Miller, BanksCurry, Bret2018-10-222018-10-222015-05-282018-10-22http://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/6226Full text access from Treasures at UT Dallas is restricted to current UTD affiliates.In 2006, the Bush administration directed nine US attorneys to resign. This decision was a partial cause of the attorney general’s departure from the administration, and it prompted investigations and congressional hearings. Seen as largely ad hoc, we argue that theory predicts a more systematic decision-making process. We investigate this empirically and find, consistent with literature on principal-agent theories and bureaucracy, that performance on easily monitored metrics and adverse-selection concerns predict the firings. We explore the implications of these findings for efforts to centralize decision-making in the Department of Justice and to exert political control over US attorneys.en©2018 by the Law and Courts Organized Section of the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.Bush, George W. (George Walker), 1946-United States Attorney's OfficeUnited States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector GeneralarticleMiller, Banks and Brett Curry, "Haphazard, Systematic, or Both? An Empirical Investigation of the US Attorney Firings in 2006," Journal of Law and Courts 6, no. 2 (Fall 2018): 379-403.62