Source-Free, Component-Driven Software Security Hardening
dc.contributor.advisor | Hamlen, Kevin W. | |
dc.contributor.committeeMember | Hao, Shuang | |
dc.creator | Wang, Wenhao | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-09-26T21:55:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-09-26T21:55:26Z | |
dc.date.created | 2019-05 | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-05 | |
dc.date.submitted | May 2019 | |
dc.date.updated | 2019-09-26T21:57:37Z | |
dc.description.abstract | Hardening COTS binary software products (e.g., via control-flow integrity (CFI) and/or software fault isolation (SFI) defenses) is extremely complex in contexts where the surrounding software environment includes closed-source, immutable, and possibly obfuscated binary components, such as system libraries, OS kernels, and virtualization layers. It is demonstrated that many code hardening algorithms, when applied only to the user-level software products in such environments, leave open critical vulnerabilities that arise from mismatches between the application-agnostic security policies enforced by the system modules versus the application-specific policies enforced at the application layer. Similar challenges also exist in web environments, which typically involve components of cross-language web scripts. This dissertation proposes the first Control Flow Integrity system to successfully harden multiple, large (millions of lines) binary Windows COTS software without sources. It implements a prototype for Microsoft COM (largest production component-based architecture in the world) with low overhead. Experiences developing and refining this approach for Microsoft Windows environments are reported and discussed. To evaluate and compare various CFI/SFI protections, the dissertation also introduces ConFIRM, a new evaluation methodology and benchmarking suite aimed at better assessing compatibility, applicability, and relevance of control-flow integrity (CFI) protections for preserving the intended semantics of real-world software while protecting it from abuse via hijacking. Reevaluation of CFI/SFI solutions using ConFIRM reveals that there remain significant unsolved challenges in securing many large classes of software products with CFI/SFI, including software for market-dominant OSes (e.g., Windows) and code employing certain ubiquitous coding idioms (e.g., event-driven callbacks and delay-loaded components). In addition, A method of detecting and interrupting unauthorized, browser-based cryptomining is proposed, based on semantic signature-matching. The approach addresses a new wave of cryptojacking attacks, including XSS-assisted, web gadget-exploiting counterfeit mining. Evaluation shows that the approach is more robust than current static code analysis defenses, which are susceptible to code obfuscation attacks. An implementation based on in-lined reference monitoring offers a browser-agnostic deployment strategy that is applicable to average end-user systems without specialized hardware or operating systems. | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/6893 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.rights | ©2019 Wenhao Wang | |
dc.subject | Computer security | |
dc.subject | Object-oriented programming (Computer science) | |
dc.subject | Intrusion detection systems (Computer security) | |
dc.title | Source-Free, Component-Driven Software Security Hardening | |
dc.type | Dissertation | |
dc.type.material | text | |
thesis.degree.department | Computer Science | |
thesis.degree.grantor | The University of Texas at Dallas | |
thesis.degree.level | Doctoral | |
thesis.degree.name | PHD |
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