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dc.contributor.authorYang, S.
dc.contributor.authorPeng, D.
dc.contributor.authorMeng, T.
dc.contributor.authorWu, F.
dc.contributor.authorChen, G.
dc.contributor.authorTang, Shaojie
dc.contributor.authorLi, Z.
dc.contributor.authorLuo, T. T.
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-07T22:39:57Z
dc.date.available2019-10-07T22:39:57Z
dc.date.created2018-09-13
dc.identifier.issn1536-1233
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/6967
dc.descriptionFull text access from Treasures at UT Dallas is restricted to current UTD affiliates (use the provided Link to Article).
dc.description.abstractAuctions are believed to be effective methods to solve the problem of wireless spectrum allocation. Existing spectrum auction mechanisms are all centralized and suffer from several critical drawbacks of the centralized systems, which motivates the design of distributed spectrum auction mechanisms. However, extending a centralized spectrum auction to a distributed one broadens the strategy space of agents from one dimension (bid) to three dimensions (bid, communication, and computation), and thus cannot be solved by traditional approaches from mechanism design. In this paper, we propose two distributed spectrum auction mechanisms, namely distributed VCG and FAITH. Distributed VCG implements the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism in a distributed fashion to achieve optimal social welfare, at the cost of exponential communication overhead. In contrast, FAITH achieves sub-optimal social welfare with tractable computation and communication overhead. We prove that both of the two proposed mechanisms achieve faithfulness, i.e., the agents' individual utilities are maximized, if they follow the intended strategies. Besides, we extend FAITH to adapt to dynamic scenarios where agents can arrive or depart at any time, without violating the property of faithfulness. We implement distributed VCG and FAITH, and evaluate their performance in various setups. ©2018 IEEE
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work was supported in part by the National the Key R&D Program of China under grant 2018YFB1004700, in part by China NSF grant 61672348, 61672353, and 61472252, and in part by Shanghai Science and Technology fund 15220721300.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
dc.relation.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2018.2869863
dc.rights©2018 IEEE
dc.subjectCommunication systems—Security measures
dc.subjectCost accounting
dc.subjectDistributed algorithms
dc.subjectGame theory
dc.subjectElectric interference
dc.subjectMobile computing
dc.subjectWireless communication systems
dc.subjectComputer games
dc.subjectMachine design
dc.subjectElectronic data processing—Distributed processing
dc.titleOn Designing Distributed Auction Mechanisms for Wireless Spectrum Allocation
dc.type.genrearticle
dc.description.departmentNaveen Jindal School of Management
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationYang, S., D. Peng, T. Meng, F. Wu, et al. 2018. "On Designing Distributed Auction Mechanisms for Wireless Spectrum Allocation." IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 18(9): 2129-2146, doi: 10.1109/TMC.2018.2869863
dc.source.journalIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
dc.identifier.volume18
dc.identifier.issue9
dc.contributor.utdAuthorTang, Shaojie
dc.contributor.VIAF7882147727666764710007 (Tang, S)


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