Sethi, Suresh P
Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/3642
Suresh Sethi holds the Eugene McDermott Chair and is Professor of Operations Management. He also is the Founder and Director of the Center for Intelligent Supply Networks. His research interests include:
- Supply chain management
- Partially observed inventory models
- Hierarchical decisions in dynamic stochastic manufacturing systems
- Dynamic and stochastic advertising models
- Optimal pricing, development and maintenance of software
- Decision, forecast, and rolling horizons in dynamic optimization problems
- Scheduling and sequencing of robotic cells
- Mathematical finance
- Genuine savings and value of population
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Recipient of the 2020 Sushil K. Gupta POMS Distinguished Service Award from the Production and Operations Management Society (POMS).
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Browsing Sethi, Suresh P by Author "0000-0001-9590-5627 (Sethi, SP)"
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Item Advance Selling in the Presence of Market Power and Risk-Averse Consumers(Wiley, 2018-07-18) Ma, Shanshan; Li, Guo; Sethi, Suresh P.; Zhao, Xuan; 0000-0001-9590-5627 (Sethi, SP); Sethi, Suresh P.We consider a manufacturer who procures raw material through a long-term contract as well as in a spot market to produce goods for selling to consumers, a fraction of whom are risk averse. We assume that the manufacturer has the market power to influence the spot market price of raw material. To increase consumer demand and obtain demand information, the manufacturer may implement an advance selling program that depends on his market power and consumer risk aversion. We investigate whether the manufacturer should offer the advance selling program and how his decision and performance are influenced by the program. We find that the advance selling program should be offered when consumer risk aversion is low, or when it is high, and the manufacturer has high and low market power. By contrast, the advance selling program should not be offered when consumer risk aversion is high and the market power is medium. Our results also reveal that even with no promotion cost of the advance selling program, the manufacturer may not always offer it. Finally, the manufacturer benefits more from advance selling when consumers are myopic and/or risk neutral.Item Scheduling in Production, Supply Chain and Industry 4.0 Systems by Optimal Control: Fundamentals, State-of-the-Art and Applications(Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2018-02-08) Dolgui, Alexandre; Ivanov, Dmitry; Sethi, Suresh P.; Sokolov, Boris; 0000-0001-9590-5627 (Sethi, SP); Sethi, Suresh P.This paper presents a survey on the applications of optimal control to scheduling in production, supply chain and Industry 4.0 systems with a focus on the deterministic maximum principle. The first objective is to derive major contributions, application areas, limitations, as well as research and application recommendations for the future research. The second objective is to explain control engineering models in terms of industrial engineering and production management. To achieve these objectives, optimal control models, qualitative methods of performance analysis and computational methods for optimal control are considered. We provide a brief historic overview and clarify major mathematical fundamentals whereby the control engineering terms are brought into correspondence with industrial engineering and management. The survey allows the grouping of models with only terminal constraints with application to master production scheduling, models with hybrid terminal-logical constraints with applications to short term job and flow shop scheduling, and hybrid structural-terminal-logical constraints with applications to customised assembly systems such as Industry 4.0. Computational algorithms in state, control and adjoint variable spaces are discussed.Item Sourcing Contract under Countervailing Incentives(Wiley-Blackwell, 2019-05-25) Gan, X.; Feng, Q.; Sethi, Suresh P.; 0000-0001-9590-5627 (Sethi, SP); Sethi, Suresh P.We study a retailer’s sourcing contract when the supplier’s reservation profit (offered by his outside options) depends on his cost, which is privately known to only the supplier. An interesting discovery from our analysis is that supply chain coordination may be achieved despite the information asymmetry between the two firms regarding the supplier’s type (i.e., his cost). This happens when the marginal contribution of the supplier’s cost efficiency to the trade matches with the supplier’s marginal reservation profit. In this case, the optimal contract quantities maximize the supply chain profits for the respective supplier types, and no information rent is paid to any supplier type. For the general case, we show that, regardless of his type, the supplier may have an incentive to overstate or understate his cost, depending on whether or not his marginal contribution to the trade exceeds his marginal reservation profit. We demonstrate six possible forms of the optimal contract. Observations from our analysis contrast with those derived from previous studies, complementing the theory of countervailing incentives. © 2019 Production and Operations Management SocietyItem Strategic Remanufacturing under Competition(De Gruyter, 2019-06-12) Ma, Zhongwen; Prasad, A.; Sethi, Suresh P.; 0000-0001-9590-5627 (Sethi, SP); Ma, Zhongwen; Sethi, Suresh P.We investigate firms' remanufacturing strategies for the case of a duopoly. On the one hand, remanufactured products cannibalize sales of new products of the same firm thereby hurting its profits. On the other hand, they can be part of a profitable marketing strategy that targets different customer preferences by providing a larger number of alternatives to customers. This paper studies the tradeoff between these effects and how it is influenced by competition. We develop a model where demand functions for new and remanufactured products of each firm are derived from utility maximization by a representative consumer. This allows us to capture preference and substitution effects between all offered products in the market. We discuss how equilibrium strategies are affected by factors such as competition, substitutability, production cost as well as remanufacturing cost. For example, when competitive intensity between new and new products, and remanufactured and remanufactured products, is (high), both (neither) firms offer remanufactured products in a symmetric equilibrium. If substitution between new and remanufactured products of the same firm is low, but the remanufactured product has a lower margin than the new product, firms can be worse off from remanufacturing. © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.