Business-Government Relationship and Foreign Market Entry in Transition Economies

Abstract

My dissertation encompasses of three essays: 1) Political Market Competition in Transition Economies, 2) How Does Home Country Bribery Change Firms’ Foreign Market Focus? 3) Divergent Learning Effects from Alliance Experience and Cross-Border M&A Entries. The first essay hinges on observing how firms deploy corporate political strategies as competitive reaction when faced with politically active industry competitors, especially in the transition economy setting. The second essay explores the effect of firm bribes paid in the home countries on firms ‘export tendencies. Using resource dependence theory, we find that bribery improves firms’ positions in their domestic market then in turn reduce their motivation to seek foreign markets. The third paper endeavors to fill a gap in the learning literature in terms of gauging the different effects of within-form and cross-form experience on making subsequent M&A deals, and how these manifest given a regulatory change. All three essays study how firms strategize given the institutional forces that they face in transition economies, in terms of their political actions and entry strategies into foreign markets.