Stecke, Kathryn E.

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/3191

Katherine Stecke is an Ashbell Smith Professor of Operations Management. She is internationally recognized as a scholar in flexible manufacturing and supply chain issues. She speaks globally about issues related to supply chain management, operations and marketing interface issues, flexible manufacturing systems and seru, which is a Japanese organizational and production system that focuses on electronics product assembly. In 2019 she was awarded the Naveen Jindal School Advisory Council Chair.

Her research covers issues relating to manufacturing and improving manufacturing efficiencies and cost controls. Currently her interests involve

  • Flexible manufacturing
  • Supply chain issues
  • Disruptions in supply chains
  • Activity-based costing in automated manufacturing
  • Quality competitiveness indices

Learn more about Dr. Stecke on her Home, Expert at a Glance, Endowed Professorships and Chairs, and Research Explorer pages.

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Recent Submissions

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
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    Operational Role of Retail Bundling and its Implications in a Supply Chain
    (Wiley-Blackwell) Cao, Q.; Geng, X.; Stecke, Kathryn E.; Zhang, J.; Stecke, Kathryn E.
    We study the impacts of retail bundling on a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. The retailer orders a primary product from the manufacturer before demand uncertainty materializes, and can retail it in a bundle with a secondary product afterwards. Our findings reveal three effects of bundling. First, bundling can help a retailer mitigate the adverse consequences of demand uncertainty in the primary product and price-discriminate customers of the secondary product. Second, bundling can lower the retailer’s wholesale-price elasticity and partition the retailer’s ordering decision into bundling and no-bundling regions, between which there is a marked drop in the retailer’s optimal order quantity. Third, bundling affects the manufacturer’s wholesale price decision in an unexpected way: The manufacturer may lower the wholesale price when the retailer bundles. Our analysis shows bundling benefits the manufacturer, but can sometimes hurt the retailer. Further, when uncertainty in retail order is considered, while the manufacturer always benefits from retail bundling in expectation, it might be worse off with bundling depending on the realization of the uncertain market size. This explains why retail bundling has been a concern to some major manufacturers whereas they do not prohibit bundling up front. ©2019 Production and Operations Management Society
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    In-Season Transshipments Among Competitive Retailers
    Çömez, N.; Stecke, Kathryn E.; Çakanyildirim, Metín; 0000 0000 6749 9396 (Stecke, KE); 85334293‏ (Stecke)
    A decentralized system of competing retailers that order and sell the same product in a sales season is studied. When a customer demand occurs at a stocked-out retailer, that retailer requests a unit to be transshipped from another retailer who charges a transshipment price. If this request is rejected, the unsatisfied customer may go to another retailer with a customer overflow probability. Each retailer decides on the initial order quantity from a manufacturer and on the acceptance/rejection of each transshipment request. For two retailers, we show that retailers' optimal transshipment policies are dynamic and characterized by chronologically nonincreasing inventory holdback levels. We analytically study the sensitivity of holdback levels to explain interesting findings, such as smaller retailers and geographically distant retailers benefit more from transshipments. Numerical experiments show that retailers substantially benefit from using optimal transshipment policies compared to no sharing. The expected sales increase in all but a handful of over 3, 000 problem instances. Building on the two-retailer optimal policies, we suggest an effective heuristic transshipment policy for a multiretailer system. © 2012 INFORMS.

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