the review by Mr. Rhodes, he sent me the attached "Hotline" poster for distribution to cleared personnel. He also suggested that the page from our facility's Security Manual of Standard Practices and Procedures (SPP) dealing with the "Hotline", also be sent. Upon receipt and reading of the referenced material, please sign the enclosed form and return it to me.

In summary, our small security program that does not involve handling of any classified material onsite at UTD will nonetheless be under greater scrutiny in the future due, in large part, to Mr. Rhodes particular attention to administrative detail. I know you will join with me in ensuring the continued good-standing of UTD's security program that provides access to necessary classified materials off-site.

Please call me if you have any questions about the information noted above (ext 2130).

Enclosures (3)

- * Hotline Poster
- * Hotline page from SSP
- * Acknowledgement form (return to AD 35)

RECEIVED

MAR 25 1993

Office of VPAA

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DEFENSE HOTLINE

The Department of Defense provides a Defense Hotline for DoD personnel and contractor employees to allow an unconstrained avenue for reporting, without fear of reprisal, known or suspected instances of security irregularities and infractions concerning defense-affiliated contracts, programs or projects.

The Defense Hotline does not supplant contractor responsibility to facilitate reporting and timely investigation of security matters concerning its operation or personnel, and contractor employees are encouraged to furnish information through established company channels. The Hotline may be used as an alternate means to report this type information when considered prudent or necessary.

The Defense Hotline is administered by the Office of the Inspector General, DoD, and that office initiates any required investigative action on the basis of such reports.

This facility will conspicuously post information regarding the Defense Hotline and will inform all employees that the Defense Hotline may be used, if necessary, for reporting matters of national security significance.

The address and telephone number of the Defense Hotline is:

The Defense Hotline
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1900
800 424-9098 (toll free)
(202) 693-5080 (Wash. DC Metro Area)

MEMORANDUM

TO: Jerry Robinson
Facility Security Officer (FSO)

SUBJECT: Review of Security Program-Related Material

This is to certify that I have received, read, and retained for possible future reference the following security program-related information:

* "HOTLINE" POSTER

* "HOTLINE" reference page from UTD's Security Manual
of Standard Practices and Procedures (SPP)

Employee Name (please print)

Employee Signature

Date Signed

(Return completed form to Jerry Robinson, AD 35)

September, 1993

MEMORADNUM

TO: All Cleared Personnel
(Faculty/Staff Holding Secret Clearance)

RE: Refresher Briefing

The Department of Defense's Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information (ISM) calls for the FSO to periodically re-brief cleared personnel on the following security-matters:

1. Cleared personnel have a continuing responsibility for safeguarding classified information. (Note: UTD has no material designated as "classified" under DOD security regulations).
2. Cleared personnel should be aware of the security procedures pertaining to their particular assignment of work. Any questions regarding such should be directed to Standard Practice & Procedure (SPP) manual holders, Mr. Ron Lippincott, Dr. John Hoffman or Mr. Jerry Robinson.
3. You will be made aware of any security deficiencies resulting from any DOD inspection that require your individual attention to bring about corrective action.
4. By copy of the attached excerpt from the aforementioned ISM, this briefing provides a reminder of counter-intelligence matters. The paper is divided into these sections: Introduction, The Threat, The Objectives and techniques of Spies, Recognizing the Approach, Protecting the Bits and Pieces, Reporting the Threat, and Summary.

Major Change in ISM: Effective immediately, the list of Designated Countries (ref. UTD SPP, pg. 13 and Attachments 2 and 3) are rescinded. Per a recent Industrial Security Letter (ISL) on the subject: "This decision (by the Asst Sec of Defense) is in response to the political changes taking place throughout the world. All ISM reporting requirements (cited in the ISL) are no longer required. However, all efforts by any individual, regardless of nationality, to obtain illegal or unauthorized access to classified or sensitive unclassified information or to compromise a cleared employee, all contacts by cleared employees with known or suspected intelligence officers from any country, or any contact which suggests the employee concerned may be the target of an attempted exploitation by the intelligence services of another country shall be reported." (end quote)


Jerry Robinson, FSO
Facility Security Officer

SECTION 3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AWARENESS BRIEFING

3-300. **General.** This Section provides guidance for the preparation of counter-intelligence awareness briefings required for cleared employees.

