On Reachable Sets of Hidden CPS Sensor Attacks
For given system dynamics, observer structure, and observer-based fault/attack detection procedure, we provide mathematical tools - in terms of Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) - for computing outer ellipsoidal bounds on the set of estimation errors that attacks can induce while maintaining the alarm rate of the detector equal to its attack-free false alarm rate. We refer to these sets to as hidden reachable sets. These bounds quantify the attacker's potential impact when it is constrained to stay hidden from the detector. We provide tools for minimizing the volume of these ellipsoidal bounds (minimizing thus the reachable sets) by redesigning the observer. Simulation results are presented to illustrate the performance of our tools. © 2018 AACC.
Full text access from Treasures at UT Dallas is restricted to current UTD affiliates (use the provided Link to Article).