On Designing Distributed Auction Mechanisms for Wireless Spectrum Allocation

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Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

Auctions are believed to be effective methods to solve the problem of wireless spectrum allocation. Existing spectrum auction mechanisms are all centralized and suffer from several critical drawbacks of the centralized systems, which motivates the design of distributed spectrum auction mechanisms. However, extending a centralized spectrum auction to a distributed one broadens the strategy space of agents from one dimension (bid) to three dimensions (bid, communication, and computation), and thus cannot be solved by traditional approaches from mechanism design. In this paper, we propose two distributed spectrum auction mechanisms, namely distributed VCG and FAITH. Distributed VCG implements the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism in a distributed fashion to achieve optimal social welfare, at the cost of exponential communication overhead. In contrast, FAITH achieves sub-optimal social welfare with tractable computation and communication overhead. We prove that both of the two proposed mechanisms achieve faithfulness, i.e., the agents' individual utilities are maximized, if they follow the intended strategies. Besides, we extend FAITH to adapt to dynamic scenarios where agents can arrive or depart at any time, without violating the property of faithfulness. We implement distributed VCG and FAITH, and evaluate their performance in various setups. ©2018 IEEE

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Communication systems—Security measures, Cost accounting, Distributed algorithms, Game theory, Electric interference, Mobile computing, Wireless communication systems, Computer games, Machine design, Electronic data processing—Distributed processing
This work was supported in part by the National the Key R&D Program of China under grant 2018YFB1004700, in part by China NSF grant 61672348, 61672353, and 61472252, and in part by Shanghai Science and Technology fund 15220721300.
©2018 IEEE