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dc.contributor.authorFatas, Enriqueen_US
dc.contributor.authorHaruvy, Ernanen_US
dc.contributor.authorMorales, Antonio J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-11T16:29:30Z
dc.date.available2014-09-11T16:29:30Z
dc.date.created2014-04en_US
dc.identifier.issn0038-4038en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/4002
dc.description.abstractThe Bertrand paradox describes a situation in which two competing firms reach an outcome where both price at marginal cost. In laboratory experiments, this equilibrium is not generally observed. Existing empirical works on Bertrand competition have found evidence for boundedly rational models. We find that such models are useful in organizing behavior in early stages of the game, but less so in later stages. We show that a new model, coarse grid Nash equilibrium, based on the assumption that subjects discretize the strategy space, explains the data better.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniv North Carolinaen_US
dc.relation.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2012.264en_US
dc.rights©2014 Southern Economic Associationen_US
dc.subjectBertrand paradoxen_US
dc.subjectPricesen_US
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectCoarse Grid Nash Equilibrium (CGNE)en_US
dc.titleA Psychological Reexamination of the Bertrand Paradoxen_US
dc.type.genrearticleen_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationFatas, Enrique, Eman Haruvy, and Antonio J. Morales. 2014. "A psychological reexamination of the Bertrand Paradox." Southern Economic Journal 80(4): 948-967.en_US
dc.source.journalSouthern Economic Journalen_US
dc.identifier.volume80en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.startpage948en_US
dc.contributor.VIAF205185198 (Haruvy, E)


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