Wan, ZhiyuVorobeychik, YevgeniyXia, WeiyiClayton, Ellen WrightKantarcioglu, MuratGanta, RanjitHeatherly, RaymondMalin, Bradley A.2015-09-292015-09-292015-03-251932-6203http://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/4649Given the potential wealth of insights in personal data the big databases can provide, many organizations aim to share data while protecting privacy by sharing de-identified data, but are concerned because various demonstrations show such data can be re-identified. Yet these investigations focus on how attacks can be perpetrated, not the likelihood they will be realized. This paper introduces a game theoretic framework that enables a publisher to balance re-identification risk with the value of sharing data, leveraging a natural assumption that a recipient only attempts re-identification if its potential gains outweigh the costs. We apply the framework to a real case study, where the value of the data to the publisher is the actual grant funding dollar amounts from a national sponsor and the re-identification gain of the recipient is the fine paid to a regulator for violation of federal privacy rules. There are three notable findings: 1) it is possible to achieve zero risk, in that the recipient never gains from re-identification, while sharing almost as much data as the optimal solution that allows for a small amount of risk; 2) the zero-risk solution enables sharing much more data than a commonly invoked de-identification policy of the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA); and 3) a sensitivity analysis demonstrates these findings are robust to order-of-magnitude changes in player losses and gains. In combination, these findings provide support that such a framework can enable pragmatic policy decisions about de-identified data sharing.enCC-BY 4.0 (Attribution)©2015 The Authorshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Computer securityGame theoryOnline identitiesDatabase securityRisk assessmentA Game Theoretic Framework for Analyzing Re-Identification RiskarticleWan, Zhiyu, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Weiyi Xia, Ellen Wright Clayton, et al. 2015. "A game theoretic framework for analyzing re-identification risk." PLOS One 10(3): doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120592.103