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dc.contributor.authorViswanathan, M.
dc.contributor.authorLi, Xiaolin
dc.contributor.authorJohn, G.
dc.contributor.authorNarasimhan, O.
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-06T22:04:20Z
dc.date.available2019-08-06T22:04:20Z
dc.date.created2018-06-01
dc.identifier.issn0022-2437
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/6773
dc.descriptionFull text access from Treasures at UT Dallas is restricted to current UTD affiliates (use the provided Link to Article).
dc.description.abstractThe pervasive use of merchandise (i.e., noncash) incentives in sales compensation plans is an empirical and theoretical puzzle given the supposed superiority of cash incentives in the standard theory (i.e., principal-agent models) as well as the scant, and contradictory empirical evidence. The authors conducted a large-scale field intervention that switched 580 salespeople at a large frozen food manufacturer away from their cash plus "merchandise points" bonus to a commensurate all-cash bonus. After controlling for salesperson, seasonality, year, and target effects, the authors estimate that sales, on average, dropped by 4.36%. Furthermore, they estimated individual level sales changes and effort changes to validate the incentive-effort-sales causal chain. The results show that the top salespeople experienced the largest drops in sales. A post-intervention survey of social and individual difference variables reveals that salespeople from households with less discretionary financial resources and those who think more abstractly about the uses of cash income exhibited smaller reductions in effort and sales. Although the absence of a control group prevents the authors from making strong causal inferences, this set of results nevertheless provides descriptive and suggestive evidence for separate mental accounts as the most promising explanation for the greater utility provided by merchandise incentives.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherAmerican Marketing Association
dc.relation.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmr.14.0290
dc.rights©2018 American Marketing Association
dc.subjectField experiments
dc.subjectIncentive awards
dc.subjectWages
dc.subjectSales personnel—Salaries, etc.
dc.titleIs Cash King for Sales Compensation Plans? Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Intervention
dc.type.genrearticle
dc.description.departmentNaveen Jindal School of Management
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationViswanathan, M., X. Li, G. John, and O. Narasimhan. 2018. "Is cash king for sales compensation plans? Evidence from a large-scale field intervention." Journal of Marketing Research 55(3): 368-381, doi:10.1509/jmr.14.0290
dc.source.journalJournal of Marketing Research
dc.identifier.volume55
dc.identifier.issue3
dc.contributor.utdAuthorLi, Xiaolin
dc.contributor.ORCID0000-0002-3163-022X (Li, X)


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