Supply Chain with Disruption Risks, Strategic Players, and Disobeying Players

dc.contributor.advisor	Sethi, Suresh P.
dc.creator	Shan, Xi
dc.date.accessioned	2020-01-24T18:05:04Z
dc.date.available	2020-01-24T18:05:04Z
dc.date.created	2019-08
dc.date.issued	2019-08
dc.date.submitted	August 2019
dc.date.updated	2020-01-24T18:05:04Z
dc.description.abstract	We consider three problems in supply chain management. First one is a single period problem where a retailer sources from a supplier, whose reliability is private information and whose efforts to improve reliability is unobservable (hidden action). Second one is a problem of a retailer who orders from competing strategic suppliers subject to independent or correlated disruptions, and responds by setting the retail price upon delivery, called responsive pricing. The suppliers set their wholesale prices in a Nash game. Finally, we develop a model where firms decide to disobey some regulating rules by considering economic, moral, as well as behavioral factors in their decisions.
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10735.1/7176
dc.language.iso	en
dc.rights	©2019 Xi Shan. All Rights Reserved.
dc.subject	Business logistics
dc.subject	Materials management
dc.title	Supply Chain with Disruption Risks, Strategic Players, and Disobeying Players
dc.type	Dissertation
dc.type.material	text
thesis.degree.department	Management Science
thesis.degree.grantor	The University of Texas at Dallas
thesis.degree.level	Doctoral
thesis.degree.name	PHD

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