Kuksov, Dmitri

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/2504

Dmitri Kuksov is a Professor of Marketing in the Naveen Jindal School of Management. In 2019 he was awarded an Ashbel Smith Professorship. Learn more about Dr. Kuksov on his home page.

ORCID page


Recent Submissions

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    The Performance Measurement Trap
    (INFORMS: Inst.for Operations Research and the Management Sciences) Kuksov, Dmitri; Villas-Boas, J. M.; 0000-0002-3157-5013 (Kuksov, D); Kuksov, Dmitri
    This paper investigates the effect of performance measurement on the optimal effort allocation by salespeople when firms are concerned about retention of salespeople with higher abilities. It shows that introducing a salesperson performance measurement may result in productivity, profit, and welfare losses when all market participants opti-mally respond to the expected information provided by the measurement and the (ex post) optimal retention efforts of the firm cannot be (ex ante) contractually prohibited. In other words, the dynamic inconsistency of the management problems of inducing the desired effort allocation by the salespeople and the subsequent firm objective to retain high-ability salespeople may result in performance measurement yielding an inferior outcome. ©2019 INFORMS.
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    A Model of the "It" Products in Fashion
    Kuksov, Dmitri; Wang, Kangkang
    One of the characteristics of the fashion marketplace is the unpredictability and apparent randomness of fashion hits. Another one is the information asymmetry among consumers. In this paper, we consider fashion as a means consumers use to signal belonging to a higher social rank and propose an analytical model of fashion hits in the presence of competition and consumers who can coordinate on which product to use. We show that, consistent with the observed market phenomenon, in equilibrium, consumer coordination involves randomization between products chosen, i.e., in randomness of fashion hits. Analyzing optimal consumer choice, we find that whenever low-type consumer demand for a product is positive, a price increase results in a higher probability of high-type consumers choosing this product but lower low-type consumer demand. We also show that although high-type consumers may prefer (higher) prices that would lead to complete separation of the high- and the low-type consumers through product use, in equilibrium, firms always price as to attract positive demand from low-type consumers. The equilibrium price and profits turn out to be nonmonotonic in the low-type consumer valuation of being recognized as belonging to a higher social rank. Equilibrium profits first increase and then decrease in this valuation.
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    Competition in consumer shopping experience
    (INFORMS) Iyer, Ganesh; Kuksov, Dmitri
    This paper analyzes the competitive role of retail shopping experience in markets with consumer search costs. We examine how a retailer's advantage in providing consumer shopping experience affects its equilibrium pricing and price advertising strategies. We find that if the consumer valuation of a shopping experience is sufficiently low, its effect on retailer strategy is similar to that of quality, and the retailer with the advantage in shopping experience then deploys higher levels of price advertising. On the other hand, when the shopping experience is valuable enough for consumers, it acts akin to price advertising in that it makes it optimal for the retailer with the advantage in shopping experience to eschew price advertising. The optimal competitive investments in consumer shopping experience can be higher than that of a monopoly. The profit impact of shopping experience for a retailer depends on the level of shopping experience: for low levels, the profit impact depends on the difference in the levels between the retailers, but for high enough levels, it depends only on whether the retailer's shopping experience level is higher than that of its competitor. In this case, even small differences in shopping experience levels can result in large differences in equilibrium profits. © 2012 INFORMS.