3-301. **Introduction.** The following elements of information are intended to be neither all-inclusive nor all-exclusive, but should be used as source material in the preparation of counterintelligence awareness briefings and as a guide for the type of information to include in this type of briefing. Routine, stereotyped briefings not only fail to meet intended objectives, but could actually weaken security by giving the recipient a false sense of security. Only the use of thoughtfully prepared briefings, based on authoritative information and related to the duties performed and the sensitivity of the classified information to which exposed and manner of presentation, will accomplish the purpose. The following information has been extracted, with permission, from a pamphlet entitled, "Secrets, Spies and Citizens," published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

3-302. **The Threat.** Intelligence collection, the world of espionage and counter-espionage, spies, and spy catchers, is a popular subject of fiction. It has been the topic of countless books, short stories, TV serials, and movies. The role of the spy, the "Secret Agent," has become so sensationalized and exaggerated that it is very easy to think that spies exist only in the minds of fiction writers, that spying belongs in the same category as science fiction and westerns. Do not believe it. Spies do exist, and literally thousands of spies, or intelligence officers, as they are officially known, are at this moment plying their treacherous trade within the U.S. The principal source of these intelligence officers is the Soviet Union, but the USSR's allied nations in Eastern Europe, as well as Cuba, the People's Republic of China, and smaller Asian designated countries such as North Korea and Vietnam, also dispatch spies to U.S. shores. It must be stressed that the threat posed by foreign intelligence agencies cannot be underestimated. History is replete with situations in which a nation's security was

greatly damaged by the efforts of a hostile nation's intelligence services. In American history, the breaking of the Japanese secret code helped bring U.S. victory in the Pacific during World War II. On the other hand, the theft of some key U.S. atomic secrets greatly abetted the interests of the Soviet Union. The craft of spies is by no means a game. The very fate of nations can be damaged or enhanced by their enterprises.

3-303. **The Objectives and Techniques of Spies.** Their main objective is the wholesale collection of data. The most prized type of intelligence data is the classified government document, but unclassified material, even material which appears to be trivial, can also be of inestimable value. In their task of gathering intelligence data, the foreign intelligence services have a large array of tools. Satellites miles above the earth's surface gather photographic data. Aircraft and vessels gather electronic intelligence. But a further source of data, and potentially the most valuable to a hostile nation, is that acquired through the use of actual spies. (Here the briefer may wish to identify the type of classified projects or work being performed by the facility which lends credence to the possibility of its being an espionage target.) Intelligence services may gather their information through the use of several different techniques. Probably the greatest achievement an intelligence organization can have is the placement or recruitment of an agent directly in a sensitive position in a national defense or intelligence element of an opposing government. The penetration by live or electronic sources of private institutions involved in sensitive, national defense-related research and development work can also be of tremendous value.

a. Hostile intelligence collectors ply Washington and other locations where strategic data can be collected. They gain their desired information wherever, whenever, and from whomever it can be had. Hostile intelligence officers employ various tactics in their campaigns to enlist target employees. They may use a honeyed,

seemingly guileless approach. They befriend targets, treat them to gifts and money, wine and dine them. Many Soviet and other agents believe that Americans are hopelessly materialistic, and can be easily swayed by appeals to their alleged greed.

b. In another maneuver, a hostile intelligence officer misrepresents him or herself as a citizen of a country friendly to the U.S. Thus a targeted American may be duped into handing over sensitive information by being led to believe that he or she is aiding an ally of the U.S. In a variation of this tactic, an intelligence officer poses as a representative of a country towards which a targeted American is particularly sympathetic. Also, if a hostile agent believes that an individual has Communist sympathies, he or she may make an appeal for information based on ideology. A "pitch" for information also may be geared to take advantage of an American's desire for international harmony and world peace.

c. Another favored appeal exploits the American belief in freedom of speech and the free exchange of information. A hostile intelligence officer in the role of a scientist may, for example, tell an American scientist that science has no political boundaries. Therefore, in the interest of science, the American is encouraged to share knowledge with a fellow "member" of the international scientific community. Intelligence agents can also play rough in their ceaseless quest for strategic information. To such people espionage is a business. If they feel coercion and blackmail will serve their purpose, they will not hesitate to employ such methods. The honeyed approach can readily turn sour if an agent determines that a targeted employee has personal inadequacies which that employee does not wish to have exposed.

d. Correspondingly, another tactic is the exploitation of a "hostage situation." If, for example, a foreign intelligence service learns that a targeted employee has relatives in Eastern Europe or the USSR, that employee is in an extremely vulnerable position. First will come gentle persuasion (an agent may produce "letters" from so-called relatives

calling for the American to "cooperate"). If that does not work, the agent may suggest that harsh measures could be applied to the relatives.

