

MEMO NO. DO 1-1163

Date: 7 October 1950

To : President
From : Director of Operations
Subject : Booklift Report

1. The Airforce has tenaciously held us to commitment of 28 planes to be available on short notice. In original talks with FEAMCOM about contract I stated the best we could do would be to have twenty of these planes operational.
2. During the first week in September, the starting date of contract was set for October 1st. Shortly after that FEAF asked if we could have six planes at Tachikawa on September 15, to which I agreed. On September 8, all points of the letter of intent were completed and signed. FEAF then asked us to have four planes at Tachikawa at 6 AM, September 10th. I agreed and had six planes there by that date, but FEAFCOM only used two because it was Sunday. As you will note from the actual operational record they only used two or three planes a day for the next few days. This naturally gave us a false feeling of security.
3. On September 19, a message from Cockrell stated "we are ahead of schedule". At this time the invasion near Seoul took place. We managed to build the number of planes available up to fourteen and FEAMCOM was using about eight except on weekends when their utilization of the planes always drops off sharply (as it also does at night).
4. From that time on, FEAMCOM has lost faith in us because we do not have twenty-eight planes available. General Doyle (Commanding General of FEAMCOM) does not even believe we own that many planes. Now they are in the frame of mind to cancel the contract if, by Oct. 10th, they are not satisfied with what we have done.
5. That is the story from the Airforce standpoint. It is easily seen that before the Korean invasion we were shown every leniency, but none afterwards. I have proceeded on every angle just to get twenty-eight planes in the Japan Area, but as of October 6 we have only been able to reach a total of fifteen. This is what FEAMCOM sees. But actually we will produce four additional planes from the CAT fleet, five from TAA, and up to twelve from the CAF. This would make a total of thirty-four operating planes (not discounting those in 100 hour).
6. Breaking our necks to get these planes, and building up in all categories of personnel is costing us plenty of money. For instance an advance of US \$3,360.00 must be made to the CAF for each flyable plane chartered. This will pay off if the contract continues, but will be sad if FEAMCOM cuts us off because of our inability to meet their demands between the September 20th and October 10th period. The peak of our buildup is

set for October 16th, and there is no doubt that FEAMCOM will not be able to see the improvement until after that date.

7. Our possible potential of employing personnel and the also initial utilization of planes led me to believe we would have sufficient time to reach our peak. The difficulties:

- (a) Lost one CAA plane to TAA in the beginning (CAA awarded plane to TAA for loss of C-47 DMG).
- (b) Lost XT-862 in an accident at Isakomi.
- (c) Have to use 80L and 848 on commercial business.
- (d) The invasion of Korea decreased the time we had for reaching our peak.
- (e) The Nationalist Government has made it virtually impossible to hire personnel from Hongkong.
- (f) There are few technicians remaining on Taiwan.
- (g) The Government has been very slow in aiding the employment of sufficient personnel.
- (h) FEAMCOM has more cargo to move than even fifty planes a day can handle and naturally we are taking the brunt of all criticism.
- (i) NSA and FAA, reportedly, would be very happy if we fall down on the job, and are influencing certain people in SCAP and FRAP.

8. Remedial Measures:

- (a) Chartered seven C-47's from TAA and TAAS. B will take until October 10th to have five of these in operation.
- (b) Chartered twelve C-46's from the CAF. The Generalissimo only approved this on October 6th, so we will have an additional big job in getting these into operation in Japan by October 10th.
- (c) Cancelled cargo flight 700 for two weeks awaiting POAS to arrange to take over this run with DC-4.
- (d) Arranged the charter of another C-47 in Hongkong to guarantee flights 200, and 300-400, but will even have to send this to Japan.
- (e) Use as many Japanese in Japan as possible (already hired a total of 33).
- (f) Hire twenty-six more mechanics in Hongkong and send direct to Tachikawa via Okinawa, so as to avoid Taiwan restrictions. This will make a total of 87 Engineering personnel at Tachikawa.

- (g) Attempt to meet remainder of Taiwan requirements (200 to 300 men) from CAF personnel. This is requiring some negotiation and even if we get the men, will not be completely satisfactory.
 - (h) Attempt to obtain co-pilots from the CAF. This is tied up with the political question of our not using Chinese Captains in the past. Col. I. Fu-Sh of A-3 has almost completely sold General C. J. Chow on the idea that the CAF should have insisted on using Chinese crews on their planes which we are proposing to lease. He will press this point even if and after we have the planes operating.
9. What we have done to date:
- (a) Met three original requests of four planes on September 10, six planes on September 14, and ten planes on September 20th.
 - (b) Doubled flying hours during first half September, redoubled during second half September, and again redoubling the first half of October.
 - (c) Increased personnel particularly in CPO and Engineering. For instance August 31 we had 206 employees in the Engineering Department. As of this date there are 271 with a proposed total of about 570. Also we will need at least forty crews (now have 25) to do the job.
 - (d) Invested in vehicles, parts, and equipment.
 - (e) Committed ourselves to other organizations (CIA, CAF, TAA, etc.) for planes which in most cases require an advance guarantee payment and 30 days notice to cancel.
10. There is one other factor, which we may or may not wish to use as a lever; the inefficiency of the Air Force in utilizing our planes. A three hour turnaround is about the best they can do. It sometimes takes 5 or 6 hours. Also on the weekend, and at night efficiency drops way off, (about half).
- FRAMCOGN admits that it has enough cargo at Tachikawa alone to load out forty or fifty planes a day. This is probably the biggest reason why General Doyle is so frantic about our having twenty-eight planes in Tachikawa. They also forget that many times a plane goes out and does not get back for over 24 hours.
- Of course, in view of the fact we since September 20th have not been able to come near 28 planes, it may not be wise to emphasize the above points.
11. We can do a good job on this project. In fact, if we are given only a little more time, I am positive we can do a better job than any other airline. It is impossible to fly at the rate of 3,000 to 4,000 hours per month with about 700 people, and it will take a space of time to double and redouble our personnel strength. In the meantime, everyone is working at twice his normal pace, and this is no exaggeration. If the Air Force considers all of the above facts I am sure it will look favorably on the continuance of the contract.

C. J. Hobert
Director of Operations

cc: Cox, Burridge, Orlovski, Active File, File