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dc.contributor.authorWang, Zhigangen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Zhenchaoen_US
dc.contributor.authorLi, Chunfaen_US
dc.contributor.authorXu, Leien_US
dc.contributor.authorYou, Changen_US
dc.identifier.citationWang, Zhigang, Zhenchao Zhang, Chunfa Li, Lei Xu, et al. 2015. "Optimal ordering and disposing policies in the presence of an overconfident retailer: A Stackelberg game." Mathematical Problems in Engineering (385289): doi:10.1155/2015/385289.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the impact of the retailer's overconfident behavior on supply chain performance. We start with a basic model on the rational newsvendor model and investigate the retailer's optimal ordering decision and expected profit. Next, we extend the basic model and introduce an overconfident retailer. We find that the retailer's overconfident behavior does not necessarily damage the supply chain compared with the basic model when the overconfident level does not exceed a threshold. We also design the cooperation and buyback mechanism and conduct numerical analysis to compare the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits and real profits with those in the basic newsvendor model. It can achieve Pareto improvement in the supply chain when the overconfident level is low. When the retailer's overconfident level exceeds a threshold, the retailer's ordering decision cannot make the whole supply chain sustainable development.en_US
dc.rightsCC-BY 3.0 (Attribution)en_US
dc.rights©2014 The Authorsen_US
dc.subjectBusiness logisticsen_US
dc.subjectOrdering decisionen_US
dc.subjectRetail trade--Managementen_US
dc.subjectStackelberg equilibriumen_US
dc.titleOptimal Ordering and Disposing Policies in the Presence of an Overconfident Retailer: A Stackelberg Gameen_US
dc.source.journalMathematical Problems in Engineeringen_US

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CC-BY 3.0 (Attribution)
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as CC-BY 3.0 (Attribution)