Lee, Seung-Hyun

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/2087

Dr. Lee's research interests are organizations, strategy and international management


Recent Submissions

Now showing 1 - 6 of 6
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    I Need to Be Your Only Friend: The Effect of Salesperson Network Centrality on Opportunistic Behavior
    (Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2019-03-26) Kang, Diane; Ryu, Sungmin; Lee, Seung-Hyun; 295606728 (Lee, S-H); Lee, Seung-Hyun
    Transaction cost economics can be used to detect opportunistic behavior by one or more actors within a sales network. Using a sample of firms in the medical industry, where the role of salespeople is important, this study examines network centrality as a determinant of a salesperson's opportunistic behavior in intrafirm relationships. The results indicate that opportunistic behavior is affected differently depending on a salesperson's relational and positional centralities. While relational centrality decreases opportunistic behavior by providing motivation to protect one's reputation, positional centrality negatively moderates the effect of relational centrality on opportunistic behavior. However, with a high relational centrality, a salesperson is less likely to be opportunistic when she or he is low in positional centrality than when her or his positional centrality is high.
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    Bending the Rules or Changing Them? MNE Responses to Institutional Challenges in Transition Economies
    (Sage Publications Ltd, 2019-04-16) Yu, J.; Lee, Seung-Hyun; Lee, Seung-Hyun
    We investigate what determines a multinational enterprise’s (MNE) propensity to engage in lobbying and bribing in host countries where the overall institutional development for market exchanges is insufficient, and thus, their governance systems are relatively weak. We extend the current literature on institutional strategies by theorizing and showing the persistent and significant impacts of home country institutions on an MNE’s choice of influencing activities to address institutional constraints overseas. More specifically, our results demonstrate that the MNEs from a home country with a stronger governance system are less involved in bribery, but have a higher tendency to lobby in transition economy countries, which have been characterized by relatively weaker institutional development, particularly in the area of governance. This tendency still holds even when these MNEs rely more on the local market for sales. We draw theoretical and practical implications from these observations. © The Author(s) 2019.
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    How Does Home Country Bribery Affect Firms’ Foreign Market Focus?: The Case of Firms in Transition Economies
    (Emerald Group Publishing Ltd.) Kim, J.; Weng, D. H.; Lee, Seung-Hyun; 295606728 (Lee, S-H); Lee, Seung-Hyun
    Purpose: Drawing on the bribery literature, this paper aims to examine the effect of bribes paid in the home country on firms’ decision to internationalize through exports from transition economies. It also investigates whether the effect of home country bribery may vary from new ventures to established firms, and from those firms that operate in an environment with high to low informal competition. Design/methodology/approach: This paper tests several hypotheses using a panel data with fixed effects based on a sample of firms in transition economies from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. Findings: First, home country bribery in transition economies can make domestic markets more lenient and dampen firms’ motivation to seek opportunities abroad. Second, new ventures have a higher motivation to focus on their domestic markets after paying bribes. Finally, despite the benefits accrued in the home country through bribery, firms that face a higher level of informal competition in the home country are more likely to seek opportunities abroad. Practical implications: Managers in transition economies should consider their home country bribery activities in their evaluation of foreign market opportunities. Firms that use money to influence home country government officials, especially new ventures, are advised to have a more holistic view in evaluating foreign market opportunities so they will not miss out on new opportunities. Originality/value: This paper advances literature on home country institutions and the research on firm global strategies. Moreover, it also highlights several contingencies that shape the effect of home country bribery on firms’ foreign market focus.
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    Dual-option subsidiaries and exit decisions in economic crisis
    (Springer-Verlag, 2013-01-08) Chung, Chris Changwha; Lee, Seung-Hyun; Lee, Jeoung-Yul
    This study examines the dual implications of dual-option subsidiaries on exit decisions during times of economic crisis. Retaining dual-option subsidiaries in crisis-stricken countries means leaving a shadow option open for future growth once a crisis ends. However, MNCs may encounter problems pursuing either option due to challenges in managing dual-option subsidiaries with clashing strategic mandates. The equivocal nature of dual-option subsidiaries points to the possibility of another factor playing an important moderating role in exit decisions—subsidiary performance—which has been rarely considered in the MNC real options literature. Our primary argument is that lower subsidiary performance increases the influence of shadow option value embedded in dual-option subsidiaries. Analyzing a sample of Korean MNCs’ subsidiaries in Asian economies, we find that when profitability falls, subsidiaries with dual options are less likely to be exited than those with single options.
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    Corruption in Asia: Pervasiveness and arbitrariness
    (Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 2007-01-12) Lee, Seung-Hyun; Oh, Kyeungrae (Kenny)
    How does one understand the differences and similarities of corruption among various Asian countries? We use a recent framework developed by Rodriguez, Uhlenbruk, and Eden (2005) to suggest that corruption has to be examined from two different dimensions: pervasiveness and arbitrariness. Using this framework, we ask why some Asian countries are able to achieve high levels of economic growth in the midst of high level corruption while other countries suffer from economic stagnation. We specifically suggest that more firms would bribe when pervasiveness is high, while fewer firms would bribe when arbitrariness is high. We also look into the implications on foreign direct investment.
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    Corruption and subsidiary profitability: US MNC subsidiaries in the Asia Pacific region
    (Asia Pacific Journal of Management) Lee, Seung-Hyun; Hong, Sungjin J.
    Would multinational corporation (MNC) subsidiaries be more profitable in host countries where corruption is less severe? Would MNC subsidiaries be more profitable in less corrupt countries if they focused on local sales? This paper examines the impact of the level of corruption on the profitability of US MNCs’ profitability in the Asia Pacific region. Using foreign direct investment (FDI) data archived by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and corruption data reported by the World Bank, we find that MNC subsidiaries located in countries with a lower level of corruption are more profitable. In addition, MNC subsidiaries with a greater focus on local sales are more profitable when the corruption level is low. This study contributes to the literature by showing that when local sales are important to MNC subsidiaries, a lower level of corruption by host countries positively affects the profitability of the MNC subsidiaries.