A Comparison of Stealthy Sensor Attacks on Control Systems

Date

ORCID

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

item.page.doi

Abstract

As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term stealthy has come to encompass a variety of techniques that attackers can employ to avoid detection. Here we show how the states of the system (in particular, the reachable set corresponding to the attack) can be manipulated under two important types of stealthy attacks. We employ the chi-squared fault detection method and demonstrate how this imposes a constraint on the attack sequence either to generate no alarms (zero-alarm attack) or to generate alarms at a rate indistinguishable from normal operation (hidden attack).

Description

Full text access from Treasures at UT Dallas is restricted to current UTD affiliates.

Keywords

Detectors, Computer networks—Monitoring, Random variables, Computer security, Human-machine systems

item.page.sponsorship

Rights

©2018 AACC.

Citation

Collections