Sethi, Suresh P
Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/3642
Suresh Sethi holds the Eugene McDermott Chair and is Professor of Operations Management. He also is the Founder and Director of the Center for Intelligent Supply Networks. His research interests include:
- Supply chain management
- Partially observed inventory models
- Hierarchical decisions in dynamic stochastic manufacturing systems
- Dynamic and stochastic advertising models
- Optimal pricing, development and maintenance of software
- Decision, forecast, and rolling horizons in dynamic optimization problems
- Scheduling and sequencing of robotic cells
- Mathematical finance
- Genuine savings and value of population
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Recipient of the 2020 Sushil K. Gupta POMS Distinguished Service Award from the Production and Operations Management Society (POMS).
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Browsing Sethi, Suresh P by Subject "Business logistics"
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Item Advance Selling in the Presence of Market Power and Risk-Averse Consumers(Wiley, 2018-07-18) Ma, Shanshan; Li, Guo; Sethi, Suresh P.; Zhao, Xuan; 0000-0001-9590-5627 (Sethi, SP); Sethi, Suresh P.We consider a manufacturer who procures raw material through a long-term contract as well as in a spot market to produce goods for selling to consumers, a fraction of whom are risk averse. We assume that the manufacturer has the market power to influence the spot market price of raw material. To increase consumer demand and obtain demand information, the manufacturer may implement an advance selling program that depends on his market power and consumer risk aversion. We investigate whether the manufacturer should offer the advance selling program and how his decision and performance are influenced by the program. We find that the advance selling program should be offered when consumer risk aversion is low, or when it is high, and the manufacturer has high and low market power. By contrast, the advance selling program should not be offered when consumer risk aversion is high and the market power is medium. Our results also reveal that even with no promotion cost of the advance selling program, the manufacturer may not always offer it. Finally, the manufacturer benefits more from advance selling when consumers are myopic and/or risk neutral.Item Relationship-Specific Investment and Hold-Up Problems in Supply Chains: Theory and Experiments(Springer, 2018-07-20) Haruvy, Ernan; Katok, Elena; Ma, Zhongwen; Sethi, Suresh; 0000-0002-7037-7896 (Katok, E); Haruvy, Ernan; Katok, Elena; Ma, Zhongwen; Sethi, SureshSupply chains today routinely use third parties for many strategic activities, such as manufacturing, R&D, or software development. These activities often include relationship-specific investment on the part of the vendor, while final outcomes can be uncertain. Therefore, writing complete contracts for such arrangements is often not feasible, but incomplete contracts, especially when relationship-specific investment is required, may leave the supplier vulnerable to a version of the “hold-up problem,” which is known to result in sub-optimal levels of investment. We model the phenomenon as a sequential move game with asymmetric information. Absent behavioral considerations, the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium implies zero investment. However, with social preferences, the hold-up problem may be mitigated. We propose a model that incorporates social preferences and random errors, and solve for the equilibrium. In addition, we look at reputation and find it to be effective for increasing investment. We conduct laboratory experiments with human subjects and find that a model with social preferences and random errors organizes our data well. © 2018, The Author(s).Item Scheduling in Production, Supply Chain and Industry 4.0 Systems by Optimal Control: Fundamentals, State-of-the-Art and Applications(Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2018-02-08) Dolgui, Alexandre; Ivanov, Dmitry; Sethi, Suresh P.; Sokolov, Boris; 0000-0001-9590-5627 (Sethi, SP); Sethi, Suresh P.This paper presents a survey on the applications of optimal control to scheduling in production, supply chain and Industry 4.0 systems with a focus on the deterministic maximum principle. The first objective is to derive major contributions, application areas, limitations, as well as research and application recommendations for the future research. The second objective is to explain control engineering models in terms of industrial engineering and production management. To achieve these objectives, optimal control models, qualitative methods of performance analysis and computational methods for optimal control are considered. We provide a brief historic overview and clarify major mathematical fundamentals whereby the control engineering terms are brought into correspondence with industrial engineering and management. The survey allows the grouping of models with only terminal constraints with application to master production scheduling, models with hybrid terminal-logical constraints with applications to short term job and flow shop scheduling, and hybrid structural-terminal-logical constraints with applications to customised assembly systems such as Industry 4.0. Computational algorithms in state, control and adjoint variable spaces are discussed.Item Sourcing Contract under Countervailing Incentives(Wiley-Blackwell, 2019-05-25) Gan, X.; Feng, Q.; Sethi, Suresh P.; 0000-0001-9590-5627 (Sethi, SP); Sethi, Suresh P.We study a retailer’s sourcing contract when the supplier’s reservation profit (offered by his outside options) depends on his cost, which is privately known to only the supplier. An interesting discovery from our analysis is that supply chain coordination may be achieved despite the information asymmetry between the two firms regarding the supplier’s type (i.e., his cost). This happens when the marginal contribution of the supplier’s cost efficiency to the trade matches with the supplier’s marginal reservation profit. In this case, the optimal contract quantities maximize the supply chain profits for the respective supplier types, and no information rent is paid to any supplier type. For the general case, we show that, regardless of his type, the supplier may have an incentive to overstate or understate his cost, depending on whether or not his marginal contribution to the trade exceeds his marginal reservation profit. We demonstrate six possible forms of the optimal contract. Observations from our analysis contrast with those derived from previous studies, complementing the theory of countervailing incentives. © 2019 Production and Operations Management Society