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dc.contributor.authorHoe, S.
dc.contributor.authorYan, Z.
dc.contributor.authorBensoussan, Alain
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-30T17:09:41Z
dc.date.available2019-08-30T17:09:41Z
dc.date.created2018-01-16
dc.identifier.issn0013-791X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/6818
dc.descriptionFull text access from Treasures at UT Dallas is restricted to current UTD affiliates (use the provided Link to Article).
dc.description.abstractThis short note clarifies how the Stackelberg leader’s competitive advantage after the follower’s entry affects the leader’s optimal market entry decision and Stackelberg strategic interactions under uncertainty. Although the Stackelberg leader’s first investment threshold remains constant and coincides with the monopolist’s investment trigger, his second (third) investment threshold, which defines the exit (entry) of the first (second) investment interval, increases with an increased competitive advantage. With an increased competitive advantage, the probability of sequential investment equilibrium (simultaneous investment equilibrium) increases (decreases) irrespective of the level of volatility. Moreover, for a given level of competitive advantage, an increase in the volatility tends to decrease (increase) the probability of simultaneous investment equilibrium (sequential investment equilibrium). For a richer set of results, endogenous firm roles are examined and analyzed as well. The leader’s preemptive threshold is negatively affected by his competitive advantage.
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation grant nos. DMS-1612880, 1303775; Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (CityU 11303316, 500113); National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC Grant nos. 11601186, 11426115, 71771142, 71271127).
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherTaylor and Francis Inc.
dc.relation.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0013791X.2017.1399186
dc.rights©2018 Institute of Industrial & Systems Engineers
dc.subjectCompetition
dc.subjectTiming circuits
dc.subjectInvestments
dc.titleThe Impact of Competitive Advantage on the Investment Timing in Stackelberg Leader–Follower Game
dc.type.genrearticle
dc.description.departmentNaveen Jindal School of Management
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationHoe, S., Z. Yan, and A. Bensoussan. 2018. "The impact of competitive advantage on the investment timing in Stackelberg leader–follower game." Engineering Economist 63(3): 236-249, doi:10.1080/0013791X.2017.1399186
dc.source.journalEngineering Economist
dc.identifier.volume63
dc.identifier.issue3
dc.contributor.utdAuthorBensoussan, Alain
dc.contributor.ISNI0000 0001 1323 1180 (Bensoussan, A)
dc.contributor.ORCID0000-0003-0743-498X (Bensoussan, A)


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