3-304. Recognizing the Approach.

a. One should therefore be wary of glad-handing strangers who make an intensive effort at forming a friendship, and then slowly but surely begin to use that friendship to learn where one works, the nature of one's assignment, and with whom one works. A generous and inquisitive stranger could very well be the proverbial wolf in sheep's clothing.

b. One should also be wary of strangers who ask for information not related to their professed area of interest or do not seem to be particularly knowledgeable in their field. Thus, if "scientists" request data not related to their fields, or do not seem to know much about their supposed areas of expertise, then they very well could be imposters.

c. The operative of a foreign intelligence service need not be a foreigner, nor need the occasion of encountering him or her be in any way extraordinary. The neighbor one might meet at a PTA meeting could be a foreign diplomat who lives down the block, or he or she could be a fellow American who has been recruited as an agent by a hostile service. The spy could be a "spotter," who reports to an intelligence service on persons he or she meets who appear to be susceptible to recruitment and, sometimes, arranges for intelligence officers to meet them. Do not expect either intelligence officers or agents to expose their roles in any dramatic and sudden fashion. Usually there is a long period of cultivation during which conversations with the individual could be completely normal and innocuous. However, at any point where someone begins to inquire into aspects of one's knowledge or activity which are classified or otherwise private, one certainly should stop to consider whether the inquiry is normal innocent curiosity, or whether it might be the beginning of an attempt to secure intelligence information for the benefit of another country.

3-305. Protecting the Bits & Pieces. It cannot be over emphasized that unclassified material may be just as valuable to a foreign intelligence service as classified material. In formulating their estimations of U.S. strengths and weaknesses, and in the quest for data that will enhance their own nation's strength, foreign intelligence services seek all types of material. A small bit of information could represent a very important piece in a much larger puzzle. Therefore, all data should be protected from the probing hands of foreign agents. A stolen industrial process can save thousands of dollars in research and development cost. The most trivial document could be the missing link of a hostile nation's problem.

3-306. Reporting the Threat. In the effort to protect America's secrets, the role of the facility must be emphasized. Each U.S. Government agency and private industry which deals with classified material has a specified official in charge of security matters. This security officer should be recognized as an ally and not an adversary. If approached by a suspicious stranger in the manner described above, the security officer should be informed immediately of the encounter. Even if a friendship has been established, even if the individual has been able to pry loose some information, the security officer should be consulted. A major aspect of the security officer's job is to protect employees from getting involved in compromising situations and, if necessary, to extricate them from such situations. Such assistance cannot be rendered if the employee remains silent. Of course, it is much better for an employee to reveal a suspect relationship voluntarily, rather than have it come to light in the course of a security investigation, or through some other means. Then, it may be too late for anyone to assist the indiscreet employee. Basically, it cannot be overemphasized that, if involved in a compromising situation, the sooner the employee consults his or her facility security officer, the better. Of course, sometimes one will be in a place or situation where one cannot, or for some reason does not want to, contact the security officer. Remember that in the U.S., the FBI is as close as the nearest telephone. Directions for contacting FBI

offices appear in the front of all U.S. telephone books. Abroad, the nearest U.S. diplomatic establishment can arrange to put one in touch with the FBI or other appropriate U.S. Government security officials. It must be stressed that the best course of action in any questionable situation is to immediately contact a counterintelligence professional who will analyze the situation and propose a course of action. Counterintelligence is a demanding and professional discipline, and any attempts by untrained amateurs to handle hostile efforts on their own could not only result in personal disaster, but also interfere with the FBI's coordinated counterattack.

3-307. Summary. Counterintelligence awareness is critical. The Soviet Union and its surrogates have established a long standing, well-organized, deliberate, and quite successful effort to acquire and utilize Western state-of-the-art technology by both overt and covert means. Unquestionably, this acquisition of Western technology has played, and will continue to play, an extremely important role in the development of industrial and military capabilities of Communist bloc countries, particularly the Soviet Union. A philosopher once said, "Knowledge itself is power." This maxim most certainly applies to national power, for one gauge of national power is the amount and quality of scientific, technological, and military-related knowledge possessed by a nation. A nation such as the U.S. can be weakened by the theft of its vital knowledge, and its enemies can be strengthened by the acquisition of that knowledge, whether it be classified or unclassified. It is the responsibility of each individual who has been entrusted with sensitive data to do his or her share in protecting America's strategic knowledge, whether it be classified TOP SECRET or seemingly unimportant, unclassified material. For if Americans do not conduct themselves in a responsible and patriotic manner, do not recognize that this country's national security is based essentially on the loyalty and efforts of its citizens, then the tightest document classification system, the most efficient security organization, and the mightiest Armed Forces may be utterly valueless.

