ItemConsumer Stockpiling and Competitive Promotional Strategies(INFORMS) Gangwar, Manish; Kumar, Nanda; Rao, Ram C.; 0000 0000 3471 3835 (Rao, RC); 82000090 (Rao, RC); 307323512 (Kumar, N)An examination of brand prices in several categories reveals that the distribution of prices is multimodal, with firms offering shallow and deep discounts. Another interesting feature of these distributions is that they may have holes in the interior of the support. These pricing distributions do not occur in extant theoretical models of price promotions. We develop a dynamic model of competition in which some price-sensitive consumers stockpile during periods of deep discounts. A game-theoretic analysis of our model generates a multimodal pricing distribution with a hole in the interior of the support. Consumer stockpiling in our model also gives rise to negative serial correlation in prices. This is consistent with our empirical observation of the pricing distribution of several brands across multiple categories in the IRI marketing data set. We generate several interesting insights into firms' optimal promotional strategies and their interplay with the clientele mix, market structure, and other market factors. We find that, in equilibrium, stockpiling by price-sensitive consumers neither harms nor benefits firms when they adopt equilibrium strategies. Interestingly, when price-sensitive consumers stockpile, even increased consumption as a result of stockpiling does not lead to higher profits for firms. ItemContent Provision Strategies in the Presence of Content PiracyJohar, M.; Kumar, Nanda; Mookerjee, Vijay S.; 90649574 (Mookerjee, VS); 307323512 (Kumar, N)We consider a publisher that earns advertising revenue while providing content to serve a heterogeneous population of consumers. The consumers derive benefit from consuming content but suffer from delivery delays. A publisher's content provision strategy comprises two decisions: (a) the content quality (affecting consumption benefit) and (b) the content distribution delay (affecting consumption cost). The focus here is on how a publisher should choose the content provision strategy in the presence of a content pirate such as a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. Our study sheds light on how a publisher could leverage a pirate's presence to increase profits, even though the pirate essentially encroaches on the demand for the publisher's content. We find that a publisher should sometimes decrease the delivery speed but increase quality in the presence of a pirate (a quality focused strategy). At other times, a distribution focused strategy is better; namely, increase delivery speed, but lower quality. In most cases, however, we show that the publisher should improve at least one dimension of content provision (quality or delay) in the presence of a pirate. © 2012 INFORMS.