COPY for: Security Program
Training file



THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS

BOX 830688 RICHARDSON, TEXAS 75083-0688 (214) 690-2221

PERSONNEL OFFICE

March 24, 1993

MEMORANDUM

TO: University Employees Holding a Secret Clearance
(Note: 12 hold clearances at this time)

FROM: Jerry Robinson
Facility Security Officer (FSO)

SUBJECT: New DOL Rep.; Increased Training

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Following the review by Mr. Rhodes, he sent me the attached "Hotline" poster for distribution to cleared personnel. He also suggested that the page from our facility's Security Manual of Standard Practices and Procedures (SPP) dealing with the "Hotline" also be sent. Upon receipt and reading of the referenced material, please sign the enclosed form and return it to me.

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800 424-9098 (toll free)
(202) 693-5080 (Wash. DC Metro Area)

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PERSONNEL OFFICE

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS

BOX 830688 RICHARDSON, TEXAS 75083-0688 (214) 690-2221

D. W. Identhal

February 4, 1994

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Personnel Holding a Secret Clearance

FROM: Jerry Robinson, Facility Security Officer (FSO)

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'J. Robinson', written over the 'FROM:' line.

RE: Summary of January 13, 1994 Inspection

President Rutford has received the standard formal report of our January 13th DOD security visit conducted by Mr. Allen Rhodes. The report reads, in part, as follows:

"The security posture of your facility was satisfactory and the inspection was satisfactory. Mr. Rhodes was complimentary about the noted improvement in your security posture. I appreciate your support of the Industrial Security Program and thank you for the courtesy extended during the inspection."

/s/ Edward A. Dotson
Chief, Industrial Security
Field Office

The letter also noted "one deficiency...discussed with Mr. Robinson (that) must be corrected before the next scheduled inspection." That deficiency has to deal with cleared personnel who have **not** used their clearance in over 12 months who, therefore, are in need of having their clearance "administratively terminated". I will be in touch with the appropriate "program manager" to confirm who needs to have their clearance removed. Such an inquiry should be conducted, per Mr. Rhodes, on an annual basis and I have made notes on my calendar to do such.

I do appreciate each of you standing by (for a **second** time!) to meet with Mr. Rhodes. UTD's security program is a small one, but, it's important to keep it in good standing for those needing to visit sites where classified material exists.

Final note: Our next inspection, per Mr. Rhodes, may be an "unannounced" one in which he calls 30 minutes before coming on campus to meet with me and review my security files. Such an inspection ("about one month before your next regular inspection in October, 1994") would probably **not** require a "fire drill" to gather all cleared personnel together with virtually no notice.



THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS

BOX 830688 RICHARDSON, TEXAS 75083-0688
(214) 690-2271 FAX (214) 690-2276

VICE PRESIDENT FOR ACADEMIC AFFAIRS

February 7, 1994

Professor David Ford
School of Management
The University of Texas at Dallas
Richardson, Texas 75083

Dear Professor Ford:

I am very pleased that you have agreed to work with my office during the Spring and Summer terms of 1994 towards the goal of creating at UT-Dallas a much expanded and enhanced program by which our students can avail themselves of the educational and financial benefits of workplace practicums linked to their on-campus classroom and laboratory experiences. UT-Dallas enjoys a physical location and a cultural history that gives us a unique advantage among all American institutions of higher learning in providing our students with opportunities to supplement their conventional learning experiences with experiences in the workplace that enrich their education, provide them with significant financial benefits and give them a major advantage in planning their careers and securing employment after graduation in accord with these plans.

Your engagement in this effort this Spring and Summer will be compensated with a one-course reduction in your regular Spring organized-course teaching assignment and with three months of salary during the Summer session. Your responsibilities will include developing a substantial and quantified profile of student interests and desires regarding practicums, similarly developing a profile of attitudes and practices of local businesses and industries regarding practicums, reviewing and summarizing in detail current UT-Dallas programs of internships, coop jobs and similar versions of practicums, working to establish a coordinating structure for these current programs, studying the most successful national models of coop education and distilling the lessons they have for UT-Dallas, initiating the steps necessary to have UT-Dallas gain official status in the national organizations of coop education, and, finally, developing an organizational structure for comprehensively coordinating our current efforts in this arena and then enhancing them by an order of magnitude in size and in impact upon our students and our business and industry partners.

Obviously, this task is one that will require longer than the next six months. Nonetheless, I hope that at the end of this period we will have made significant progress on all of these fronts and have determined strategies for carrying the initiative on to full implementation. I look forward to working with you and our colleagues on this exciting and important initiative.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Hobson Wildenthal".

Hobson Wildenthal

BHW:mrk